摘要
我国是在人口基数大、人均资源少、经济和科技比较落后的条件下发展经济的,面临着加快经济发展和保护生态环境的双重压力。目前,人口增长、经济社会发展与节约资源、保护生态环境之间的矛盾日益尖锐,成为制约我国实现可持续发展的瓶颈。如何通过节约资源、保护环境来实现经济与社会的全面发展,既是每一个中国人的重要责任,更是我国理论工作者应面临的一项重大课题。建立排污权交易制度就是其中一项重要内容。理论分析和国际经验显示,排污权交易制度是最有效的治污手段。构建中国排污权交易制度是我国实施可持续发展战略的基础,是实现“十一五”规划提出的节能降耗和污染减排目标,贯彻落实科学发展观、建设资源节约型、环境友好型社会和和谐社会的必然选择,对于促进调整经济结构和加快转变增长方式,提高人民生活质量,维护中华民族长远利益,具有深远的意义。所以,本选题有重要现实意义和理论研究价值。
本论文的研究内容构筑在两大基点之上。其一,以新制度经济学中的制度变迁理论和制度演化博弈理论等为主要理论依据,从制度移植的角度分析我国建立排污权交易制度问题。我国是发展中国家,在制度建设方面具有“后发优势”。国际经验证明,发展中国家通过学习发达国家的成功经验,把他们已经发育成熟的制度移植过来为我所用,以制度移植的方式进行制度建设,能够节约制度原创成本和缩短制度建设进程。但是,国际经验也同时提醒发展中国家,要使制度移植获得成功,达到预期效果,必须解决好移植进来的制度与本土文化和社会环境的相互适应问题。本论文十分重视这个提示,提出,一方面,要根据我国的国情特点对欲移植的制度作科学合理的选择,并适当加以修改和调整;另一方面,则要对我国本土文化和社会环境中那些不适应移植制度要求的落后因素加以革除,提高二者的相互适应性,使移植进来的制度能够落地生根,发育成为适应我国需要的排污权交易制度,成为推动治污减排的强力工具。论文围绕这一思路展开研究,提出了建立我国排污权交易制度的一系列构思和具体措施。其二,系统完整地揭示和论述了我国将要建立的排污权交易制度的框架结构和具体内容。论文设计了排污权交易制度的结构图形,并据此对该制度各个主要组成部分的内部结构、各部分之间的联系和运行机制,建设的重点和难点等作系统而具体的分析,并且提出推进排污权交易制度建设的路径、措施和对策。论文围绕这两个基点展开论述。全文共分八章,具体是:
绪论:从论文选题的背景引出本文的写作目的和意义、论文的基本思路、框架结构和研究方法,以及相关概念的界定和必要的说明。
第一章:国内外研究现状评述及将本论文应用较多、较为重要的理论作了一个综述。论文涉及的主要理论包括制度变迁理论和制度演化博弈理论、外部性理论、交易费用理论、福利经济学理论、寻租理论及博弈理论,并就这些理论在本文中的应用进行了说明。
第二章:排污权交易制度的结构与基本特征分析。本章研究了排污权交易制度产生的社会背景及轨迹、排污权交易制度的结构与特性及理论模型等内容。主要目的在两方面,其一是对排污权交易制度有清晰的认识和理论深化,其二是为我国构建排污权交易制度找到切入点。
第三章:确定排污权总量的原则、方法及数学模型。本章在研究确定排污权总量的基本原则、方法及建立相关数学模型的基础上,特别针对我国经济社会实际,提出了确定我国排污权总量及向各省市区分配初始额度时的总体思路和基本方法。
第四章:排污权初始分配的方法。本章研究了排污权初始分配可供选择的几种方法,重点研究了我国排污权初始分配的方式抉择,提出了我国现阶段适宜采用免费分配与有偿分配相结合的基本主张。
第五章:排污权交易市场的结构、运作与管理。本章以排污权交易市场的构成为起点,分析了排污权市场的运作程序和内在机制,重点研究了如何防范排污权市场失灵和加强市场管理,并提出了对策措施。
第六章:排污权交易的法律保护与监管制度建设。本章从排污权交易监管的理论基础出发,围绕我国排污权交易法律及监管制度的现状与缺陷,提出了加强法律保护和监管制度的对策。
第七章:我国建立排污权交易制度的路径、重点、障碍和难点及可行性分析。本章提出了我国建立排污权交易制度的路径和步骤,分析了我国建立排污权交易制度的重点、障碍和难点,并得出了我国已具备建立排污权交易制度的可行性的结论。
第八章:结论与政策建议。本章结合上述各章的研究,总结了全文的主要观点,并提出了构建我国排污权交易制度及运行机制的政策建议,以及今后继续研究的设想。
论文提出了以下创新性的观点:
1、论文根据排污权是国家对环境公有资源进行界定而形成的非实体财产性外生权利性质,排污权交易制度供给具有公共产品性质这两个基本特点,依据制度经济学中的制度变迁理论和制度演化博弈理论等,提出我国建立排污权交易制度,只能由中央政府组织实施,而且应以排污权产权的初始界定为起点和基础的基本理论观点,全文以此为基点展开。
论文认为,与其它以实体资产为依托的产权不同,排污权产权是国家基于保护环境的目的,通过确定总量和分配初始权利等行政手段建立并界定的权利,具有明显的非实体财产性外生权利性质。制度变迁理论认为,界定和实施产权的职能只能由国家承担并完成,对我国这样一个多省区的国家来说,界定和实施排污权产权的职能,只能由中央政府承担并完成。建立排污权交易制度,是一种着眼于提高全社会环境福利水平的制度供给,具有公共产品性质,私人不愿意也无能力承担和完成,只有中央政府才有责任和能力组织实施。论文同时指出,科斯定理认为,当交易费用不为零时,资源配置状况优劣和经济效率的高低,就与产权的初始界定状况高度相关。因此,科学合理地确定全国排污总量,并对它予以界定,把它公平合理地分配落实到企业等经济社会组织中去,是构建我国排污权交易制度的基础性环节和排污权交易活动的起点。
2、依据前述基本理论观点,论文具体设计出了我国排污权交易制度的框架结构和基本内容。论文认为,我国排污权交易制度应当由确定排污权总量的规则、排污权初始分配的规则、排污权一级市场和二级市场交易规则、以及排污权市场管理规则等四大部分组成。前一项规则与后一项规则之间有继起性和关联性,每一项大的规则又由若干子规则组成。
例如,确定排污权总量的规则包括:界定排污权种类规则、确定排污许可期限规则、确定排污因子规则、确定排污总量的具体原则等;排污权初始分配规则包括:确定分配对象规则和分配方式规则;排污权一级市场和二级市场交易规则包括:确认交易参与者资格规则和确认交易过程规则两大部分,其中确认交易参与者规则又包括:确定强制参与者规则、确定自愿参与者规则、以及确定排污权交易储备中心规则;确认交易过程规则又包括:检查企业的排污许可证规则、监督企业排污情况的规则、排污量审核规则和执行环境政策规则等等;排污权市场管理规则,主要由交易结果认定规则构成。
我国排污权交易制度的各组成部分,彼此联系紧密,具有继起性特征。界定排污权种类规则是前提,同时它又是排污权交易的客体,其核心是对环境资源进行产权界定,这也是把污染物的外部性内部化的第一步;初始分配把排污权量化分配给经济社会组织,使之成为“私人产权”能够在市场中交易,因此,初始分配的公平性和有效性是排污权交易制度顺利推行的基础;二级市场是排污权交易的场所,是实现排污权优化配置的关键环节,故而建立健全市场规则与秩序,降低交易成本,吸引更多企业参与排污权交易,才能实现以市场手段治理污染的目的。产权经济学理论认为,产权的法律保护是市场机制充分发挥作用不可或缺的必要条件,因此,加强法律保护是排污权交易制度建设的重要内容。
3、提出了我国建立和实施排污权交易制度的基本路径、重点、难点和相关政策建议。
论文认为,我国建立排污权交易的基本路径是:第一步,由全国人大常委会立法确认环境资源产权制度,修改完善法律,体现“总量控制”的环境治理意图,从法律上确立我国的环境资源产权制度;第二步,在国家层面确定我国某类污染物的排污权总量并对各省市区进行初始分配,随后各省市区对排污企业进行初始分配;第三步,建立排污权产权有效转让的二级市场;第四步,建立健全全方位、有效的、立体型的监管网络体系。
论文认为,我国建立排污权交易的重点是:解决排污权产权的法律缺失问题,科学合理地确定全国的排污权总量,公平合理地界定和分配初始排污权,公开、公平、公正地开展排污权交易,严格实行市场监管。难点是:确定排污权总量时,如何兼顾提高环境保护质量和加快经济社会发展两方面的要求;界定和分配初始排污权时,如何在综合考虑各省区经济社会发展水平,和它们所处的环境区位,以及企业的实际情况,并且通过防范设租——寻租行为的干扰,使排污权初始分配的结果真正实现公平合理;如何防范弄虚作假,确保企业投放到市场中进行交易的节余排污量的真实性和准确性。论文就如何破解这些重点和难点问题提出了一系列的政策建议和措施对策。
论文就我国构建排污权交易制度,提出了以下政策建议和对策措施:培育国民的环境保护意识,加强对排污权制度的社会监督;构造诚信社会环境,提高建立和实施排污权交易制度的效率;建立健全相关法律条文,为建立排污权交易制度提供充足的法律依据;加强对排污权初始分配中设租——寻租行为的治理;在二级市场交易中积极采取措施解决排污权交易市场失灵问题;加强排污权市场监管体系建设,改变环保部门的相对弱势地位以增大环保部门执法力度;改革环境成本的计算方法,在新的《会计准则》中明确将各种外部环境成本转化为内部成本,激励企业参与排污权交易;在运用排污权交易制度治理环境时辅之以其他相关措施。
4、论文对一些重要问题作了深入探索,提出了一些独立见解。例如:
(1)提出并论证了排污权的非实体财产性外生产权性质。排污权是国家基于保护环境的目的,通过确定总量和分配初始权利等行政手段对环境这一公有资源作界定并分配而形成的产权。
(2)基于我国幅员辽阔,处于东中西部三大经济地带的省市区经济社会发展水平有较大差距和环境区位特征明显这一国情特点,论文提出了全国排污总量的确定和对各省市区排污量的初始分配,只能由中央政府实施的观点,并用数学模型进行了证明。论文通过对排污权初始分配方法的分析,明确提出了现阶段我国排污权初始分配应采用免费分配与有偿分配相结合的方式,并给出了具体模型。
(3)论文认为,针对企业缺乏自我约束其环境行为的内在动因,为了驱动企业参与排污权交易,必须改革环境成本的计算方法,设计一套行之有效的制度,将企业排污的成本完全内部化。即要求企业把排污费用和成本全部计入会计账目,以对自己的排污行为承担全部责任,激励其主动自觉治污减排。
(4)论文认为,投机商的积极参与可增大排污权二级市场交易活跃程度,提高排污权交易市场的定价效率。但是在市场发育初期阶段,监管制度不健全时,应暂不允许投机商参加交易,以防止市场混乱。待市场发育趋于成熟后,在严密的监管下,可以允许投机商参与排污权交易,但要防止恶意炒作和投机交易过度。
(5)论文通过建立模型,研究了排污权的内在价值的确定问题。论文认为,在排污权市场价格的形成方面,可以利用影子价格、拍卖、机会成本(治污费用)等多种方法发现价格,然后综合各种因素,由代表政府的监管部门制定出一个指导价格,各参与企业也可据此作为买卖依据。
由于排污权交易制度在我国尚属新生事物,因此本文的研究具有探索性,加之资料有限、学识水平有限,因此,在对排污权的理论拓展上,还有许多地方研究的深入度不够,如排污权交易制度供给的成本——收益分析,排污权市场对商品市场的影响程度的结构分析;另一方面,在对我国开展排污权交易时的具体设计上,某些问题回答得不够充分,例如如何更科学合理地在经济增长率和环境容量之间找到均衡点,如何完善机制允许投机者参与排污权交易以活跃市场、提高定价效率。这些不足,以后将作进一步研究予以弥补。
China’s economic development has been proceeding under the condition of large population, rare resource per capita, backward economy and science and technologies, thus facing double pressures of economic development and ecological environment. Currently, contradictions of population, ecology, environment, resource have become more and more critical and have already become the bottleneck of sustainable development. How to fulfill comprehensive economic and social development is not only a significant project for all Chineses, but is more an important responsibility that every theorist should shoulder. We have to think about and furthermore set up newly-typed policy for governing environment pollution and protecting ecological environment. Building up pollution emission permits trade market is one of the most important parts. In a sense, building up emission permits market is fundamental to carry out sustainable development strategy. It’s a significant measure for achieving the goal of energy saving, consumption reduction and pollution emission reduction, and for implementing the Scientific Concept of Development and constructing Harmonious Socialist Society. It’s the inevitable choice for building resource-saving, environment-friendly society. It carries extremely important and far-reaching for adjusting economic structure, transferring growth ways, improving people’s living quality and safeguarding long-term national benefit.
The content of this article is built on two basic points. The first point, based on Institution Transformation Theory in Neo-Institution Economics and Institution Evolution Game Theory, etc., this article analyzes the problem of China’s building up emission permits trade system from the aspect of institution transplantation. China is a developing country and it had“late development advantage”. International experience shows that developing countries can save institution originating cost and shorten institution construction process through learning successful experience of developed countries and transplanting those maturely-grown institutions into their countries to build up their own institutions by ways of institution transplantation. However, international experience also warns developing countries that if they want a successful institution transplantation and achieve expected effect, they must deal with the problem of mutual adaptation between institution transplanted into and native culture and social environment very well. This article put much premium on this hint and points out that, on one side, China should choose the prospected transplanted institution scientifically and reasonable according to China’s national situation and do necessary change and adjustment; on the other side, backward factors in China’s native culture and social environment that are not good for transplanting institution should be removed to improve the mutual accommodation to make the transplanted institution can be rooted in China and become the emission permits trade system which is adaptive to China’s requirement and become a powerful tool for pushing pollution governance and emission reduction. Studied around this thought, the article puts forward a series of ideas and concrete measures for establishing China’s emission permits trade system. The second point, this article reveals and discusses the structure framework and concrete content of the emission permits trade system that China is going to build up systematically and completely. The article has designed the structure picture of emission permits trade system based on which the article has systematically and concretely analyzed the internal structure of component of this system, connection among each parts and the operation mechanism, important and difficult points in system establishment. This article extends its discussion around these two basic points and it covers eight chapters.
The preliminary part starts from the study background and introduces the purpose and meanings, basic thinking approaches, framework structure, research methods, definition of relevant concepts and necessary interpretations.
Chapter one: An overview of and brief comments on those important theories which will be mostly used in this article. Theories of Externality, New-institutional Economics, Transaction Cost, Welfare Economics, Rent Seeking will be presented. This chapter also makes comments on their combination with emission permits trade system and their applications in emission permits trade system.
Chapter two: Basic characteristics of emission permits trade system. Social background and the pathway of the birth of emission permits trade, analysis of economic theorems and the property of emission permits, model description and features of emission permits trade system, feasibility, obstacles and difficulties for China to conduct emission permit trade, etc., are under consideration. There are two purposes to be showed in this chapter. The first is to get a better understanding of emission permits system and to deepen it theoretically. The second is to find the breakthrough point for China to building up emission permits trade system.
Chapter three: Principles, ways and mathematical models for defining total quantity of emission permits. This chapter puts emphasis on the basic principles of defining total quantity of emission permits and makes relevant mathematical model. In special consideration of China’s social and economical reality, this chapter comes up with a general approach for setting up China’s total quantity of emission permits and for allocating initiative quota to respective province and city. Chapter four: Principles and ways for initial emission permits distribution.
This chapter examines the basic principles for initial emission permits distribution and puts forward several alternative way. This part puts highlights the choice of the ways of initial emission permits distribution in China and suggests that at present stage, it’s more appropriate for China to combine both ways of free distribution and paid distribution.
Chapter five: Structure, operation and administration of emission permits trade market. Starting from the composition of emission permits trade market, this chapter examines the operation process and inner mechanism and mainly studies on how to protect emission permits market from malfunctioning and to strengthen market administration and comes up with some countermeasures.
Chapter six: Legal protection and supervision mechanism for emission permits transactions. Beginning with theoretical basis of supervision of emission permits transactions, and concerning the status quo of and flaws in the laws and supervision system of China’s emission permits trade, this chapter puts forth measures for enhancing legal protection and supervision system.
Chapter seven: Approach, difficulties and analysis on the feasibility, in China’s establishing emission permits trade system. This chapter discusses the possibility to build up emission permits trade system in China and puts forward the approach and measures for China to build up emission permits trade system. It also analyzes the obstacles and difficulties in constructing China’s emission permits trade system, as well as the premium points.
Chapter eight: Conclusion and policy suggestion. Based on the studies of previous seven chapters, this chapter summarizes the main viewpoints of the whole article and puts forward some policy suggestions for China’s building up emission permits trade system and the operation mechanism. It also points out the orientation for future study.
This essay puts forward several innovative viewpoints.
1. Based on two fundamental features: emission permits are non-physical property exogenous rights formed the government’s defining of environment public resource and emission permits trade system supply is some kind of public goods, and founded on Institution Transformation Theory and Institution Evolution Game Theory, etc., this article proposes that the establishment of China’s emission permits trade system can only be conducted by the central government and initial definition of emission permits property should the starting point and fundamental basic theoretical points. The whole thesis extends from this basic point.
The article argues, different from property based on physical assets, emission permits is obviously a kind of non-physical property exogenous property right, through administrative ways such as defining total quantity and distributing initial rights by the government for the purpose of protecting environment. In Institution Transformation Theory, the function of defining and executing can only be taken and implemented by the state. As regard for a country like China which has decades of provinces, this function can only be taken and implemented by the central government. Building up emission permits trade system is a kind of supply in the perspective for improving environment wellbeing level for the whole society, therefore it’s public goods that individuals aren’t willing to and incapable to take and can only leave to the central government who is responsible and capable to organize the implementation. This article also points out that in Coase Theorem, when the transaction cost is more than zero, the effectiveness of resource distribution and the efficiency of economy will be highly relevant to the initiative definition of property rights. Thereafter, to scientifically and reasonably determine the whole country’s total quantity of emission permits and to define them and then to allocate them to the economic-social units such as enterprises fairly and reasonably is the fundamental phase and the starting point of emission permits trade activities.
2. According to above mentioned basic theoretical viewpoints, this article has designed the basic framework and content of China’s emission permits trade system. The article suggests that China’s emission permits system should be composed of four rules: rule for determining the total amount of emission permits, rule for initial distribution of emission permits, rules for emission permits trade in primary market and secondary market, rule for emission permits market administration. Between two successive rules, there are continuation and relevance and each rule has several sub-rules. For example, rule for determining the total quantity of emission permits includes: rule for defining the categories of emission permits, rule for defining the emission permission period, rule for defining pollution factors, concrete principles for determining the total quantity of emission; rule for initial distribution of emission permits includes rule for defining distribution objects and rule for distribution ways; rule for emission permits market administration. Between two successive rules includes rule for defining participants’qualification and affirming the trade process among which the first rule involves rule for deciding compulsory participants, rule for defining free-willed participants, rule for defining the reserve center of emission permits trade while the second rule involves rule for checking enterprises’emission permission certificates, rule for supervising enterprises’pollution emission, rule for examining the emission quantity and rule for policy implementation, and so on; rule for emission permits market administration is mainly constructed the rule for affirming the result of emission permits trade.
The different components in China’s emission permits trade system are closely connected to each other and show characteristic of continuation between one another. Defining the categories of emission permits is precondition, and it’s the object of emission permits as well, the kernel of which is to define environment resources property rights, the first step to internalize the externality of pollutants. Initial distribution is to quantify emission permits and allocate them to social-economic organizations, making them to be“private property rights”which are tradable in the market. So, fair and effective initial distribution is essential for smoothly pushing emission permits trade system. The secondary market is the place where emission permits trade take place, and is also the key knot for realizing optimum distribution of emission permits. Therefore, only to establish sound market rule and order to reduce transaction cost and attract more enterprises to take part in emission permits trade, can the goal of governing pollution by the hand of market be achieved. In Property Rights Economics, legal protection for property rights is an indispensable necessity for market mechanism to fully function. So, it’s an important part in developing China’s emission permits system to enhance legal protection.
3. This article brings forward the basic approach, important and difficult points and relevant policy suggestions in China’s building up and carrying out emission permits trade system.
The article classifies the basic path of China’s building up and carrying out emission permits trade system into four steps. The first step, the NPC Standing Committee is to work out laws to affirm environment resource property rights system, to amend and perfect laws, embodying the environment governance intention of“total quantity control”and legally affirming China’s environment resources property rights system. The second step is to defining the emission permits total quantity for a certain pollutant at the national level and initially distribute them to respective provinces, followed by the initial distribution of emission permits to emission enterprises at provincial level. The third step is to establish secondary market for efficient transfer of emission permits property rights. The last step is to build up a sound, all-sided, efficient and three-dimensional supervision network.
This article argues that the premium parts in China’s building up emission permits trade are to solve the problem of lack of laws concerning emission permits property rights, to scientifically and reasonably determine the nation’s total quantity of emission permit, to fairly and soundly define and distribute initial emission permits, to conduct emission permits trade in an open, fair and just way. While, the hard nuts are: how to cater to the requirements of both improving the environment protection quality and speeding up economic and social development in defining the total quantity of emission permit; how to assure the result of initial emission permits distribution will be truly fair and reasonable in defining and distributing initial emission permits, taking into comprehensive consideration of different development levels of different provinces, enterprises, economy and society, of the environment zone they are located in, and through guarding against the interruption of rent making– rent seeking behaviors; how to guard against deceptive practices and guarantee the authenticity and accuracy of residual emission quantity put on the market to trade by the enterprises. This article proposes a series of policy suggestions and measures for dealing with these important and difficult issues.
For China’s building up emission permits trade system, the article puts forward some policy making suggestion and measures as follows: to nurture the people’s sense of environment protection and enhance social supervision of emission permits system; to construct a social environment full of credit and trust and raise the efficiency of establishing and implementing emission permits trade system; to set up sound relevant laws and regulations to provide sufficient legal basis for building up emission permits trade system; to enhance the governance of rent making– rent seeing behaviors in initial emission permits distribution; to take proactive measures to solve the problem of market malfunction in secondary market trade; to enhance the construction of emission permits market supervision system and change the relatively weak position of environment protection sectors to increase the enforcement of such sectors; to reform environment cost calculation methods based on the new“Accounting Standards”in which various external environment costs are clearly transferred into internal costs for encouraging enterprises to take part emission permits trade system; to employ other assisting relevant measures in environment governance by ways of emission permits trade system.
4. The article deeply explores some important issues and comes out with some unique perspectives. Such as:
(1) It has brought forward and proved emission permits’attribute of non-physical exogenous property rights. Emission permits are property rights formed from the government’s defining and distributing the public resource---environment by administrative ways such as determining the total quantity and distributing initial rights for the purpose of protecting environment.
(2) Taking into account of China’s national feature, that is, China has vast territory and provinces, cities and regions located in the East, Middle and West have different economic and social development level and different geographical characteristics, this article proposes that the defining of total quantity and distribution of initial emission permits to respective provinces, cities and regions can only be executed by the central government, which is also be mathematically proved. Based on the analysis on the ways of initial emission permits distribution, the article unambiguously points out that at current stage, China should combine both ways of free and paid allocation and also gives a concrete model.
(3) This article suggests that, in response to the situation that enterprises are lack of internal incentive to self constrain their behaviors on environment and in order to push enterprises to participate in emission permits trade, the environment costs calculation methods must be reformed and to design an effective system which can internalize enterprises’emission costs. That is, to require enterprises account the emission expenditures and costs into accounting items so that they have to take full responsibility for their emission behavior thus stimulating them to govern pollution and reduce emission proactively.
(4) This article argues that active involvement of speculative traders can increase activeness of emission permits trade in secondary market and raise pricing effectiveness of emission permits market. However, at the beginning stage when the market is not mature and the supervision system is not perfect, speculators should not be allowed to be involved in transactions in order for preventing market chaos. When the market grows to be mature and with seamless supervision, speculators can be allowed to take part in emission permits trade, while at same time, vicious and excessive speculation should be guarded against.
(5) This article studies the definition of inner value of emission permits through model building. The article suggests that in respect of emission permits market price formation, such ways as shadow price, auction, opportunity cost (pollution governance costs) , etc., can be used to find out the price and then to generalize various factors and then to work out a guiding price by the government’s supervision sector. Participating enterprises can make deals according to this guiding price.
Since emission permits trade system is a newly-born thing in China, this study in a sense is explorative; Added limited references, literatures and personal knowledge limitation, in this article, on one side, in emission permits’theoretical extension, there are places needed further and deeper research, such as cost-benefit analysis in the transformation of emission permits trade system and analysis on the structure of influence degree of emission permits market to goods market. On the other side, on the concrete design of China’s conducting emission permits trade, there are no sufficient answers for some questions, such as, how to find out the balance point between economic growth rate and environment capacity scientifically and reasonably, how to perfect the system to allow speculators to take part in the transactions to activate the market and raise pricing efficiency. In the future study, the author will try harder to keep further exploration to make up for those insufficient parts.
引文
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