摘要
知识经济时代，企业竞争归根结底是人才的竞争，而薪酬作为人力资本的价格符号，对人才的流动有着相当的导向作用。本文旨在通过对我国民营股份制医药流通企业高层管理人员薪酬状况的研究，帮助民营股份制医药流通企业解决人才的有效吸引和激励的难题，以便在外资进入流通领域后的竞争中立于不败之地。
本文先是对薪酬研究的理论基础进行了阐述，指出了现代主要薪酬制度的运行机制对民营股份制医药流通企业的影响。然后运用实证研究的方法，对民营股份制医药流通企业高层管理人员薪酬与公司业绩的现状进行了研究，发现现阶段我国民营股份制医药流通企业业绩逐步下滑，高层管理人员的薪酬偏低，影响高层管理人员薪酬的主要因素是公司规模、公司业绩、高层管理人员的学历、公司所处地区等。
接着，本文对企业业绩与高层管理人员薪酬之间的关系从总体和分组两方面进行了实证研究。在总体研究中发现我国民营股份制医药流通企业中不存在将高层管理人员的薪酬与企业业绩紧密挂钩的激励、约束机制。同时就公开性的收入而言，我国民营股份制医药流通企业对高层管理人员的激励、约束机制的实际效果也很差。这说明，我国民营股份制医药流通企业内部没有建立起一种对高层管理人员有效的激励、约束机制。在分组研究中，发现不论是民营股份制医药流通企业中的大公司，还是小公司，对高层管理人员的激励、约束机制都是不明确的，两者之间没有明显的差别。笔者认为其原因在于：①我国民营股份制医药流通企业的股权相对比较集中；②我国民营股份制医药流通企业的股权结构相仿。在两职分设的企业中，其对高层管理人员的激励、约束机制要明显好于两职合一的企业。
最后在以上实证研究的基础上，借鉴国外发达国家对高层管理人员的薪酬模式设计的经验，并结合案例企业的实际情况，对我国民营股份制医药流通企业的薪酬模式进行了设计。
In the information and economy age, the competition between enterprises is the talent competition in the final analysis. And as the price sign of manpower resources, pay plays rather an important guiding role in influencing the flow of talent. The aim of this paper is to help medicine circulation enterprises run by civilian on stock system overcome the difficulty in the efficient attraction and stimulation of the talented persons, thus raising the competitive power of the enterprise to be in an unassailable position in the competitions after the foreign capital's entering the circulation field.
The paper first expounds the theoretical foundation of the research into pay, points out the influence of the running mechanism of the main modern pay system on the medicine circulation enterprises run by civilian on stock system, and then utilizing the method of positive research, carries out the research into CEO pay in the medicine circulation enterprises run by civilian on stock system and the current status of the enterprises achievement, finding that the enterprises run by civilian on stock system have declined gradually in their performance during the current stage, CEO pay is a little low and the main factors in affecting CEO pay are the company's scale, the company's achievement, the record of formal schooling of CEO, the company's location, and etc.
Then, the paper makes an empirical study into the relationship between the firm performance and CEO pay on the whole and in groups. In the research as a whole, no stimulation and restraint mechanism in the close hook between CEO pay and the firm performance have been found. Meanwhile, in terms of the visible income of CEO, the real effect of the medicine circulation enterprise run by civilian on stock system on the stimulation and the restraint mechanism is very poor. This indicates that no efficient stimulation and restraint mechanism has been set up within the enterprises run by civilian on stock system in our country. In the research in groups, it has been found that the stimulation and restraint mechanism of CEO is not clearly known, no matter whether the medicine circulation enterprises run by civilian on stock system are large companies or small companies. There is no evident difference between the stimulation and restraint mechanism of the large companies and that of the small companies. The author th
inks the reasons lie in the relatively more concentration of stock right of the medicine circulation enterprises run by civilian in our country and the similarity in the structure of the stock right of them. In the enterprises chairman of the board and CEO separate (Great Britain
and USA structure) the stimulation and restraint mechanism of CEO is better than that in the enterprises the chairman of the board and CEO (Japan and Germany structure).
Finally, on the bases of the above empirical study, the paper conducts an exploration into the pay model design of the medicine circulation enterprises run by civilian in our country through drawing experience of the pay model design of CEO from the developed countries abroad and consulting the actual conditions of the enterprises relevant to the case.
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