快速消费品行业供应链协调研究
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摘要
当前快速消费品行业(FMCG)的销售渠道正在面临着深刻的变革,FMCG制造商和零售商之间的联系比以往任何时候都更加紧密,其中大型零售终端的主导地位日益凸显。虽然大型零售终端和制造商是一个价值链的成员,但由于各自不同的目标价值,所以渠道冲突不可避免。由于渠道冲突给供应链整体利益带来了负面的影响,因此通过契约机制协调供应链成员的利益分配就显得尤为重要。
     本文首先定性地分析了促使制造商和大型零售终端合作的原因,然后从利润分配层面定量地分析了促使制造商和大型零售终端合作的理由。本文将快速消费品分为易逝品和非易逝品,针对这两类产品,分别建立零售商主导型的收入共享契约模型和回购契约模型,通过数值实验证明了收入共享契约和回购契约能够提高供应链系统的整体利润。
     本文的创新之处在于通过加入进场费T以及设置零售商毛利润n作为参数,建立了零售商主导型的收入共享契约模型,从理论和数值实验上证明本模型的优越之处。另外,建立了零售商毛利润和制造商批发价的函数关系,构建了不确定需求的零售商主导型的回购契约模型,实验证明回购契约有利于提高供应链系统整体及个体利润。
The fast moving consumer goods(FMCG) industry is undergoing deep changes.FMCG manufacturers and retailers have much closer contact than before and large retailers play a more and more important role in the supply chain.The traditional manufacturer-leading supply chain is converted to retailer-leading gradually.Even both the large retailers and manufacturers are the members in the supply chain but they have their own targets.That is why there are channel conflicts which would cause negative effects.Contracts mechanism is one of the best ways to help reduce channel conflicts.
     This paper firstly gives qualitative analysis to explain why FMCG manufacturers and large retailers would unite.Then it gives quantitative analysis to explain it.Fast moving goods are divided into perishable goods and non- perishable goods.Accordingly a retailer-leading buy back contract and a retailer-leading revenue-sharing contract are built.Finally numerical examples are carried out to illustrate the application of the contracts could achieve supply chain coordination.
     Entrance fee and retail gross profits are introduced as two new parameters in the retailer-leading revenue-sharing contract model and numerical example is carried out to illustrate the model is excellent.Besides,the function is built to explain the relationship between trade price and retail gross profit and it's used in the retailer-leading buy back model.Finally numerical examples are carried out to illustrate the model could help both the manufacturers and large retailers gain more profits.
引文
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