摘要
发达国家的房地产市场经过几百年的发展,经历工业化和城市化以后,早在20世纪50年代就已进入成熟期。目前,在发达国家,房地产市场以二手房交易为主,一手房买卖只占总交易量的很小比例。但在我国却不一样,目前我国还处在快速工业化和城市化进程中,每年新房交易超过二手房交易量。并且,随着社会分工的发展,新房销售时很多开发商选择销售代理的模式。因而,销售代理在我国房地产市场中占有重要地位,协调好房地产销售代理双方的关系,对于房地产业及社会经济的发展具有重要意义。
但是,从我国目前的房地产销售代理市场的运作情况来看,销售代理商未受到较好激励、积极性未充分发挥,导致销售代理活动效率不高,开发商对销售代理商的工作不满意。
为协调好房地产销售代理双方的关系,论文从供应链的角度对房地产销售代理进行研究。在介绍我国房地产及销售代理业的发展历程,以及房地产销售代理业存在的问题的基础上,对现有研究成果和文献进行了梳理和综述。
作为房地产销售代理活动的源头,房地产开发商要作出销售工作是否外包的决策。从业务外包的理论基础和动因出发,指出房地产销售外包的动因是开发商专注于核心业务,提高项目的售价及销售速度,提升项目的盈利能力。开发商销售外包决策,主要看是自行组织销售的收益更高还是销售外包所带来的收益更高。以此为开始,分析了房地产销售代理的委托代理关系与契约理论中委托-代理问题的异同；在此基础上,对房地产销售代理活动进行基础分析,研究房地产销售代理活动中双方各自的决策和行为。
为协调好房地产销售供应链上下游企业之间的关系,须在开发商和销售代理商之间进行合理的利益分配。由于房地产销售代理过程中,房地产的所有权在代理双方之间并不发生转移,这与一般的销售供应链存在根本区别。为此,分析了房地产的销售价格构成,以及在不同价格区段销售代理商对于价格上升的贡献,指出根据不同价格区段实施分级分成利益分配合约,可以更好地激励销售代理商,调动其积极性,促进房地产销售供应链运作效率的提高。
除了提高售价,增加项目总利润外,项目阶段性销售目标的实现对于开发商而言具有重要的意义。因此,将回馈和惩罚机制引入房地产销售代理,研究房地产销售代理承诺合约。作为研究基点,首先分析了普通佣金模式下销售代理商的工作努力程度以及整个销售供应链和委托代理双方各自的收益。随后,对销售数量承诺销售代理合约进行研究,在承诺合约模型中,引入单价奖惩加固定金额奖惩的综合奖惩措施,通过模型构建和优化分析,得出销售代理商的决策策略和收益。并对两种模式下销售代理商的努力程度和各方收益进行了对比分析。在考虑一般回馈和惩罚措施的基础上,综合奖惩措施可以迫使销售代理商选择较高的努力程度,避免道德风险行为的出现,保证其承诺的实现,从而保证房地产开发商预定目标的实现。
分级分成利益分配合约和承诺合约的研究均是针对静态的收益,但现实经济生活中,事物是动态发展的,资金是有时间价值的。为使研究更接近实际,考虑资金时间价值对房地产销售代理双方的影响。分别分析了不考虑和考虑资金时间价值两种情况下销售代理商的行为和各方收益,结果表明,考虑资金时间价值情况下比不考虑资金时间价值情况下,销售代理商工作更努力,房地产项目能在前期实现更多的销售,各方收益更高。
最后,以相关实际数据为基础,进行了案例研究。数据分析结果表明,房地产销售外包不能带来成本的降低,但能促进项目产品售价的提升,且售价的提升幅度超过成本的增加幅度,进而提高项目的投资收益率。
In the nineteen fifties, the real estate market of developed countries has early entered into maturation stage, after industrialization and urbanization of society and several hundred years of development. At present, the real estate market of developed countries is mainly based on second-hand house transactions. One-hand house transactions only take up a very small proportion of the total transaction volume. But in China, it is a totally different situation. China is in the process of rapid industrialization and urbanization. The volume of one-hand house transaction is bigger than that of two-hand house transaction. Moreover, with the development of social division of labor, many developers choose sales agent as their new house sales pattern. Therefore, in China, sales agents play an important role in the real estate market. Good relationship between both parties of sales agent has important significance to the development of the real estate and social economy.
But, in our country, the present operating condition of real estate sales agent market shows that sales agents are not well inspired and their initiative is not fully aroused. That resulted in low efficiency of sales agents'activities and developers' low satisfaction to sales agents'work.
In order to balance two parties'relationship of real estate sales commissioning, this paper carried out the research on real estate sales agent from the perspective of supply chain. It introduced the development process of real estate and sales agents of China and its existing problems. On this basis, this paper sorted out and summarized the existing research achievements and literatures.
As the source of real estate sales agent's activities, real estate developer will make decision on whether or not to outsource his sales work. Analyzing from perspective of outsourcing's theoretical basis and motivation, this paper pointed out that the motivation is that developers want to focus on their core business, enhance price and sales speed of their projects, and improve their profitability. For developers, to organize sales work by themselves or to outsource sales work, that depends on which one will bring higher profit for them. From this point, the paper analyzed the similarities and differences between sales agency theory of real estate sales and principal-agent relationship of contract theory; on this basis, the paper analyzed the activities of real estate sales agents and studied both sides'decisions and actions under their activities.
In order to properly coordinate each other's relationship of companies on the sales and supply chain, proper benefit distribution between developer and sales agent is very necessary. In the process of real estate sales commissioning, the ownership of real estate doesn't change, that the essential difference from general chain of sales and supply. Therefore, this paper analyzed the price structure of real estate and sales agents'contributions to the price ascending in different price segments, and pointed out that classified profit distribution contract can inspire sales agents and arouse their enthusiasm better, and improve the efficiency of sales and supply chain of real estate.
In addition to price and profit increase, achievement of interim sales goals is also important to developers. Therefore, the reward and punishment system is introduced to real estate sales commissioning to study agent commitment contract. As a starting point for research, this paper firstly analyzed the performance of agents and respective gains of both sides under general commission mode. And then the paper studied the sales quantity promise agent contract. In the model of promise contract, a comprehensive incentive measure which includes unit-price rewards and punishments measures plus fixed rewards and punishments measures was introduced in. through the model establishing and optimization analyzing, we can get the decision-making strategy and revenue of agents. On the basis of general reward and punishment measures can push agents to work harder, avoid moral hazard behaviors and guarantee the realization of their promise, so as to ensure the realization of the goals set by developers.
Classified profit distribution contract and promise contract are all aimed at static income. All things is under dynamic development and capital has time value. In order to make the research to be more close to reality, the paper considered the influence of capital's time value to both sides of real estate sales commissioning. The result of study shows that, in the situation of taking time value into consideration, the sales agents will work harder, more sales can be achieved in earlier stage, and profits of each side can be higher.
Finally, based on the related actual data, the empirical study was conducted. The result of data analysis shows that real estate sales outsourcing can not reduce the cost, but it can promote price rising. Moreover, the extent of price rising will exceed that of cost rising. So the yield from project investment will be improved.
引文
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