摘要
高管报酬是公司向管理者支付的、作为其服务对价的现金、非现金等形式的酬劳。在现代公司所有权与控制权分离的背景下,管理层是公司的代理人,但与股东利益天生存在冲突。高管报酬被认为是降低代理成本、协调高管和股东利益的工具,但在实践中本身却演变成为典型的代理成本问题,成为公司治理的最大难题,因此也是近年来西方国家(尤其是美国)法学研究的最热门问题之一。
目前我国法学界对高管报酬还未予以重视,相关研究基本处于起步阶段。本文首次系统、全面地介绍了美国公众公司高管报酬的法律规制,并与我国高管报酬的法律规制进行比较,进而结合我国实际情况,分析美国高管报酬法律规制值得借鉴的经验,提出作者的改进意见。
美国公众公司高管报酬的法律规制主要有:(1)注意义务、忠实义务和“公司浪费原则”。董事和经理报酬应由董事会决定,但股东可以董事会违反注意义务、忠实义务或构成“公司浪费原则”为由提起股东派生诉讼。(2)税法上的限制。CEO和其他四名报酬最高的高管,年报酬超过一百万美元以上的部分,均不得作为“普通和必要的商业费用”而进行税收扣减。(3)强制信息披露。证券交易委员会于1992年颁布了系统的高管报酬披露规则,并于2006年8月对1992年规则作了彻底修改,对高管报酬的强制披露作了全面规定。信息披露是美国规制高管报酬的最重要手段。
我国的法律规制与美国有较大不同。《公司法》规定董事报酬由股东大会确定,经理报酬由董事会确定。但国资委等部门的规章对国有控股上市公司高管报酬的规制,却体现了鲜明强烈的政府干预色彩。而关于高管报酬信息披露的规定,则十分简陋。
本文对我国关于高管报酬的规定进行了反思,提出在高管报酬的确定上,应更充分发挥市场作用,保持适度政府干预。关于税收规制,本文认为尚无必要。关于信息披露,本文对我国立法提出了作者的改进意见。
Executive compensation refers to the remuneration paid by the corporation, either in the form of cash or non-cash, to the management, including management directors and executives, as the consideration for their service. Under the circumstance of separation of ownership and control of the corporation, which is the common case for public companies (listed companies) in modern business world, the management acts as the agent of the owners of the corporation, the shareholders. The management, with the control of the corporation, may maximize its own interest at the cost of shareholders’wealth. Executive compensation has been considered as a tool to lower the agency cost and align the interests of the management and shareholders. However, in practice, executive compensation itself becomes a classic agency problem and the most intractable conundrum in corporate governance and, consequently, one of the hottest topics for legal scholars in western countries, especially the United States.
Currently Chinese legal scholars do not attach much importance to executive compensation. Therefore few studies have been conducted concerning the legal regulation on executive compensation. This article, for the first time in China, thoroughly reviews American legal regulation on executive compensation in public companies in details, and make abundant comparisons between American and Chinese legal regimes regarding executive compensation. Based on the aforesaid efforts, the author analyzes lessons for China from American experience and offers his suggestions.
The American legal regulation on executive compensation in public companies mainly includes: (1) Duty of care, duty of loyalty and“corporate waste”. Executive compensation has long been deemed as the ordinary business of a corporation, and thus shall be determined by the board of directors. While generally shareholders have no right to intervene, they may, in the case that they are dissatisfied with the executive compensation, lodge a shareholder derivative suit in courts against the board of directors, claiming that the board breaches the duty of care or duty of loyalty, or that the compensation constitutes“corporate waste”. (2) Restriction on tax deductibility. Annual compensation paid to the CEO and the four other highest paid officers of public companies which exceeds $ 1 million may not be deducted as an ordinary and necessary business expense. (3) Mandatory information disclosure. The Securities and Exchange Commission of the United States (“SEC”) promulgated executive compensation disclosure rules in 1992 and revised the rules sweepingly in 2006, requiring full executive compensation information to be disclosed to shareholders and investors. Mandatory disclosure system is the most important regime regulating executive compensation in the US.
Chinese legal regimes concerning executive compensation varies sharply from the US model. The Company Law of China provides that directors’compensation shall be determined by the shareholders and the officers’compensation be determined by the board of directors. But regulations issued by the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (“SASAC”) and other relevant government agencies regulating the executive compensation in state-controlled listed companies, which accounting for the majority of listed companies in China, have conferred too much power on these government agencies as to the determination of executive compensation and constrained the autonomy of corporations extraordinarily. And, compared with the US regime, the rules regulating mandatory disclosure of executive compensation are incomplete and ill-considered, and shall be improved sweepingly and systematically.
Based on thoughtful review and comparison, the author argues that the government shall only keep moderate control and more reliance shall be placed on the market force in the determination of executive compensation in the future. The author finds no reason to adopt tax as a tool to control executive compensation. Furthermore, the author brings forward suggestions to improve the mandatory disclosure system concerning executive compensation.
引文
1 “报酬”在美国一般用 compensation 表述,在英国和其他欧洲国家一般用 remuneration 表述。
2 Detlev F. Vagts, Basic Corporation Law 339-40, 2d ed. 1979; Halle Fine Terrion, Regulation S-K, Item 402: The New Executive Compensation Disclosure Rules, 43 Case W. Res. 1175, n.6 (1993); 张维迎:《产权、激励与公司治理》,北京,经济科学出版社,2005 年,第 276-278 页;朱保成:《关于完善国有企业经理薪酬制度的政策建议》,《商业研究》,第 350 期(2006/18),第 107 页。
3 Geoffrey S. Rehnert, The Executive Compensation Contract: Creating Incentives to Reduce Agency Costs, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 1147, 1155 (1985); Meredith M. Stead, How Incentive Pay for Executives Isn't - And What We Can Do about It, 80 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 722, 727 (2005).
4 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Executive Compensation: Who Decides?, 83 Tex. L. Rev. 1615, 1662 (2005).
5 Brian R. Cheffins & Randall S. Thomas, The Globalization (Americanization?) of Executive Pay, 1 Berkeley Bus. L. J. 233, 235 (2004).
6 Presidential Candidates Divide on Executive Compensation Caps, 24 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 42 (Oct. 23, 1992), at 1634, cited from Michael E. Ragsdale, Executive Compensation: Will The New SEC Disclosure Rules Control "Excessive" Pay at the Top?, 61 UMKC L. Rev. 537, 540-41, n.29 (1993).
7 Linda J. Barris, The Overcompensation Problem: A Collective Approach to Controlling Executive Pay, 68 Ind. L.J. 59, 73-4 (1992); Randall S. Thomas, Should Directors Reduce Executive Pay, 54 Hastings L.J. 437, 438-39, 453-66 (2003); Susan Lorde Martin, Executive Compensation: Reining in Runaway Abuses again, 41 U.S.F. L. Rev. 147, 166 (2006).
8 其官方网站将其职能解释为“US government agency responsible for tax collection and tax law enforcement”,即负责税务征收和强制执行的机关,亦有译为“国内收入署”、“国税局”、“国家税务总局”、“联邦税务部门”等的。
9 289 U.S. 582 (1933).
10 Mark A. Salky, The Regulatory Regimes for Controlling Excessive Executive Compensation: Are Both, Either, or Neither Necessary?, 49 U. Miami L. Rev. 795, 807 (1995).
11 Ibid, at 806-07.
17 证监发〔2001〕102 号。
18 证监发〔2002〕1 号。
19 中国证券监督管理委员会令第 40 号。
20 David Cay Johnston, American-Style Pay Moves Abroad: Importance of Stock Options Expands in a Global Economy, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 1998, at C1, cited from Brian R. Cheffins & Randall S. Thomas, The Globalization (Americanization?) of Executive Pay, 1 Berkeley Bus. L. J. 233, 241 (2004); Brian R. Cheffins, Will Executive Pay Globalise along American Lines?, Corporate Governance: An International Review, 11 (1), Jan. 2003, 8-24; 吉尔·所罗门、阿瑞斯·所罗门:《公司治理与问责制》,李维安、周建译,大连,东北财经大学出版社,2006 年,第 78-79 页。
21 吉尔·所罗门、阿瑞斯·所罗门:《公司治理与问责制》,李维安、周建译,大连,东北财经大学出版社,2006 年,第 79 页。
22 Lori B. Marino, Executive Compensation and the Misplaced Emphasis on Increasing Shareholder Access to the Proxy, 147 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1205, 1205 (1999).
23 笔者将在 LexisNexis 检索到的美国和加拿大所有以“高管报酬”为题的文章下下来后,经过筛选,剔除不太相关文章,经统计发现有 80 余篇是严格研究高管报酬的论文。
24 SSRN 收录的论文不限于法学论文,还包括经济学界、管理学界等学者撰写的论文。
25 〔美〕罗伯特·蒙克斯,尼尔·米诺:《公司治理》,李维安译,北京,中国劳动社会保障出版社,2004 年,第 223 页。
26 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Executive Compensation: Who Decides?, 83 Tex. L. Rev. 1615, 1616 (2005).
27 Ibid, at 1652.
28 26 U. S. C. 162 (m) (1), 1994.
29 26 U. S. C. 162 (m) (14) (c), 1994.
30 Randall S. Thomas, Explaining the International CEO Pay Gap: Board Capture or Market Driven?, 57 Vand. L. Rev. 1171, 1265 (2004); Nathan Knutt, Executive Compensation Regulation: Corporate America, Heal Thyself, 47 Ariz. L. Rev. 493, 517 (2005); John E. Core, Wayne R. Guay & Randall S. Thomas, Is U.S. CEO Compensation Inefficient Pay without Performance?, 103 Mich. L. Rev. 1142 (2005).
31 Robert A. Rosenblatt, Firms Must Fully Report Officers Pay, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 16, 1992, at A1, A34; Mark A. Salky, The Regulatory Regimes for Controlling Excessive Executive Compensation: Are Both, Either, or Neither Necessary? 49 U. Miami L. Rev. 795, 825-26 (1995).
34 Securities and Exchange Commission Release No. 33-8732 (Aug.11, 2006).
35 所有权与控制权分离、所有者与经营者分离,是阿道夫·伯利(Adolf A. Berle)和加德纳·米恩斯(Gardiner C. Means)在其不朽名著《现代公司与私有财产》(The Modern Corporation and Private Property)中首次提出并系统论证的,至今仍是现代公司尤其是上市公司的基本特征。
36 施天涛:《公司法论》,北京,法律出版社,2005 年,第 358-359 页;王天习:《公司治理与独立董事研究》,北京,中国法制出版社,2005 年,第 17-22 页。
37 张开平:《英美公司董事法律制度研究》,北京,法律出版社,1998 年,第 106 页。
38 〔西〕泽维尔·维夫斯编:《公司治理:理论与经验研究》,郑江淮、李鹏飞等译,北京,中国人民大学出版社,2006 年,第 37 页。
39 Charles M. Elson, Director Compensation and the Management-Captured Board: The History of a Symptom and a Cure, 50 SMU L. Rev. 127, 127 (1996). 相关中文文献,请参阅张开平:《英美公司董事法律制度研究》,北京,法律出版社,1998 年,第 114-115 页、144 页;〔美〕玛格丽特·M·布莱尔:《所有权与控制:面向二十一世纪的公司治理探索》,张荣刚译,北京,中国社会科学出版社,1999 年,第 62 页;于东智:《董事会与公司治理》,北京,清华大学出版社,2004 年,第 32-33 页;施天涛:《公司法论》,北京,法律出版社,2005 年,第 352-356 页。
40 Charles M. Elson, Director Compensation and the Management-captured Board: The History of a Symptom and a Cure, 50 SMU L. Rev. 127 (1996).
41 Ibid, at 155.
42 Susan J. Stabile, Is There A Role for Tax Law in Policing Executive Compensation?, 72 St. John's L. Rev. 81, n.2 (1998).
43 Brian R. Cheffins & Randall S. Thomas, The Globalization (Americanization?) of Executive Pay, 1 Berkeley Bus. L. J. 233, 241 (2004).
44 童卫华、石美娟、刘冬、吴佩旆:《中国上市公司高管人员报酬信息披露研究》,《重庆大学学报(社会科学版)》,2006 年第 12 卷第 5 期,第 53 页。
45 参阅张民安、刘云桂:《商事法学》,广州,中山大学出版社,2002 年,第 160-161 页;吴国基:《中国上市公司高管报酬的公司法规制》,湖南农业大学学报,第 5 卷第 2 期(2004 年 4 月),第 79 页;杨蕙馨、王胡峰:《国有企业高层管理人员激励与企绩效效实证研究》,2006 年第 4 期,第 84 页。
46 张开平:《英美公司董事法律制度研究》,北京,法律出版社,1998 年,第 57-58 页。
47 如《公司法》第三十八条规定:“股东会行使下列职权:(二)选举和更换非由职工代表担任的董事、监事,决定有关董事、监事的报酬事项。”第四十七条规定:“董事会对股东会负责,行使下列职权:(九)决定聘任或者解聘公司经理及其报酬事项,并根据经理的提名决定聘任或者解聘公司副经理、财务负责人及其报酬事项。”第一百一十七条规定:“公司应当定期向股东披露董事、监事、高级管理人员从公司获得报酬的情况。”《证券法》第一百五十条:“证券公司的净资本或者其他风险控制指标不符合规定的,国务院证券监督管理机构应当责令其限期改正;逾期未改正,或者其行为严重危及该证券公司的稳健运行、损害客户合法权益的,国务院证券监督管理机构可以区别情形,对其采取下列措施:(三)限制分配红利,限制向董事、监事、高级管理人员支付报酬、提供福利。”
48 值得注意的是,在英国、德国、法国、日本等国家,与美国不同,其法律规制的重点也是董事报酬(director’s remuneration)而非经理人员报酬(executive remuneration),因为这些国家都没有象美国一样,完全进入“经理中心主义”,董事会和董事还享有较大权利,尤其是相当多的董事兼任经理人员,即 executive directors。
49 Linda J. Barris, The Overcompensation Problem: A Collective Approach to Controlling Executive Pay, 68 Ind. L.J. 59, 63 (1992). 另请参阅谈萧:《经理革命的法学解释》,北京,中国时代经济出版社,2005 年,第149-150 页。
50 王学力:《高管人员薪酬应科学管理》,《经济参考报》,2006 年 3 月 25 日,第 006 版。张娟:《高管薪酬机制有待完善》,《中国证券报》,2006 年 4 月 28 日,第 A20 版;朱保成:《关于完善国有企业经理薪酬制度的政策建议》,《商业研究》,第 350 期(2006/18),第 106 页;刘芳:《中国上市公司高管人员薪酬存在的问题及对策》,《商场现代化》,第 492 期(2007 年 1 月下旬刊),第 117 页。
51 郭晋晖:《上市国企高管薪酬长期激励不明显》,《第一财经日报》,2007 年 1 月 31 日,第 A02 版。
52 朱伟一:《美国公司法判例解析》,北京,中国法制出版社,2000 年,第 156 页。
53 Jaclyn Braunstein, Pound Foolish: Challenging Executive Compensation in the U.S. and the U.K., 29 Brooklyn J. Int'l L. 747, 748 (2004).
54 Tracy Scott Johnson, Pay for Performance: Corporate Executive Compensation in the 1990s, 20 Del. J. Corp. L. 183, 186 (1995).
55 〔美〕罗伯特·蒙克斯,尼尔·米诺:《公司治理》,李维安译,北京,中国劳动社会保障出版社,2004 年,第 292 页。
56 Mark J. Loewenstein, The Conundrum of Executive Compensation, 35 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1, 1 (2000).
57 Kevin Murphy, Top Executives Are Worth Every Nickel The Get, Harvard Business Review 125, March-April 1986。当然,该文发表时间较早,后来 Murphy 教授已经意识到高管报酬过高的问题了。See Kevin Murphy, Explaining Executive Compensation: Managerial Power versus the Perceived Cost of Stock Options, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 847 (2002).
58 “ 美 国 证 交 会 关 注 高 管 薪 酬 : 是 否 会 改 变 现 状 ? ” , 宾 夕 法 尼 亚 大 学 沃 顿 知 识 在 线 ,http://www.knowledgeatwharton.com.cn/index.cfm?fa=viewArticle&articleID=1319,2007 年 4 月 14 日访问。
59 Geoffrey S. Rehnert, The Executive Compensation Contract: Creating Incentives to Reduce Agency Costs, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 1147, 1149, n.7 (1985).
60 What 800 Companies Paid, Forbes, 25 May 1992, at 182, cited from Michael E. Ragsdale, Executive Compensation: Will The New SEC Disclosure Rules Control "Excessive" Pay at the Top?, 61 UMKC L. Rev. 537, 541 (1993).
61 John A. Byrne, What, Me Overpaid? CEOs Fight Back, Bus. Wk., 4 May 1992, cited from Michael E. Ragsdale, Executive Compensation: Will the New SEC Disclosure Rules Control "Excessive" Pay at the Top?,
61 UMKC L. Rev. 537, 541 (1993). 62 Ibid.
63 数据来自标准普尔 ExecuComp 数据库(http://www.compustat.com),cited from Kevin J. Murphy, Explaining Executive Compensation: Managerial Power versus the Perceived Cost of Stock Options, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 847, 847 (2002)
64 Louis Lavelle, Frederick F. Jespersen & Michael Amdt, Special Report: Executive Pay, Business Week, 15 April 2002, cited from Benjamin Alarie, Executive Compensation and Tax Policy: Lessons for Canada from the Experience of the United States in the 1990s, 61 U.T. Fac. L. Rev. 39, 44 (2003).
65 “ 透 过 首 席 执 行 官 的 薪 酬 看 公 司 治 理 ” , 宾 夕 法 尼 亚 大 学 沃 顿 知 识 在 线 ,http://www.knowledgeatwharton.com.cn/index.cfm?fa=viewArticle&articleID=1400,2007 年 4 月 14 日访问。
66 卢怀谦:《美国公司高管薪酬惹争议》,《中国青年报》,2007 年 1 月 5 日,第 005 版。
67 Lucian Bebchuk & Jesse Fried, Pay without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 2004, p.9, cited from Stephen M. Bainbridge, Executive Compensation: Who Decides?, 83 Tex. L. Rev. 1615, 1619 (2005).高管报酬领域的权威学者 Kevin Murphy教授对过高的高管报酬亦有细致描述,请参阅 Kevin Murphy, Politics, Economics and Executive Compensation, 63 U. Cin. L. Rev. 713, 715 (1995); Kevin Murphy, Explaining Executive Compensation:Managerial Power versus the Perceived Cost of Stock Options, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 847, 847-48 (2002).
68 Lucian Bebchuk & Yaniv Grinstein, The Growth of Executive Pay, 21 Oxford Review of Economic Policy, at 283-303 (2005), also available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=648682.
69 Linda J. Barris, The Overcompensation Problem: A Collective Approach to Controlling Executive Pay, 68 Ind. L. J. 59, 60 (1992).
70 Louis Lavelle, Frederick F. Jespersen & Michael Amdt, Special Report: Executive Pay, Business Week, 15 April 2002, cited from Benjamin Alarie, Executive Compensation and Tax Policy: Lessons for Canada from the Experience of the United States in the 1990s, 61 U.T. Fac. L. Rev. 39, 44 (2003).
71 Meredith M. Stead, How Incentive Pay for Executives Isn't - And What We Can Do about It, 80 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 722, 723 (2005).
72 Where's the Stick? Carrots, Sticks and Bosses' Pay, Economist, Oct. 11, 2003, at 13, cited from Jaclyn Braunstein, Pound Foolish: Challenging Executive Compensation in the U.S. and the U.K., 29 Brooklyn J. Int'l L. 747, 761 (2004).
73 Lucian Bebchuk & Jesse Fried, Pay without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 2004, p.9, cited from Stephen M. Bainbridge, Executive Compensation: Who Decides?, 83 Tex. L. Rev. 1615, 1619 (2005).
74 Cath Blackledge, "Euroland Bonanza," European, June 8, 1998, at 20, cited from Brian R. Cheffins, The Metamorphosis of "Germany Inc.": The Case of Executive Pay, 49 Am. J. Comp. L. 497, 508 (2001).
75 Andrew R. Brownstein & Morris J. Panner, Who Should Set CEO Pay? The Press? Congress? Shareholders?, Harv. Bus. Rev., May-June 1992, at 29, cited from Mark A. Salky, The Regulatory Regimes for Controlling Excessive Executive Compensation: Are Both, Either, or Neither Necessary?, 49 U. Miami L. Rev. 795, 797, n.14 (1995).
76 Press Release, PIRC, PIRC Highlights Huge Increase in Potential and Real Directors' Remuneration in Trade & Industry Committee Evidence (July 1, 2003), available at http://www.pirc.co.uk/trade%20&%20industry%20ctte.pdf, cited from Jaclyn Braunstein, Pound Foolish: Challenging Executive Compensation in the U.S. and the U.K., 29 Brooklyn J. Int'l L. 747, 767 (2004)..
77 Mark A. Salky, The Regulatory Regimes for Controlling Excessive Executive Compensation: Are Both, Either, or Neither Necessary?, 49 U. Miami L. Rev. 795, 800-01 (1995); Susan Lorde Martin, Executive Compensation: Reining in Runaway Abuses again, 41 U.S.F. L. Rev. 147, 161 (2006).
78 Jensen and Murphy, CEO Incentives - It's Not How Much You Pay, But How, Harvard Bus. Rev., May-June 1990, at 138; Charles M. Yablon, Bonus Questions: Executive Compensation in the Era of Pay for Performance, 75 Notre Dame L. Rev. 271, 279 (1999); Brian R. Cheffins, The Metamorphosis of "Germany Inc.": The Case of Executive Pay, 49 Am. J. Comp. L. 497, 506 (2001).
79 Robin Marris, A Model of the "Managerial" Enterprise, 77 Q. J. Econ. 185, 187 (1963); Joseph W. McGuire et al., Executive Incomes, Sales and Profits, 52 Am. Econ. Rev. 753, 760 (1962); Kevin J. Murphy, Corporate Performance and Managerial Remuneration: An Empirical Analysis, 7 J. Acct. & Econ. 11, 11-12 (1985), cited from James R. Repetti, Accounting and Taxation: The Misuse of Tax Incentives to Align Management-Shareholder Interests, 19 Cardozo L. Rev. 697, 698 (1997); Susan Lorde Martin, Executive Compensation: Reining in Runaway Abuses again, 41 U.S.F. L. Rev. 147, 161 (2006).
80 Brian R. Cheffins & Randall S. Thomas, The Globalization (Americanization?) of Executive Pay, 1 Berkeley Bus. L. J. 233, 235 (2004).
81 “透过首席执行官的薪酬看公司治理”,宾夕法尼亚大学沃顿知识在线。
82 Kevin J. Murphy, Politics, Economics, and Executive Compensation, 63 U. Cin. L. Rev. 713, 715 (1995).
83 早在 1990 年代初,机构投资者即持有美国所有上市公司 50%以上股份,这一比例一直在不断上升。机构投资者在美国公司治理中发挥着重要作用,其中最著名者,有加州公共雇员退休系统(California Public Employees' Retirement System, CalPERS)、美国教师退休基金会(Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association - College Retirement Equities Fund, TIAA-CREF)。See James E. Heard, Executive Compensation: Perspective of the Institutional Investor, 63 U. Cin. L. Rev. 749, 749-50 (1995).
84 James E. Heard, Executive Compensation: Perspective of the Institutional Investor, 63 U. Cin. L. Rev. 749, 749, 765-67 (1995).
85 Michael E. Ragsdale, Executive Compensation: Will The New SEC Disclosure Rules Control "Excessive" Pay at the Top?, 61 UMKC L. Rev. 537, 547-48 (1993).
86 289 U.S. 582 (1933).
87 Mark A. Salky, The Regulatory Regimes for Controlling Excessive Executive Compensation: Are Both, Either, or Neither Necessary?, 49 U. Miami L. Rev. 795, 807 (1995).
88 Paul K. Rowe, Defending Executive Compensation in the Courts: Substance and Strategy, 6 Law & Bus. Insights (P-H) No. 4, at 12 (Apr. 1992); Saxe v. Brady, 184 A.2d 602, 610 (Del. Ch. 1962); Michael E. Ragsdale, Executive Compensation: Will The New SEC Disclosure Rules Control "Excessive" Pay at the Top?,
61 UMKC L. Rev. 537, 548 (1993).
89 Mark A. Salky, The Regulatory Regimes for Controlling Excessive Executive Compensation: Are Both, Either, or Neither Necessary?, 49 U. Miami L. Rev. 795, 819-22 (1995).
90 Michelle L. Johnson, Forget the Rhetoric -- Executive Pay Fell for Many in '91, Investor's Bus. Daily, 13 March 1992, at 8, cited from Linda J. Barris, The Overcompensation Problem: A Collective Approach to Controlling Executive Pay, 68 Ind. L.J. 59, 80 (1992); Mark A. Salky, The Regulatory Regimes for Controlling Excessive Executive Compensation: Are Both, Either, or Neither Necessary?, 49 U. Miami L. Rev. 795, 814 (1995).
91 Louis D. Brandeis, Other People’s Money and how the Bankers Use It, London: Bedford Books, St Martin’s Press 1914, p. 89. 转引自〔英〕阿德里安 · 卡德伯里:《公司治理和董事会主席》,陈海威、唐艳辉译,北京,中国人民大学出版社,2005 年,第 21 页。
92 Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors, 70 Va. L. Rev. 669 (1984); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1991, pp.276-314.
93 John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 Va. L. Rev. 717 (1984); Paul G. Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency Problems, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1047 (1995).
94 〔美〕K. 弗莱德·斯考森、斯蒂芬·M. 格洛夫、道格拉斯·F. 普莱维特:《公司治理与证券交易委员会》,方红星译,大连,东北财经大学出版社,2006 年,第 178 页。
95 Executive Compensation Disclosure, Release No. 33-6962, 34-31327, IC-19032 (Oct. 15, 1992), 57 Fed. Reg. 48126 (Oct. 21, 1992).
96 Patrick J. Straka, Executive Compensation Disclosure: The SEC's Attempt to Facilitate Market Forces, 72 Neb. L. Rev. 804, 806 (1993).
97 Executive Compensation and Related Person Disclosure, SEC, Release No. 33-8732, 34-54302, IC-27444 (Aug. 11, 2006).
98 该数据库可检索 2000 年以来中国重要报刊的全文数据。
99 最后检索日期为 2007 年 4 月 20 日。
100 汪娅娅、东水:《高管年薪“高歌猛进”的背后》,《中国财经报》,2006 年 3 月 3 日,第 004 版。另请参阅任小雨:《高管薪酬过快增长有问题》,《证券日报》,2004 年 05 月 15 日。
101 见依:《高管报酬一再飚升》,《北京人才市场报》,2005 年 7 月 23 日,第 006 版。
102 卢晓平:《吴定富:部分保险公司高管薪酬过高》,《上海证券报》,2007 年 1 月 22 日,第 A05 版。
103 郭永刚:《吴定富痛斥保险业薪酬差距过大》,《中国青年报》,2007 年 1 月 22 日,第 007 版。
104 彭运年:《上市公司高管薪酬增长 16.34%》,《中国证券报》,2007 年 3 月 27 日,第 A12 版。
105 《中国上市公司老总年薪状况》,《上海证券报》,1998 年 11 月 18 日。
106 魏刚:《高级管理层激励与上市公司经营绩效》,《经济研究》,2000 年第 3 期,第 33 页。
107 赵逸荻:《高管报酬与公司绩效无关》,《经济观察报》,2004 年 8 月 23 日,第 23 版。
108 王姝:《国有与民营上市公司高管报酬对比》,《证券时报》,2005 年 04 月 29 日,第 A03 版。
109 梁桦:《高管薪酬畸高畸低,九成不合理》,《经济日报》,2005 年 5 月 25 日,第 014 版;师向阳:《问诊中国上市公司高管薪酬五大症候》,《上海证券报》,2005 年 9 月 14 日,第 B04 版。
110 刘柳:《中国高管薪酬:与绩效无关》,《财经时报》,2005 年 7 月 4 日,第 D08 版。
111 苏卫东、冯冰花:《上市公司高管薪酬与经营者腐败》,《金融与经济》,2006 年第 1 期,第 38-39 页。
112 阴长霖:《上市公司高管报酬激励与公司绩效研究》,《经济师》,2004 年第 1 期,第 125 页;喜玉、老岩:《我国上市公司高管平均年薪二十五万元》,《中国劳动保障报》,2006 年 3 月 11 日,第 003 版。
113 朱其祥、卢俊义:《上市公司高管人员薪酬与企绩效效的实证分析》,《特区经济》,2005 年第9 期,第 109 页。
114 曹阳:《我国现行国企高管薪酬制度存在的缺陷及应对策略》,《企业经济》,2005 年第 6 期,第 57 页。
115 周城雄:《国企高管薪酬怎么定才合理》,《新京报》,2007 年 1 月 23 日,第 B02 版。
116 杨瑞龙:《公司高管薪酬谁说了算》,《经济日报》,2004 年 10 月 13 日,第 009 版。
117 王红领:《决定国企高管薪酬水平的制度分析》,《现代经济探讨》,2006 年第 1 期,第 14-18 页。
118 〔日〕青木昌彦、钱颖一:《转轨经济中的公司治理结构》,北京,中国经济出版社,1995 年,第 4 页。
119 李建伟:《公司制度、公司治理与公司管理——法律在公司管理中的地位与作用》,北京,人民法院出版社,2005 年,第 240 页。
120 谢军:《公司内部治理机制的透视》,北京,人民出版社,2006 年,第 143-144 页;徐向艺等:《公司治理制度安排与组织设计》,北京,经济科学出版社,2006 年,第 433-434 页。
121 关于我国国有企业“内部人控制”问题,目前国内已有相当多文献论及,如李建伟:《公司制度、公司治理与公司管理——法律在公司管理中的地位与作用》,北京,人民法院出版社,2005 年,第 249-251 页;王天习:《公司治理与独立董事研究》,北京,中国法制出版社,2005 年,第 25-29 页;曾小青:《公司治理、受托责任与审计委员会制度研究》,大连,东北财经大学出版社,2005 年,第 114-116 页;于东智:《公司治理》,北京,中国人民大学出版社,2005 年,第 15 页;徐向艺等:《公司治理制度安排与组织设计》,北京,经济科学出版社,2006 年;陈湘永、张剑文、张伟文:《我国上市公司“内部人控制”研究》,《管理世界》,2000 年第 4 期,第 103-109 页;刘涛:《从“内部人控制”问题谈我国现行公司法的完善》,《经济师》,2003 年第 6 期,第 67-69 页;余剑:《上市公司内部人控制的治理途径》,《企业改革与管理》,2004 年第 7 期;张国平:《论“内部人控制”的治理》,《江南大学学报(人文社会科学版)》,第 3 卷第 1 期(2004 年 2 月),第 49-53 页;尹渔清:《上市公司内部人控制产生的根源及治理的对策》,《江汉大学学报(社会科学版)》,第 22 卷第 3 期(2005 年 9 月),第 74-78 页;何泽军:《析新公司法对上市公司内部人控制监管的加强》,《河南工业大学学报(社会科学版)》,第 2 卷第 2 期(2006 年 6月),第 17-18 页;卢锐:《上市公司高管在自定薪酬吗?——来自我国两职兼任公司的初步证据》(2005年 12 月 20 日 发 布 , 作 者 为 中 山 大 学 管 理 学 院 博 士 研 究 生 ),http://mns.sysu.edu.cn/accounting/onews.asp?id=53, 2007 年 4 月 14 日访问。
122 吉尔·所罗门、阿瑞斯·所罗门:《公司治理与问责制》,李维安、周建译,大连,东北财经大学出版社,2006 年,第 153 页。
123 曾小青:《公司治理、受托责任与审计委员会制度研究》,大连,东北财经大学出版社,2005 年,第 114页。
124 李亚静、朱宏泉、黄登仕:《董事会控制、经理报酬与公司绩效》,《系统工程理论与实践》,第 2 期(2005年 2 月),第 36 页、38 页;高军、徐向艺:《上市公司股权结构和董事会结构对 CEO 薪酬的影响》,《东岳论丛》,第 27 卷第 5 期(2006 年 9 月),第 80 页。
125 潘飞、石美娟、童卫华:《高级管理人员激励契约研究》,《中国工业经济》,2006 年 3 月第 3 期(总第216 期),第 69 页。
126 徐奎松、相晓冬:《高管年薪价值与回报的“不等式”》,《中国企业报》,2006 年 7 月 25 日,第 005 版;丁是钉:《国企高管薪酬绩效说了算》,《中国企业报》,2007 年 4 月 3 日,第 001 版。
127 卢锐:《上市公司高管在自定薪酬吗?——来自我国两职兼任公司的初步证据》;朱弈锟:《经营者薪酬:程序公正与制度设计》,赵万一、卢代富主编:《公司法:国际经验与理论架构》,北京,法律出版社,2005 年,第 340 页。
128 付建利:《呼吁高管薪酬"透明化"》,《证券时报》,2006 年 7 月 15 日,第 A08 版。
129 朱克江:《经营者薪酬激励制度研究》,北京,中国经济出版社,2002 年,第 103 页;卢锐:《上市公司高管在自定薪酬吗?——来自我国两职兼任公司的初步证据》;曾小青:《公司治理、受托责任与审计委员会制度研究》,大连,东北财经大学出版社,2005 年,第 115 页;李建伟:《公司制度、公司治理与公司管理——法律在公司管理中的地位与作用》,北京,人民法院出版社,2005 年,第 241 页。
130 周永亮:《中国企业前沿问题报告》,北京,中国社会科学出版社,2001 年,第 52 页。
131 Charles M. Elson, Director Compensation and the Management-captured Board: The History of a Symptom and a Cure, 50 SMU L. Rev. 127, 135-36 (1996).
132 94 F. 335 (8th Cir. 1899).
133 94 F. 335, at 337 (8th Cir. 1899).
134 118 A. 1 (Del. Ch. 1922).
135 118 A. 1, at 3 (Del. Ch. 1922).
136 Charles M. Elson, Director Compensation and the Management-captured Board: The History of a Symptom and a Cure, 50 SMU L. Rev. 127, 138-39 (1996).
137 〔美〕阿道夫·A·伯利、加德纳·C·米恩斯:《现代公司与私有财产》,甘华鸣、罗锐韧、蔡如海译,北京,商务印书馆,2005 年,第 78-129 页。
138 Charles M. Elson, Director Compensation and the Management-captured Board: The History of a Symptom and a Cure, 50 SMU L. Rev. 127, 139-40 (1996).
139 Ibid, at 141-42.
140 George E. Bates, The Board of Directors, 19 Harv. Bus. Rev. 72, 85 (1940), cited from Charles M. Elson, Director Compensation and the Management-captured Board: The History of a Symptom and a Cure, 50 SMU L. Rev. 127, 142-43 (1996)
141 Adolf A. Berle & Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (1932), p225, cited from Charles M. Elson, Director Compensation and the Management-captured Board: The History of a Symptom and a Cure, 50 SMU L. Rev. 127, 142 (1996)
142 Paul W. Dickson, Conference Board, Inc., Compensation and Duties of Corporate Directors 3 (1947), cited from Charles M. Elson, Director Compensation and the Management-captured Board: The History of a Symptom and a Cure, 50 SMU L. Rev. 127, 142 (1996)
143 Charles M. Elson, Director Compensation and the Management-captured Board: The History of a Symptom and a Cure, 50 SMU L. Rev. 127, 144-46 (1996)
144 Janice Kay McClendon, Bringing the Bulls to Bear: Regulating Executive Compensation to Realign Management and Shareholders' Interests and Promote Corporate Long-Term Productivity, 39 Wake Forest L. Rev. 971, 987 (2004).
145 Robert B. Thompson, Insider Trading, Investor Harm and Executive Compensation, 50 Case W. Res. 291, 301-04 (1999).
146 Heller v. Boylan, 29 N.Y.S.2d 653, 671 (Sup. Ct. 1941), aff'd mem., 32 N.Y.S.2d 131 (App. Div. 1941); Linda J. Barris, The Overcompensation Problem: A Collective Approach to Controlling Executive Pay, 68 Ind. L.J. 59, 74 (1992); Mark A. Salky, The Regulatory Regimes for Controlling Excessive Executive Compensation: Are Both, Either, or Neither Necessary?, 49 U. Miami L. Rev. 795, 819-22 (1995); Iman Anabtawi, Secret Compensation, 82 N.C.L. Rev. 835, 841 (2004).
147 Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, The Effect of Shareholder Proposals on Executive Compensation, 67 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1021, 1026-27 (1999); Brian R. Cheffins, The Metamorphosis of "Germany Inc.": The Caseof Executive Pay, 49 Am. J. Comp. L. 497, 528-29 (2001).
148 Linda J. Barris, The Overcompensation Problem: A Collective Approach to Controlling Executive Pay, 68 Ind. L.J. 59, 75-6 (1992)
149 Iman Anabtawi, Secret Compensation, 82 N.C.L. Rev. 835, 842 (2004); also see Richard H. Wagner & Catherine G. Wagner, New Concerns for Corporate Directors, 3 Stan. J.L. Bus. & Fin. 5, 5 (1997).
150 N.Y. Stock Exch., Listed Company Manual 303A.08 (2003), available at http://www.nyse.com /listed/p1020656067970.html (on file with the North Carolina Law Review); Nat’l Assoc. of Sec. Dealers, (“NASD”) Manual 4350(i) (2003), available at http://www.nasdr.com/pdf-text/nasd_manual.pdf, at 683-85 (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
151 N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law 505(d) (McKinney 2003).
152 Daniel Niehans & Shawn E. Lampron, Vol. 2 Executive Compensation for Emerging Companies 7-5 to 7-6 (2d ed. 2002), cited from Iman Anabtawi, Secret Compensation, 82 N.C.L. Rev. 835, 842, n.28 (2004).
153 Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, The Determinants of Shareholder Voting on Stock Option Plans, 35 Wake Forest L. Rev. 31, 46-47, 51, 73-74 (2000); Brian R. Cheffins, The Metamorphosis of "Germany Inc.": The Case of Executive Pay, 49 Am. J. Comp. L. 497, 531-32 (2001).
154 Developments in the Law: Corporations and Society, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 2205, 2209 (2004).
155 Linda J. Barris, The Overcompensation Problem: A Collective Approach to Controlling Executive Pay, 68 Ind. L.J. 59, 76 (1992); 谢军:《公司内部治理机制的透视》,北京,人民出版社,2006 年,第 82 页。
156 Iman Anabtawi, Secret Compensation, 82 N.C.L. Rev. 835, 846 (2004).
157 Mark A. Salky, The Regulatory Regimes for Controlling Excessive Executive Compensation: Are Both, Either, or Neither Necessary?, 49 U. Miami L. Rev. 795, 819-22 (1995).
158 Iman Anabtawi, Secret Compensation, 82 N.C.L. Rev. 835, 846-47 (2004).
159 Ibid, at 847.
160 Bureau of Nat’l Affairs, Inc., Corporate Governance Manual 1:A-16 (2002),cited from Iman Anabtawi, Secret Compensation, 82 N.C.L. Rev. 835, 847 (2004).
161 William W. Bratton, The Academic Tournament over Executive Compensation, 93 Calif. L. Rev. 1557, 1579 (2005).
162 Janice Kay McClendon, Bringing the Bulls to Bear: Regulating Executive Compensation to Realign Management and Shareholders' Interests and Promote Corporate Long-Term Productivity, 39 Wake Forest L. Rev. 971, 990 (2004).
163 Iman Anabtawi, Secret Compensation, 82 N.C.L. Rev. 835, 847-52 (2004); Janice Kay McClendon, Bringing the Bulls to Bear: Regulating Executive Compensation to Realign Management and Shareholders' Interests and Promote Corporate Long-Term Productivity, 39 Wake Forest L. Rev. 971, 990-91 (2004).
164 “ 透 过 首 席 执 行 官 的 薪 酬 看 公 司 治 理 ” , 宾 夕 法 尼 亚 大 学 沃 顿 知 识 在 线 ,http://www.knowledgeatwharton.com.cn/index.cfm?fa=viewArticle&articleID=1400,2007 年 4 月 14 日访问。
165 Lucian Bebchuk & Jesse Fried, Pay Without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 2004.
166 Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Jesse M. Fried & David I. Walker, Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 751 (2002); John Biggs, Executive Compensation: Perspective from a Former CEO, 30 Iowa J. Corp. L. 755, 756 (2005); James McConvill, Executive Compensation and Corporate Governance: Rising above the “Pay-for-Performance” Principle, 43 Am. Bus. L. J. 413, 413-14 (2006).
167 Kevin J. Murphy, Explaining Executive Compensation: Managerial Power versus the Perceived Cost of Stock Options, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 847 (2002).
168 Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, Remuneration: Where We’ve Been, How We Got to Here, What are the Problems, and How to Fix Them, at 53 (Harvard NOM Working Paper No. 04-28, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=561305; William W. Bratton, The Academic Tournament over Executive Compensation, 93 Calif. L. Rev. 1557, 1583 (2005).
169 Benjamin Alarie, Executive Compensation and Tax Policy: Lessons for Canada from the Experience of the United States in the 1990s, 61 U.T. Fac. L. Rev. 39, 53-4 (2003).
170 证券委发〔1994〕21 号。
173 Lucian Bebchuk & Jesse Fried, Pay Without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation 4-5, at 190-220, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 2004, cited from Susan Lorde Martin, Executive Compensation: Reining in Runaway Abuses again, 41 U.S.F. L. Rev. 147, 155, n.57, (2006); Brian R. Cheffins, The Metamorphosis of "Germany Inc.": The Case of Executive Pay, 49 Am. J. Comp. L. 497, 530 (2001).
174 Charles M. Yablon, Overcompensating: The Corporate Lawyer and Executive Pay, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 1867, 1869, 1881-82 (1992).
175 Brian R. Cheffins & Randall S. Thomas, The Globalization (Americanization?) of Executive Pay, 1 Berkeley Bus. L. J. 233, 262-63 (2004).
176 Janice Kay McClendon, Bringing the Bulls to Bear: Regulating Executive Compensation to Realign Management and Shareholders' Interests and Promote Corporate Long-Term Productivity, 39 Wake Forest L. Rev. 971, 976, 1018-19 (2004); Iman Anabtawi, Secret Compensation, 82 N.C.L. Rev. 835, n.28 (2004).
177 Meredith M. Stead, How Incentive Pay for Executives Isn't - And What We Can Do about It, 80 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 722, 730-31 (2005).
178 依《德国股份公司法》第 87 条之规定,董事的报酬一般应由监事会决定。See Hannes Schneider & Martin Heidenhain, The German Stock Corporation Act, Munich: C. H. Beck, 2000, at 93.
179 Brian R. Cheffins & Randall S. Thomas, The Globalization (Americanization?) of Executive Pay, 1 Berkeley Bus. L. J. 233, 267-68 (2004).
180 Jaclyn Braunstein, Pound Foolish: Challenging Executive Compensation in the U.S. and the U.K., 29 Brooklyn J. Int'l L. 747, 778-79 (2004).
181 Adrian Cadbury:《公司治理和董事会主席》,陈海威、唐艳辉译,北京,中国人民大学出版社,2005年,第 231 页。
182 Directors' Remuneration - Annual Shareholder Votes, JJ 74 (7) (Jordans Journal, August 2002); Ramesh Maharaj, Fat Cat Scan-Director Pay under the Microscope, NLJ 152.7046 (1302) (New Law Journal, 6 September 2002).
183 朱弈锟:《经营者薪酬:程序公正与制度设计》,赵万一、卢代富主编:《公司法:国际经验与理论架构》,北京,法律出版社,2005 年,第 346 页。
184 Ian Malcolm Ramsay, Directors’ and Officers’ Remuneration: The Role of the Law, Journal of Business Law, July 1993, at 355, available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=928807.
185 王文宇:《公司法论》,北京,中国政法大学出版社,2004 年,第 288-289 页。
186 Brian R. Cheffins & Randall S. Thomas, The Globalization (Americanization?) of Executive Pay, 1 Berkeley Bus. L. J. 233, 262 (2004).
187 Ibid.
188 Kannan Ramaswamy et al., A Study of the Determinants of CEO Compensation in India, 40 Mgmt. Int'l Rev.
167, 182 (2000), cited from Brian R. Cheffins & Randall S. Thomas, The Globalization (Americanization?) of Executive Pay, 1 Berkeley Bus. L. J. 233, 262-63 (2004).
189 Brian R. Cheffins & Randall S. Thomas, The Globalization (Americanization?) of Executive Pay, 1 Berkeley Bus. L. J. 233, 264 (2004).
190 一些相关专家也主张应该让让市场决定高管薪酬,请参阅吕锦明:《让市场决定的高管薪酬——温天纳谈国内上市公司高管薪酬定位》,《证券时报》,2006 年 7 月 15 日,第 A08 版;李增泉:《激励机制与企绩效效———一项基于上市公司的实证研究》,《会计研究》,2000 年第 1 期,第 29 页。
191 Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, Corporate Accountability: Litigating Challenges to Executive Pay: An Exercise in Futility?, 79 Wash. U. L. Q. 569, 576 (2001).
192 Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1991, pp.101-02, 105-06; Robert W. Hamilton, Law of Corporations, 法律出版社,1999 年,p.466.
193 参阅严刚:《股东代表诉讼的限制研究》,《西南民族大学学报·人文社会科学版》,总 24 卷,第六期(2003年 6 月),第 250-253 页。
194 Robert B. Thompson and Randall S. Thomas, The Public and Private Faces of Derivative Lawsuits, 57 Vand. L. Rev. 1747 (2004).
195 Revised MBCA§7.41 provides that “A shareholder may not commence or maintain a derivative proceeding unless the shareholder: (1) was a shareholder of the corporation at the time of the act or omission complained of or became a shareholder through transfer by operation of law from one who was a shareholder at the time; and (2) fairly and adequately represents the interest of the corporation in enforcing the right of the corporation.”
196 Robert W. Hamilton, Law of Corporations, p.467; 严刚:《股东代表诉讼的限制研究》,第 250 页。
197 Robert W. Hamilton, Law of Corporations, pp.469-471; also see Robert B. Thompson and Randall S. Thomas, The Public and Private Faces of Derivative Lawsuits, 57 Vand. L. Rev. 1747 (2004).
198 Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, Corporate Accountability: Litigating Challenges to Executive Pay: An Exercise in Futility?, 79 Wash. U. L. Q. 569, 576-78 (2001).
199 Linda J. Barris, The Overcompensation Problem: A Collective Approach to Controlling Executive Pay, 68 Ind. L.J. 59, 81-85 (1992); Michael E. Ragsdale, Executive Compensation: Will The New SEC Disclosure Rules Control "Excessive" Pay at the Top?, 61 UMKC L. Rev. 537, 547-49 (1993); Mark A. Salky, The Regulatory Regimes for Controlling Excessive Executive Compensation: Are Both, Either, or Neither Necessary?, 49 U. Miami L. Rev. 795, 806-08 (1995); Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, Corporate Accountability: Litigating Challenges to Executive Pay: An Exercise in Futility?, 79 Wash. U. L. Q. 569, 581-85 (2001); Alarie, Executive Compensation and Tax Policy: Lessons for Canada from the Experience of the United States in the 1990s, 61 U.T. Fac. L. Rev. 39, 51 (2003).
200 施天涛:《公司法论》,北京,法律出版社,2005 年,第 472-476 页;Michael E. Ragsdale, Executive Compensation: Will The New SEC Disclosure Rules Control "Excessive" Pay at the Top?, 61 UMKC L. Rev. 537, 547-48 (1993).
201 施天涛:《公司法论》,法律出版社,2005 年,第 481-482 页。
202 Michael A. Broyles, Case Notes: Hall v. Staha: Arkansas Courts Adopt the Business Judgment Rule as a Tool of Judicial Review and Analyze the Issue of Excessive Executive Compensation, 47 Ark. L. Rev. 959 (1994).
203 Principles of Corp. Governance 4.01(c) (ALI) (Tentative Draft No. 4, 1985); Michael E. Ragsdale, Executive Compensation: Will The New SEC Disclosure Rules Control "Excessive" Pay at the Top?, 61 UMKC L. Rev. 537, 547 (1993); Mark A. Salky, The Regulatory Regimes for Controlling Excessive Executive Compensation: Are Both, Either, or Neither Necessary?, 49 U. Miami L. Rev. 795, 807 (1995); 施天涛:《公司法论》,法律出版社,2005 年,第 476-479 页。
204 Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, Corporate Accountability: Litigating Challenges to Executive Pay: An Exercise in Futility?, 79 Wash. U. L. Q. 569, 581 (2001).
205 Michael E. Ragsdale, Executive Compensation: Will The New SEC Disclosure Rules Control "Excessive" Pay at the Top?, 61 UMKC L. Rev. 537, 547-48 (1993).
206 关于“灰色董事”的界定,请参阅朱弈锟:《经营者薪酬:程序公正与制度设计》,赵万一、卢代富主编:《公司法:国际经验与理论架构》,北京,法律出版社,2005 年,第 355-360 页。
207 Michael E. Ragsdale, Executive Compensation: Will The New SEC Disclosure Rules Control "Excessive" Pay at the Top?, 61 UMKC L. Rev. 537, 548 (1993).
208 Charles M. Yablon, Overcompensating: The Corporate Lawyer and Executive Pay, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 1867, n.43, (1992); Mark A. Salky, The Regulatory Regimes for Controlling Excessive Executive Compensation: Are Both, Either, or Neither Necessary?, 49 U. Miami L. Rev. 795, 806-07 (1995).
209 289 U.S. 582 (1933).
210 Mark A. Salky, The Regulatory Regimes for Controlling Excessive Executive Compensation: Are Both, Either, or Neither Necessary?, 49 U. Miami L. Rev. 795, 807 (1995).
211 Eric L. Johnson, Waste Not, Want Not: An Analysis of Stock Option Plans, Executive Compensation, and the Proper Standard of Waste, 26 Iowa J. Corp. L. 145, 155-56 (2000).
212 Paul K. Rowe, Defending Executive Compensation in the Courts: Substance and Strategy, 6 Law & Bus. Insights (P-H) No. 4, at 12 (Apr. 1992); Saxe v. Brady, 184 A.2d 602, 610 (Del. Ch. 1962), cited from Michael E. Ragsdale, Executive Compensation: Will The New SEC Disclosure Rules Control "Excessive" Pay at the Top?, 61 UMKC L. Rev. 537, 548 (1993).
213 Joshua A. Kreinberg, Reaching beyond Performance Compensation in Attempts to Own the Corporate Executive, 45 Duke L.J. 138, 170-71 (1995); Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, Corporate Accountability: Litigating Challenges to Executive Pay: An Exercise in Futility?, 79 Wash. U. L. Q. 569, 581 (2001).
214 David W. Deal, Directors' Vulnerability to Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claims for Compensation Decisions: Where Have We Been, Where Are We Now?, 30 Okla. City U.L. Rev. 311, 318 (2005).
215 315 A.2d 610 (Del. Ch. 1974).
216 Michael E. Ragsdale, Executive Compensation: Will The New SEC Disclosure Rules Control "Excessive" Pay at the Top?, 61 UMKC L. Rev. 537, 549 (1993).
217 Owensby & Kritokos, Inc. v. Commissioner, 819 F.2d 1315, 1323 (5th Cir. 1987); RTS Inv. Corp. v. Commissioner, 877 F.2d 647, 651 (8th Cir. 1989); Rutter v. Commissioner, 853 F.2d 1267, 1271 (5th Cir. 1988); Owensby & Kritikos, Inc. v. Commissioner, 819 F.2d at 1323, cited from Mark A. Salky, The Regulatory Regimes for Controlling Excessive Executive Compensation: Are Both, Either, or Neither Necessary?, 49 U. Miami L. Rev. 795, 815 (1995).
218 Heather L. Hathaway, Determining the Deductibility of Executive Compensation: Exacto Spring Corp. v. Commissioner, 53 Tax Law. 919 (2000).
219 纽约州最高法院是纽约州的第一审法院,是其州法院系统最低层次的法院。请参阅潘维大、刘文琦:《英美法导读》,法律出版社,2000 年,第 40 页。
220 273 N.Y.S. 87 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1934).
221 273 N.Y.S. 87, 114 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1934).
230 137 Cong. Rec. E2727 (daily ed. 25 July 1991) (statement of Rep. Sabo), cited from Linda J. Barris, The Overcompensation Problem: A Collective Approach to Controlling Executive Pay, 68 Ind. L.J. 59, 79 (1992); Mark A. Salky, The Regulatory Regimes for Controlling Excessive Executive Compensation: Are Both, Either, or Neither Necessary?, 49 U. Miami L. Rev. 795, 815 (1995).
231 H.R. 3056, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (introduced by Rep. Sabo), cited from Linda J. Barris, The Overcompensation Problem: A Collective Approach to Controlling Executive Pay, 68 Ind. L.J. 59, 79 (1992); Mark A. Salky, The Regulatory Regimes for Controlling Excessive Executive Compensation: Are Both, Either, or Neither Necessary?, 49 U. Miami L. Rev. 795, 813 (1995).
232 Thomas McCarroll, The Shareholders Strike Back: Executive Pay, TIME, 4 May 1992, at 46, cited from Kevin J. Murphy, Politics, Economics, and Executive Compensation, 63 U. Cin. L. Rev. 713, 727 (1995).
233 Kevin J. Murphy, Politics, Economics, and Executive Compensation, 63 U. Cin. L. Rev. 713, 727 (1995).
234 S. 2329, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1992).
235 26 U.S.C.162 (a) (1) (1988), “Individuals and corporations may take as a deduction “all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business, including - (1) a reasonable allowance for salaries or other compensation for personal services actually rendered ....””
236 S. 2329, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992).
237 S. 2261, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1992); S. 2261, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992).
238 H. R. 5260, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1992).
239 H. R. 4210, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1992).
240 138 Cong. Rec. S14866 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1992).
241 26 U.S.C. 162 (m) (Supp. V 1993).
242 另外两个条款是税法第 280G 节和第 4999 节,对公司控制权转移时公司向其雇员(包括高管)提供“金降落伞”的税收扣减进行限制,也被认为是规制高管报酬的税收手段。See Ryan Miske, Can't Cap Corporate Greed: Unintended Consequences of Trying to Control Executive Compensation through the Tax Code, 88 Minn. L. Rev. 1673, 1676-77 (2004). 鉴于其重要性较低,本文不对其进行介绍。
243 Mark A. Salky, The Regulatory Regimes for Controlling Excessive Executive Compensation: Are Both, Either, or Neither Necessary?, 49 U. Miami L. Rev. 795, 817-18 (1995).
244 Ibid, at 819-20.
245 Ibid, at 821.
246 Ibid, at 821-22.
247 Ibid, at 822.
248 附加福利是指由于雇员已经提供或即将提供的服务而获得的货币工资和薪金以外的所有利益。
249 Ryan Miske, Can't Cap Corporate Greed: Unintended Consequences of Trying to Control Executive Compensation through the Tax Code, 88 Minn. L. Rev. 1673, 1685 (2004).
250 Kevin Murphy, Politics, Economics and Executive Compensation, 63 U. Cin. L. Rev. 713, 738 (1995).
251 Ryan Miske, Can't Cap Corporate Greed: Unintended Consequences of Trying to Control Executive Compensation through the Tax Code, 88 Minn. L. Rev. 1673, 1685 (2004).
252 Mark A. Salky, The Regulatory Regimes for Controlling Excessive Executive Compensation: Are Both, Either, or Neither Necessary?, 49 U. Miami L. Rev. 795, 823 (1995).
253 Committee on Ways and Means: Revenues Report to Accompany Recommendations from the Committee on Ways and Means, H.R. Rep. No. 103-111, at 646 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 378, 877, cited from James R. Repetti, Accounting and Taxation: The Misuse of Tax Incentives to Align Management-Shareholder Interests, 19 Cardozo L. Rev. 697, 708 (1997).
254 Kevin J. Ryan, Rethinking Section 162(m)'s Limitation on the Deduction of Executive Compensation: A Review of the Commentary, 15 Va. Tax Rev. 371, 396 (1995).
255 James R. Repetti, Accounting and Taxation: The Misuse of Tax Incentives to Align Management-Shareholder Interests, 19 Cardozo L. Rev. 697, 709 (1997); Enron: Joint Committee on Taxation Investigative Report - Compensation - Related Issues before the Comm. on Senate Finance, 108th Cong. 6-7 (2003) (statement of Pamela Olson, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury (Tax Policy)), cited from Janice Kay McClendon, Bringing the Bulls to Bear: Regulating Executive Compensation to Realign Management and Shareholders' Interests and Promote Corporate Long-Term Productivity, 39 Wake Forest L. Rev. 971, 1018 (2004).
256 Ryan Miske, Can't Cap Corporate Greed: Unintended Consequences of Trying to Control Executive Compensation through the Tax Code, 88 Minn. L. Rev. 1673, 1687 (2004).
257 Kevin Murphy, Politics, Economics and Executive Compensation, 63 U. Cin. L. Rev. 713, 739 (1995); Alexander Gumbel, Managerial Power and Executive Pay, OJLS 2006 26 (219) (Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 1 March 2006).
258 Ryan Miske, Can't Cap Corporate Greed: Unintended Consequences of Trying to Control Executive Compensation through the Tax Code, 88 Minn. L. Rev. 1673, 1687 (2004).
259 Mark A. Salky, The Regulatory Regimes for Controlling Excessive Executive Compensation: Are Both, Either, or Neither Necessary?, 49 U. Miami L. Rev. 795, 814 (1995).
260 Michelle L. Johnson, Forget the Rhetoric -- Executive Pay Fell for Many in '91, Investor's Bus. Daily, 13 March 1992, at 8, cited from Linda J. Barris, The Overcompensation Problem: A Collective Approach to Controlling Executive Pay, 68 Ind. L.J. 59, 80 (1992); Mark A. Salky, The Regulatory Regimes for Controlling Excessive Executive Compensation: Are Both, Either, or Neither Necessary?, 49 U. Miami L. Rev. 795, 814 (1995).
261 Susan J. Stabile, Is There A Role for Tax Law in Policing Executive Compensation?, 72 St. John's L. Rev. 81, 97 (1998); Ryan Miske, Can't Cap Corporate Greed: Unintended Consequences of Trying to Control Executive Compensation through the Tax Code, 88 Minn. L. Rev. 1673, 1688 (2004).
262 Inez H. Friedman, The Deductibility of Executive Compensation: Automotive Investment, Pulsar Components, and New Section 162(m), 48 Tax Law. 255 (1994); Mark A. Salky, The Regulatory Regimes for Controlling Excessive Executive Compensation: Are Both, Either, or Neither Necessary?, 49 U. Miami L. Rev. 795, 814 (1995); Susan J. Stabile, Is There A Role for Tax Law in Policing Executive Compensation?, 72 St. John's L. Rev. 81, 89 (1998); Heather L. Hathaway, Determining the Deductibility of Executive Compensation: Exacto Spring Corp. v. Commissioner, 53 Tax Law. 919 (2000).
263 Ryan Miske, Can't Cap Corporate Greed: Unintended Consequences of Trying to Control Executive Compensation through the Tax Code, 88 Minn. L. Rev. 1673, 1688 (2004).
264 Inez H. Friedman, The Deductibility of Executive Compensation: Automotive Investment, Pulsar Components, and New Section 162(m), 48 Tax Law. 255 (1994).
265 Janice Kay McClendon, Bringing the Bulls to Bear: Regulating Executive Compensation to Realign Management and Shareholders' Interests and Promote Corporate Long-Term Productivity, 39 Wake Forest L. Rev. 971, 1017 (2004).
266 Ryan Miske, Can't Cap Corporate Greed: Unintended Consequences of Trying to Control Executive Compensation through the Tax Code, 88 Minn. L. Rev. 1673, 1684 (2004).
267 Susan J. Stabile, Is There A Role for Tax Law in Policing Executive Compensation?, 72 St. John's L. Rev. 81, 98-9 (1998).
268 Janice Kay McClendon, Bringing the Bulls to Bear: Regulating Executive Compensation to Realign Management and Shareholders' Interests and Promote Corporate Long-Term Productivity, 39 Wake Forest L. Rev. 971, 1016-19 (2004).
269 《美财长表示不干涉公司高管薪酬问题》,《财会信报》,2007 年 2 月 5 日,第 A05 版。
270 〔美〕K. 弗莱德·斯考森、斯蒂芬·M. 格洛夫、道格拉斯·F. 普莱维特:《公司治理与证券交易委员会》,方红星译,大连,东北财经大学出版社,2006 年,第 1-2 页。
271 侯汉杰、刘佑风:《证券信息披露法律制度研究》,王保树主编:《商事法论集》,北京,法律出版社,第 6 卷,2002 年,第 114-117 页;吉尔·所罗门、阿瑞斯·所罗门:《公司治理与问责制》,李维安、周建译,大连,东北财经大学出版社,2006 年,第 79 页。
272 侯汉杰、刘佑风:《证券信息披露法律制度研究》,王保树主编:《商事法论集》,北京,法律出版社,第 6 卷,2002 年,第 114-117 页。
273 徐向艺等:《公司治理制度安排与组织设计》,北京,经济科学出版社,2006 年,第 474-76 页。
274 Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors, 70 Va. L. Rev. 669,683-85 (1984).
275 John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 Va. L. Rev. 717, 722-23 (1984).
276 Troy A. Paredes, After the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: The Future of the Mandatory Disclosure System: Foreward, 81 Wash. U. L. Q. 229, 231-33 (2003).
277 Jennifer G. Hill, What Reward Have Ye? Disclosure of Director and Executive Remuneration in Australia, Company and Securities Law Journal, Vol. 14, 1996, at 17, available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=934697.
278 Ibid, at 12-18.
279 “美国证交会关注高管薪酬:是否会改变现状?”,宾夕法尼亚大学沃顿知识在线。
280 Ian Malcolm Ramsay, Directors’ and Officers’ Remuneration: The Role of the Law, Journal of Business Law, July 1993, at 371-72.
281 Edward M. Iacobucci, The Effects of Disclosure on Executive Compensation, 48 Univ. of Toronto L.J. 489, 497-98 (1998); 谷 米 娜 :《 论 我 国 上 市 公 司 高 级 管 理 人 员 报 酬 信 息 披 露 制 度 的 完 善 》,http://www.law-lib.com/lw/lw_view.asp?no=1394,2007 年 4 月 14 日访问。
282 Adolf A. Berle & Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (New York: MacMillan, 1933) at 7-9, cited from Edward M. Iacobucci, The Effects of Disclosure on Executive Compensation, 48 Univ. of Toronto L.J. 489, 491 (1998).
283 谷米娜:《论我国上市公司高级管理人员报酬信息披露制度的完善》。
284 Halle Fine Terrion, Regulation S-K, Item 402: The New Executive Compensation Disclosure Rules, 43 Case W. Res. 1175, 1185 (1993); Michael E. Ragsdale, Executive Compensation: Will The New SEC Disclosure Rules Control "Excessive" Pay at the Top?, 61 UMKC L. Rev. 537, 555-56 (1993); Martin D. Mobley, Compensation Committee Reports Post-Sarbanes-Oxley: Unimproved Disclosure of Executive Compensation Policies and Practices, 2005 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 111, 120-21 (2005).
285 Edward M. Iacobucci, The Effects of Disclosure on Executive Compensation, 48 Univ. of Toronto L.J. 489, 504-07 (1998); 郁光华:《从代理理论看对高管报酬的规范》,《现代法学》,第 27 卷第 2 期(2005年 3 月)。
286 关于高管报酬信息披露的意义和作用的相关分析,还可参阅童卫华、石美娟、刘冬、吴佩旆:《中国上市公司高管人员报酬信息披露研究》,《重庆大学学报(社会科学版)》,2006 年第 12 卷第 5 期,第48-49 页。
287 Mark A. Salky, The Regulatory Regimes for Controlling Excessive Executive Compensation: Are Both, Either, or Neither Necessary?, 49 U. Miami L. Rev. 795, 809 (1995).
288 本小节主要参考了如下文献:Patrick J. Straka, Executive Compensation Disclosure: The SEC's Attempt to Facilitate Market Forces, 72 Neb. L. Rev. 804 (1993); Halle Fine Terrion, Regulation S-K, Item 402: The New Executive Compensation Disclosure Rules, 43 Case W. Res. 1175, 1179-90 (1993); Kevin Murphy, Politics, Economics and Executive Compensation, 63 U. Cin. L. Rev. 713, 731-37 (1995); Michael E. Ragsdale, Executive Compensation: Will The New SEC Disclosure Rules Control "Excessive" Pay at the Top?, 61 UMKC L. Rev. 537, 550-61 (1993); 谷米娜:《论我国上市公司高级管理人员报酬信息披露制度的完善》(该文关于美国 1992 年高管报酬披露规则的介绍基本是参考 Patrick J. Straka, Executive Compensation Disclosure: The SEC's Attempt to Facilitate Market Forces, 72 Neb. L. Rev. 804 (1993))。
289 Patrick J. Straka, Executive Compensation Disclosure: The SEC's Attempt to Facilitate Market Forces, 72 Neb. L. Rev. 804, 806 (1993).
290 Ibid, at 804-05.
291 Press Conference with Richard Breeden, SEC Chairman, Fed. News Serv., Feb. 13, 1992, available in LexisNexis Library, Fednew File, cited from Linda J. Barris, The Overcompensation Problem: A Collective Approach to Controlling Executive Pay, 68 Ind. L.J. 59, 74 (1992);
292 Halle Fine Terrion, Regulation S-K, Item 402: The New Executive Compensation Disclosure Rules, 43 Case W. Res. 1175, 1176 (1993).
293 Executive Compensation Disclosure, Release No. 33-6962, 57 Fed. Reg. 1 48,126 (1992).
294 SEC Adopts Proxy Reform Package after Long Study and Intense Debate, Sec. L. Daily (BNA), Oct. 16, 1992, cited from Michael E. Ragsdale, Executive Compensation: Will The New SEC Disclosure Rules Control "Excessive" Pay at the Top?, 61 UMKC L. Rev. 537, 537 (1993).
295 Executive Compensation Disclosure, 57 Fed. Reg. 48,126 (1992) (to be codified at 17 CFR 228-29, 240, 249); Patrick J. Straka, Executive Compensation Disclosure: The SEC's Attempt to Facilitate Market Forces, 72 Neb. L. Rev. 804, 804 (1993).
296 Michael E. Ragsdale, Executive Compensation: Will The New SEC Disclosure Rules Control "Excessive" Pay at the Top?, 61 UMKC L. Rev. 537, 551 (1993).
297 Ibid, at 550-51.
298 Patrick J. Straka, Executive Compensation Disclosure: The SEC's Attempt to Facilitate Market Forces, 72 Neb. L. Rev. 816-17 (1993).
299 Ibid, at 817-18.
300 Ibid, at 818-19.
301 Ibid, at 820.
320 Executive Compensation and Related Person Disclosure, available at www.sec.gov/rules/final/2006/33-8732a.pdf.
321 Jeffrey N. Gordon, Executive Compensation: If Theer's A Problem, What's the Remedy? The Case for “Compensation Discussion and Analysis”, 30 Iowa J. Corp. L. 675 (2005).
322 Elizabeth A. Brower, J. Mark Poerio and Michael L. Zuppone, Executive Compensation and Related Person Disclosure, Paul Hastings LLP, at 1.
323 Executive Compensation and Related Person Disclosure, Release No. 33-8732, 34-54302, IC-27444 (Aug. 11, 2006), at 39-40; SEC Amends Executive Compensation, Related Person and Corporate Governance Disclosure Requirements, O'Melveny and Myers LLP; SEC Significantly Revises Executive Compensation and Related Person Disclosure Requirements, at 2, Mayer, Brown, Rowe & Maw LLP.
324 Executive Compensation and Related Person Disclosure, Release No. 33-8732, 34-54302, IC-27444 (Aug. 11, 2006), at 192-93.
329 国资发分配〔2006〕175 号,2006 年 9 月 30 日。
330 证监发行字〔2006〕2 号,2006 年 5 月 8 日。
331 证监发行字〔2006〕5 号,2006 年 5 月 18 日。
332 中国证券监督管理委员会令第 40 号,2007 年 1 月 30 日。
333 Janice Kay McClendon, Bringing the Bulls to Bear: Regulating Executive Compensation to Realign Management and Shareholders' Interests and Promote Corporate Long-Term Productivity, 39 Wake Forest L. Rev. 971, 976, 1018-19 (2004); Iman Anabtawi, Secret Compensation, 82 N.C.L. Rev. 835, n.28 (2004).
334 周松林:《上证所备忘录指导年报编制》,《中国证券报》,2006 年 2 月 6 日,第 A02 版。
335 张娟:《高管薪酬机制有待完善》,《中国证券报》,2006 年 4 月 28 日,第 A20 版。
336 熊晨:《高管=高薪?》,《财会信报》,2005 年 6 月 8 日,第 A05 版。
337 付建利:《呼吁高管薪酬"透明化"》,《证券时报》,2006 年 7 月 15 日,第 A08 版;吕锦明:《让市场决定的高管薪酬——温天纳谈国内上市公司高管薪酬定位》,《证券时报》,2006 年 7 月 15 日,第 A08版。
338 Jonathan E. Gottlieb & Diana R. de Brito, Disclosure of Executive Compensation: An Analysis of the SEC's New Rules, 6 Law & Bus. Insights (P-H) No. 11, at 3 (Nov. 1992), cited from Michael E. Ragsdale, Executive Compensation: Will The New SEC Disclosure Rules Control "Excessive" Pay at the Top?, 61 UMKC L. Rev. 537, 552, n.111 (1993).
339 我国上市公司平均高管人数为 19 人,请参阅乐琦、蒋峦:《高管人员报酬与公司经营绩效关系研究》,《广东商学院学报》,2006 年第 1 期,第 43 页。
340 陈少华、葛家澎等:《公司财务报告问题研究》,厦门大学出版社,2006 年,第 60、74 页;林国全:《证券交易法研究》,北京,中国政法大学出版社,2002 年,第 43 页。
341 童卫华、石美娟、刘冬、吴佩旆:《中国上市公司高管人员报酬信息披露研究》,《重庆大学学报(社会科学版)》,2006 年第 12 卷第 5 期,第 47 页。
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343 林国全:《证券交易法研究》,北京,中国政法大学出版社,2002 年,第 51 页。
344 Looking Ahead to the 93 Proxy Season, Business Wire, Dec. 3, 1992, cited from Michael E. Ragsdale, Executive Compensation: Will The New SEC Disclosure Rules Control "Excessive" Pay at the Top?, 61 UMKC L. Rev. 537, 540-41, n.29 (1993).
345 Executive Compensation and Related Person Disclosure, Release No. 33-8732, 34-54302, IC-27444 (Aug. 11, 2006), at 39-40; SEC Amends Executive Compensation, Related Person and Corporate Governance Disclosure Requirements, O'Melveny and Myers LLP; SEC Significantly Revises Executive Compensation and Related Person Disclosure Requirements, at 2, Mayer, Brown, Rowe & Maw LLP.
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