中国证券市场卖空机制研究
详细信息    本馆镜像全文|  推荐本文 |  |   获取CNKI官网全文
摘要
中国证券市场经过20多年高速发展,投资品种越来越丰富,投资规模和投资者队伍不断壮大,市场监管和约束机制逐渐加强,但是市场波动性较大、容易出现暴涨暴跌现象。通过与成熟市场比较,本文认为缺乏卖空机制是其中的重要原因。中国长期以来存在“地下”融资交易活动,但一直缺乏卖空机制。本文从卖空交易对市场运行绩效的影响,卖空限制与市场收益分布关系以及如何在我国建立卖空机制等三个角度入手,展开理论、实证和实践三个层面的研究,为中国推出融资融券业务提供理论和实证依据。
     本文首先阐述了卖空机制的原理。然后对具有代表性的美国、日本和中国台湾地区的卖空交易发展历史进行比较,分析三种主要卖空交易模式形成的过程。目前全球范围内大多数国家(地区)实行了卖空机制,但各国或地区对卖空交易都有不同程度的限制,市场经济比较成熟的国家(地区)对卖空限制少,市场经济不完善的国家(地区)对卖空限制程度大或禁止卖空。
     在研究卖空机制对信息效率的影响方面,将Easley et al.(1996)和Diamond andVerrecchia(1987)两个模型结合,通过建立卖空限制条件下的PIN模型,研究卖空限制对PIN的影响,进而对市场信息效率的影响。研究发现,知情交易者根据卖空限制的程度来选择是否进行卖空交易。如果卖空限制程度小,知情交易者选择卖空,坏消息因而释放出来;如果限制程度太大,知情交易者不会卖空,坏消息被隐藏。在信息分布不变的前提下,卖空交易能够促进市场价格对知情交易者信息的揭示,卖空机制有助于提高信息效率。
     本文从理论和实证两个方面深入研究卖空机制对市场波动性和流动性的影响。从理论上分析,卖空机制能够增加流动性,有着稳定市场的作用,但可能存在噪声交易及正反馈风险、逼空风险、交割风险、“裸卖空”风险和国际游资冲击的风险等。在实证研究方面,首先运用单位根检验和Granger因果关系检验,研究融资融券与市场波动性和流动性之间的关系,结果表明,融资交易能显著增强流动性,融券卖空在提高市场的流动性方面不是很显著,这可能与市场监管较严和融券规模较小有关;融资和融券交易都不是市场波动率变化的Granger原因。然后以融券保证金比例调整代表卖空限制程度的变化,运用Wilcoxon和Kruskal-Wallis非参数检验方法,研究卖空限制程度变化对波动性和流动性的影响。结果表明,放松卖空限制不会显著增大市场波动性,反而可能使市场的波动性减少,卖空限制程度变化对流动性也没有显著影响。最后以2008年国际金融危机为背景,研究台湾监管当局采取的“卖空禁令”措施对市场的影响,发现实施严格卖空管制期间,波动性显著增大,没有达到稳定市场的作用,更多的只是减轻投资者心理上对金融危机的恐怖情绪。
     在卖空机制与市场收益分布的关系方面,借鉴改进的BB法则划分股市周期,统计牛市和熊市的偏度情况,发现上海证券市场和香港证券市场的收益分布无论牛市还是熊市,既有正偏也有负偏。通过采用滚动窗口法对偏度动态变化的研究发现,上海市场收益分布正偏情况较多,但正偏到负偏变化急剧;而香港市场在负偏为主,但负偏程度不大。然后运用EGARCH模型检验两市的波动不对称性,发现在熊市中两个市场均存在“杠杆效应”,即坏消息对市场的影响更大;在牛市中香港市场坏消息的影响仍然更大,而上海市场则存在“反杠杆效应”。收益分布与波动的非对称性密切相关,可以认为禁止卖空的市场更容易出现“暴涨暴跌”现象。
     根据前人及本文的研究并结合现实背景,中国有必要建立卖空交易机制,而且在制度建设、市场环境、投资者结构、技术等方面已经具备了推出卖空机制的条件。通过比较具有代表性的美国市场化模式、日本集中授信模式和台湾双轨制集中授信模式,本文认为中国更适合选择日本的集中授信模式。鉴于卖空交易存在一定风险,需要在信息披露、监管手段、制度体系、监管体制和监管分工等方面进一步改革和完善,防范信用交易的风险。
After more than 20 years' high-speed development in China's securities market, products, scale of investment and investor's structure have expanded, and market supervision mechanism have gradually increased. But there exists great market volatility which is prone to rise and drop suddenly and sharply. Through the comparison with foreign mature markets, the lack of short selling mechanism is one of the important reasons for market volatility in China. The "underground" activities of long sales in China have existed for many years, but there is lack of the mechanism of short sales. On the basis of theoretical, practical and empirical analysis, this article studies the short sale mechanism from the following three aspects: the influence of short sales on market performance, the relationship between short selling restrictions and market interests' distribution and how to establish the short selling mechanism in China. The purpose of the research is to offer a theoretical and practical foundation for launching short sales and margin purchase in China.
     This paper first illustrates the principles of short selling mechanism, and then comparatively analyzed the history of credit transaction of the United States, Japan and Taiwan. At present, most countries or regions in the world have mechanism of short selling, but many countries or regions have restrictions on short sale in varying degrees, and those countries whose market manchanism is more perfect have fewer restrictions.
     In the study of the impact of short selling mechanism on information efficiency, this paper intends to combine Easley et al. (1996)'s model with Diamond and Verrecchia (1987)'s model. Through establishing the PIN model under short-sales constraints, studying the influences of short-selling restrictions on the PIN, and the impact of short sales on market information efficiency, the author finds that informed traders decide to sell short whether or not according to the cost of short sales. If the cost is small, informed traders will decide to sell short and be able to release bad news; if the restrictions are strict, informed traders will not sell short, and then hide the bad news. Suppose the distribution of the information is unchanged, short selling will promote the market price to reveal information of the informed traders, and the short-selling mechanisms will help to improve information efficiency.
     In this paper, the impact of the mechanism of short selling on market volatility and liquidity is studied from theoretical and empirical aspects. Through the theoretical analysis, we can see that short selling mechanism will increase liquidity and play a role in stabilizing the market, but at the same time there are some risks. In empirical research, first of all, the unit root test and Granger causality test are used to study the relationship between the margin purchase, short sales, market volatility and liquidity. The results show that it is not very significance in the aspect of short selling to improve market liquidity because of many regulation measures in Taiwan. The margin purchase and short sales are all not the Granger causes to market volatility. Secondly, the margin ratio of short sales in the Taiwan stock market is on behalf of the level of short selling restrictions, and Wilcoxon and Kruskal-Wallis non-parametric test methods are used to study the impact of margin ratio on the volatility and liquidity. It turns out that the relaxation of restrictions on short selling will not enlarge the fluctuation, and in some cases it will lead to less volatility. The changes of short-sale constraints have no significantly influence on liquidity. Finally, under the circumstances of international financial crisis, this paper studies the impact of "short-selling ban" on the market and finds that the implementation of strict control measures significantly increase volatility. These measures only play a role to alleviate panic of investors in the financial crisis.
     In studying the relationship between short sales and the interest distribution, the improved BB rule is used to determine the stock market cycle, and evaluate the skewness of the bull and bear market. It shows that the return distribution of Shanghai and the Hong Kong stock market all have positively skewed and negatively skewed results whether in bull market or bear market. Through the use of rolling windows techniques on the dynamic changes of skewness, the author finds that the Shanghai market is positively skewed in short-term, negatively skewed in long-term and the convertin is sharp. The Hong Kong market is negatively skewed in short-term and long-term, but the extent of negativeness is not so much. Then the EGARCH model is used to test the asymmetry of volatility in the two markets. The empirical results show that whether in Shanghai or Hongkong, bad news has greater impact on market activities than good news in the bear market. But in the bull market, there is "leverage" effect in Hongkong and there is "anti-leverage" effect in Shanghai. The differences arise mainly because of lack of short-selling mechanism in the Shanghai securities market, affecting the absorbing of price to bad news.
     Based on the studies of former chapters and other scholars, short sales mechanism is necessary to be established in China considering the present condition of the law system, the market environment, investors' structure and technology. By comparing the credit model of the U.S., Japan and Taiwan, China can follow the credit model of Japan. Because there are some risks in short selling transactions, we need to increase the disclosure of information; use monitoring tools freely, perfect the law system, reform the supervisory system and further improve the regulatory framework.
引文
[1] Admati, A.R. and Pfleiderer, P. A Theory of Intraday Patterns: Volume and Price Variability. Review of Financial Studies, 1988, 1(1):3-40.
    [2] Admati, A.R. and Pfleiderer,P. Sunshine Trading and Financial Market Equilibrium. Review of Financial Studies, 1991,4(3):527-551.
    [3] Aitken, M. and A. Frino. The Accuracy of the Tick Test: Evidence from the Australian Stock Exchange. Journal of Banking an d Finance, 1996, 20:1715-1729.
    [4] Allen, Franklin and Douglas Gale. Arbitrage, short sales, and financial innovation. Econometrica, 1991, 59(4):1041-1068.
    [5] Amihud, Y. and Mendelson, H. Dealership Market: Market-making with inventory. Journal of Financial Economics, 1980, 8(1):31-53.
    [6] Amihud, Y. and Mendelson, H. Liquidity, Volatility, and Exchange Automation. Journal of Accounting, Auditing, and Finance, 1988, 3:369-395.
    [7] Back, K. and Baruch, S. Information in Securities Markets: Kyle Meets Glosten and Milgrom. Econometrica, 2004, 72:433-465.
    [8] Bagehot, W. The Only Game in Town. Financial Analysts Journal, 1971, 27(2): 12-14.
    [9] Barclay, Michael J., Warner, Jerold B. Stealth Trading and Volatility: Which Trades Move Prices? Journal of Financial Economics, 1993, 34(3):281-305.
    [10] Battalio, Robert and Paul Schultz. Options and the Bubble. Journal of Finance, 2006, 61(5):2071-2102.
    [11] Beckers, S. Variance of security price return based on high, low and closing prices. Journal of Business, 1983, 56: 97-112.
    [12] Benveniste, L. Marcus, A. and Wilhelm, W. What's Special about the Specialist?Journal of Financial Economics, 1992, 32:61-86.
    [13] Bernardo, Antonio E. and Ivo Welch. Liquidity and financial market runs.Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2004,119(1):135-158.
    [14] Biais, B., Glosten, L. and Spatt, C. The Microstructure of Stock Markets. CEPR Discussion Papers, 2002.
    [15] Bloomfield, R. and M. O'Hara. Market Transparency:Who Wins and Who Loss?Review of Financial Studies,1999,12:5-35.
    [16] Bbehme, Rodney D., Bartley R. Danielsen and Sorin M. Sorescu. Short-sale constraints, differences of opinion, and overvaluation. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 2006,41:455.
    [17] Bollerslev, Tim. Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity. Journal of Econometrics, 1986,31:307-327.
    [18] Brent, A, D.Morse and E. K. Stice. Short Interest: Explanation and Tests. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 1990, 25:273-289.
    [19] Bris, A., Goetzmann, William N. and Zhu, Ning. Eficiency and the Bear: Short Sales and Markets around the World. Journal of Finance, 2006,62(3): 1029-1079.
    [20] Calcagno, R. and Lovo, S. Bid-Ask Price Competition with Asymmetric Information between Market Makets. Woking Paper of CORE, 1998.
    [21] Chang, E.C. Cheng, J.W. and YU, Y.H. Short-Sales Constraints and Price Discovery: Evidence from the Hong Kong Market. The Journal of Finance, 2007, 62(5):2097-2121.
    [22] Charoenrook, A. and Daouk, H. The world price of short selling. Working paper, The Owen Graduate School of Manangement, Vanderbilt University, 2003.
    [23] Chiang,R., Venkatesh, P. Insider Holdings and Perceptions of Information Asymmetry: 'a Note. Journal of Finance. 1988, 43(4):1041-1048.
    [24] Christie, W.G and Schultz, PH. Why do NASDAQ Market Makers Avoid Odd-Eighth Quotes. Journal of Finance, 1994,49(5): 1813-1840.
    [25] Chen, Joseph, Harrison Hong, and Jeremy C. Stein. Forecasting Crashes: Trading Volume, Past Returns and Conditional Skewness in Stock Prices. Journal of Financial Economics, 2001, 61(3):345-381.
    [26] Chen, J., Harrison Hong and Jeremy C. Stein. Breadth of ownership and stock returns. Journal of Financial Economics, 2002, 66:171-205.
    [27] Chowdhry, B. and V. Nanda. Multimarket Trading and Market Liquidity. Review of Financial Studies, 1991, (4):483-511.
    [28] Danielsen, Bartley R. and Sorin M. Sorescu. Why Do Option Introductions Depress Stock Prices: A Study of Diminishing Short Sale Constraints? Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 2001, 36:451-484.
    [29] Demsetz, H. The Cost of Transacting. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1968, 82(1): 33-53.
    [30] Diamond, Douglas W. and Robert E. Verrecchia. Constraints on Short-Selling and Asset Price Adjustment to Private Information. Journal of Financial Economics, 1987,18:277-311.
    [31] Diether, Karl B., Christopher J. Malloy and Anna Scherbina. Differences of Opinion and the Cross Section of Stock Returns. Journal of Finance, 2002, 57: 2113-2141.
    [32] Easley, D. and O'Hara, M. Price, Trade Size,and Information in Securities Markets. Journal of Financial Economics, 1987,19(1):69-90.
    [33] Easley, D. and O'Hara, M. Time and the Process of Security Price Adjustment. Journal of Finance, 1992, 47(2):577-605.
    [34] Easley, D., Kiefer, N.M., O'Hara, M. and Paperman, J.B. Liquidity, Information and Infrequently Traded Stocks, Journal of Finance, 1996, 51:1405-1436.
    [35] Easley, D., N.M. Kiefer, and M. O'Hara. The Information Content of the Trading Process. Journal of Empirical Finance, 1997, (4): 159-186.
    [36] Easley, D., N.M. Kiefer, and M. O'Hara. One Day in the Life of a Very Common Stock. Review of Financial Studies, 1997, 10(3):805-835.
    [37] Engle, Robert F. Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedsticity with Wstimates of the Variance of United Kingdom Inflation. Econometrica, 1982, 50(4):987-1007.
    [38] Evans, R., C. Geczy, D. Musto and A. Reed. Failure is An Option: Impediments to Short-Selling and Options Prices. Review of Financial Studies, 2005, forthcoming.
    [39] Fama, Eugene F. The Behavior of Stock Market Prices. Journal of Business, 1965, 38(1): 34-105.
    [40] Fama, Eugene F. Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work. Journal of Finance, 1970,25:383-417.
    [41] Figlewski, Stephen. The Informational Effects of Restrictions on Short Sales: Some Empirical Evidence. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 1981, 16: 463-476.
    [42] Figlewski, Stephen and Gwendolyn P. Webb. Options, Short Sales and Market Completeness. Journal of Finance, 1993,48:761-777.
    [43] Flood, M.D., R. Huisman, K.G Koedijk and R.J. Mahieu. Quote Disclosure and Price Discovery in Multiple-dealer Financial Markets. Review of Financial Studies, 1999,12:1012-1054.
    [44] Foster, F.D., and Viswanathan S. Strategic Trading with Asymmetrically Informed Traders and Long-Lived Information. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 1994,29(1):499-518.
    [45] Forster, M., and T. George. Anonymity in Securities Markets. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 1992, (2): 168-206.
    [46] Foucault, Thierry. Order Flow Composition and Trading Costs in a Dynamic Limit Order Market. Journal of Financial Markets, 1999, 2(2):99-134.
    [47] Garman, M. Market microstructure. Journal of Financial Economics, 1976,3(3): 257-275.
    [48] Glen, R. Components of the Bid-Ask Spread and the Statistical Properties of Transaction Prices, Journal of Finance, 1994,42:1293-1308.
    [49] Glosten, L. Is the Electronic Open Limit Order Book Inevitable? Journal of Finance, 1994,49:1127-1161.
    [50] Glosten, L. and Milgrom, P. Bid, Ask, and Transaction Prices in a Specialist Market with Heterogeneously Informed Traders. Journal of Financial Economics, 1985, 13(1): 71-100.
    [51] Glosten, L. and Harris, L. Estimating the Components of the Bid-Ask Spread. Journal of Financial Economics, 1988, 21(1):123-142.
    [52] Handa P., Schwartz R. and Tiwari A. Quote Setting and Price Formation in An Order Drove Market. Journal of Financial Markets, 2003, (6):461-489.
    [53] Harris, L Liquidity, Trading Rules and Electronic Trading Systems. New York University Salomon Center, Monograph Series in Finance and Economics, 1990
    [54] Harris, L. Stock Price Clustering and Discreteness. Review of Financial Studies, 1991, 4(3): 389-415.
    [55] Haruvy, E. and Noussair, C. N. The Effect of Short Selling on Bubbles and Crashes in Experimental Spot Asset Markets. Journal of Finance, 2006, 61 (3): 1119-1157.
    [56] Hasbrouck, J. Trades, Quotes, Inventories and Information. Journal of Financial Economics, 1988,22:229-252.
    [57] Hasbrouck, J. Measuring the Information Content of Stock Trades. Journal of Finance, 1991, 46(1):179-207.
    [58] Hausman, J.A., Lo, A.W. and MacKinlay A.C. An Ordered Probit Analysis of Transaction Stock Prices. Journal of Financial Economics, 1992, 31(3):319-379.
    [59] Holden, C.W. and Subramanyam, A. Long-lived Private Information and Imperfect Competition. Journal of Finance, 1992, 47(1):247-270.
    [60] Hong, Harrison and Jeremy C. Stein. A Unified Theory of Underreaction, Momentum Trading, and Overreaction in Asset Market. Journal of Finance, 1999, 54(6):2143-2184.
    [61] Hong, Harrison and Jeremy C. Stein. Differences of Opinion, Short-sales Constraints, and Market Crashes. Review of Financial Studies, 2003, 16:487-525.
    [62] Huang, R. and Stoll, H. Dealer Versus Auction Markets:A Paired Comparison of Execution Costs on NASDAQ and the NYSE. Journal of Financial Economics, 1996,41:313-357.
    [63] Hueng, C. J. Short-Sales Constraints and Stock Return Asymmetry: Evidence From the Chinese Stock Markets. Applied Financial Economics, 2006,16:707-716.
    [64] Hueng, C. J., and McDonald, J. B. Forecasting Asymmetries in Aggregate Stock Market Returns: Evidence from Conditional Skewness. Journal of Empirical Finance, 2005,12:666-685.
    [65] Jaffe, Jeffrey F., Winkler, Robert L. Optimal Speculation against An Efficient Market. Journal of Finance, 1976, 31(1):49-62.
    [66] Jarrow, Robert. Heterogeneous Expectations, Restrictions on Short Sales, and Equilibrium Asset Prices. Journal of Finance, 1980,35(5):1105-1113.
    [67] Jennings, R., and L. Starks. Earnings announcements, stock price adjustment, and the existence of option markets. Journal of Finance, 1986,41:107-125.
    [68] Jones, Charles M. and Owen A. Lamont. Short-sale constraints and stock returns. Journal of Financial Economics, 2002, 66:207-239.
    [69] Keim, Donald B. and Ananth Madhavan. Anatomy of the Trading Process: Empirical Evidence on the Behavior of Institutional Traders. Journal of Financial Economics, 1995, 37:371-398.
    [70] Kyle, A. Continuous Auctions and Insider trading. Econometrica, 1985, 53(6): 1315-1335.
    [71] Kyle, A. Informed Speculation with Imperfect Competition. Review of Economic Studies, 56:317-355.
    [72] Lee, C.M. and Ready, M.J. Inferring Trade Direction from Intraday Data. Journal of Financial, 1991,46(2):733-746.
    [73] Levine, R. Stock Market, Growth, and Tax Policy. Journal of Finance, 1991, 46(4): 1445-1465.
    [74] Madhavan, A. Market Microstructure: A Survey. Journal of Financial Markets, 2000, (3):205-258.
    [75] Madhavan, A. Trading Mechanism in Securities Markets. Journal of Finance, 1992, 27(2):607-641.
    [76] Madhavan, A. and Smidt, S. A Bayesian Model of Intraday Specialist Pricing, Journal of Financial Economics, 1991, 30:99-134.
    [77] Madhavan, A. and Smidt, S. An Analysis of Changes in Specialist Inventories and Quotations. Journal of Finance, 1993, 48(5):1595-1628.
    [78] Marshall. Liquidity and Stock Returns: Evidence from a Pure Order-Driven Market using a New Liquidity Proxy. International Review of Financial Analysis, 2006, 15:21-38.
    [79] Miller, Edward M. Risk, Uncertainty, and Divergence of Opinion. Journal of Finance, 1977, 32(4): 1151-1168.
    [80] Naik, N., A. Neuberger, and S. Viswanathan. Trade Disclosure Regulation in Markets with Negotiated Trades. Review of Financial Studies, 1999, 12(4): 873-900.
    [81] Nelson, Daniel B. Conditional Heteroskedasticity in Asset Returns: A New Approach. Econometrica, 1991, 59:347-370.
    [82] Nyholm K. Estimating the Probability of Informed Trading. Journal of Financial Research, 2002, 12:485-505.
    [83] O'Hara, M. Making Market Microstructure Matter. Financial Management, 1999, 28(2): 83-90.
    [84] O'Hara, M. Market Microstructure Theory. Blackwell Publishers Inc, Cambridge MA, 1995.
    [85] O'Hara, M. and Oldfield,G The Microeconomics of Market Making. Journal of Economic Theory, 1986, 21:361-376.
    [86] Ofek, Eli and Matthew Richardson. Dotcom mania: The rise and fall of Internet stock prices. Journal of Finance, 2003, 58:1113-1138.
    [87] Pagano, M. and Roell A. Transparency and Liquidity: A Comparison of Auction and Dealer Markets with Informed Trading. Journal of Finance, 1996, 51:579-611.
    [88] Parlour, C. Price Dynamics in Limit Order Market. Review of Financial Studies, 1998,11:789-816.
    [89] Porter, D. C., and Weaver D.G. Post-trade Transparency on NASDAQ's National Market System. Journal of Financial Economics, 1998, 50:241-272.
    [90] Porter, D. C., and Weaver D.G. Tick Size and Market Quality. Financial Management, 1997,26:5-26.
    [91] Reed, Adam V. Costly Short Selling and Stock Price Adjustment to Earnings Announcements. Working paper, 2007.
    [92] Roell, A. Liquidity in Limit Order Book Markets and Single Price Auctions with Imperfect Competition. Working paper, Princeton University, 1999.
    [93] Roll, R.A Simple Implicit Measure of the Effective Bid-Ask Spread in an Efficient Market. Journal of Finance, 1984,39(4): 1127-1139.
    [94] Battalio, Robert and Paul Schultz. Options and Bubble. Journal of Finance, 2006, 61(5).
    [95] Scherbina, Anna. Stock Prices and Differences of Opinion: Empirical Evidence that Stock Prices Reflect Optimism. Working paper, Northwestern University, 2000.
    [96] Scheinkman, J. and Xiong, Wei. Overconfidence and Speculative Bubbles. Journal of Political Economy, 2003,111(6):1183-1219.
    [97] Senchack, A.J. and Laura T. Stark. Short-sale Restrictions and Market Reaction to Short-interest Announcement. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 1993, 28: 177-194.
    [98] Schwert, G. William. Stock Market Volatility. Financial Analysts Journal. 1990, 46: 23-34
    [99] Skinner, D. Options markets and the information content of accounting earnings releases. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 1990, 13:191-211.
    [100]Smith Jr., Clifford W., Watts, Ross L. The Investment Opportunity Set and Corporate Financiong, Dividend, and Compensation Policies. Journal of Financial Economics, 1992, 32(3): 263-292.
    [101] Stoll, H. Inferring the Components of the Bid-Ask Spread: Theory and Empirical Tests. The Journal of Finance, 1989, 44:115-134.
    [102] Stoll, H. The Supply of Dealer Services in Securities Markets. Journal of Finance, 1978, 33(4): 1133-1151.
    [103] Tai Ma, M.H. Hsieh and J.H. Chen. The Probability of Informed Trading and The Performance of Stock in An Order-Driven Market. AFPA Conference, 2001.
    [104]Tinic, S.M. The Economics of Liquidity Services. Journal of Economics, 1972, 86(1): 59-93.
    [105] Viswanathan, S. and Wang, J. Why is Interdealer Trading so Pervasive in Financial Studies, 1999, 10:871-901.
    [106] Woolridge, J.R. and A. Dickinson. Short-selling and common stock price. Financial Analysts Journal, 1994, (12): 20-28.
    [107] Wood, R.A., Mclnish, T.H. and Ord, J.K. An Investigation of Transactions Data for NYSE Stocks. Journal of Finance, 1985, 40(3): 723-739.
    [108] Xu, JianGuo. Price Convexity and Skewness. The Journal of Finance, 2007, 62(5): 2521-2552.
    [109] Zakoian, J.M. Threshold Heteroskedastic Models. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 1994, 18:931-944.
    [110]陈国进,胡超儿.异质信念、卖空限制与股票预期益:基于中国股票市场的实证证据.中国经济学年会论文,2007.
    [111]陈国进,张贻军,王景.异质信念与盈余惯性.当代财经,2008,(7):43-48.
    [112]陈淼鑫,郑振龙.推出卖空机制对证券市场波动率的影响.证券市场导报,2008,(2):61-65.
    [113]陈淼鑫,郑振龙.融券保证金成数调整对证券市场波动性的影响.财经问题研究,2008,(3):55-60.
    [114]顾斌.股票逆回购-中国证券市场卖空机制的现实模式.经济导刊,2006,(12):62-64.
    [115]江曙霞等.市场微观结构:理论、实践与监管应用.北京:中国财政经济出版社,2006.
    [116]蒋涛.中国沪深股票市场流动性研究.深交所第四届会员研究成果,2001.
    [117]李朋,刘善存.知情交易概率分解与买卖价差研究.南方经济,2006,(2):13-22.
    [118]廖士光,杨朝军.证券市场卖空机制的价格发现功能探讨.上海立信会计学院学报,2006,20(1):73-77.
    [119]廖士光,杨朝军.卖空交易机制、波动性和流动性.一个基于香港股市的经验研究.管理世界,2005,(12):6-13.
    [120]廖士光,张宗新.新兴市场引入卖空机制对股市的冲击效应.财经研究,2005,31(10):42-52.
    [121]刘海龙,仲黎明,吴冲锋.股票流动性的度量方法.系统工程理论与实践,2003,1:16-21.
    [122]刘善存.金融市场微观结构模型、方法和应用.北京:中国财政经济出版社,、006年第1版.
    [123]屈文洲,吴世农.中国股票市场微观结构的特征分析-买卖报价价差模式及影响因素的实证研究.经济研究,2002,(1):56-63.
    [124]施东晖,孙培源.市场微观结构-理论与中国经验.上海:上海三联书店,2005.
    [125]舒建平,谭燕芝.有限理性的微观机理评述.经济评论,2007,(2):77-80.
    [126]孙国茂.中国证券市场信用交易研究.北京:中国金融出版社,2007.
    [127]王春峰,董向征,房振明.信息交易概率与中国股市价格行为关系的研究.系统工程,2005,23(2):62-67.
    [128]王昕,张博,殷仲民.上海证券市场质量分析与交易机制改进研究.西南大学学报(社会科学版),2008,34(1):106-111.
    [129]徐婕.中国融资融券交易模式的制度选择分析.上海金融,2008,(3):66-67.
    [130]许睿,刘海龙,吴冲锋.中国A股市场流动性统计特性与变化趋势.系统工程理论与实践,2004,(4):26-32.
    [131]谢绵陛.看法差异、信息不对称、卖空限制与价格形成.南方经济,2007,(7):3-22.
    [132]杨之曙.市场微观结构理论及其应用.经济学动态,1999,(7):59-62.
    [133]杨之曙.应用市场微观结构理论构建中国证券市场实时监管系统.金融科学,2000,(3):76-79.
    [134]杨之曙,姚松瑶.沪市买卖价差和知情交易实证研究.金融研究,2004,(4):45-55.
    [135]张维,张永杰.异质信念、卖空限制与风险资产价格.管理科学学报,2006,9(4):58-64.
    [136]郑振龙,俞琳,张睿.卖空约束对股票市场的影响----兼论中国能否引入卖空机制.河北经贸大学学报,2004,(11):51-55.