摘要
社会两难问题,尤其那些由于人口过多、资源减少、环境污染等引起的两难问题引起了社会学家、经济学家和心理学家等越来越多的关注。社会两难研究的主题可以归纳为两大类:一类是对社会两难条件下对个体的理性特点进行探讨;另一类是分析社会两难情景下影响合作行为的因素。通过综述以上两个方面的研究发现,他们的研究结果并不是相互一致。针对这些冲突的结果,研究者普遍认识到,揭示处于社会两难情景下的人的理性特点是解决该问题的关键,需要找到一个解释性更强的模型来包涵以往的研究,来适应更具有社会意义的情景。
本研究认为,不能把两难行为视为纯粹的个体认知分析活动,必须在社会理性基础上,从社会认知的角度分析社会交互过程对两难情景中的两难行为的影响。本研究以人的理性特征为突破口,以社会认同理论、适当性决策逻辑等理论为依据,探讨社会身份对个体的社会两难对策的影响,并分析其作用机制。同时探讨了社会价值取向、规范、群体特征等社会理性变量与个体的社会身份认同之间的关系。研究分为四个部分:
研究一分析现实的两难困境中影响人们合作行为的社会理性因素,尤其是社会身份对合作行为的影响。采用现场研究法关注现实的社会两难情景中,人们的社会理性因素(如社会身份、规范)对合作水平的影响。研究遵循适当性决策逻辑的思想,强调社会理性因素对人们决策行为的影响,尤其是社会身份对人们捐赠行为的影响。通过定性研究的方法,发现在现实社会两难情景中,社会身份、规范等社会理性因素相对“理性”计算而言是更重要的影响人们捐赠行为的因素。具有某些特定社会身份的参与者相比于普通参与者会表现出更多的合作行为,表现出更多的责任感。
研究二在研究一的基础之上探讨社会身份对两难情景中合作行为影响的心理基础。研究关注不同层次的社会身份认同感对人们在社会两难情景中合作行为的影响,认为对社会身份的认同是社会身份在两难情景中影响人们决策行为的心理基础。采用嵌套式两难困境范式,将人们的身份认同水平分为三个不同的层次,分别为个人身份认同,子群体身份认同和集体身份认同。结果验证了社会认同理论,突显相应的社会分类会增加人们对相应群体的合作水平。其次,结果发现社会责任感在社会身份认同与合作行为之间起一定程度中介作用。
研究三探讨社会身份对两难情景中合作行为影响的作用机制。研究主要从合作动机的激发与破坏的角度考察身份突显效应(突显合作者与突显不合作者)的心理机制。同时考察社会价值取向、群体内初始财富差异等变量与突显效应之间的关系。该研究采用“操作撤销”方式,考察不同的身份突显操作方式对合作水平的影响,及操作撤销后对人们合作水平及合作动机的影响。结果显示,突显合作者与突显不合作者两种方式都会提高被试的合作水平。但两种突显方式的作用机制不同:突显合作者激发了被试合作的内在动机;而突显不合作者则会破坏被试合作的内在动机。突显合作者条件下,不同价值取向的被试受突显效应的影响不同,合作取向的被试更多受内在动机的影响;非合作取向的被试则更多受外在动机的影响。突显合作者条件下,初始财富无差异的群体较初始财富有差异的群体更容易激发合作的内在动机。
研究四在研究三的基础之上进一步探讨社会身份对两难情景中合作行为影响的作用机制。研究关注在社会两难情景下,社会身份的差异性对于合作行为的影响及其作用机制,认为责任感是社会身份影响合作行为的作用机制之一。在社会认同理论的基础上,把人的社会身份分为显性身份和隐性身份。通过不同的实验设计突显人的不同社会身份特征,并且认为社会责任感的提高是身份突显的作用机制。结果显示,责任感可以影响人在社会两难中的合作行为。高责任感可以增加被试对财富和力量贡献。人的隐性身份和显性身份在不同条件下表现出来,都可以影响人的合作行为,并通过责任感发生作用。群体组成会影响社会责任感。群体组成不同,会导致责任分散,使得责任感不同,从而影响个体的合作行为。
最后,研究者在上述研究结果的基础上,拓展了适当性决策模型,初步提出两难情景中影响人们合作行为的社会理性模型。
Social dilemma is more and more concerned by sociologists, economists and psychologists, especially on the topics of population, resource and environmental pollution. The subject of social dilemma research can be concluded tow aspects, one discusses the individual's rationality character in social dilemma, the other discusses the influencing factors of cooperation in social dilemma. With reviewing the literatures, there are many inconsistencies in their results. More and more researcher realizes that to find the people's social rationality factors in social dilemma is the key to improve the cooperation.
On the perspective of social rationality, this paper discusses how social identity influences subjects' decision making in social dilemma based on social identity theory and the logic of appropriateness. This paper is consisted of the following 4 parts:
Study 1 focuses on the facets of social rationality (such as social identity, social norm), and analyzes their influences on the level of cooperation. According to March's logic of appropriateness, this study emphasizes social rational facets' influence on subjects' decision making. The results indicate that the behavior in the second stage is different from the baseline in the first stage. The subjects contribute more in the second stage. The facets of social rationality are more important than rational calculation in donation situation. Someone with specific social identity (organizer) is more cooperative than usually participator, and takes on more responsibility.
Based on study 1, study 2 focuses on the influences of identification, discusses how different level of identification influence subjects' cooperation in social dilemma. This study uses nested dilemma paradigm proposed by Wit and Kerr (2002) to simulate conflicts between individual, subgroup and collection, and observes how the subjects make decision in such a situation. Resent researches indicate that highlighting subjects' certain social category can focus subjects' attention on corresponding category's interests, and make them do more for corresponding category's interests. Nested dilemma paradigm divides the identification into three levels, namely individual identification, subgroup identification and collective identification. Three conclusions are given in this study. First, the results confirm the social identity theory (SIT), indicating that making some social category salient can increase subjects' cooperation for corresponding social category. Second, in the situation of individual identification, social orientation doesn't influence subjects' donation significantly. Third, by discussing the mechanism of social identity, the researcher finds that social responsibility plays a mediated role, and raising the level of responsibility is important to push social dilemma further.
In study 3, the researcher discusses the psychology mechanism of identity salience in public good dilemma. Deci (1999) indicated that extrinsic motivation would decrease the intrinsic motivation of donating voluntary, and then, change the fame of cooperation. Based on this proposition, this study discusses the effect of identity salience on the perspective of inhibition or activation of cooperative motivation (salient cooperator or salient non-cooperator). Also, this study discusses the relationship of social orientation, the difference of initial fortune in group and the effect of identity salience. In this study, the researcher uses the paradigm of "Removing the Sanction" to probe how the different operation of identity salience influence subjects' cooperation, and what happen when the operation was removed. The subjects level of cooperation can be increased by making either cooperator or non-cooperator salient. However, the functions of these two types of identity salience are different. Salient cooperator activates people's intrinsic cooperation motivation, whereas salient non-cooperator, inhibit subjects' intrinsic cooperation motivation. Moreover, when cooperation behavior is salient, subjects with cooperation value are more influenced by intrinsic motivation, whereas subjects with individual value are more influenced by extrinsic motivation. In the situation of cooperation salience, the group with indifferent initial fortune is more easily activated to cooperate than group with different initial fortune.
Based on study 3, study 4 discusses how social identity influences cooperation. In our daily life, everyone has multiple social identities. The researcher gives subjects different social identities by social operation, and then, analyzes subjects' cooperation in social dilemma to know more about a person with "social rationality". The different composition of group may elicit decentralization of responsibility, and then influence subjects' cooperation. Based on social identity theory, this study divides social identities into two categories, one is explicit and the other implicit. In this study, the researcher uses experimental operation to highlight subjects' different social identity to understand how different social identity influences cooperation. The researcher proposes that social responsibility is an important mechanism. The results indicate responsibility would influence subjects' cooperation. High responsibility can increase subjects' donation of fortune and power. Both the explicit and implicit social identities are simultaneously, and make effect in different condition. They both have an effect on subjects' cooperation through the mechanism of responsibility. The composition of group has effect on responsibility. And then influence subjects' cooperation.
Finally, based on all above results, research expands the logic of appropriateness and advances the "social rationality model" in social dilemmas.
引文
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