摘要
低碳背景下，碳排放权成为一种可交易新型资源，产品和服务的减排效果具有价值属性。将供应链中共存的碳排放权视为一种特殊资源纳入企业的运营优化中，使企业与上下游关系从传统“二维交易”模式变为“三维交易”模式。此外，现实中出现合同能源管理等新经济主体和新的经济关系。上述低碳经济特征使供应链企业的成本构成、盈利模式和市场风险发生了深刻变化，为供应链企业实现低碳化运营提出许多新问题。针对上述情况，本文提出“考虑碳规制及交易的供应链企业生产及减排决策机制研究”这一主题。主要对以下几方面进行研究：
(1)当考虑碳减排及交易成本时，给出了下游零售商以零售价格以及上游制造商以批发价格为决策变量的利润函数。通过对集中和分散决策的分析得出：减排成本过高意味着制造商将会付出巨大的代价去减排，在与零售商合作时失去合作的空间；过低意味着产品不具有市场竞争力，减排投资的收益率小的结论。
(2)通过对处于供应链上下游制造型企业的合作减排问题进行研究，得到两主体在三种不同合作情况下的利润值和减排效果。分析表明：在减排和定价均合作情况下，各主体的利润和减排效果是最好的；政府应首先瞄准排放量大的企业并从所处供应链的上游抓起；企业若要减少碳排放总量，必须放弃最优产量等重要结论。
(3)讨论由能源管理公司(EMC)和下游制造商所组成的供应链系统的减排与定价问题。通过设计碳配额分享和利润分享两种契约得出：最优定价与减排决策主要依赖于主体的边际减排成本及碳交易成本；不同分享契约条件下所产生的制造商利润差值存在临界点，而对于EMC来说，利润分享能给其带来更多的利润等结论。
(4)考虑碳减排供应商和下游零售商的减排决策问题。在收益共享寄售契约下，通过对集中和分散决策的比较，得到分散决策下制造商的最优变量值与分享比例的关系；供应商减排驱动及零售商取得最优利润的分享比例范围；零售商需调整分享比例与成本占有率间的关系以使供应链达到集中决策下最优值等结论。
(5)产品制造商不但受政府碳排放的规制，还受碳配额供应商碳交易价格影响。通过建立零供两主体Stackelberg博弈模型得到：单位产品碳排放量和政府碳排放限额对两主体利润的影响是呈反向关系的；政府应合理制定碳排放上限值、制造商也该有效治理产品碳排放量，以使零供两主体的效用增量和达到最优。
From the perspective of cap and trade, carbon emission permit has become a newtype of enterprise’s resource which can be traded in the market. Emission reductionhas the value attributes of products and services. Taking carbon emission permitcoexisting in the supply chain as a kind of special resources and integrated into theenterprise operation optimization will change the relationship between enterprisesfrom the traditional pattern of "two-dimensional trade" to the new pattern of"three-dimensional transaction". Moreover, the contract energy management and theresulting new economic relations have appeared in reality. These low-carbon economycharacteristics make the supply chain’s cost structure, profit model and market risktransform profoundly. So many new problems have emerged for enterprises to realizelow carbon supply chain operations. According to the above situation, this paper putsforward the topic "Supply Chain Enterprises’ Production and ReductionDecision-making Mechanism Research Considering Emission Regulation andTrading" and discusses the following items:
(1) When allowance is made for the carbon emissions reduction and transactioncosts, the profit functions can be deduced that retailer takes retail price as decisionvariable and manufacturer takes wholesale price as decision variable. Through theanalysis of centralized and decentralized decision-making, it can be derived thatoverhigh emission reducing cost means that the manufacturer will pay a huge cost toreduce carbon emission, and then will lose the cooperative space when cooperateswith retailer, meanwhile, overlow means that the product will lose competition ability,it has little rate of return on investment.
(2) Through investigating how upstream and downstream enterprises in thesupply chain choose cooperational reduction strategy while they are facingenvironmental regulation, we can get their profits and reduction efficiencies in threedifferent situations. It can be obtained that in full-cooperation case, both their profitand reduction efficiency are optimal. The results show that in the process of lowcarbonization of manufacturing enterprises, government should aim at the enterpriseswhich emit larger carbon and grab from the source of supply chain firstly, alsoenterprises must reduce their optimal output in order to reduce their total emissions.
(3) Considering the reduction and pricing problem of a carbon emission permitsupply chain system which is composed by one manufacturer and one energymanagement company (EMC), we can get the inclusion by means of designing twokinds of sharing contract that the optimal pricing and reduction decision depend mainly on the two subjects’ marginal abatement cost and the carbon price, themanufacturer profit margin arising from the different sharing contracts has a criticalvalue, but for EMC, profit sharing contract can bring more profit value.
(4) We will discuss emission reduction and sharing decision making problem of asupply chain system which is composed of a single emission reduction suppliers anddownstream retailer. Under the revenue sharing consignment contract, by means ofcomparison decentralized decision-making with the centralized, we can not only getthe optimal abatement level and yield under the decentralized decision, but also therelationship with share proportion and the range of the optimal sharing proportionwhich can urge the supplier reduce emission and the retailer achieve the optimal profit.Moreover, the retailer need coordinate the sharing proportion with the cost sharingrate in order to make the supply chain achieve the optimum value which is equal tothe centralized decision.
(5) Manufacturer who produces perishable good will not only be affected by thegovernment regulation of carbon emission, but also by the carbon price decision ofthe upstream supplier. By the establishment of the two agents Stackelberg gamemodel, we can get the conlusion that the impact of unit product’s carbon emission andthe government's ‘cap-and-trade’ regulation on two agents profit is inversed. Also thegovernment should reasonably establish carbon emissions’ cap, and manufacturershould effectively control product’s carbon emissions. Only in this way can make theincrement of the two agents’ utility optimal.
引文
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