不确定电力市场环境下梯级电站竞价理论与应用
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摘要
我国水资源丰富,且富集于十二大水电基地的大江大河,具备梯级滚动开发的有利条件。随着一系列流域梯级电站群的建成投运以及全国互联电网的形成,流域水电能源的优化配置和高效利用已成为影响国家能源安全和国民经济发展的重大问题。同时,为提高互联大电网背景下电力系统的运行效率,我国开展了以“厂网分开,竞价上网”为核心的电力市场改革,初步建立了发电侧竞价市场,使梯级电站运营环境发生了根本性改变。电力市场环境下梯级电站的竞价策略是梯级电站经济运行的重要内容,亟须相关的理论和技术提供支撑。为此,国内外学者对梯级电站竞价策略开展了广泛研究,并取得了一些研究成果。然而,我国电力市场改革历时短,能源政策和市场规则尚不完善,电网结构与国外不同,市场信息获取机制缺乏,市场主体竞争与合作、电价和负荷波动、需求价格弹性、竞争对手行为等不确定因素相互作用,使梯级电站竞价策略成为一个多阶段、多层次、多市场的复杂对策决策问题,建模及求解非常困难,现有研究成果难以直接应用,需要从竞价理论和方法上进行突破。
     本文围绕梯级电站在不确定电力市场环境下的竞争与冲突,以分析不确定因素对梯级电站竞价策略的影响为切入点,引入系统优化、概率性区间预测、(非)合作博弈等先进理论,考虑梯级电站发电约束和市场政策变动、不完全信息、竞争对手行为、发电主体竞争与合作等因素,建立了不同市场条件下梯级电站多级市场竞价的对策决策模型,制定了多级市场中梯级电站竞价策略,通过分析竞价市场均衡演化规律揭示了梯级电站竞价策略对市场政策、不完全信息、竞争对手行为、需求价格弹性和发电成本变动等不确定性因素的响应机理,并基于理论研究成果设计并实现了梯级电站竞价上网决策支持系统,为梯级电站在多级市场下的优化运营提供了理论依据和技术支撑。本文主要研究内容和创新之处包括:
     (1)通过分析市场出清电价特性,提出了两种确定性电价预测模型;针对确定性电价预测结果表现信息不全的固有缺陷,在确定性电价预测模型的基础上,提出了基于误差统计分析的电价概率性区间预测模型;
     (2)针对不同竞价模式的特点,考虑梯级电站发电机组成本特性、预期利润回报和多级市场间电量的分解,建立并求解了梯级电站中长期合约市场最优竞价模型;基于电价概率性区间预测结果,提出了日前市场梯级电站最优竞价策略;
     (3)从市场多主体全局优化的角度出发,针对不同市场条件,分别建立了完全信息和不完全信息下的日前市场竞价过程序贯博弈模型和Cournot博弈模型,通过求解模型均衡获得不同条件下梯级电站的最优竞价策略,并分析了市场能源政策和不完全信息对市场均衡和梯级电站竞价策略的影响;围绕日前市场中市场主体的竞争与冲突,建立了日前市场供给函数模型,通过求解并分析市场均衡的变化规律,揭示了竞争对手行为、需求价格弹性、发电成本特性影响市场均衡和梯级电站竞价策略的作用机理。
     (4)考虑流域梯级水电能源在市场条件下的优化配置,探索了日前市场中梯级电站与“唯一购买方”电网公司合作的可能性,分析了梯级电站竞价策略影响市场均衡的规律,在此基础上推导了厂网合作的条件,揭示了厂网合作对市场出清结果的影响,设计了合作双方的收益分配策略,为市场条件下流域梯级水电能源优化配置开辟了一条新的途径。
     (5)基于上述理论研究成果,以三峡-葛洲坝梯级为对象,设计了梯级电站竞价上网决策支持系统的物理结构、功能结构、主要功能模块和逻辑结构,并在J2EE平台上实现了系统的开发与集成。
In China, there are abundant water resources in the large rivers of twelve hydropower bases which have advantages in cascade development. With the construction and operation of the cascade hydropower stations in the basin and the formation of national interconnected electric network, the allocation optimization and effective utilization of the water resources in the basin has already become an important problem which has impact on the national energy security and economic development. Simultaneously, the electric industy reform has being carried out all over China in order to improve the operation efficiency of electric system under the background of national interconnected electric network and thereafter generation-side electricity market has been set up. These have fundamentally changed the operation environment of cascade hydropower stations. The bidding strategy of cascade hydropower stations is an important content of its optimal operation under multi-level electricity markets and need the support of relevant theories and technologies urgently. In this respect, the scholars have carried out extensive researches and obtained useful results. However, the electric industy reform in China has a short duaration, its energy policys, market rules and market information transfermation mechanism are far from perfect, the structure of electric network are different from that in other countries, the uncertain factors which includes the competition and cooperation of market agents, the fluctuation of electricity demand and market price, the demand-price elasticity and the behavior of competitors interact with each other. These made the optimal bidding strategies of cascade hydropower stations a complex multi-step, multi-stage and multi-level market gaming and decision-making problem which is hard to model and solute. The existing reseach results are difficult to adapt directly to solute the problem which calls for the breakthrough of bidding theories and methods.
     Surrounding the competition and conflict of cascade hydropower stations in uncertain electricity market environment, using the analysis of the impact of the uncertainties on bidding strategies of cascade hydropower stations as an entry point, this paper introduces the theories of system optimization, probabilistic interval price forecasting, (non-) cooperative game theory to constructe the bidding game and decision-making model of cascade hydropower stations under multi-level electricity market environment considering the generation constraints of cascade hydropower stations, the change of market policy, incomplete information, competitor's behaviors, the competition and cooperation among market agents. Based on these models, the optimal bidding strategies of cascade hydropower stations are obtained and the response mechanism are revealed that bidding strategy of cascade hydropower stations to the uncertainties which includes market policies, incomplete information, competitor behaviors, demand-price elasticity and the change of generation costs. Besides, a bidding decision support system of cascade hydropower plant has been designed and implemented. These results provide theoretical basis and technical support for the operation optimization of cascade hydropower stations in multi-level electricity market environment. The main contents and innovations of the paper are stated as follows:
     (1) According to the characteristics of market clearing price, two deterministic price forecasting models are set up based on which a probabilistic interval price forecasting model using error statistical analysis and fitting are constructed to overcome the disadvantage of deterministic price forecasting model that it can not provide comprehensive information of the forecasting price.
     (2) Based on the analysis of the characteristics of different bidding modes, the optimal bidding model of the cascade hydropower stations in long-term and middle-term contract electricity market are constructed and soluted considering the generation cost characteristics and the expected profit return. After that, the optimal bidding strategy of cascade hydropower stations in the day-ahead electricity market is presented based on the results of probabilistic interval price prediction.
     (3) In order to realize global optimization of market agents, the Stackelberg and Cournot game model under both complete and incomplete information for the bidding process in the day-ahead market are constructed to derive the optimal strategy for the cascade hydropower stations and discover the mechanism that the energy policy and incomplete information affect the market equilibrium and the profits of generators. The supply function equilibrium model of day-ahead electricity market has also been set up to discuss the competition among the market agents. Based on the model, the laws are revealed how the bidding behaviors of competitors, demand-price elasticity and generation cost affect the market equilibrium and the bidding strategies of cascade hydropower plant and its competitors.
     (4) Considering the allocation optimization of the basin cascade hydropower energy under electricity market condition, the possibility of the cooperation between cascade hydropower stations and the grid company which is the only purchaser in the day-ahead market are discussed. The law has been revealed how the bidding strategy of cascade hydropower stations affects the market clearing results. Based on the results, the necessary condition for the cooperation between the generator and the grid company are derived and the impact of the cooperation on the market clearing results has also been analyzed. Besides, an effective and feasible profit allocation method is design for the two sides. All these results construct a new road for the allocation optimization of hydropower resources.
     (5) Based on the bidding theories above, the physical structure, functional structure, main functional moduals and logic structure of the bidding decision support system have been designed for three gorges cascade hydropower stations, the development and integration of the system are realized.
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