摘要
随着社会经济发展到较高级阶段,在市场竞争推动和企业内部进化的联合作用下,公司所形成母子公司为特点的高级企业组织形态——企业集团。国有企业集团的发展直接关系国家经济的发展速度,而国有企业集团的发展状况在很大程度上取决于该企业集团母子公司之间的有效管控。
我国企业集团,以国有企业集团为主,经历近三十年的发展,在资产、数量等方面已初具规模,并在社会经济建设中起重要作用。但我国企业集团,尤其是国有企业集团,在集团治理、母子公司管控方面尚存在一定的问题。所以,本文选择国有企业集团母子公司管控模式研究,具有一定的现实和理论意义。
正文由八章组成,分为三部分。第一部分由第一章和第二章组成,指出本文选题意义之所在,通过对国内外研究文献的回顾和总结,阐明了研究目的、研究方法以及正文的结构的基础上,对国有企业集团母子公司管控模式的概念、理论及手段予以阐述。第一章在指出本文研究意义及研究架构外,系统性的回顾国内外企业集团管控的研究现状。第二章对国有企业集团、母子公司界定及其关系予以论述,并对相关的产权理论、委托代理理论、组织协调理论及集团治理理论予以阐述,从而对国有企业集团母子公司管控的手段和方式进行总结。
第二部分为本文的核心部分,包括第三章、第四章、第五章、第六章和第七章。本部分主要在第一部分的基础上,通过对国有企业集团管控模式的国际比较借鉴,构建我国国有企业集团管控模式,进而建立相应评价体系,在此基础上提出该管控模式的主要运行保障体系,并通过实例验证。第三章分别对美国、德国、新加坡的国有企业集团的一般治理结构、管控模式予以论述,并以淡马锡国有企业集团的实例予以分析。第四章在国有企业集团管控模式国际比较借鉴的基础上,对我国国有企业集团管控构建的原则予以界定,以此对企业集团管控模式深入分析,通过剖析构建我国国有企业集团管控模式所需的要素及对各要素的影响因素,研究提出我国国有企业集团母子公司A型、V型、W型和H型管控模式,并对其在我国应用情况予以阐述。第五章则在管控模式的论述基础上,通过对国有企业集团管控的绩效的界定,构建我国国有企业集团管控绩效评价体系。第六章则在整体研究基础之上,对我国国有企业集团母子公司管控的主要运行保障予以总结,其主要集中在战略保障、资金保障、文化保障等方面。第七章则以上市公司武汉长江通信产业集团股份有限公司为案例,对构建的我国国有企业集团的管控模式予以验证论述。
第三部分是第八章。该部分主要对本文的研究结论、创新点和进一步研究及发展方向进行归纳总结。
When a social economy develops into a higher stage, under the combined effects of the market competition and its internal evolution, a company may be organized in a senior form, which is called the enterprise group, characterized by the combination of parent and subsidiary companies. The development speed of national economy is directly affected by the development of state-owned enterprise groups, which depends largely on the effective control of the subsidiary companies by their parent.
After nearly30years of development, the enterprise groups in China, especially the state-owned enterprise groups, have begun to take shape in the assets and the number, etc., and played an important role in the socio-economic construction. However, the enterprise groups in China, especially the state-owned enterprise groups, still face certain problems in the corporate governance and the parent-subsidiary control. The study of parent-subsidiary control in the state-owned enterprise groups has a certain practical and theoretical significance.
The body of the dissertation is composed by eight chapters divided into three parts. The first part consists of Chapters Ⅰ and Ⅱ, which points out the significance of the study, clarifies the research purpose, methods and the structure of the body after the review and summary of domestic and foreign literature, and elaborates the related concepts, theories and means of the parent-subsidiary control in the state-owned enterprise group. The first chapter points out the meaning and the framework of the study after systematically reviewing the domestic and foreign study of parent-subsidiary control in the enterprise group. The second chapter defines the state-owned enterprise group, the parent and subsidiary companies and their relationship, and discusses the related theories, including the property rights theory, the principal-agent theory, the organizational coordination theory and the group governance theory. Finally, the means and ways of parent-subsidiary control in state-owned enterprise groups are summarized in this chapter.
The second part is the core of this dissertation, which includes ChapterⅢ, Chapter IV, Chapter V, Chapter VI and Chapter Ⅶ. Mainly based on the first part, this part builds a China's state-owned enterprises Group control mode after the international comparative study. Furthermore, a related evaluation system and maintenance system are established and verified. Chapter Ⅲ analyzes of the corporate governance and the control model of state-owned enterprise groups in the United States, Germany and Singapore, and takes Temasek Holdings as a study case. Chapter IV explicit the principles of the parent-subsidiary control in China's state-owned enterprise groups based on the international comparative analysis. Through parsing the elements to build an effective control model, the author classifies the control model into A, V, W and H type, and discusses their application in China. The Chapter V builds a performance evaluation system on the basis of the definition of the performance of parent-subsidiary control in China's state-owned enterprise group. The Chapter VI summarizes the maintenance system of the parent-subsidiary control in China's state-owned enterprise group, including the corporate strategy, funds and the corporate culture etc.. Chapter Ⅶ takes the Wuhan Yangtze Communications Industry Group Co., Ltd. as example to verify the parent-subsidiary control in China's state-owned enterprise group.
The third part is the Chapter Ⅷ. This part summarizes the main conclusions and innovation of this article, and further study direction.
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