摘要
传统意义上对公司治理问题的研究,大都以股权高度分散由此引发公司所有权和经营权的分离从而带来的所有者和管理者之间的“委托—代理”问题为逻辑起点。然而,大量实证研究表明,世界上多数上市公司都有控制性大股东,而且控制性大股东积极参与了公司治理,即所有权与经营权的分离并不是一个普遍现象。与此同时,控制性大股东大多采用金字塔股权结构对上市公司进行控制,金字塔股权结构的一个鲜明特征是它会导致控制性大股东现金流权(所有权)与控制权的分离,即控股股东用较少的股权投资就可以实施对上市公司的完全控制,这样就带来了控制权的溢价,这就为控股股东掏空上市公司资源提供了动力。这就引发了公司治理研究的一个更深层面的代理问题,即控制性大股东与其他中小股东之间的利益冲突。但同时,研究发现,金字塔股权结构也给大股东提供了支持上市公司的动机和途径。也就是说,掏空和支持是对称的。现有的研究对掏空问题已有大量论证和检验,但对支持行为的研究还不够全面。尤其是在我国,股权分置改革基本完成,市场进入全流通时代,控制性大股东与中小股东的利益诉求正逐渐趋于一致,以对处于财务困境下的上市公司实施救助及对上市公司注入优质资产的支持行为正纷纷出现,由此带来的对上市公司价值以及投资者回报的影响的研究是本文的重要内容。
与此同时,机构投资者在世界范围内迅速壮大,成为可以制衡上市内部的控制性大股东的重要力量。随着持股比例的大幅增加,机构投资者的投资理念正发生变化,即逐渐从过去的消极持股,用脚投票向“股东积极主义”行为转变,即为了取得长期的超额回报,机构投资者会利用自己的专业优势,直接介入到上市公司的公司治理中去。机构的这种积极行为会对上市公司的经营管理即业绩产生怎样的影响,本文也将运用上市公司数据和相关软件进行实证分析。
综上所述,本文的主要研究内容如下：
1、首先界定本文所要研究的“大股东”的定义,将研究的对象确认为公司的控制性大股东和大比例持有公司股票的机构投资者,然后讨论大股东参与公司治理和决策的动机和利益机制,在此基础上比较控制性大股东对企业的“掏空”行为和“支持”行为,分析其行为动机并确认分别的实施路径。
2、界定控制性大股东获得公司实际控制权的股权结构安排,即水平控股结构与金字塔控股结构的选择,通过一家或几家有代表性的上市公司的股权结构描绘,追溯金字塔股权结构下控制性大股东的控制权路径以及其支持和掏空行为。
3、从控制性大股东追求当期和未来效用最大化出发,建立金字塔控股结构下控制性大股东对财务困境企业支持路径的选择模型。通过模型分析,得到控制性大股东对财务困境企业支持路径选择的临界支持规模,并根据该规模对控制性大股东的支持路径选择提供决策依据。
4、研究控制性大股东向上市公司注入资产的动机和模式,重点关注定向增发资产注入模式的作用机制,运用事件研究的方法,重点讨论控制性大股东资产注入的路径与市场反应。
5、分析论证机构投资者参与公司治理的能力、动机以及‘股东积极主义’是否能够降低交易成本、改善公司决策、提高上市公司业绩。在回顾相关理论的基础上,设计相关变量和函数关系,运用WIND数据库的数据进行实证分析,考察机构投资者的‘股东积极主义’对于中国上市公司的绩效影响并得出结论。
最后文章将针对以上研究结果提出相关政策建议,供决策参考。
In the traditional sense,the research on the corporate governance issues usually bases on the 'principal-agent problem' arising from the interest conflicts between the shareholders and the managers due to the Dispersed ownership of the firm. However, a large number of empirical studies have shown that the majority of listed companies in the world have a controlling shareholder which actively involves in corporate governance.The separation of ownership and management is not a universal phenomenon. At the same time, most of the controlling shareholder employ pyramid ownership structure to take control of the listed companies. A striking feature of the pyramid ownership structure is that it will lead to the separation of controlling shareholders'cash flow rights (ownership) and control right, which means the controlling shareholder can implement full control of listed companies with less equity investment. The existence of the control right premium provides the controlling shareholder with the impetus to hollow out the resources of the listed companies. This leads to a deeper level of agency problems in corporate governance research, which is the conflict of interest between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. But at the same time, the study found that the pyramid ownership structure also provides controlling shareholder with the motivation and means to prop the listed companies. In other words, tunneling effect and propping behavior is symmetrical. Existing research on tunneling effect has a large number of demonstration and testing, but is not comprehensive enough to propping behavior. In China, the equity division reform has basically completed. With the arrival of the era of the full circulation, the interest of the controlling shareholder and the minority shareholders'is becoming more and more consistent. Implementation of relief to listed companies in financial distress and injection of high-quality assets into the listed company have been appearing, the resulting value of listed companies and investors return is an important content of this article.
At the same time, institutional investors in the rapidly growing worldwide, becoming an important force to counterbalance the behavior of the controlling shareholders. With the substantial increase in the stake, the investment philosophy of the institutional investors is gradually shifting from the previous negative holding and voting with their feet to the'shareholder activism' behavior. In order to achieve long-term excess returns, institutional investors will use their professional advantage to directly involve in the corporate governance of listed companies. Institutions such positive behavior would be listed on the company's management that the results of what kind of impact, this article will use the data of listed companies and related software to conduct empirical analysis.
In summary, the main researches are as follows:
1, Firstly define that the object of this study includes the controlling shareholders and institutional investors, then discuss the two kinds of shareholders' motivation and interests mechanism which attracts them to positively participate into corporate governance and decision-making. On this basis, compare the 'tunneling' behavior and 'propping' behavior of the controlling shareholder and analyze the motives and the path of implementation respectively.
2, Identify the controlling shareholder's equity structure arrangement which is the choice between the level holding structure and the pyramid holding structure. Through the portray of one or several representative listed company's equity structure, trace the controlling path as well as the tunneling and propping behavior of the controlling shareholder under the pyramid equity structure.
3, Proceeding from the maximization of the current and future utility of controlling shareholder, set up the path selection model of propping the listed company in financial distress. Through the model analysis, indentify the critical propping scale, and provide basis for decision making for path selection of the size of the controlling shareholders.
4, Analyze the motives and modes of controlling shareholders of listed companies of assets injection, to focus on the mechanism of asset injection which financed by private placement. And using the event study method to discuss the path and the market reaction of assets injection
5, Analyze the ability and the motivation of institutional investors to participate in corporate governance and find whether'shareholder activism' is able to reduce transaction costs, improve corporate decision-making and improve the performance of listed companies.on the basis of Review of the relevant theory, design variables and function to conduct empirical analysis using WIND database data, to investigate the impact of'shareholder activism'on the performance of China's listed companies and make a conclusion.
Finally, this paper will focus on the above findings to raise relevant policy advices for decision making.
引文
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