摘要
改革开放以来,中国的经济保持了三十多年的高速增长,取得了举世瞩目的巨大成就。正如吴敬琏教授(2008)所云：“三十年来,GDP增长了14倍,年均增长速度接近10%；城镇居民可支配收入和农村居民纯收入增长了6.7倍,贫困人口从1978年的2.5亿减少到2006年的2148万(季谭,2008)。”就增长速度而言,自现代以来,目前还没有任何一个大国能在30年间保持每年将近10%的增长,日本的高速经济增长也仅持续了20年(周黎安,2007),从这个角度而言,中国的经济发展在世界范围内创造了一个增长的奇迹。
现有研究普遍认为,1978年以来中国在政治体制和经济体制方面所采取的一系列改革措施,尤其是经济体制方面的改革在促进中国的经济发展中发挥了至关重要的作用。中国在经济体制改革方面所实行的分权改革,即向地方政府下放更多的经济管理权力,对于地方政府发展经济产生了重要的作用(Weingast,1995；McKinnon,1997；Qian and Roland,1998；Jin et al.,2005；林毅夫,2007；王永钦等,2007)。中国的经济分权改革主要体现在两个方面：一方面,通过市场化,政府逐步退出竞争性领域,使这些领域的资源配置主要由价格和竞争机制实现；另一方面,在政府体制内部,中央也逐步向地方放权,无论是早期的财政包干制,还是后来的分税制,都使得地方政府拥有了一定程度的事实上的自主权(周业安、章泉,2008),这些改革措施有力地调动了地方政府发展经济的积极性,从而促进了中国经济的快速发展。
实际上,由于中国采取了一种“渐进式”的改革策略,在经济体制改革方面采取了诸多的重大改革措施,取得了巨大的成就,但是在政治体制改革方面却相对进展缓慢。因此,当经济发展到一定的阶段之后,政治体制改革方面的滞后必将制约经济的持续健康发展。所以,近年来,尤其是十八届三中全会之后,中央明确提出了要“全面深化改革”,继续深化经济体制方面的改革并推进政治体制方面的改革,加快“国家治理体系和治理能力的现代化”建设,提升政府的治理效率,从而实现中国经济的长期健康发展。
国家审计与国家治理之间有着天然的联系,国家审计是国家治理的重要组成部分(刘家义,2011)。国家审计通过保障国家经济安全、监督制约权力运行、加强反腐倡廉、推进民主法治、维护民生权益以及推动深化改革可以有效促进善治国家的实现(刘家义,2012)。2013年12月在北京召开的世界审计组织第二十一届大会把“国家审计与国家治理”作为大会的主要议题之一,随后发布的《北京宣言——最高审计机关促进良治》提出：国家审计的中心目标就是促进国家实现善政良治,并且国家审计应该通过致力于“维护民主法治、提高政府效能、预防并打击腐败、保障国家安全、促进改善民生、推动透明问责”等工作以促使国家善政良治目标的实现。可见,“国家审计与国家治理”的有关问题已经成为了当下以及今后一段时期亟需研究的重大问题。
三十多年来改革开放的实践表明,国家审计在提升政府治理效率、促进经济社会的持续健康发展中发挥了非常重要的作用,获得了世界同行的高度赞誉。正如刘家义审计长在2011年全国审计工作会议上所总结的：“‘十一五’期间,全国审计和调查72万多个单位,促进财政增收节支4893亿元,挽回或避免损失789亿元,查出重大违纪违法案件和经济犯罪线索1.3万余件”。三十余年来,各地区的国家审计机关平均每年查处的问题资金达到了20多亿,占各地区GDP的2%左右,而各地区的财政收入占GDP的比重也仅在7%左右’。可见,国家审计作为宪法规定的专职从事经济监督的组织机构在促进我国的经济发展中发挥了非常重要的作用。
然而,与审计实践所取得巨大成就相比,国家审计理论方面的研究却相对滞后。目前,还鲜有文献系统深入地探讨国家审计在促进经济发展中的作用问题。实际上,促进经济发展是国家审计的重要目标之一,2011年正式实施的《国家审计准则》提出：“审计机关的主要工作目标是通过监督被审计单位财政收支、财务收支以及有关经济活动的真实性、合法性、效益性,维护国家经济安全,推进民主法治,促进廉政建设,保障国家经济和社会健康发展”。
目前,在中国经济发展的有关问题上,已有研究主要探讨了激励机制,尤其是经济激励和政治晋升激励在经济增长中的作用(Weingast,1995;Qian and Roland,1998;Jin et al.,2005;Li and Zhou,2005;樊纲等,1990；林毅夫、刘志强,2007；王永钦等,2007；张军,2007；周黎安,2007；皮建才,2012)。鲜有文献探讨国家审计这种特殊的经济控制机制在经济发展中的作用,亦未能把国家审计、政府治理与经济发展纳入一个整体的框架进行分析,并系统深入地探讨三者之间的相互关系。因此,本文将承继中国式分权(Chinese Style Decentralization)的有关研究,在对国家审计提升政府治理效率的作用进行分析的基础上,进一步探讨国家审计的治理功能在促进经济发展中的作用。
基于此,本文以公共受托经济责任理论为基础,基于中国式分权的视角,探讨国家审计在促进地方政府公共受托经济责任履行中所发挥的作用,并从经验研究的角度,实证考察国家审计提升地方政府治理效率以及促进地方经济发展的作用。本文的研究有助于拓展人们对于监督机制在经济发展中所发挥作用的认识,并有助于深化人们对于国家审计具有国家治理功能这一重要论断的理解。此外,还对当前“推进国家治理体系和治理能力的现代化”建设以及促进经济体制的改革和经济发展方式的转变具有一定的启示意义。
本文主要包括六个部分,各章的具体内容如下：
第一章,导论。本章主要介绍选题背景与意义、研究思路与方法、研究内容与结构安排以及预期创新等内容。
第二章,文献综述。本章将首先梳理并分析中国式分权与经济增长以及中国式分权与地方政府行为偏向的有关文献,然后对国家审计与政府治理以及国家审计与经济发展等有关的文献进行总结,最后对已有的研究文献进行适当评述,阐明本文的研究机会与空间。
第三章,理论分析框架。本部分将以公共受托经济责任理论为基础,基于中国式分权的视角,构建国家审计、政府治理与经济发展的分析框架。首先,根据公共受托经济责任理论,探讨政府公共受托经济责任的主要内容以及政府的委托代理问题；其次,分析中国式分权在解决政府委托代理问题中的作用以及对地方政府公共受托经济责任的履行所产生的影响；再次,依据现有的体制模式,探讨国家审计在促进政府治理中的作用,即主要分析国家审计在促进地方政府公共受托经济责任履行中的作用；最后,探讨国家审计促进地方经济发展的作用机制等问题。
第四章,国家审计提升地方政府治理效率的实证检验。本章将利用省级地方政府的数据,基于中国式分权的视角,实证考察国家审计提升地方政府行政管理效率、抑制政府人事及支出规模的扩张以及有效治理腐败等方面的作用,为国家审计具有国家治理功能这一重要论断提供经验证据。
第五章,国家审计促进地方经济发展的实证检验。本章将利用省级地方政府的数据,实证检验国家审计的治理功能在促进地方经济发展中的作用,着重考察国家审计促进经济发展的作用效果及作用路径等问题,并分析审计结果公告制度实施以来中国式分权对于国家审计作用发挥的影响。
第六章,研究结论、政策建议与未来研究展望。本部分将在前文研究的基础上,对主要的研究结论进行归纳总结,以之为基础,提出相应的政策建议,并对本文的研究创新与局限进行分析,进而提出未来的研究展望。
本文的研究取得了一些有益的结论,主要有以下几个方面：
(1)中国式分权这种制度安排引致了地方政府公共受托经济责任履行的异化行为。在以“GDP论英雄”的政绩考核模式下,中国式分权这种制度安排容易引致地方政府公共受托经济责任履行的选择性倾向。它促使地方政府把经济发展责任的履行放在首要位置,使得地方政府把拥有的全部经济资源首先投入到经济发展中,甚至在不具备某些资源的情况下,通过举债或变相举债的方式发展经济,从而实现地区经济的快速发展。然而,由于地方政府把绝大部分的经济资源都投入到了发展经济中,致使地方政府在其他责任的履行方面却显得“回天乏力”,从而导致了公共品供给的失衡、社会利益分配的不合理、日益扩大的贫富差距、严重的环境污染以及部分地区突出的腐败问题等一系列的社会问题。
(2)地方政府在追求经济发展的过程中存在一定程度的机会主义行为。在以“GDP论英雄”的政绩考核模式下,中国式分权的制度安排会促使地方政府有强烈的动机追求任期内的短期经济增长,甚至不惜挪用或违规使用原本用于教育、医疗、卫生、社会保障等非经济性公共物品的预算资金,而将其投入到基础设施建设等有助于促进短期经济增长的项目,进而导致“预算软约束”问题。本文的经验研究发现,国家审计查处的违法违规、损失浪费等问题资金越多,越不利于实现当期经济增长,但是国家审计对于问题资金的查处却能够显著促进未来的经济增长。该研究结论表明,地方政府在追求经济发展的过程中存在着违规使用、甚至滥用预算资金的机会主义行为,而国家审计通过抑制地方政府的机会主义行为,能够有效促进地方经济的长期健康发展。
(3)国家审计具有重要的国家治理功能。第四章的经验研究发现,国家审计通过监控地方政府财政资金的使用状况、向纪检监察等有关部门移送审计案件以及向政府有关部门提出相应的对策建议,能够有效提升地方政府的行政管理效率、抑制地方政府人事及支出规模的不断扩张、提高地方政府的反腐败效率。以上研究结论表明,国家审计能够有效提升政府的治理效率,进而说明国家审计具有重要的国家治理功能。
(4)国家审计通过监控地方政府履行公共受托经济责任,能够有效促进地方经济的长期健康发展。第五章的经验研究发现,国家审计作用的发挥并不利于实现短期经济增长,但却能够显著促进地方经济的长期发展；审计结果公告制度实施以来,国家审计在促进地方经济的长期发展中发挥了更大的作用,并且分权程度越高的地区,国家审计促进地方经济长期发展的作用越明显；国家审计对于地方经济发展的促进作用,主要是通过提升地方政府的行政管理效率、减少地方政府的不合理支出、促进地方政府积极开展反腐败等措施来实现的。
本文的研究具有一定的创新之处,主要体现在以下三个方面：
(1)本文以公共受托经济责任理论为基础,基于中国式分权的视角,尝试构建了国家审计、政府治理与经济发展的分析框架。本文提出政府的公共受托经济责任应该包括经济发展责任、公共品供给责任、促进公平竞争责任、协调利益分配责任、保障经济主体合法权益责任、有效防治腐败责任以及政府信息公开责任等至少七个方面的内容。在“以GDP论英雄”的政绩考核模式下,中国式分权这种制度安排容易导致地方政府公共受托经济责任履行的选择性倾向,地方政府热衷于履行经济发展责任却忽视了其他方面责任的履行。国家审计作为一种特殊的经济控制机制,通过其功能的发挥,能够有效促进地方政府公共受托经济责任的全面有效履行,进而促进经济的长期健康发展。该框架的构建,有助于人们紧密结合中国的国情来研究国家审计的功能与作用,能够更好地提升审计理论对实践活动的解释力,同时深化人们对于国家审计在转型经济国家中所发挥作用的认识。
(2)本文的研究为国家审计具有国家治理功能这一重要论断提供了经验支持。本文基于中国式分权的视角,运用1984——2010年的省级地方政府数据,实证考察了国家审计在提升地方政府治理效率中所发挥的作用,发现国家审计能够有效提升地方政府的治理效率,并且在分权程度越高的地区,国家审计对地方政府治理效率的改善作用越大。该经验研究表明,国家审计具有重要的国家治理功能,对于进一步“推进国家治理体系和治理能力的现代化”建设具有一定的启示意义。
(3)本文承继了中国式分权的有关研究,进一步探讨了国家审计这种特殊的中国式监督机制在经济发展中的作用。在中国式分权与经济发展的研究方面,以往研究主要探讨了激励机制,尤其是经济激励和政治晋升激励在促进经济发展中的作用,本文则在已有研究的基础上,进一步探讨了国家审计这种特殊的监督机制的作用。结合中国式分权的已有研究,这有助于形成一个较为完整的理论分析框架,对于深入理解中国经济发展之谜的有关问题并深化与之相关的研究具有一定的启示意义,同时对于经济体制的改革和经济发展方式的转变也具有一定的借鉴意义。
Since the reform and opening up, Chinese economic has been keeping a high growth rate for over30years, leading remarkable achievements. As documented by Wu (2008):"From1978to2008, the reform and opening up taken place in China has brought pronounced economic outcomes. Compared with1978, by the end of2006, the total amount of GDP has increased14times with an average annual growth rate nearly10%. In addition, the disposable income of urban residents and the net income of rural residents both increased6.7times. And furthermore, the poverty population has reduced from250million to21.48million." Except China, there is no other country in the world, even Japan, has ability to maintained an annually economic growth rate of nearly10%for over30years (Zhou,2007).Thus, the economic growth in China could be seemed as a miracle.
Prior studies have concurred that since1978, the reforms taken in Chinese political system and especially the economic system, have played a crucial role in promoting Chinese economic development. The decentralization reform taken in Chinese economic system, which gives local governments more economic management power, contributes lot to the development of local economy (Weingast,1995; McKinnon,1997; Qian and Roland,1998; Jin et al.,2005; Lin,2007; Wang et al.,2007). The decentralization reform in China could be mainly manifested in two aspects:First, the marketization leads government gradually withdraw from competitive fields and make the resources allocation mainly determined by price and competitive mechanism. Second, as to the government system, central government also gradually decentralizes to the local government, though the overall rationing system in early periods and the tax assignment system in later periods, entitling the local government a certain degree of substantial autonomy (Zhou and Zhang,2008). All these reforms effectively arouse the local government's enthusiasm of developing economy and accordingly promote the rapid development of Chinese economy.
As a matter of fact, although China takes an incremental reform, the major reforms are taken in the economic system, making great achievement. However, the political system reform is relatively slower. Therefore, the lag of political system reform will affect the sustainable and healthy development of economy when economic development to a certain stage. Hence, in recent years, especially after the third plenary session of the eighteenth, the central government explicitly proposes to "comprehensively deepen reform", promotes the reform of political and economic system, speeds up the "modernization of state governance system and governance ability", as well as improves the governance efficiency of government, in order to realize the long-term healthy economic development.
There is a natural connection between state audit and state governance. In fact, state audit is an important part of state governance (Liu,2011). The state audit can effectively promote the realization of "good governance" by ensuring state economic security, supervising power operation, strengthening anti-corruption, promoting democracy and rule of law, maintaining the rights of people's livelihood as well as promoting deepen reform(Liu,2012). In December2013, the21st world audit organization conference, which was held in Beijing, put the "state audit and state governance" as one of its main topics. The meeting issued the "Beijing declaration-the supreme audit institutions promoting good governance", which puts forward as follows:the central goal of state audit is to promote the country to achieve good governance, and the state audit should promote the realization of good governance by maintaining democracy and the rule of law, improving the government efficiency, strengthening anti-corruption, safeguarding state security, promoting the improvement of people's livelihood, improving government transparency and so on.
In recent years, the state audit has played a very important role in promoting the government governance efficiency and the sustainable, healthy economic development. Therefore, it won the world's highly praise. As auditor-general Liu said in the national auditing conference (2011):"During the period of'11th five-year plan', the state audit institutions have surveyed more than720000units, increased fiscal income savings of489.3billion Yuan, saved or avoided the loss of78.9billion Yuan, and found out more than13000major disciplinary violations and economic crimes clues." Compared with the local fiscal revenue, which is about7%of GDP, the problem funds investigated by local audit institutions per year is over2billion, which accounts for2%of GDP. As a professional economic supervision organization, State Audit has played a very important role in promoting China's economic development.
As a matter of fact, promoting economic development is one of the primary goals of the state audit. The which enforced in2011proposes the major goal of state auditing is to protect the safety of national economy, push forward the democracy and anti-corruption, ensure the healthy development of national economy and society, by supervising the financial revenue and expenditure of audited units and the reality, legitimacy as well as effectively of relative economic activities.
However, on the issues related to Chinese economic development, existing research mainly focus on the incentive mechanism, especially the role of economic incentives and political promotion incentives played in economic growth(Fan et al.,1990; Weingast,1995; Qian and Roland,1998; Lin and Liu,2000; Jin et al.,2005; Li and Zhou,2005; Wang et al.2007; Zhang,2007; Zhou,2007; Pi,2012). Few literatures explore the role of supervision mechanism in economic development. This dissertation inherits the relevant researches of Chinese Style Decentralization, and further discusses the role of state audit role played in China's economic development and the path through which state audit affects the economic development.
Based on the theory of public accountability, this dissertation explores the state audit's role in promoting local government to perform accountability from the perspective of Chinese style decentralization, and then test the state audit's effect on promoting the government governance efficiency and the long-term healthy development of the local economy. This dissertation will not only help people to learn more about Chinese style supervision mechanism's role in economic development, but also help deepen the people's understanding of the state audit's governance function. In addition, this dissertation has certain significant enlightenment in promoting" the modernization of state governance system and governance ability", boosting the reform of economic system and changing the way of economic development.
This desertion mainly includes six parts. The specific contents of the chapters are as follows.
Chapter1:Introduction. This chapter mainly introduces the research background of the topic and its importance, the research ideas and methods, the expected innovations, the research contents and structures.
Chapter2:Literature review. This chapter first defines the meaning of Chinese style decentralization based on the existing research literature and then analyzes the role of Chinese style decentralization in economic growth and the bias behavior of Chinese local government caused by the decentralization. I next discuss the state audit's role in service state governance and promoting economic development. Finally, I summarize the existing research literature and show the research opportunities.
Chapter3:Building the whole analysis framework of state audit, government governance and economic development. First, this chapter discusses the main content of public accountability and principal-agent problems of government according to the theory of public accountability. Next, this chapter analyzes the role of Chinese style decentralization played in dealing with the government principal-agent problems and its impact on promoting local government to perform accountability. Then according to the characteristics of the state audit system, this chapter further explores the mechanism of state audit in promoting local government governance. Finally, I discuss the mechanism of the state audit in promoting local economic development.
Chapter4:The empirical test of the state audit to promote local government governance efficiency. Using the data of local government at the provincial level, this chapter tests the state audit's effect on the efficiency of government governance, the expansion of the government scale and the struggling against corruption, based on the perspective of Chinese style decentralization. This chapter provides the empirical evidence for the important thesis that the state audit has governance function.
Chapter5:The empirical test of the state audit to promote local economic development. Using the data of local government at the provincial level, this chapter tests the state audit governance function role in promoting local economic development, based on the relevant research of Chinese style decentralization. This chapter focuses on the effects and acting path of state audit to promote the development of economy, and analyzes the influence of Chinese style decentralization on the function of state audit since the'audit storm'
Chapter6:Conclusion. On the basis of above research, this chapter summarizes the main findings, and puts forward the corresponding policy recommendations and the future research prospects with the discussion of the innovations and limitations of this dissertation.
The main findings in this dissertation are as follows.
(1) Chinese style decentralization leads to the alienation of local governments'behaviors in performing public accountability. Under the system, which puts GDP as the core of criteria of assessments, Chinese style decentralization leads to the local governments'selective tendency in fulfilling public accountability. It prompts the local government to put the performance of economic development in the first place, making them allocate the most economic resources in the economic development. When certain resources are in short, in order to local governments even tend to adopt some inappropriate methods, such borrowing, to keep the economy grow rapidly. Therefore, local governments can hardly perform other responsibilities effectively, since most resources are spend in economic development. As a result, a series of social problems, such as the public goods supply imbalance, unreasonable distribution of social interests, gradually expanding gap between rich and poor, serious environmental pollution, and prominent corruption comet to the surface.
(2) There is a certain degree of opportunistic behaviors in the process of local governments pursuing the economic development. Under the system, which puts GDP as the core of performance criteria of assessments, the arrangement of Chinese style decentralization would motivate local government to pursuit for short-term economic growth, even may incent them to misappropriate or illegal use of the budget, which was supposed to be used in education, health care and social security, to projects, such as infrastructure construction, which is helpful to the short-term economic growth, leading to the'soft budget constraint'problem. This dissertation finds that the more the illegal and wasted fund investigated by state audit the more adverse to the current economic growth. However, the investigations on the illegal and wasted fund conducted by state audit can significantly promote the future economic growth. This study shows that there are certain opportunistic behaviors, such as misappropriate or illegal use of the budget, in the process of local governments pursuing for economic development, and the state audit can effectively promote the long-term healthy development of the local economy, by inhibiting the opportunism behavior of local government.
(3) The state audit has important governance function. The empirical research of chapter4finds that, the state audit can effectively improve the administration efficiency of local government, inhibit the expansion of the government scale and improve the efficiency of local government's anti-corruption. The results indicate that, the state audit can enhance the efficiency of government governance, testifying that the state audit has important governance function.
(4) The state audit can promote the long-term healthy development of the local economy by supervision the local government effectively to perform public accountability. The empirical research of chapter5finds that, the role of state audit is not conducive to achieve short-term economic growth, but to promote the long-term development of the local economy. Since the'auditing storm', the state audit has played a more important role in promoting the long-term development of the local economy. In the region with higher degree of decentralization, state audit has greater effect on promoting long-term development of the regional economy. State audit promotes the development of local economy mainly in three ways: improving the administration efficiency of local government, reducing the unreasonable expenditure of local government, and facilitating local governments actively conducting anti-corruption.
The innovations of this desertion are mainly embodied in the following three aspects:
(1) Based on the theory of public accountability, this dissertation builds a whole framework for analysis of the state audit, government governance and economic development. This dissertation argues that the governments'public accountability should include at least seven aspects, which are economic development responsibility, public goods supply responsibility, promote fair competition responsibility, coordination of interest distribution responsibility, guarantee the economic entity's legitimate rights responsibility, prevention and control of corruption responsibility, information disclosure responsibility. Chinese style decentralization would lead to the local governments'selective tendency to fulfill public accountability. Local governments are keen to fulfill economic development but ignore other aspects. As a special economic control mechanism, state audit can promote the long-term healthy development of the local economy by supervising the local government effectively to perform public accountability. The theoretical framework this dissertation built can help people to study state audit's function under the institutional backgrounds of China, and can better promote explanatory power of auditing theory to practice, also can deepen people's understanding of the state audit's role in transition economies.
(2) This dissertation provides empirical evidence on the aguments that state audit has significant governance function. Using province-level data, this dissertation tests the state audit's effect on the efficiency of government governance based on the perspective of Chinese style decentralization, and finds that state audit can effectively improve the efficiency of local government governance. This dissertation also finds the effect of state audit would be greater in regions with higher degree of decentralization. My results indicate that state audit has important governance function. Thus, this dissertation has certain significant enlightenment in promoting "the modernization of state governance system and governance ability".
(3) This dissertation inherits the relevant research of Chinese style decentralization, and further discusses the role of state audit (the special Chinese style supervision mechanism) played in Chinese economic development. On the issues related to Chinese economic development, existing researches mainly discuss the incentive mechanism, especially the role of economic incentives and political promotion incentives played in economic growth. This dissertation further discusses the special Chinese style supervision mechanism's role in economic development. Combined with the existing researches of Chinese style decentralization, my dissertation helps to form a relatively complete theoretical analysis framework. Also, this dissertation has some implications for helping people to better understand the mysteries of Chinese economic growth, and boosting the reform of economic system and changing the way of economic development.
引文
14 文硕：《世界审计史》,1990年第1版,5页,北京：中国审计出版社,1990。转引至,蔡春：《审计理论结构研究》,2001年第1版,80页,大连：东北财经大学出版社,2001。
15 蔡春：《审计理论结构研究》,2001年第1版.大连：东北财经大学出版社,2001。
27 有关财政分权度量指标的详细讨论,请参见张晏和龚六堂(2005)的文章“分税制改革、财政分权与中国经济增长”,《经济学(季刊)》,2005年10月,第5卷第1期。
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