摘要
回顾中国过去的三十多年，中国经济的迅速崛起几乎超出了所有人的预期。平心而论，在当前的制度背景下，中国经济增长的速度挑战了传统的经济学理论，被世人誉为“增长的奇迹”。尽管财政分权理论和政治晋升锦标赛理论在某种程度上解读了中国经济增长的奇迹，但更应该认识到中国经济增长奇迹的背后：中国经济增长的主要驱动力是高储蓄和高投资，而创新的作用并未有效地发挥出来。从长远来看，这种粗放式的经济增长方式并非推动中国经济可持续发展的持久动力，相反，它不仅使得当前中国社会背负着高昂的治理成本，而且还长期压制了中国企业创新。为此，营造良好的制度环境，推动中国企业创新，转变经济增长方式便成为现阶段中国政府的首要任务之一，也是中国实现经济可持续发展的重大课题。但是，当前我国的各项正式制度并未完全建立起来，企业创新面临着诸多风险。为此，在当前的制度环境下，中国政府应该完善何种制度才能最有效的促进企业创新，同时，寻租、贿赂等腐败活动是否能够成为当前制度环境下企业抵御创新风险的一种有效的非正式制度。
基于上述问题，本文的工作至少可以分为两个层面：第一个层面是，试图在通盘考虑制度环境和腐败两类因素的基础上，从产出层面考察这两大因素对创新的效应，以综合视点梳理出“制度环境—腐败—企业创新”的链条效应，从而较为全面地分析制度环境和腐败为何会影响到企业创新，以及在考虑制度环境的情况下，腐败与企业创新之间的关联性。另一个层面是，引入中国宏观、微观和调查数据对由机理分析所推导出的若干命题进行实证研究，以寻找来自中国的经验证据，并试图找寻中国企业创新的激励因素，这对把握中国企业的创新行为，进而合理引导企业乃至整个产业的转型升级有着非常重要的意义。
理论上，首先，本文分析了制度环境作用于企业创新的机理，该机理表明制度环境决定了不同类型经济活动所提供的激励结构，理性的企业家会根据经济体中的经济环境来权衡各种经济活动的收益与成本，从而选择自身利益最大化的活动作为对现有制度环境的一种回应。其次，分析了腐败作用于企业创新的机理，该机制表明，在正式制度并未完全确立的经济体中，适度的寻租、贿赂等腐败活动虽然增加了企业创新的交易成本，但它有助于企业规避官僚体制中的繁文缛节。正如拍卖机制一样，建立在适度贿赂基础上的许可证授予和官方授权能够实现相关资源配置的帕累托次优。更为重要的是，企业创新成果非排他性和非竞争性使得处在正式制度缺位经济体中的企业亟需通过适当贿赂等腐败活动寻求“政府庇护”以防止创新成果收益的侵蚀。然而，更高额度的贿赂则既有可能扭曲了资源配置，同时又增加了企业创新的交易成本。再加上，建立在更高额度贿赂等腐败活动基础上的承诺并没有强制执行的法律基础，这使得更高水平的腐败活动带有事后机会主义和随意性。这显然增加了企业创新所面临的风险，抑制了企业创新动力。最后，本文还从理论上分析了制度环境与腐败之间的关系。相关理论表明，一方面，良好的制度环境提高了腐败的交易成本，为经济活动的正常开展提供了有章可循的依据，此时以寻租、贿赂等为典型特征的腐败活动只会破坏经济活动的正常规则，限制经济自由。另一方面，当制度环境限制经济自由时，腐败则可以帮助企业家规避繁琐的规则，提高经济运行的效率。
基于上述理论分析，本文在实证上得出的研究结论至少有以下四点：
第一，运用2012年世界银行关于中国企业营运的制度环境质量调查数据实证分析了腐败水平对企业创新的影响。研究发现：一定程度的腐败有利于企业创新，而更高程度的腐败则会抑制企业创新。腐败与企业创新之间呈现出显著的倒U型曲线关系。进一步地，本文发现，腐败可以通过以下两种渠道来促进企业创新，即腐败有助于企业获得政府订单(政府担保)和银行机构贷款，从而推动企业创新。
第二，运用省域层面的宏观经济数据，并考虑将市场化指数作为制度质量的指代指标，同时作为腐败影响企业创新的门槛变量，从而将经济系统中各因素互动关系的非线性纳入到计量框架中。实证研究发现，腐败对企业创新具有消极影响，但这种消极影响会随着制度质量的改善而发生非线性的“区制变化”。即制度质量的单门槛效应使得腐败对企业创新的影响呈现出非线性变化，当制度质量处于较低的“区制”时，腐败的蔓延会对企业创新造成致命的打击，而制度质量处于较高的“区制”时，腐败的蔓延对企业创新的打击力度会大大削弱，甚至并不明显。此外，本文还发现制度质量存在较大的区域差异，具体表现为东部地区绝大多数省份已经跨越了制度质量的门槛，而中部和西部地区，尤其是西部地区大多数省份却停留在制度质量的门槛值内。
第三，运用1998-2007年的中国工业企业数据库相关数据以及手工搜集的省长和省委书记官员任期的相关数据，实证研究了地方官员任期和腐败对企业创新行为的影响。研究结果表明地方官员任期与企业创新之间呈现显著的倒U型曲线，同时腐败也与企业创新之间呈现倒U型曲线关系，更为重要的是，官员任期会负向调节腐败与企业创新之间的关系。进一步地，本文发现官员任期和腐败与企业创新之间的关系会因为市场化进程、产业性质、所有制结构和官员特征而表现出动态的复杂关系。
第四，运用1998-2007年的中国工业企业数据库相关数据以及手工搜集的省长和省委书记官员任期的相关数据，实证研究了地方官员异地更替和腐败对企业创新行为的影响。研究结果表明，地方官员异地更替对企业创新具有显著的消极影响。同时，腐败与企业创新之间呈显著的倒U型曲线关系。此外，地方官员异地更替会正向调节腐败与企业创新之间的关联性。进一步地，本文发现官员异地更替和腐败与企业创新之间的关系会因为市场化进程、产业性质、所有制结构和官员特征而表现出动态的复杂关系。
Over the past thirty years of China, the rapid rise of china’s economic growthbeyond the expectations of almost everyone. To be fair, under the background of currentinstitution, the rapid of China’s economic growth is a challenge to traditional economictheory, which is known as “growth miracle”. Although fiscal decentralization theoryand political tournament theory provide interpretation of China’s growth miracle insome measure, we should realize that behind China’s economic growth miracle: themajor driving forces of China’s economic growth are high saving rate and highinvestment, but innovation has not played at its potential. In the long term, the extensiveeconomic growth pattern is not the lasting power to push China’s sustainable economicdevelopment, oppositely, which not only makes Chinese society bear costly governancecost, but also suppress firm innovation for a long time. Therefore, constructingfavorable institutional environment, promoting firm innovation and transformingeconomic growth pattern become one of the primary tasks of Chinese government, alsoare the important issue to achieve sustainable economic development. However, thevarious formal institutions of China at present have not been completely set up,innovative firms are faced with lots of risks. For this reason, under the currentinstitutional environment, the government of China should improve which institution inorder to promote firm innovation effectively. Meanwhile, are bribe and other corruptactivities able to become an effective informal institution under current institutionalenvironment to against the risk of innovation?
Based on the above mentioned problems, the works of this paper are divided into atleast two aspects: the first aspect is that, based on the two types factors, which areinstitutional environment and corruption, we consider the effects of institutionalenvironment and corruption on innovative output, card the chain effect of institutionalenvironment-corruption-firm innovation from integrated viewpoint, thus analysis howinstitutional environment and corruption affect firm innovation overall, and therelationship between corruption and firm innovation under considering the interferenceof institutional environment. The other aspect is that, using macro, micro data andsurvey data of China, we conduct an empirical analysis to test some propositions whichare elicited from mechanism analysis, in order to search the experimental evidence fromChina, and the incentive factors of firm innovation, and this has important significance to master firm innovative behaviors of China, and then provide reasonable guidance tothe transformation and upgrading of firm and even the whole industry in China.
Theoretically, first of all, this paper provides the analysis about the mechanism ofinstitutional environment acting on firm innovation, and which manifests that theinstitutional environments determine the incentive structures which are provided bydifferent types of economic activities. Rational entrepreneur would trade off theearnings and costs of various economic activities according to the economicenvironments of economic entity, and then choose the activities to maximize their owninterests. Secondly, we analysis the mechanism of corruption acting on firm innovation,and which manifests that moderate bribe and other corrupt activities increase thetransaction cost of firm innovation, but it helps firm to avoid the red tape of bureaucracy.Just as auction mechanism, license grant and official authorization based on themoderate bribe can achieve Pareto suboptimal of the resources allocation. It is moreimportant that, the non-excludability and non-competitiveness of firm innovativeproduct make the firm need to seek “Political asylum” through moderate bribe andother corrupt activities under the defective institution of economy, to protect theinnovative product earnings from erosion.
However, higher amount of bribes are likely to distort resource allocation, andincrease the transaction cost of firm innovation. Moreover, the commitment based onthe higher amount of bribes and other corrupt activities do not have legal footing, whichmakes higher level corrupt activities with ex post opportunism and randomness, and itincreases the risk of firm innovation, and inhibits the force of firm innovation. Lastly,we analysis the relationship between institutional environment and corruption, and findthat good institutional environment raises the transaction cost of corruption, andprovides a rule-based for the normal conduct of economic activities, and now bribe andother corrupt activities would only damage the normal rules of economic activity, andrestrict economic freedom. On the other hand, when institutional environment restrictthe economic freedom, corruption may help entrepreneurs to avoid burdensome rules,enhance the efficiency of economic operation.
Based on the above theoretical analysis, the empirical research conclusions of thispaper at least the following4point:
Firstly, we provides a firm-level empirical analysis on the ways in whichcorruption affects firm innovation using survey data of World Bank about institutionalquality of Chinese enterprise operation in2012. This study finds that, there is an inverted U-shaped curve relationship between corruption and firm innovation; it meansthat a certain degree of corruption is grease for firm innovation, but higher level ofcorruption is stumbling block for firm innovation. Furthermore, this study also revealsthat government guarantee and banking leading are the effective channels for theinfluence of corruption on innovation.
Secondly, using the macroeconomic data at provincial-level, considering themarketisation index as proxy index of institutional quality, and the threshold variable ofcorruption acting on firm innovation, then take nonlinearity of the interaction betweenvarious factors into the econometric framework. The conclusion of the empiricalresearch conclusions show that, corruption has a negative influence on firm innovation,but the negative effect would have nonlinear change with the improvement ofinstitutional quality. It means that, the single threshold effect of institutional qualitymakes the relationship between corruption and firm innovation change non-linearly,when institutional quality remains at lower regime, the spread of corruption will providea fatal blow to firm innovation. However, when institutional quality remains at higherregime, the blow of corruption spread to firm innovation will be greatly weakened, eventhere is no obvious blow. Moreover, We also find that there is a big regional differencesof institutional quality, that is most of the provinces in eastern area have crossed thethreshold of institutional quality, but in the middle area and western area, especiallywestern area, most provinces remains into the threshold of institutional quality.
Thirdly, using China's industrial enterprise database related data from1998-2007and a hand-collected data of official tenure, the empirical study about theeffect of local official tenure and corruption on firm innovative behaviors. The resultsshow that, there is an inverted U-shaped curve to depict the relationship between localofficial tenure and firm innovation; meanwhile, there is also a U-shaped curve to depictthe relationship between corruption and firm innovation. It is more important that, localofficial tenure negatively regulates the relationship between corruption and firminnovation. Furthermore, we find that the relationship between corruption and firminnovation will show the dynamic complex relationship with marketization, industrialnature, ownership structure and officials characteristics.
Fourthly, using China's industrial enterprise database related data from1998-2007and a hand-collected data of official tenure, the empirical study about the effect of thegeographical rotation of local official and corruption on firm innovative behaviors. Theresults show that, the geographical rotation data of local official have negative effect on firm innovation; meanwhile, there is a U-shaped curve to depict the relationshipbetween corruption and firm innovation. It is more important that, the geographicalrotation of local official negatively regulates the relationship between corruption andfirm innovation. Furthermore, we find that the relationship between the geographicalrotation of local official, corruption and firm innovation will show the dynamic complexrelationship with marketization, industrial nature, and ownership structure and officialscharacteristics.
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