摘要
长期以来,国内外学者对经济增长的影响因素已进行了大量的实证研究,结果表明,随着时间的推移,技术进步在经济增长中的作用日益提高,并逐步取代了生产要素投入在经济增长中的主导地位。要保持我国的经济持续高速增长,就必须加强技术进步的力度,转变经济增长方式,提高技术创新能力,使经济增长逐步实现从要素驱动型向创新驱动型转变。知识和技术的创新和创造性应用越来越成为当今知识经济时代技术进步、经济社会发展的推动力。创新的成果水平衡量指标专利尤其是对发明专利的创造、拥有和运用,成为一个企业乃至一个国家在竞争中获得优势的关键因素。然而,不容乐观的是,专利成果转化率并没有明显提高,大量专利得不到应用而成为“沉睡专利”,科技成果转化不成生产力。要彻底改变这种科技与经济脱节、科技向现实生产力转化能力薄弱的局面,充分发挥知识和技术在推动我国经济增长方式转变中的重要作用,需要积极研究和探讨我国的技术市场交易与科技成果转化。
技术许可是在技术市场上实现技术交易的主要形式之一,是技术要素流动的一种重要方式,也是技术充分发挥其经济主导力量的主要路径。如何确定被转移技术的价格契约方式是技术许可决策的核心。因此,随着以创新为基础的市场竞争日益激烈、科技水平的快速提升以及世界范围内对知识产权保护的不断加强,在许多产业的技术转移及扩散过程中,技术许可将不可避免地发挥越来越重要的作用。技术许可价格决策过程是十分复杂和困难的。研究技术许可的内在价格决策行为无论对于提高企业、高校等市场主体的技术交易效率,促进科技成果向现实生产力转化,提高创新技术对于经济增长的贡献力,还是扩展技术许可契约理论研究的深度和广度都是有一定的价值的。
本文提出产品创新技术许可策略理论,是考虑与产品创新技术许可活动相关的政府、研发者、许可方、被许可方以及消费者等决策主体,关于产品创新许可相关的技术获取模式、市场竞争结构、需求结构、产品耐用性、信息不对称、不确定性等因素作用下的系统性产业组织框架下的技术许可决策模型研究。其中,产品创新是技术创新的一种重要类型,实践数据表明,产品创新在技术创新中占据很大的比例。本文进行的主要工作如下：
(1)比较分析了企业创新技术获取策略。针对现实经济中企业创新技术获取问题,首先运用包含创新及产出阶段的博弈模型分析了合作创新模式；然后构建了包含创新、许可及产出阶段的博弈模型,并根据模型重点比较分析了技术许可模式；最后比较分析得出企业较优的创新技术获取策略。
(2)研究了寡头垄断市场结构下质量提高型创新技术许可决策。按照典型寡头垄断市场结构Cournot(古诺)市场、Stackelberg(斯坦伯格)市场、Bertrand(伯川德)市场结构等,分别讨论了不同市场结构下质量提高型创新技术的许可决策问题。由于产品创新技术许可行为受到市场结构的影响,考虑了基于产量竞争的静态博弈和动态博弈模型,并分别比较不同市场结构下固定费用许可、提成许可、两部制许可的市场均衡,以及相应的最优许可决策及消费者剩余和社会剩余。同时,讨论了产品差异Bertrand竞争市场结构下质量提高型创新技术许可决策问题。
(3)论证了创新技术应用后,产品市场需求结构对质量提高型创新技术许可决策的影响。按照市场需求假设为线性市场需求、logit市场需求,分析不同市场需求条件下的质量提高型创新技术许可决策问题,并且讨论了许可方为同时参与市场竞争的内部创新者时的技术许可决策问题。其中,logit需求框架下的分析使得考虑新品牌产品相对于替代者的相对吸引力、边际成本、产品差异水平以及消费者偏好的差异对于创新技术许可决策的影响成为可能。
(4)研究了耐用品在纵向一体化结构情况下的创新技术许可相关决策问题。分析了创新产品是耐用品时,垄断市场结构对于创新技术许可决策的影响。在前人研究的基础上,结合上下游纵向独立产业和产品耐用性的分析思路,重点讨论了上游原料供应市场不完全竞争,即存在垄断势力时,下游两阶段耐用品独占垄断厂商的质量提高型和成本降低型技术创新激励,以及在此背景下外部创新者的最优许可方式的选择问题。由于完全竞争在现实世界中不可能也从来没有存在过,不完全竞争市场条件下的技术许可决策分析更具有现实意义。
(5)论证了信息不对称性对创新技术许可决策的影响。由产品创新者对创新技术的创新规模,及技术应用者对创新技术的应用价值,拥有私有信息而产生的产品创新技术的产品质量信息不对称,以及技术创新市场价值信息不对称情况下的技术许可决策比较分析,寻求信息不对称条件下的技术许可混同均衡、分离均衡以及对应的最优许可策略。
(6)提出了不确定性条件下产品创新技术许可相关的决策模型。分析新产品研发不确定性条件下同时考虑研发、事前许可、事后许可以及政府补贴的博弈模型,讨论了研发产品的差异性以及研发过程中的技术溢出效应对于不确定条件下政府研发补贴的影响。基于期权博弈建立了新产品创新面临的市场需求不确定条件下的技术许可决策模型。
Domestic and foreign scholars have made a great deal of empirical research on factors affecting economic growth over the years. It is concluded that, over time, the role of technological progress on economic growth is increasing, and gradually replaces the production factors and obtains the dominant position in economic growth. To maintain sustained rapid economic growth, we must strengthen the efforts to technological progress, and change the mode of economic growth, improve the ability to innovate, making the economic growth gradually change from the factor-driven to innovation-driven. Innovative and creative application of knowledge and technology has increasingly become the driving force of technological advances and economic and social development in today's knowledge economy era. Patent, the measurement of achievement in innovative level, especially the creation, possession and use of a patent, has become a key in the competition to gain an advantage for an enterprise or even a country. Unfortunately, however, the conversion rate of the patent outcome has not increased significantly, and a large number of patents have not been applied and become sleeping patents. That is, the technology can not be transferred into productivity. To completely change the situation of dislocation of technology and economic as well as weak transfer capacity from science and technology into practical productivity, and make the knowledge and technology play an important role in the process of promoting economic growth in our country, it is urgent to research and explore the technology market transactions and the transfer of the scientific and technological achievements.
Technology licensing is one of the main forms of technology transactions in the technology market, a main path for the technology to give a full play in the economic growth, an important flow way of technical elements. The method to determine the price item in the technology transfer contract is the core of the technology licensing. Howerver, the decision-making process of technology licensing pricing strategy is very complex and difficult. Thus, with the innovation-based competition becoming increasingly fierce, the technological level rapidly improved, and the protection of intellectual property strengthened worldwidely, the patent license would inevitably play an increasingly more important role in the technology transfer and diffusion process of the industries in our country. The research of internal price decision-making behavior mechanism in the process of patent licensing is significantly important, no matter for the enterprises and universities or other departments to improve the efficiency of the technical transaction, to transfer the scientific and technological achievements into productivity, and to enhance the very important contribution of technological innovation to economic growth as well as to extend the depth and breadth of the theoretical research.
The systematic product innovation technology licensing strategy theory under the framework of industrial organization is presented in this paper, considering the decision-making departments as the government, developers, licensors, licensees and consumers making strategies about the technology acquisition modes, market structures, demand structures, product durability, asymmetric information, uncertainties and other factors. Among them, the product innovation is an important type of technology innovation, and practical data show that product innovation occupies a large proportion in technological innovation. The main work carried out in this paper is as follows:
(1) The innovation technology acquisition mode is analyzed. As to the issue of technology acquisition for the enterprises, firstly, the collaborative innovation mode is analyzed through a game including innovation and output stage. Then a game model including innovation, licensing, as well as the output stage is disccussed. What is followed is that with the model the technology licensing mode is analyzed. Finally, the optimal innovation technology acquisition strategy is obtained by comparative analysis.
(2) The quality improving innovation technology licensing under the market structure of oligopoly is researched in this paper. The optimal licensing schemes of the quality-improving innovation are analyzed in different market structures including Cournot, Stackelberg as well as Bertrand. As the technology licensing behaviors are affected by the market structure, the static and dynamic game models based on output competition are analyzed respectively. The fixed-fee licensing, royalty licensing, fixed-fee plus royalty licensing equilibriums are compared under different market structures, as well as corresponding optimal licensing strategies, consumer surplus and society surplus. The quality-improving innovation licensing schemes under Bertrand market structure considering product varieties are followed.
(3) The impacts of the product market demand structures after the application of innovation technology on the licensing schemes of quality-improving innovation are analyzed in this paper. The market demand is assumed to be a linear market demand, a logit market demand, respectively. And the optimal quality-improving innovation technology licensing schemes are deduced under the up two market demand structures respectively. The inside innovator case is also considered. The analysis under logit demand framework makes it possible to consider the impacts of the comparative attractive of new brand product with substitutes, marginal cost, the level of product differentiation, as well as differences in consumer preferences on licensing schemes.
(4) The decision problem of durable goods innovation and technology licensing is analyzed under a vertically integration structure. The case of the durable-good innovation product is analyzed about the impacts of monopoly market structure on licensing schemes of innovation technology. Based on the existing analysis, combining the analysis method of downstream and upstream vertically independent industry, under the assumption of the upstream material market with imperfect competition, that is, existing monopoly power, the innovation incentives of downstream two-stage durable monology producers to the quality-improving and cost-reducing technological innovation are analyzed, as well as the optimal licensing schemes under this sense. As the perfect competition in the real world is impossible, the technology licensing market under the conditions of imperfect competition is of more practical significance.
(5) The impact of information asymmetry on the innovation technology licensing decisions is analyzed. As product innovator has private information about the innovation magnitude and the technology users have private information about the product market and the application value of the technology, the asymmetric information affacts the licensing of innovation technology. The pooling licensing equilibrium and separating licensing equilibrium under asymmetric information are deduced as well as the corresponding optimal licensing schemes.
(6) The impact of uncertainty on new product innovation technology licensing is analyzed. Under the condition of uncertainty in the process of R&D for new products, a model considering R&D, pro-licensing, post-licensing as well as government subsidies is analyzed. The impacts of product differentiation and technology spillover on the government R&D subsidies are analyzed. An option game model is obtained under the assumption that market demand is uncertain in the process of new product innovation to analyze the optimal technology licensing.
引文
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