摘要
20世纪90年代农业产业化的兴起与发展,为解决我国“三农”问题,建设社会主义新农村的提供了新的思路,得到了各级政府和学术界的广泛认同,并在全国掀起了发展农业产业化经营的热潮。“公司十农户”型订单农业是目前我国农业产业化进程中得到普遍推行的模式,它通过在公司与农户间签订各种互惠契约来取代一些临时性的市场交易,可以缓解“小农户”与“大市场”的矛盾,为促进农户增收、提高农户的生活水平做出了重要贡献。然而,实践中公司与农户利益冲突严重,互相违约现象突出,双方合作关系极不稳定,面临着农户相对利益受损、公司经营风险增大、规模化经济难以形成等困境,严重制约了农业产业化的顺利实施。
“公司+农户”型订单农业的存在是否具有内在合理性?如果它合理,那么公司和农户间应建立怎样的利益协调机制,真正实现公司和农户之间的“利益共享,风险共担”,使合作更为紧密、稳定?这是本文要研究的两个主要问题。尽管目前已有不少相关研究成果,但已有成果大多从表象出发,运用交易成本及制度经济学等理论来解释“公司+农户”型订单农业存在的合理性,并将公司和农户割裂开来,单独从公司或农户的层面来研究各自的行为,进而提出解决方案。往往会由于对研究系统的本体对象与演化机理的认识不足而使得系统优化的方向、优化的理论与方法缺乏必要的机理支撑。此外,由于农产品的独特的特性(易腐性、生产周期性、受气候等环境影响大等)造成农产品市场价格频繁波动,使订单农业面临较大的市场风险,而公司与农户为使自身利益最大化互相转嫁风险,从而引起订单农业高违约率。已有研究往往从系统某一稳态出发,构建系统的静态模型,不能将由环境变化产生的规则调整考虑在内。
为此,本文首先从自组织及协同学的角度出发,运用复杂系统相关理论及方法构建公司与农户协同竞争演化模型,以便从更深层次理解与认识“公司+农户”型订单农业系统演化的规律及系统优化的思路,并据此提出解决订单农业违约的对策。在此基础上,本文从“公司+农户”型订单农业系统的结构出发来分析系统的动态行为特性及各要素间的动态反馈关系,利用系统动力学相关理论和方法,构建公司与农户的合作机制的SD模型,并进行仿真模拟。根据系统优化的对策,对模型进行改进,以提高公司和农户的收益及化解、转移系统风险为目标,提出“公司+农户”型订单农业系统的协调优化的方案。旨在为增强系统运行的稳定性并提高系统的绩效提出合理有效的对策建议。
本文的主要研究工作和结论有：
(1)构建了公司与农户协同竞争演化Logistic模型,对模型的稳定性进行分析,证明公司与农户通过相互作用、相互耦合创生出一个新系统——“公司+农户”系统,产生了由稳定定态代表的整体涌现性。
(2)变换“公司+农户”系统协同竞争演化模型中公司和农户间的合作竞争参数,分别对各种情景下系统演化结果进行仿真模拟,结果表明,“公司+农户”协同竞争系统演化的结果与公司和农户间的合作竞争效益系数密切相关。
当公司和农户间由合作产生的正效应大于由竞争产生的负效应时,公司规模和农户规模都超过了在资源有限性制约下仅依靠自身能力所能达到的最大规模,即在“公司+农户”型订单农业系统中,当公司与农户双方都采取合作策略时,系统的绩效要高于双方各自独立经营的绩效。这就通过对公司与农户协同竞争自组织规律的研究,从理论上证明了“公司+农户”型订单农业的存在具有内在合理性。
而当竞争负效应大于合作正效应时,由于竞争负效应的影响,系统运行效率较低,公司和农户的最终规模都小于初始规模。
由此可见,通过政府的引导、鼓励以及合理的契约设计等措施,扩大系统中的合作效应,使有益的运行模式占主导作用,并形成序参量,从而使系统不断向正确的方向演化。这为系统的优化升级提供了科学决策的思路。
(3)根据系统优化的思路即扩大系统中公司与农户间的合作效应,结合农产品的特征,通过定性分析提出解决“公司+农户”订单农业违约的思路与对策。
(4)分析了公司与农户合作机制运行系统的动态反馈关系及其因果关系,构建了“公司+农户”运行系统的SD模型。以云南宾川葡萄产业化为例,对模型进行了实例仿真。
结果表明“自由买卖”模式下,双方都要承担市场不确定的风险,不仅农户的利益难以得到保障,公司经济效益也受到影响。为保障农户的利益,采用“保底收购,随行就市”的保护价模式,从系统仿真结果可以看出,保护价的利益联结机制能有效保护农户的利益,但是实行保护价格机制后,市场价格波动的风险并没有降低,而是由自由买卖式联结下的公司和农户双方共同承担市场风险,转换成了由公司承担全部市场风险。
公司为了化解市场风险,与农户签订农产品订单后(按保护价收购),转而在农产品期货期权市场购买期权进行套期保值。通过构建“保护价+期权”模式下的SD模型并对模型进行仿真模拟,可以看出通过购买期权公司可以在一定程度上化解市场价格波动的风险,使利润趋于稳定。当市场价格下降幅度较大时,公司利用期权,可以规避市场风险,获得相对稳定的收益。当市场价格上升或下滑幅度较小时,公司收益相对于不购买期权时有所减少。为鼓励涉农企业进入农产品期货期权市场以化解农产品经营的风险,政府可以对涉农公司购买期权进行一定的补贴。
为了进一步扩大大系统中的合作效应,从而提高“公司+农户”系统的绩效,构建了“保护价+期权+生产协作+保证金”模式的系统动力学模型,仿真结果表明,这种合作模式可以促进公司与农户利润的增加,实现系统的完美协调。此外,从仿真结果还可以得出保证金可作为公司和农户之间调节利润分配的一个工具以及公司的扶持力度不是越大越好,而是应该控制在一定的范围之内的结论。
本文的主要创新之处有：
(1)从自组织及协同学的角度认识“公司+农户”系统的内在演化机理,突破了以往基于交易成本和制度经济学理论的分析,有助于从更深层次把握“公司+农户”订单农业内在演化机理。
(2)构建了公司与农户协同竞争系统演化Logistic模型,通过对模型稳定性的分析以及仿真模拟,研究了系统演化规律,从而对“公司+农户”型订单农业存在的内在合理性进行了理论解释,并得出了系统优化的思路。
(3)运用系统动力学理论和方法对公司与农户合作协调机制进行研究,不同于以往基于不完全契约理论和博弈论等的基于对问题表象的静态研究,它从观察系统的结构出发,并将环境的变化考虑在内,通过系统仿真定量分析系统的动态行为。
(4)建立了公司与农户合作机制运行系统的三个流位变量(公司利润、农户利润及农户产量)和三个微分方程组,实现了对“公司+农户”系统合作机制的数学描述。在此基础之上对模型进行了实例仿真,并提出了实现系统协调的机制。
The rise and development of agricultural industrialization provides a new train of thought to solve the so called three dimensional rural issues in China during the1990s. It has been widely recognized by the government and academic community. The "Company&peasant household" mode of contract farming is a generally pursued model in the process of agricultural industrialization in our country. It signs various reciprocal contracts between companies and farmers to replace the temporary market dealing. It can alleviate the contradictions of "small farmers" and "big market". It has made important contribution to promote the farmers' income and raise farmers' living standard. However, in the practice of agriculture industrialization, the cooperative relationship between companies and farmers is extremely unstable. The breaching of contract phenomenon between farmers and companies is serious. Facing the plight of the farmers' interest losses, companies' operating risk increases, economies of scale forms difficultly.
Does the "company&peasant household" mode of contract farming have its inherent rationality? If it is reasonable, then what kind of benefit coupling mechanism should be established between corporation and farmers in order to make the cooperation more closely and stable? This is the two major problems to be studied in this paper. Although there are many relevant research achievements, most of the existing researches have explained the rationality of contract farming from the appearance by using the transaction cost and institutional economics theory. And they always study the behavior of the company and farmers separately, and then propose solutions. This may make the system optimization direction lack of necessary supporting mechanism because of the knowledge deficiency of evolution mechanism of the study system. In addition, the market price of agricultural products fluctuates frequently because of the unique characteristics of agricultural products, such as perishable, production cycle, affected by the climate etc. This leads to the high risk of contract farming. The existing researches usually start from a steady state, and then construct static model of the system. So they don't take rule adjustment generated by the changes of the environment into consideration.
Therefore, this paper studies the rationality of "company&peasant household" mode of contract farming and system optimization directions from the view of Self-organization and Synergetics. Then it puts forward countermeasures of solving the breaching of contract. On the basis of this, it analyzes the dynamic behavior characteristics of the system and feedback relationships between the elements by starting from the structure of "company&peasant household" system. It establishes the corresponding SD model and simulates the model. This article inspects the system performance with emphasis on the affects of the market price. It puts forward the coordination and optimization scheme of the "company&farmer" system to aim at improving both the company and farmer's income and resolving system risk. The purpose is to propose the reasonable and effective countermeasures which can promote the formation of truly "benefit-sharing and risk-sharing" cooperative mechanism between company and farmer, enhance the system stability, and improve the system performance.
The main research works and conclusions of the paper are as follows:
(1)It constructs the cooperative and competitive evolution Logistic model of "company&farmer" system, then analyses the stability of the model and proves that a new system-"company&farmer" system is created through interaction and coupling to each other between the company and farmers, which produces whole emergences represented by the stable state.
(2)It simulates the system evolutionary process on a variety of scenarios when the cooperative and competitive parameters of the system are altered. The results show that the evolution directions of the "company&farmer" system have close relationship with the cooperative and competitive coefficients and the initial size of the company and farmer.
When the positive effects generated by the cooperation between corporation and farmer outweighs the negative effects produced by competition, both the company's and farmer's scale exceed the maximum scale which can reach only relying on themselves. This proves theoretically that the "company&peasant household" mode of contract farming has its inherent rationality.
But the operating efficiency of the system is low and the ultimate scales of the corporation and peasant household are less than their initial scales when the negative effects come from competition is strong. It's useful to amplify the cooperation effect in the system, make the beneficial operation mode the leading role, thus guide the system to the correct direction of evolution.
(3)It analyzes the typical interest coupling mechanisms between company and farmer. It point that we can use the agri-products currency options market to dissolve market risk. Then it puts forward a innovation mode----"contract farming&options".
(4) It analyzes the dynamic feedback relation and causal relation of "company&farmer" system and constructs the SD model of the system under "free trade" mode. It simulates the model with taking grape industrialization of Binchuan Yunnan province as an example. The results show both the company and the farmer need to bear the market uncertainty risk under the "free" mode. Not only the interest of farmer can't be guaranteed, the economic benefits of the company are also affected.
It uses protective price pattern in order to protect the interests of farmers. The simulation results show that the protective price mechanism can protect the interests of farmers effectively. It can improve the income of farmer and stimulate the steady progress of agriculture production. But the risks from fluctuation of market price are not reduced after executing protective price mechanism. The company bears all the market risks under the price protective mechanism.
In order to dissolve market risks, the company purchases options in the agri-product currency options market after signing with farmers. It constructs a "protective price+options" SD model and simulates it. From the results it can be seen that the company can dissolve market risk of price fluctuation to a certain extent through the purchase of options and achieve stable profit. The company can avoid market risks and obtain relatively stable income when the fall range of market price is bigger. But the profit of the company is decreasing compared with the case of not buying options when the fall range of market price is small. Therefore, the government can allowance the agriculture-related companies for the purchase of options by using certain proportion of agricultural subsidies funds. It can improve the performance of the "company&farmer" system effectively and reduce the default behavior of the company, then promote the stable operation of the system.
It constructs a SD model of the "protective price+option+production cooperation+caution money" mode in order to further enhance the performance of "company&farmer" system. The simulation results show that this cooperation mode can promote the increase of both the company and farmer's profit. It can achieve perfect harmony of the system. Furthermore, the simulation results also show that caution money can be used as a tool for regulating the distribution of profits between company and farmer. And the support strength of the company should be controlled within a certain range.
The paper is innovative in the following aspects:
(1)It considers the company and the farmer as two species in the ecological system which is mutually dependent and competitive due to limited resources. It constructs cooperative competition evolution model of company and farmer system by using Logistic equation. The model takes company size and farmer size for the order parameter. It analyzes the stability of the model. It researches on system coordination competition evolutionary laws and reveals the system evolution mechanism through model simulation.
(2)It applies system dynamics theory and method to study the cooperation coordination mechanism of the company and farmer. This breaks the previous research which mainly based on transaction cost theory, incomplete contract theory and game theory. It considers "company&farmer" contract farming as a whole and establishes the corresponding SD model from the observation of system structure. It can not only analyzes the dynamic behavior of system quantitatively through system simulation, but also can change the policy parameters, set up different scenes, and observe the system responses to the relevant policy, then obtains the satisfactory results.
(3)It establishes three level variables (the company's profit, farmer's profits and farmer production) and three differential equations of the "company&farmer" system and realizes mathematical description of the system. Then it runs the model by practical simulation. It proposes optimization solutions to improve system performance according to the simulation results. It establishes the system dynamics model of each scheme and compares the profit of company and farmer under different scheme when market prices fluctuate frequently. Finally it puts forward coordination and optimization schemes of "company&farmer" system in order to improve the company and farmer profit as the goal.
引文
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