摘要
实施闭环供应链管理对于发展循环经济、实施可持续发展、降低成本、改善服务水平及企业形象等方面都具有重要的理论和实践价值,同时可以解决资源枯竭和环境污染等问题。闭环供应链与开环供应链一样,都是由多个相互独立的决策主体构成,各决策主体间的合作均以自身利益最大化为基础,因此研究闭环供应链定价与协调问题对于解决节点企业目标冲突,提高闭环供应链整体绩效具有重要的理论和现实意义。
本文在总结分析闭环供应链及供应链协调相关理论及研究的基础上,综合应用博弈论、契约理论和优化理论,采用定量与定性相结合的方法,深入研究具有两个相互独立的终端市场的闭环供应链定价决策与协调问题,主要内容如下：
首先阐述了闭环供应链及供应链协调的基本理论,分析了供应链失调的原因,简要介绍了几种常见的供应链协调机制,在此基础上从概念、作用和分类三方面阐述了供应链契约基本理论。
其次,针对新产品与再造品无差异的情况,构建了集中决策、分散决策和局部联盟模式下的闭环供应链博弈模型。在对比分析节点企业最优决策和利润的基础上,提出了可以实现闭环供应链完美协调的收入费用共享契约,并通过数值仿真来验证了相关结论,确定出了契约参数的具体取值范围。
最后,将模型扩展到新产品与再造品存在纵向差异化的情形,对比分析了集中决策、分散决策和局部联盟模式下闭环供应链的最优决策及利润,探讨了如何应用收入费用共享契约实现闭环供应链完美协调的问题,并通过数值仿真验证了模型的正确性和有效性。
研究表明：相对于分散决策,局部联盟可以改善消费者福利,提高环保效应、资源利用率和系统绩效,但仍不能达到集中决策的最优水平；在局部联盟中,制造商与零售商联盟将大幅改善闭环供应链绩效,而第三方物流提供商与制造商或零售商联盟则实现了逆向供应链定价决策的完美协调,且这两种联盟模式对闭环供应链绩效的影响完全一致；在新产品与再造品存在纵向差异化时,制造商与零售商联盟将使得新产品销售量最优,并大幅增加再造品的销售量,而其他两种联盟模式则只会影响到再造品的销售量；在分析企业参与约束时,考虑节点企业的局部联盟将缩小收入费用共享契约中收入共享比例和成本分摊比例的取值范围。
The closed-loop supply chain management has important theoretical and practical value for developing circular economy, implementing sustainable development, reducing costs, improving service levels and corporate image, and can solve the problem of resource depletion and environmental pollution at the same time. Closed-loop supply chain and open-loop supply chain, are both composed of by a number of decision-making body which are independent of each other, and cooperation among the various decision-making body are based on maximizing their own interests, so the study of closed-loop supply chain coordination has important theoretical and practical significance for solving the conflict of node enterprises goals and improving the closed-loop supply chain performance.
Based on analyzing the relevant theory and research of closed-loop supply chain and supply chain coordination, this paper comprehensively apply of game theory, contract theory and optimization theory, use combination of quantitative and qualitative methods, in-depth study third-stage closed-loop supply chain pricing decision-making and coordination problem with two independent end-markets, the major elements are following:
First we describe the basic theory of the closed-loop supply chain and supply chain coordination, analyze the reasons for supply chain disorder, brief introduce some common supply chain coordination mechanism, on base of which,we describe the basic theory of the supply chain contract from three aspects of the concept, role and classification.
Second, in the situation of new products and remanufactured products for no difference, we build the closed-loop supply chain game models in the mode of centralized decision-making, decentralized decision-making and partly coordination. Based on Comparative analysis of the node enterprises'optimal decision-making and profits, we propose the revenue-and-expense sharing contract which can achieve the perfect coordination of closed-loop supply chain, and verify the conclusions by numerical simulation, determine the specific range of contract parameters.
Lastly, the model is extended in the case of new products and remanufactured products found vertical differentiation, comparatively analyze the optimal decisions and profits of the closed-loop supply chain in the mode of centralized decision-making, decentralized decision-making and partly coordination, discuss how to apply the revenue-and-expense sharing contract to achieve the perfect coordination of closed-loop supply chain, and through numerical simulation verify the correctness and effectiveness of the model.
The results show that:Compared to decentralized decision-making, the partly coordination can improve consumer welfare, enhance the environmental effects, resource utilization and system performance, but still can not achieve the optimal level of centralized decision-making; in the partly coordination, the alliance of manufacturers and retailers will significantly improve the closed-loop supply chain performance, and third-party logistics providers and manufacturers or retailers Union implements the perfect coordination of the reverse supply chain pricing decisions, and the two Union mode have exactly the same influence to the closed-loop supply chain performance; when the new products and remanufactured products exist vertical differentiation, manufacturers and retailers Union will make the best of new product sales, and while Significant increase in sales of remanufactured goods, the other two alliance mode will only affect the sales of remanufactured products; in the analysis of enterprises participation constraints, considering the node enterprise alliance will reduce in the range of revenue-sharing and cost-sharing ratio of the revenue-and-expense sharing contract.
引文
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