摘要
随着改革的深化、经济转型步伐的加快，我国目前急需要加强专利的保护，从而推动科技竞争力的提高、推动产业结构的转型与升级。专利侵权诉讼作为我国专利司法保护的主渠道与调整专利保护水平的重要杠杆，是政府与学术界关注的热点问题。目前，我国专利侵权诉讼的有效性受到了西方国家的质疑，特别是美国等西方国家总是以“中国的知识产权保护不力”为由，对我国施压和实施贸易制裁。因此，加强对我国专侵权诉讼有效性的研究，不仅可以为深化改革、加快经济转型提供理论参考，也可以为回应西方国家的不实言论、避免贸易制裁提供理论支撑。
本文的创新点主要有以下几点：首先，对专利侵权认定的有效性进行研究。论文基于专利宽度理论，对专利侵权认定的调整作用进行了理论分析，研究发现：专利侵权认定主要是通过识别与确认权利边界、专利侵权判定原则的运用等对专利保护宽度进行调整。实证研究发现：我国法院普遍使用全面覆盖原则判定侵权，可以证明我国目前的司法保护宽度较窄，应逐步放宽司法保护宽度。
其次，对专利侵权损害赔偿的有效性进行研究。论文基于专利侵权诉讼的目的论，对专利侵权损害赔偿的有效性进行了理论研究。专利侵权损害赔偿的目的主要包括：激励创新；给予专利权人足够的赔偿；给予侵权人足够的惩罚从而抑制侵权；防止专利权人获得超额赔偿造成社会福利的损失；并且各国的国情不同，对专利的保护程度、保护措施也不同，西方发达国家不能以其自身对专利保护的标准要求发展中国家。以“332调查”结论为背景进行了实证分析，发现：“332调查”结论存在主观偏见，我国专利侵权损害赔偿基本有效。
再次，对停止侵权的有效性进行研究。论文分析了停止侵权对专利保护宽度的调整、对专利权人与公共利益的平衡，并对美国发出永久性禁令的案例以及中国停止侵权的案例进行了分析、比较与借鉴，研究发现：我国的停止侵权对专利权人的利益保护不够，会影响激励技术创新以及全社会大众长期的公共利益。
最后，根据对我国专利侵权诉讼基本情况的分析，研究了专利钓饵对我国专利侵权诉讼的影响及其防范对策。研究认为：专利钓饵在中国有较大的赢利空间。应借鉴美国对专利钓饵的防范措施，并结合我国专利侵权诉讼的特点，完善专利侵权诉讼及其相关的制度，应对和防范专利钓饵。
With reform deepening and the pace of economic restructuring accelerating, Chinaurgently needs to strengthen patent protection in order to promote the improvement ofscientific and technological competitiveness, and promote transformation andupgrading of industrial structure. As the main channel for the patent judicial protectionand an important policy lever for adjustment of patent protection level, improvingpatent infringement litigation system becomes a hot topic concered by government andthe scholars. At present, the validity of our patent infringement litigation has beenquestioned by the Western countries, especially the United States always say "Chinafailure to protect IPR”, and put pressure on Chinese government or implement tradesanctions to maximize its own interests. Therefore, to enhance the study on China’svalidity of patent infringement litigation is not only providing a theoretical referencesfor deepening reform and accelerating economic restructuring, but also responding toWestern countries’ false statements to avoid trade sanctions.
The main innovations of this paper are as follows: Firstly, the paper studied theeffectiveness of patent infringement determination. Based on the theory of patentbreadth, the adjustment mechanism of patent infringement determination was studied,and the research found: the patent infringement determination adjusted the patentbreadth mainly through the identification and confirmation of patent rights’ scope andusing the different patent infringement determination principle. The empirical studyfound that the courts in our country generally used comprehensive coverage ofprinciples to decide tort, which could prove that our current judicial protection breadthwas narrow, and the government should gradually relaxe judicial protection breadth.
Secondly, the paper studied the effectiveness of compensation for patentinfringement damage. Based on patent purpose theory, the thesis found that thepurposes of compensation including: stimulate innovation; give the patent ownerenough compensation; give the infringer enough penalties to reduce infringement;prevent the patent owner getting extra damages to reduce social welfare; differentcountries has different protection level and measures based on their own economic development’s level. Western countries could not ask the developing countries use thesame protection level as their own. The empirical study starting from conclusions ofthe "332Survey", and found: the findings in US332Investigation were non-objuetive,and China’s compensation system for patent infringement damage run effectively.
Thirdly, the paper studied the effectiveness of stop infringement. This paperanalyzed the adjustment that the stop infringement did on patent breadth, and thebalance that the stop infringement made on the interests of patentee and the public.Then the thesis analyzed and compared the cases judged according to the law of USpermanent injunction and Chinese stop infringement institution, and found: our stopinfringement institution’s protection on the interests of the patentee was not enough,which would affect the incentive of innovation as well as public longly interests.
Finally, the paper explored patent trolls’ challenge which posed on China's patentsystem and researched on the countermeasures based on the analyzing of the patentlitigation’s situation in china. The study found: the patent trolls in China had a largedevelopment space to get more profit. In order to avoid the risk of litigation andrespond to trolls’ litigation attacks effectively, we should combine the characteristics ofChina's patent system and make reference for countermeasures that the US had adoptedto improve China’s patent infringement litigation institution and the other relevantinstitutions.
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