摘要
股东派生诉讼制度首创于英国判例,经过百余年的发展,股东派生诉讼制度已为两大法系的多数国家所接受,由于其是保护中小股东利益的一项有效制度,所以成为各国公司法中不可缺少的重要部分。新修改的《中华人民共和国公司法》(以下简称《公司法》)在第152条规定了股东派生诉讼制度,是我国确立股东派生诉讼制度的标志,这对于推动我国国有企业改革和现代化企业制度的建立将发挥十分重要的作用。股东派生诉讼不同于一般的民事诉讼,公司在我国的股东派生诉讼制度中究竟处于何种地位,在理论和司法实践上都有很大的分歧,《公司法》也没有明确规定。
本文比较了英美法系和大陆法系代表国家的立法模式,并就我国学者相关理论观点进行了探讨。考虑到移植成本及诉讼文化等因素,在构建公司在我国股东派生诉讼中的地位时,应在我国原有的诉讼制度基础上,借鉴日本的立法式模,对我国无独立请求权第三人制度加以修正。这样,既可以发挥公司在诉讼中的作用,又可以保护公司和中小股东的切身利益,基本解决了公司在我国股东发生诉讼中的地位问题,可以充分发挥出股东派生诉讼在我国的作用。
The system of shareholders’derivative action is one of important systems of modern company law, which is playing a significant role in protecting shareholders’position in governing a company, as well as perfecting the company governing structure. However, the mechanism of operation of this system exceeds the characteristic of autonomy of company as a corporation, so if it was created properly, it would be a strong weapon used by the shareholders with goodwill to protect the company, otherwise, it might become a tool to interfere operation of the company and to pursue self-interest by the shareholders with malice. Company Law of the People's Republic of China has established the system of shareholders’derivative action, which has great significance to Chinese company legal system, but it is still defective and has no clear stipulation on the status of company in shareholders’derivative action, which makes the company falling into an embarrassing situation, what’s more, the benefits of the company and the minority shareholders can hardly be completely protected. This thesis will try constructing the status of company in shareholders’derivative action, on the basis of comparative analysis of relative regulations of different states and regions, as well as generalization and discussion of relative theories of domestic scholars, to perfect Chinese company legislation.
The thesis includes four parts:
The first one is mainly an introduction of the system of shareholders’derivative action and litigants in it. The system derived from English common law, and is one important system in modern company management structure. Company Law of the People's Republic of China complied with the tendency of development of company law and adopted the system of shareholders’derivative action to perfect the protection mechanism of minority shareholders. The thesis discusses about the signification, characteristics and history of the system of shareholders’derivative action, also the distinction between shareholders’derivative action and shareholders litigation, all of which gives a clear and overall acknowledgement of this system. In the matter of litigants, it includes three parties: plaintiff, defendant and company. Almost every state imposes limits on shareholders being plaintiff, such as the proportion and time limits of holding shares, which were set in case of improper suits to interrupt regular management of company. Defendant in shareholders’derivative lawsuit is the one who causes damages to company’s benefits and ought to be responsible for compensation to company, usually including directors, managers and the third party outside the company. But there are always some different limits on object and scope of shareholders’derivative lawsuit in different countries out of their own policy consideration. Company is an indispensible party in shareholders’derivative lawsuit because its benefit is closely linked to it.
The second part mainly discusses the necessity and practical significance for company participating in shareholders’derivative lawsuit. In respect of status of litigant shareholders’derivative lawsuit, there is neither dissent on shareholders participating as plaintiff, nor on infringer who causes damages to company being defendant, and on this point, there has already an agreement been reached. But as to if company should attend the suit, and if it should, what status it should be in the suit, the regulations are quite different from different states and regions. This thesis systemically discusses the necessity of company’s participation in shareholders’derivative lawsuit in three respects, namely the status of shareholders in company, the interests of company in the suit, and investigation of facts. It also sets forth the practical significance for company participating in the suit, by analyzing the relationship between company and three situations of plaintiff winning and losing the suit, as well as settlement.
The third part makes a brief comment on relative regulation of different states and regions. This thesis introduces the relative legislations of United States and Japan, etc. and makes a brief comment on them. The two legal systems have some points in common in legislation pattern: no matter what status the company has in shareholders’derivative lawsuit, the purpose is to protect benefits of company, prevent collusion between plaintiff and defendant, and guarantee supervision and compensation effect of shareholders’derivative action; and in the suit, the benefits of company is guaranteed, meanwhile its litigation rights is limited to some extent. But because of different legislation systems and legal cultures of the two legal systems, there are still some distinctions: in American legislation pattern, company will be ordered by court as nominal defendant on the purpose of due procedure and adjudication effect exceeding to company; but in Japanese pattern, plaintiff is legitimate based on the theory of legitimation of litigant, and company will determine itself participating in the suit or not, however the effect of judgment will still reach it no matter if it is involved in the suit. According to the comparison of legislation pattern from different states, it is not hard to be seen that although different regulations, they all aim to the largest extent to protect benefits of minority shareholders of domestic company.
The fourth part discusses and concludes related theories of domestic scholars and tries to construct the status of company in shareholders’derivative action, by using foreign developed legislation pattern for reference. Chinese civil litigation system has been hugely influenced by continental legal system, so such patterns of countries from continental legal system can be learned: company participates in the suit as a supportive party on the side of plaintiff. The best way of adopting other countries’legislation pattern for reference is to modify the currently existing system, combining with our own legal system, which will avoid conflicts between systems and also have shareholders’derivative action grown well in Chinese legal culture. In Chinese current litigant system, third party without independent claim system is the most close to Japanese assistant party system. The thesis makes some modifications on the third party without independent claim system: first of all, make an alternation to the ways of third party without independent claim participating in the suit, that is to say, the third party will participate in it by litigation notice instead of being ordered by court, so that company can self-determine whether to participate in shareholders’derivative lawsuit or not; secondly, clarify the effect caused by participation of third party without independent claim and according to res judicata, objections should not be proposed in one case based on the facts in another case that has already decided by court; thirdly, clarify that company is bound under the judgment issued by court. According to the modifications above about third party without independent claim system, the status of company in shareholders’derivative action will be constructed and the role of shareholders’derivative action will be greatly played.
In conclusion, clarification of the status of company in shareholders’derivative action has great significance in perfecting system of shareholders’derivative action, as well as protecting benefits of company and minority shareholders.
引文
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