摘要
网络型产业,具有网络效应、用户转换成本等独特技术经济特征,具有自然垄断性,普遍正在经历着管制放松和引入竞争的产业治理改革。同时,随着管制演进,网络运营商之间的竞争呈现出显著的动态竞争特点,竞争互动频繁。网络竞争的动态化,对网络运营商竞争战略提出了创新挑战。在此背景下,结合管制演进背景,融合产业组织、网络竞争、动态竞争等理论和应用非合作博弈分析等工具,对于网络运营商的动态竞争战略分析理论、思路和方法展开探索性研究,对于塑造网络运营商理性战略思维和提高新竞争环境下动态战略适应能力,具有积极的理论研究意义和实用价值,有利于丰富竞争战略理论,以及指导网络运营商参与动态竞争实践。
论文着重对动态竞争条件下网络运营商的动态竞争战略展开研究,将基于非合作博弈的动态竞争互动和竞争行为分析纳入战略分析内容,并主要以代表性的移动电信市场竞争为应用研究背景。
首先,对网络型产业和网络市场及其特点进行了界定和分析,识别了产业的主要参与主体及其关系。然后,对网络型产业,特别是移动电信产业的自然垄断管制理论和实践演进背景进行了综述,指出管制放松和竞争程度提高是当前网络型产业发展的必然趋势。论文把对网络市场竞争的分析视角分为产业治理和微观网络运营商的不同层面。进而,分析了网络竞争的动态化发展对传统战略理论提出的挑战,提出网络运营商应制定动态竞争战略和实现战略过程的一体化。论文还对动态竞争战略理论及其分析思路和方法进行了综述和评价。
论文研究了我国产业治理中出现的双重委托代理链问题,提出产业绩效不仅取决于管制、产权等产业治理层面的制度安排,也取决于微观层面网络运营商参与竞争的努力程度,明确了研究的必要性。论文重点对网络运营商的动态竞争战略分析理论进行了研究,提出了包括结构要素、资源要素、规则要素和动态要素在内的网络运营商动态竞争战略要素分析框架,融合传统结构主义和资源基础的战略分析思想和方法,纳入竞争互动分析和竞争者分析,与基于生命周期的动态战略一体化过程模型结合起来,采用非合作博弈分析作为竞争互动分析的主要工具,相对于传统竞争战略分析能够更好地适应动态、不确定的网络竞争格局。在此基础上,概括了国内外移动电信竞争发展及其特点,提出了基于博弈模型构建移动电信竞争互动模型的方法,阐述了对移动电信竞争主要主体的特征及其数量刻画方法和建立移动电信竞争博弈模型的思路。
然后,对市场进入阶段网络运营商进行了竞争者分析,以及结构和资源要素分析,重点强调和分析动态竞争战略中动态要素和规则要素,提出了该阶段后进入者和在位网络运营商可能的战略选择。
再次,对市场内竞争阶段的特点和该阶段移动电信竞争进行了概述,以移动运营商之间的“价格战“、移动运营商差异化竞争等竞争场景采用博弈模型进行了竞争互动分析,认为在产品同质化程度较高情况下,价格战不可避免,但是在运营商服务质量差异的情况下,依靠差异化竞争将更有利于运营商战略目标的实现;对移动电信市场面临的日益激烈的低端增量市场竞争进行了竞争互动分析,认为移动电信服务资费的用户效用才是决定该市场竞争成败的关键,而与运营商自身的规模和先动优势无关。
最后,论文将所提出的动态竞争战略分析理论应用于某地区移动运营商的竞争战略分析中,对该运营商动态竞争战略各要素进行分析,并结合移动电信市场价格竞争的场景对“资费套餐“创新激励和策略进行了分析。并且,基于要素分析结论和所存在的问题,对该运营商提出了相应的动态竞争战略建议。该战略在实际竞争中得到应用,实现了巩固和扩大该运营商主导战略地位的目标,证明本论文所提出的动态战略分析理论能够应用于指导战略竞争实践,具有一定的应用价值。
论文的创新之处在于,集成了传统的竞争战略分析理论,并通过纳入竞争者分析模型和基于非合作博弈竞争互动分析方法提出了一个集成的网络运营商动态战略分析理论框架。同时,对市场进入阶段和市场内竞争阶段的网络竞争进行了深入分析,提出了不同市场地位网络运营商的竞争战略选择,以及必要的战略转换机制。此外,还对与此相关的网络型产业治理中不同制度安排的产业绩效贡献进行了理论分析,认为产业治理的绩效偏好对于制度安排的选择和企业经营者的经营努力水平具有重要影响。
网络运营商动态竞争战略的研究,涉及到动态竞争、战略管理、网络型产业组织理论、管制经济学等众多的知识领域,其研究的广度和深度还有待更进一步的探索和拓展。
Network industries, which have particular technical and economic features including network effects and switching costs of subscribers, occupy the certain natural monopoly to some extent, while generally undergoing a industrial governance innovation to deregulate and introduce further competition. Accompanying with regulatory evolution, competiton between network operators turns to significantly dynamic competiton with frequent interactivities. This challenges network operators to innovate their competitive strategies. For this reason, with background of regulation evolution, comprised of such theories about industrial organization, dynamic competition and network competition and applying the game theory, the study with foresight and insight about dynamic competitive strategies analytical theories and methods of network operators, should contribute to enhance the dynamic adaptability and building the rational strategic thinking ways. Therefore, this study is worthy of deep academic research with positive value and competitive applicable role. It can also enrich the theories of strategies, and help network operators participate in network competition.
This study focuses on the dynamic competitive strategies of network operators in dynamic competiton environment, which introduces game-based dynamic competition interaction analysis into strategic analytical process,which is mainly implemented with mobile telecommunication market competition.
First, network industries and network markets and their characteristics are identified and analyzed, while main participants and their relationship in network industries are identified. Further, the present regualatory theories of natural monopoly and the regulatory evlution are surveyed with emphasis upon the essential trends of deregulation and stimulating competition in network industries. Accordingly, the analytical ways about network competition are categorized into industrial governance level and network operators’level. After discussing the trend of dynamic network competiton, it is proposed that dynamic competition should require network operators to define dynamnic competitive strategies and implement the integrated strategic process. Besides, the basic theory and its analytica methods, tools of dynamic competitive strategies are surveyed in detail .
And, the dual-layer principal-agentrelationship link problem of industrial governance in China is discussed with results that industrial conducts are not only up to the exogenous schemes planning such as regulation and ownship at industrial level, but also the competiton efforts of network operators themselves at micro level,which implies the necessity of the study. In the study, this paper endeavors to integrate the traditional structural strategic analysis, resource-basd strategic analysis and dynamic competitive strategic analysis into the dynamic strategic analytical framework, which is comprised of four factors analysis about structural factors, resource factors,rule factors and dynamic factors.And, the analytical framework, which applies the analysis of competitive interaction and competitor analysis, is integrated into lifecycle-based strategic integrated process model, applying the game theorys as main modeling tool. Compared to traditional strategic analysis, the analytical model can be better adapted to the dynamic and unstable network competition Based on this, the mobile competition and its development inland and overseas is introduced. The basic game-based modeling methods is also introduced into mobile competition, the mathamatical modeling methods of market participants as well.
Then, the competitor analysis at market-entry phase, the structural and resource factors analysis is taken, which emphasizes and analyzes the dynamic and rules factors. As results, the possible strategic choice martric of the newcomers and the existing network operators
This paper summarized the characteristics of in-market competition and mobile competition, and further investigates the typical competition scenarios, such as price war, differentiation competition between mobile operators, with game–based competition interaction analysis. As results, with homogenous products, price war is hard to avoid. However, in multi-phase sequential price competition, more differentiation will benefit to the operator itself. And, the fierce low-end incremental market competition faced by mobile operators in present market is also discussed with conclusion that the utilities of cellular tariff received by subscribers is the key factor determining the competition result, regardless of operator’s scale econmy and first-move advantages.
Finally, the proposed dynamic strategies analytical framework and its tools are applied by a certain mobile operator’s in the local mobile market. By competitive analysis about the basic strategic factors, the tariff plans innovation is analyzed. Based these, objective basic advices about dynamic strategic advices are proposed to the mobile operator, which is thereafter applied in the practical competition, with better performance of consolidating the operators dominant strategic situation and enlarge the advantagous leading gap to the rival. This proves that the propsed dynamic strategies analytical framework can be applied to direct the strategic competition.
The innovative points of this paper includes that, a integrated network operators‘dynamic strategic analytical framework not only integrating the traditional strategic analysis, but applying competitors analytical model and non-cooperative competitive interaction analysis. Further, network competition at market-entry phase and in-market phase are discussed in detail,proposing the dynamic strategic choice of network operators with different market status and their necessary strategic transitional mechanism. Besides, industrial conducts of different industrial governace schemes in network industries are also analyzed. The coclusion is that conducts preference have important influence upon the industrial governance and managers’efforts in regulated companes.
The study about dynamic strategies of network operators, as an edging academic research field, requires various and consolidated knowledge foundations and relates to various industries with differentiated technical economic features. Its academic research space is promising to be enlarged in the future.
引文
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