摘要
在20世纪80年代以后,公司治理问题开始进入人们的视野,通过对英美与德日两类不同类型公司竞争力的考察,经济学家和实业者意识到公司治理结构对企业经营绩效的重大影响,并由此引发了全球对公司治理问题的高度关注。我国国有商业银行①公司治理体系演进的历史也是中国经济变迁的历史。整个演进过程大致可以分为四个阶段：第一阶段为新中国成立——1978年,该阶段为计划经济体制下的“大一统”时期；第二阶段为1978年——1993年,该阶段为有计划商品经济时代的专业银行时期；第三阶段为1994年——2002年,该阶段为转轨阶段国有银行改革时期；第四阶段为2003年至今,该阶段为国有商业银行股份制改革,构建现代公司治理框架时期。那么在不同的历史时期,政府干预、市场结构与所有权安排等外部治理因素对国有商业银行公司治理的影响如何?国有商业银行的内部治理情况如何,有何缺陷?在国有商业银行的改革中,公司治理绩效的演变趋势是怎样的?影响国有银行公司治理绩效的因素有哪些?现代公司治理框架的建立对其公司治理效率有何影响?国有商业银行现代公司治理框架的建立对效率影响的作用渠道是什么?国有商业银行现行的内部治理框架的特征对其治理效率产生影响如何?这些问题都需要我们进行不断分析与探讨。
本文以国内外的有关理论为指导,从新制度经济学、产业经济学、金融学等角度对国有商业银行公司治理问题进行了分析。在研究过程中,贯穿理论与实践相结合、规范分析与实证分析相结合、逻辑与历史相结合的思想方法,以定性分析为主,辅之以定量分析,以求达到预期的研究目的。本文既从理论上阐述了制约商业银行公司治理的因素以及商业银行特殊的所有权安排,又从实践角度对现今商业银行公司治理的两种基本模式进行介绍和比较,而且对实践中国有商业银行公司治理中的特殊问题——控制权收益问题进行了分析；既从规范的角度出发,对国有商业银行公司治理的“应该是什么”问题进行了回答,也从实证角度对国有商业银行公司治理的“是什么”问题进行了解答；既从定性角度阐述和分析了国有商业银行与中央政府、地方政府干预之间的关系,也用一些数据来说明中国银行市场结构变化与国有商业银行公司治理之间的内在联系,以此作为定性分析的旁证。本文的实证分析部分通过国有商业银行效率的变化来说明其公司治理的变化轨迹,即使用非参数的DEA方法,主要以X非效率为评价指标,以10家股份制银行为对比组,用实证的方法考察1996年——2006年国有商业银行公司治理绩效的演变,力求反映在中国金融业持续推进的改革过程中国有商业银行公司治理绩效的演变趋势。另外,本文对国有银行公司治理绩效的决定及影响因素进行实证分析,使用了多元线性回归、DID和General DID等模型和方法,目的在于寻找国有商业银行构建的公司治理框架推动其自身治理效率改进的经验证据。
本文研究的核心内容包括以下三个部分：
(1)在国有商业银行改革的历史考察中,以政府干预为研究视角,对其如何影响国有商业银行治理问题进行探讨；
(2)对国有商业银行内、外部治理结构进行分析。外部治理包括市场结构与国有商业银行公司治理和所有权安排与国有商业银行公司治理两个部分。市场结构决定了商业银行的经济行为,而经济行为又决定了市场运行在各个方面的绩效与公司治理效果,并且按照企业契约理论,对国有商业银行如何合理分配剩余索取权和控制权问题进行探讨也十分必要。内部治理主要分析了国有商业银行内部结构安排的变迁、缺陷以及下阶段改革的取向。
(3)以X非效率为指标,考察1996年—2006年国有商业银行公司治理绩效的演变。以10家股份制银行作对比,通过对银行间X非效率的时间序列比较等方式,力求全方位、多角度反映改革进程中国有商业银行公司治理效果的变化。
(4)从国有商业银行内部治理的角度,对影响国有商业银行公司治理绩效的因素进行分析。具体包括,一是对国有银行经营特征对其治理效率产生影响的分析；二是建立模型量化三家国有商业银行现代公司治理框架的建立对其运行效率的影响,以期对改革的效果进行初步评价。三是从扩大业务量和节约成本两个角度分析国有商业银行现代公司治理框架的建立对效率影响的作用渠道。
研究得出的主要结论如下：
(1)中国商业银行市场属于典型的寡头垄断市场,国有商业银行出现了垄断市场结构与低收益并存的现象。在银行市场结构发生变化之后,中国商业银行业的服务质量较以前专业银行时代已经有了极大提高。其中,银行业之间的竞争对服务质量提高功不可没。国有商业银行的控制权掌握在各级行长(经理)手中,而剩余所有权为中央政府垄断。长期以来,在各上级行拥有人事决定权的情况下,决定经理人员能否升迁的关键是其公关能力而非其经营能力。新的干部选拔制度应该改变国有银行经理人员的激励机制入手,通过降低净控制权收益,提高货币性收益促使经营管理能力强的人员走上高层管理岗位,同时通过增量指标考核来完善评价体系。
(2)国有商业银行现在主要在产权主体虚设、缺乏对董事会和经理层有效的监督和评估机制、约束机制弱化与内部人控制、激励约束与委托代理机制不能发挥应有的作用等方面存在缺陷。对现阶段国有商业银行内部治理结构的探讨必须在市场机制尚不健全的条件下考量治理结构的设计。第一,应当遵循被事实证明行之有效的关于公司治理的基本原则；第二,要积极为治理结构有效性的提高创造条件；第三,中国国有商业银行必然要面临占据控制地位的国有产权的产权主体虚置状态下的治理结构问题；第四,中国的国有商业银行还面临进行规范化公司制改造的任务,因而建立有效治理结构的过程中,需要同时推进明确产权关系,建立所有者和董事会之间的信任托管关系的改革。
(3)1996—2002年期间,国有商业银行的X非效率虽然有所波动,但一直在高位运行,自2002年开始,X非效率急速降低至2006年的0.063。而从作为对比组的股份制银行来看,结果却恰恰相反。以2002年为拐点,国有银行呈直线下降趋势,而股份制银行呈上升趋势,两条曲线竞于2004—2005年期间相交,说明两类银行的相对效率状况发生了转换。两类银行的比较结果表明,2002年以后的国有银行X非效率发生的巨变是排除了宏观因素干扰的,是由于自身以公司治理结构的改造为根本目的的股份制改革而产生的。随着改革的逐步深入,国有商业银行现代公司治理结构优化效果有所显现,国有银行X非效率下降速度开始加快。
(4)现代公司治理框架的构建使三家国有商业银行的X非效率净下降12.1个百分点,即相对于未进行此项改革的对比组来说,改革使得国有商业银行的整体治理效率得到很大程度上提升,说明了现代公司治理框架的构建使国有商业银行在一定程度上达到了改善经营状况的目的；三家国有商业银行的管理效率在公司治理框架构建的作用下实现8.7%的净增长。配置效率在公司治理框架构建的作用下出现5.3%的净下降,但是三个效率指标中变化幅度最小的一个。
(5)国有商业银行开始构现代公司治理框架后,其年度营业收入增长(开源)和营业费用增长(节流)均发生了一定变化,但两者比较而言,国有商业银行营业收入增长高出了营业费用的增长0.7个百分点,说明2002年以后,国有商业银行的治理效率的提高主要是源于其自身业务规模的扩张,但这一规模扩张同样也伴随着营业费用的大幅上涨.。
A study of the reform and performance of corporate governance in China's state-owned commercial banks
Corporate governance has caught people's attention since1980's. After studying the competitiveness of two types of corporations—the Anglo-American ones and the German-and-Japanese ones, economists and industrialists realized the impact of corporate governance structure on firm performance, thus the global attention on corporate governance. The development of the corporate governance system of China's state-owned commercial banks can be divided roughly into four periods, just as China's economic development:
Period1:1949-1978, the period of "great unity" under the planned economy.
Period2:1978-1993, the period of specialized banks under the "planned commodity economy.
Period3:1994-2002, the transitional period when state-owned banks carried out reforms.
Period4:2003-, when stated-owned commercial banks have carried out share-holding system reform and tried to establish modern corporate governance structure.
Then there arise a series of questions. At different periods, what are the impacts of external controls, namely, government intervention, market structure and ownership arrangement, on the corporate governance of state-owned commercial banks? What is their internal governance environment like? Is it effective? How did governance performance change in different stages of reform? What are the factors, which have influenced governance performance? What are the impacts of the modern governance structure on governance performance? In which way has it influenced governance performance? What are the impacts of the present internal governance environment on governance performance? All these questions are worth studying.
The dissertation tries to analyze corporate governance of China's state-owned commercial banks in the light of new institutional economics, property rights economics and finance. The research methodology of this thesis is a combination of prescriptive study and empirical study, both qualitative and quantitative. The thesis discusses the factors, which govern corporate governance of commercial banks and the ownership arrangement that is unique to commercial banks, and then compares the two popular governance modes in today's corporate governance. It also analyzes the problem of control benefits. It tries to answer both the question of "what should be governed in a corporate" and the question of "what is governed in a corporate". It analyzes the relationship between state-owned commercial banks and the intervention from the central and local government, and also the relationship between the change of China's market structure and corporate governance. In the thesis, the author studies the change of governance performance of ten joint-stock banks in terms of X-inefficiency by using DEA. In addition, the author tries to study the factors which determine or influence the governance performance by multiple linear regression, DID and General DID in order to prove that the corporate governance structure which is common in state-owned commercial banks can improve their governance performance and sum up useful experience.
The dissertation focuses on four issues:
1.Study the reforms of state-owned commercial banks and the impact of government intervention on the governance of these banks.
2. Analyze the internal and external governance environment of these banks. Elements of external governance are market structure and ownership arrangement. Market structure plays a significant role in the economic behaviors of commercial banks, and economic behaviors determine the performance of market operation and corporate governance. Furthermore, it is also necessary to study the sound allocation of residual claims and residual control rights in the light of contract theory of enterprises. As for internal governance, the dissertation reviews the change of banks'internal structures, analyzes the deficiencies in internal structures and discusses the future orientation of the reform.
3. Analyze the change of the banks' performance of corporate governance in the process of reform by comparing the X-inefficiencies of ten joint-stock banks from1996to2006.
4. Analyze the elements of internal governance, which influence the performance of corporate governance from three perspectives. First, the impact of operational features of the banks on their governance performance. Second, the impact of modern corporate governance structure of three banks on their operational efficiency by modeling so as to make an assessment of the reform; how has modern corporate governance structure influenced operational efficiency from the perspective of maximizing business and minimizing cost. And the third, the impact of the features of internal governance structure on governance performance.
The findings of the dissertation are as follows:
1. Compared with the period of specialized banks, service of China's commercial banks has been improved significantly when market structure changed, largely due to the competition between different banks. In addition, discounts given by the banks have increased the overall social welfare rather than the other way around. When it is the higher authorities that approve appointments and personnel changes, the promotion of management personnel has long been based on their public relation ability instead of management ability. Therefore, even if these banks fully implemented the relevant policies, it is still difficult to solve the problems and improve the present system.
2. Today, state-owned commercial banks still have a number of problems, namely, nominal ownership of the property rights, lack of sound supervision and assessment of the Board of Directors and the management, weak constraint mechanism and insider control, and ineffectiveness of incentive constraint mechanism and principal-agent mechanism. Therefore, the present internal governance structure must be assessed when considering the unsound market mechanism. Firstly, banks need to adhere to the basic corporate governance principles which have been proved effective. Secondly, banks need to create favorable conditions to improve the effectiveness of corporate governance structure. Thirdly, banks have to solve the problem of governance structure when the dominant state ownership is, in some sense, nominal. Fourthly, banks need to construct a standard company system. Therefore, it is necessary to build effective governance structure, and at the same time, clarify property-right relationship and promote the trusteeship between the owners and the Board of Directors.
3. From1996to2002, the level of X-inefficiency of state-owned commercial banks varied, but it remained high. Since2002, the level of inefficiency of state-owned commercial banks has decreased sharply, to0.063in2006, while the level of X-inefficiency of joint-stock banks has increased. From2004to2005, the level of X-inefficiency of two types of banks is close to each other, which means the X-inefficiency of the two types changed. The comparison between the two types of banks reveals that the sharp reduction of X-inefficiency of state-owned commercial banks from2002is due to their efforts to overcome interference from macro-factors, and the reform to introduce joint-stock system and standard corporate governance system. When the modern corporate governance structure began to take effect, the reform inevitably lead to the sharp reduction of X-inefficiency.
4. Thanks to the modern corporate governance structure, the X-inefficiency of three state-owned commercial banks decreased by12.1%. In other words, in comparison with the control group which has not carried out the reform, the overall governance efficiency has been improved to a large extent. Therefore, it can be said that the modern corporate governance structure has contributed, to some extent, to the improvement of operation. The management efficiency of the three state-owned commercial banks has registered a net change of8.7%due to the corporate governance structure. The management efficiency has a net increase of5.3%, the lowest increase among the three index of efficiency.
5. Since commercial banks have built modern corporate governance structure, the annual increase of both the business income and business expenses has changed. To be specific, the latter is0.7%more of the former, which means the promotion of governance efficiency results mainly from the expansion of business. But at the same time, business expenses also increase greatly.
6. In the ownership structure of commercial banks, the largest shareholder has not played its role in the improvement of governance performance, and due to the high concentration of shares in the hands of a relatively small number of shareholders, the problem of insider control remains unsolved. The appointment of independent directors is of help to improve governance performance, but the Board of Supervisors and the Board of Trustees are under the control of the Board of Directors and the senior management, so they are not able to have their role. Award to the top management has exerted a positive influence on the improvement of governance performance, but under the annual-salary system the standards of performance evaluation are vague. Some of the standards are subject to external factors due to the difficulty to quantify them.
引文
⑤W. Anderson & L. Campbell, "Corporate Governance of Japanese Bank s", University of Missouri Working Paper, 2000.
⑥Benny Simon, "Corporate Governance on Indonesian Bank s", Nanyang Technological University, PhD. Thesis, 2001.
⑥范一飞：《国民收入流程及分配格局分析》,第270页,北京,中国人民大学出版社,1994年版。
⑨张杰：《中国金融制度的结构与变迁》,第48页,太原,山西经济出版社,1998年版。
⑩详细研究请见见巴曙松、吕国亮《股份制改革后国有银行的治理结构缺陷及其国际差异》,《管理学报》2005年1期。
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22Berger A N,Humphrey D B.Efficiency of Financial Institutions:International Survey and Directions for Future Research.European Journal of OperationsResearch,1997,98:175-212。
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