摘要
投资、消费、出口为拉动中国经济增长的“三驾马车”,这三者的情况的好坏会对中国经济产生重大影响。出口贸易除了受到国外市场需求的影响之外,还会受到进口国的各种贸易壁垒的制约,其中反倾销已逐渐发展成为一种贸易壁垒的主导形式。
反倾销现已成为WTO成员用以保护本国产业,抵制不公平竞争行为的最主要手段,但是有的国家滥用反倾销手段,使其变成贸易保护的工具。中国是一个外贸大国,有较高的对外贸易依存度,我国的国民经济发展较多的受制于外贸的发展状况。无论从占比,还是从总量,以及从单个年度来看,中国遭受的反倾销长期都位居世界第一,中国已成为世界反倾销最大的受害国。世界对中国频繁的反倾销已经对我国的对外贸易构成了严峻的挑战。本文围绕中国遭受反倾销的相关问题进行研究,试图通过构建相应的体系、实施合理的政策措施来维护我国的合法贸易利益,有效减少我国的贸易损失和贸易摩擦,进而实现我国贸易的可持续发展和产业安全。
论文在前人研究的基础上,采用理论与实际相结合,重在实际；实证研究与规范研究相结合,以实证研究为主；定量分析与定性分析相结合；总量研究与局部分析相结合等多种方法。综合应用国际经济学、金融学、统计学、计量经济学、博弈论以及法律等多学科交叉展开研究,从不同的视角对中国遭受反倾销的影响因素进行了详细研究,同时也对中国遭受反倾销的影响效应进行来了详细研究,并就如何构建反倾销的二维贸易救济体系进行了详细的分析,最后还对贸易救济体系中的关键之处提出了详细的政策建议。
本文研究中的创新主要有：
(1)重新测算了人民币有效汇率,并分析其对反倾销调查的影响。在研究我国遭受反倾销总量的背景下,双边汇率无法反映出人民币与这些对华反倾销国家货币之间的汇率的整体情况,而有效汇率(Effective Exchange Rate, EER)则弥补了上述缺陷。以前的文献中主要是直接采用IMF公布的人民币有效汇率进行研究,但是这种做法有一定缺陷：IMF选取的样本国中缺少了一些主要的对华反倾销国家,比如不包含印度,而印度是现在每年对华反倾销数量最多的国家；另外IMF公布的有效汇率的基期调整过几次,导致不同时段的有效汇率不具备可比性,因此人民币有效汇率需要重新测算。本文在16个样本国的基础上再增加了6个主要的对华反倾销国家,扩展到22个样本国,另外所有样本国都调整为以1995年为基期,然后重新计算了人民币有效汇率。
(2)在国内首次基于非时间序列定量分析了中国的“非市场经济地位”问题和微观因素对反倾销裁决的影响。针对中国的“非市场经济地位”的研究主要集中在国内学者身上,但国内学者的研究主要是采用一般逻辑推理和个案的研究,专门就“非市场经济地位”问题给中国的反倾销带来多大的负面影响进行定量分析和实证分析很少,有少数的实证研究是基于时间序列以某个年份为界设定一个虚拟变量来反映中国的“非市场经济地位”的变化,这种研究设定有一定缺陷。本文在对华反倾销裁决的影响因素的研究中,不使用通常的时间序列,而采用非时间序列,即以各个案件的裁决结果为样本,定量实证分析了中国的“非市场经济地位”对肯定性或否定性裁决以及对反倾销税率高低的影响。另外由于对于反倾销影响因素的研究主要集中于宏观因素,对微观因素的研究非常稀少,所以本论文还重点考察各个案件中具体涉案产品的出口份额变动、出口价格变动等微观因素,定量分析了微观因素对反倾销裁决的影响。
(3)研究了涉案企业反倾销胜诉预期并构建了反倾销二维贸易救济体系。促使涉案企业积极应诉仅靠呼吁是不够的。其实每个涉案企业都知道不参加应诉的严重后果,但是实际上仍然有一些企业放弃反倾销应诉。企业之所以不愿意参加反倾销应诉主要原因在于高额的应诉费用和缺乏胜诉预期,因此胜诉预期状况对是否积极应诉起到至关重要的作用。本文研究了预期结果如何对应诉行为产生影响、哪些因素对胜诉预期有影响、如何改善涉案企业的胜诉预期。对于反倾销的贸易救济的研究有不少,但没有就如何构建一个完整的贸易救济体系进行系统研究。完整的贸易救济体系应是功能维度和时间维度在纵向和横向有机耦合的二维贸易救济体系。功能维度包括：宏观的政府部门,中观的社会机构和行业协会,微观的涉案企业三个层次；时间维度包括：事前的预警体系、事中的应对措施、事后的弥补策略三个层次。本文研究了如何将功能维度的组成要素和时间维度的组成要素进行合理的藕合,使其构建成为一个较完整的反倾销二维贸易救济体系。
论文的主要研究内容和结论如下：
(1)对中国遭受反倾销状况及特征的研究。本文对1995年至2009年世界对华反倾销的情况进行了全面的统计分析。中国遭受的反倾销调查总量达到761起,对世界总量的占比达到20.7%。中国遭受最终反倾销措施总量达到538起,对世界总量的占比达到22.7%。世界对中国反倾销的国家或地区达到29个,而且涉案产品分布是非常广的,共涉及17个大类的产品。各种统计数据和指标都显示出形势的严峻性,显示出中国是世界反倾销最大的受害国。
(2)对中国遭受反倾销调查的影响因素的研究。首先,运用负二项回归模型从中国遭受反倾销调查的总量和中国内部视角去研究反倾销调查的影响因素,从国家层面的一些宏观影响因素去考察后发现,中国的经济贸易状况、中国的报复能力和中国的国际地位三个方面都会对世界对华反倾销调查产生显著影响,具体影响因素包括：中国出口、中国GDP、人民币实际有效汇率、中国进口、中国对外反倾销调查、中国入世。其次,运用条件Logistic技术研究中国农产品遭受反倾销调查的影响因素,从产品层面研究发现,对农产品遭受反倾销产生显著影响的主要是一些涉案农产品的微观因素,包括农产品出口价格增长率、农产品在进口国占比。这些实证结果对于政府部门和涉案企业、行业协会的意义是有差异的,政府部门进行的宏观监控主要是对总量的监控,更多地是把握大局,因此政府部门更多需要对中国的经济贸易状况、报复能力、国际地位中的各种影响因素的关注；而涉案企业、行业协会作为一个出口涉案产品的个体或一个集合,更多地是需要对自身出口的产品的价格变动、出口份额变动这些微观因素给予高度的关注。
(3)对中国遭受最终反倾销措施影响因素的研究。由于美国在世界经济贸易中的举足轻重的地位,它对中国的反倾销行为具有强烈的示范效应,而且美国是最主要的对华反倾销国家之一,因此基于美国对华反倾销裁决去研究我国遭受最终反倾销措施的影响因素得到的结果是具有代表性的。运用二元Logistic回归和关联分析方法进行实证研究后发现,对反倾销最终裁定结果产生影响的因素包含涉案产品的微观因素：涉案产品在美国进口份额、涉案产品的主要输美国家出口价格变动率,这再次提醒中国的涉案企业和行业协会要高度关注涉案产品的微观因素的变动。另外中国的“非市场经济地位”虽然对肯定性或否定性倾销裁决结果不产生显著影响,但会显著影响到反倾销税率高低的裁定,即“非市场经济地位”容易导致我国获得较高税率的裁决结果,因此无论是从涉案企业的角度还是国家的角度,“非市场经济地位”问题都是需要我们认真面对的。
(4)对中国遭受反倾销影响效应的研究。以非常典型的涉案农产品中的蜂蜜产品反倾销为例,研究了1994年开始持续至今的美国对华蜂蜜反倾销。通过Johansen检验和各种统计数据的分析,结果显示,美国的反倾销没有给我国的蜂蜜出口价格产生明显影响,但是我们无法保证在其它产品的案件中反倾销也同样对出口价格没有影响,因为蜂蜜产品毕竟是个案。另外美国的反倾销对我国蜂蜜出口市场份额、出口收入已经造成了严重影响。除了涉案企业自身要尽力通过应诉、市场多元化等手段减少损失外,政府和行业协会的积极的贸易救济也显的非常重要。
(5)对中国遭受反倾销的二维贸易救济体系构建的研究。该章研究的贸易救济是指贸易救济的第二层意思,即指我国为避免国外对我国滥用反倾销、反补贴和保障措施带来的负面影响而采取各种政策措施进行的贸易救济。涉案企业应诉与否是最终博弈的结果,涉案企业选择“应诉”最基本的前提一定是“胜诉预期”。影响涉案企业的“胜诉预期”的因素是多方面的,提高涉案企业的“胜诉预期”总体思路是：积极改善我方可以操控的因素,尽量改善我方不易操控的因素；以涉案企业为主体在政府部门和外部机构的配合下改善内部因素,政府部门和外部机构则负责改善外部因素。鉴于中国遭受反倾销的形势的严峻性,建立一个高效、全面的针对国外反倾销的贸易救济体系就显的很有必要。完整贸易救济体系的构建需要从功能维度和时间维度进行藕合,改变以前贸易救济体系构建的单一性。功能维度包括：宏观、中观、微观三个层次。宏观主要涉及到我国相关政府部门；中观主要涉及行业协会和社会机构；微观主要涉及涉案产品的出口企业。时间维度包括：事前、事中、事后三个层次,分别涉及到事前的预警体系、事中应对措施以及事后的弥补策略。本文构建出了一个功能维度的各个要素和时间维度的各个要素相互支撑的二维贸易救济体系,并对整个体系的运作进行了详细的论述。
(6)对前面研究得出的结论进行总结,并基于研究结论对二维贸易救济体系中的关键之处提出相应的政策建议。
Investment, consumption and export are the troika for China's economic growth. The situations of these three growth engines have the significant impacts on China economy. Export trade will not only be affected by the demand of foreign markets, but also be subject to the constraints of the various trade barriers from importing countries, and anti-dumping is becoming a dominant form of trade barriers.
Anti-dumping has become the main tool with which WTO members protect their domestic industries and resist unfair competition, but because of the abuse of anti-dumping in some countries, it becomes a tool for trade protection. China is a big foreign trade country with higher foreign trade dependence. In the case of China's foreign trade dependence gradually climbing up, China's national economic development is more subject to the development of foreign trade. In terms of proportion, or total number, and single year, the anti-dumping which China suffered has long been ranked first in the world; China has become the world's largest victim of anti-dumping. The world's frequent anti-dumping against China makes a serious challenge to China's foreign trade. The dissertation focuses on the issues of anti-dumping against China and tries to build a corresponding system, implements reasonable policies and measures to safeguard China's legitimate trade interests, and effectively reduces the trade loss and trade friction, thus achieves the sustainable development of China's foreign trade and industrial safety.
Based on the previous studies; the dissertation employs a combination of theory and practice, focusing on the practice; a combination of empirical research and normative research, focusing on the empirical research; a combination of quantitative analysis and qualitative analysis; a combination of total analysis and partial analysis. The dissertation comprehensively applies international economics, finance, statistics, econometrics, game theory, and law and so on to carry out multidisciplinary research, studies in detail the affecting factors of anti-dumping against China from a different perspective, and also studies in detail the effect of anti-dumping against China, and analyses in detail how to build a anti-dumping two-dimension trade remedy system, finally, puts forward specific policy recommendations to the key points of trade remedy system.
The main innovations of the research are listed as follows:
(1) Re-calculate RMB effective exchange rate and analyze its impact on anti-dumping investigations. In the study of the total anti-dumping amount against China, the bilateral exchange rate does not reflect the exchange rate between RMB and the currencies of these countries anti-dumping against China, but the effective exchange rate makes up for the shortcoming. Previous literature published mainly used directly RMB effective exchange rate of IMF to study, but this approach has shortcomings:IMF misses some of major anti-dumping countries against China in the selection of sample countries, such as India excluded, while India has the most anti-dumping against China every year; and the base period of effective exchange rate of IMF has been adjusted several times, and the effective exchange rate of different periods isn't comparable in result. So RMB effective exchange rate needs to be re-calculated. Sample countries have been extended to 22. That is,6 major anti-dumping countries against China have been added to the sample of 16 countries. The base period of all the sample countries have been adjusted to 1995 in the calculation. At last, re-calculate RMB effective exchange rate.
(2) It's the first time to quantitatively analyze the impact of China's "non-market economy status" and micro-factors on anti-dumping decision based on non-time series in domestic. China's "non-market economy status" is researched mainly by domestic scholars using general logical reasoning and case study, and impact of non-market economy status on China's anti-dumping is little analyzed with the quantitative and empirical methods. Few empirical researches based on the time series set a dummy variable that dividing line is a certain year to reflect China's "non-market economy status" changes. This kind of study set has defects. This dissertation doesn't uses the usual time series, but uses the non-time series, that is, uses the sample of case rulings other than time series to empirically and quantitatively explore the impact of China's "non-market economy status" on the affirmative or negative decisions and the level of anti-dumping duty in the research of impact factors of anti-dumping rulings against China. In addition, the research of anti-dumping impact factors are focused on macro-level and the analysis of micro-factors are very few, so this dissertation also focuses on the micro-factors such as the changes in export share and export price for the specific product involved in all the cases, and quantitative analysis of their impact on anti-dumping rulings against China.
(3) Research the recovery expectation of anti-dumping for the companies involved in the cases, and how to build an anti-dumping two-dimension trade remedy system. Appeal isn't enough to encourage companies to actively respond to the anti-dumping. In fact, every companies involved knows the serious consequences of non-participation in the responding, but some companies will still give up responding to the anti-dumping. The main reason that companies are reluctant to participate in anti-dumping responding is mainly due to high costs and the lack of recovery expectation, so recovery expectation plays a crucial role in actively responding or not. How the expectation results influence responding behaviors, the factors that affect the winning expectation and how to improve the companies involved in the favor of expectations are explored. The anti-dumping trade remedy in this dissertation refers to the second meaning that a series of aid policies are conducted to maintain our normal trade and reduce our trade loss when China suffers anti-dumping, countervailing, and safeguard measures from foreign countries. There are many studies on anti-dumping trade remedy, but the systematical research on how to build a complete trade remedy system is not found. Complete trade remedy system should be vertically and horizontally organic coupling by function dimension and time dimension. The function dimension includes macro-government sector, social institutions and industry associations, three levels for micro-companies involved. The time dimension includes the prior early-warning system, concurrent countermeasures, and compensation strategies afterwards. This dissertation studies how the elements of the function dimensions and time dimensions are organically coupled to construct an effective two-dimension anti-dumping trade remedy system.
The main contents and conclusions of the dissertation are as follows:
(1) Research characteristics and situation of anti-dumping against China. The dissertation makes the comprehensive statistical analysis to the situation of the world anti-dumping against China from1995 to 2009. The total anti-dumping investigations of China suffering are 761; the proportion in the total of the world is 20.7%. The total final anti-dumping measures of China suffering are 538; the proportion in the total of the world is 22.7%. The number of the countries or regions of anti-dumping against China is 29. The products involved are very widely distributed, involving 17 categories of products. Various statistical data and indicators have shown the seriousness of the situation, and have shown that China is the world's largest victim of anti-dumping.
(2) Research affecting factors of anti-dumping investigations against China. Firstly, the dissertation uses negative binomial regression model to study the affecting factors of anti-dumping investigations against China from the total amount of anti-dumping investigations and the China's internal perspective. After studying some macro factors from the national level, the dissertation finds that all of economy and trade situations, retaliatory capability, and international status of China significantly influence the anti-dumping investigations against China. The affecting factors include China's export, China's GDP, RMB real effective exchange rate, China's import, the number of China's anti-dumping investigations against the foreign countries, China's accession to the WTO. Secondly, the dissertation uses conditional logistic regression to study the affecting factors of anti-dumping investigations against China agricultural products. After studying from product level, the dissertation finds that some micro-factors of agricultural products involved significantly influence the anti-dumping investigations against China agricultural products. The affecting factors include the growth rate of agricultural products export price, proportion in import countries of agricultural products. These empirical results have different meaning for the government departments and companies involved, industry associations. Macro-control from government departments is mainly to monitor the total, and grasp the overall situation, so Chinese government needs to be more concerned about the factors of economy and trade, retaliatory capability, international status of China. The companies involved, industry associations as an export individual or a collection of products involved, need to pay high attention to the change of micro-factors including export price and export proportion of their own products.
(3) Research affecting factors of final anti-dumping measures against China. Because the United States has a pivotal position in the world economy and trade, its anti-dumping practices against China have a strong demonstration effect, and the United States is one of the most important anti-dumping countries against China, so it is representative to research the affecting factors of final anti-dumping measures against China based on U.S. anti-dumping decision against China. The dissertation uses binary Logistic regression to make the empirical study. It finds out that the affecting factors include some micro-factors of products involved:import proportion of products involved in U.S, change rate of main export countries'export price of products involved. It once again reminds that China's companies involved and industry associations involved should pay high attention to micro-factors changes of the product involved. Although China's "non-market economy status" does not have a significant impact on the positive or negative dumping decision, it significantly affects the decisions of the anti-dumping duties'level. That is, "non-market economy status" easily leads to a higher rate of anti-dumping duties. Whether from the perspective of the companies involved or the national perspective, "non-market economy status" is the issue which we need to face seriously.
(4) Research the effect of anti-dumping against China. The honey anti-dumping is very typical in anti-dumping against China's agricultural products, so the dissertation researches the U.S. anti-dumping against China in honey since 1994. By Johanscn test and analysis of various statistical data, the research shows that U.S. anti-dumping hasn't given China's honey a significant impact on export price, but we can not guarantee that anti-dumping also had no effect on export price in other anti-dumping cases, because honey anti-dumping is an individual case after all. The research also shows that U.S. anti-dumping has had a serious impact on China's honey export market share and export earnings. Besides that the companies involved should try to reduce losses through responding, market diversification and other means, the trade remedies of government and industry associations are also very important.
(5) Research the construction of two-dimension trade remedy system of anti-dumping against China. The trade remedy of this chapter means the second meaning of trade remedy, that is, China takes various policy measures to avoid the negative impact of foreign anti-dumping, countervailing and safeguard measures against China. Whether companies involved respond is the result of the final game. The most basic premise which companies involved select "responding" must be "recovery expectation". The affecting factors of "recovery expectation" of companies involved. The general idea to improve "recovery expectation" of companies involved is:actively improve the factors which we can control, try to improve the factors which we can't easily control; with the cooperation of government departments and external agencies, the companies involved are the main entities to improve internal factors, and government departments and external agencies are responsible for the improvement of the external factors. Given the serious situation of the anti-dumping that China has suffered, it is obviously necessary to establish an efficient and comprehensive trade remedy system against foreign anti-dumping. Construction of a complete trade remedy system needs to be coupled with function dimension and time dimension, to change the previous system of single construction. Function dimension includes three levels:macro, meso and micro. Marco-level mainly relates to China's relevant government departments, meso-level mainly relates to industry associations and social institutions, micro-level mainly relates to export companies with products involved. Time-dimension includes three levels:prior, concurrent, afterwards. Prior-level relates to early-warning system, concurrent-level relates to countermeasures, afterwards-level relates to compensation strategies. The dissertation constructs the two-dimension trade remedy system in which various elements of the function dimension and time-dimension mutually support, and discusses the operation of the system in detail.
(6)The dissertation summarizes the previous research conclusions, and puts forward specific policy recommendations based on research conclusions to the key points of two-dimension trade remedy system.
引文
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14“最终反倾销措施占比”为1995-2009年某国遭受印度最终反倾销措施数量占同期印度实施的最终反倾销措施总数的百分比,即为AD1/ADINDIA。
15由于无法获得中国台湾与印度的双边贸易数据,因此,中国台湾的进口占比、最终反倾销措施强度指数无法计算出。
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17根据联合国统计署数据计算得到
29根据WTO反倾销统计数据整理计算得到。
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