摘要
20世纪90时代以来，随着经济的全球化、国际竞争的激烈化和科学技术的迅猛发展，公司治理面临着一系列新的矛盾，股东利益保护问题、人力资本拥有者激励约束问题、向公司贡献了专用性投资的主体参与公司治理等公司的治理理论和实践问题，已越来越成为各国家经济政策的兴趣点，并成为一个世界性的课题。
中共中央十四届三中全会提出建立现代企业制度以后，国有企业改革进入了崭新的历史阶段。然而，由于新旧体制的碰撞，法律规范的不完善，市场体系尚不够成熟，在公司治理中存在着诸如“内部人控制”、“一股独大”、“新老三会矛盾”等问题，严重影响了现代企业制度的建立和证券市场的规范，损害了股东、职工、经营者和债权人等多元利益主体的利益，因而实现公司治理结构的优化便成为一个亟待研究的课题。这正是本论文的研究背景。
论文以企业契约理论、公司治理理论等相关基本理论为基础，首先对公司治理的性质和功能进行辨析。提出企业是一种创造财富的有效机制，而绝非仅是比市场更加节约交易费用。企业作为经济主体，其行为动因源于人的自利动机和对需求的渴望。由此，论文明确给出公司治理的概念，认为公司治理是在法律、法规和惯例的框架下，以简约的方式，规范和治理以股东为主体的利益相关者之间的关系，实现财富创造长期最大化的制度安排。公司治理的核心和本质是以关系合同的形式，协调以投资者利益为核心，以经营者利益、职工利益和债权人利益为支柱，以其他利益相关者的利益为支持的利益体系内错综复杂的关系的制度安排。在此基础上，论文系统地分析了公司治理的四项基本功能。以上分析为本文研究奠定了坚实的基础。
论文将多元利益主体根植于企业契约理论，认为企业是一系列不完全产权契约的联合体。企业的不完全产权契约随着制度环境和专用性投资的变化，不断的对企业所有权进行边际调整，实现参与契约的要素主体向公司治理主体的转变，同时，通过公司治理主体维度和多个体联合决策有利于提高公司决策效率的分析，导出了公司治理主体的多元化特征；并从有效监控成本和收益、制度性安排、社会文化传统等角度对股东、职工、经营者和债权人等多元利益主体的行为进行了分析。
论文构建了公司治理的理论体系，认为它是由公司治理主体、公司治理客体、公司治理边界和公司治理机制四个部分组成。给出了公司治理机制的内涵是：为实现公司长期财富创造最大化，治理主体作用于治理客体，以发
挥治理作用的机理、运行方式和途径。按照发挥作用的机理不同，将其划分
为基于公司治理结构的内部治理机制、基于市场的市场治理机制和基于社会
环境的社会治理机制。认为内部治理机制是公司治理机制的基础;市场治理
机制通过市场竞争发挥作用;社会治理机制通过根植于人们价值观念的法律
法规、政治和社会文化传统等因素起作用。这三种治理机制相辅相成，共同
构成多元利益主体参与公司治理的机制体系。
论文对中国上市公司治理机制进行了评价实证分析。在基于多元利益主
体的公司治理机制体系的基础上，构建了基于多元利益主体的公司内部治理
机制和市场治理机制的评价指标体系;收集了截止到2003年3月26日已公
布2002年年报的305家沪市上市公司，运用回归分析等统计分析手段，对公
司内部治理和市场治理中的单项治理机制进行实证研究;从收集到的数据完
整的290家样本公司总体中等距抽取了29家公司，运用数据挖掘技术对公司
治理机制进行系统化研究，为公司治理机制组合设计提供借鉴。运用模糊综
合评价模型对社会治理机制的伦理道德建设进行了评价，为加强公司社会治
理机制的伦理道德建设提供借鉴。
在公司治理机制评价实证分析的基础上，论文从优化股权结构、增强董
事会功能、完善监督机制、推进市场化建设以完善市场治理机制、培育公司
治理文化以完善社会治理机制诸方面，提出了完善基于多元利益主体的公司
治理机制的对策。
Since 20 centuries nineties, accompanying with economic globalization, intension of international competition, corporate governance was faced with a series of new contradictions and problems, such as interest protection of shareholder under new situation, incentive and restriction problem of human capital and how do the main bodies who contribute specialized investment to company participate corporate governance, etc. Thus, in recent years, corporate governance and its practice of modern company acts as economic entity become interest of economic policy of more and more countries, and become a world program of research and practice.
Since fourteenth session three plenary meeting of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in which puts forward establishing modern enterprise system, SOE's reform enter into a new history stage. However, at the course of establishing modern enterprise system, there are some problems in corporate governance such as internal control, contradiction between new and old three boards, etc. This affects the establishing modern enterprise system and the standardizing of securities business seriously, and damage interest of multi-bodies of interest such as shareholder, employee, manager and creditor, etc. So how to propel optimization of corporate governance structure is urgent programs need to solve. This is the study background of the dissertation.
At first, the dissertation discriminates and analysis the nature and function of corporate governance based on fundamental theories of enterprise contract and corporate governance. Enterprise is an efficacious mechanism of creating new fortune, it issue from market is not only because it can economize much more transaction costs. As an economic body, the behavior of enterprise is the result of human self-benefit motive and craving for demand. Thereof, the dissertation gives the concept of corporate governance definitely. Corporate governance is system arrangement of standardizing and governing relationship between stakeholders in which shareholder is the main body to achieve supreme fortune creating for long terms by incomplete contract under the framework of law, norm and convention. The core and essence of corporate governance is system arrangement to collaborates intricate relationship of the interest system in which the investor interest is core, the manager interest, employee interest are pillar, and the other
stakeholders interest are in supporting status. Based on this, the dissertation analysis systematically four fundamental function of corporate governance. All these analysis give strong basis for the following research.
The enterprise contract theory is source of multi-parties of interest theory. Thesis believes that enterprise is union of a series of incomplete property contract. Accompanying with the transformation of the system circumstances and specialized investment, incomplete property contract will continue adjust enterprise ownership marginally; achieve the transition from element parties participate in contract to governance parties. At the same time, the dissertation analysis governance parties' dimension and the decision efficiency of muti-individual union decide. This led to plural-character of corporate governance parties. The dissertation analyzed action of multi-parties such as shareholder, employee, manager and creditor from aspects of controlling cost and profit effectively, system arrangement and society culture tradition
The dissertation constructed corporate governance theory system. It consists of main body of corporate governance, object of corporate governance, and boundary of corporate governance and mechanism of corporate governance. Among them, corporate mechanism is operation form and way by which governance body impacts governance object to realize governance function and goal of creating fortune for a long time. According to base of exerting function corporate governance mechanism can be divided internal governance mechanism based on corporate governance structure, market governance mechanism based
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