摘要
本文从经济理论和实证检验两个方面，考察了南南区域一体化的贸易效应和投资效应，并在此基础上探讨了中国参与南南区域一体化取得的成果。改革开放以来，特别是21世纪最初几年，中国更加重视与发达国家的经贸往来，特别关注吸引外资和对发达国家的产品出口。随着中国经济实力日益强大，贸易摩擦增加，部分发达国家陆续出台“购买本国货”、“制造业回流”等经济政策，并且成立“跨部门贸易执法机构”，旨在限制中国产品获得更大世界市场份额。受到经济危机的影响，部分发达国家实行“量化宽松”货币政策，中国出口商品积累的外汇储备大幅贬值。加入WTO后，在积极推动多边贸易谈判的同时，中国也参与并建立区域经济一体化组织，以便全面融入世界经济体系，而这些区域一体化组织大多属于南南区域一体化组织。在目前国际经济形势下，对南南区域一体化经济效应的研究，能够加深对中国参与南南区域一体化已经取得效果的认知，并合理引导中国今后的国际区域一体化政策和经贸政策。
本文的理论推导部分以规模收益递增的垄断竞争市场结构为基础，通过构建各国福利函数，衡量南南区域一体化的贸易效应。在理论部分，南方国家和北方国家的区别体现在两个方面。第一，相对禀赋不同。南方国家相对劳动力充裕，北方国家相对资本充裕。根据比较优势理论，南方国家出口密集使用劳动力禀赋的农产品，北方国家出口密集使用资本进行生产的工业品。而农业生产规模报酬不变，工业品生产规模报酬递增。第二，进口关税税率不同。北方国家进口关税税率较低，对外开放程度较高，而南方国家税率较高。在分析了贸易效应的基础上，为了考察南南区域一体化的投资效应，本文将资本作为能够跨国流动的生产要素，用达到均衡状态时国际资本使用的实际分布，衡量南南区域一体化的投资效应。为了降低模型复杂程度，在分析投资效应时，本文借鉴了新地理经济学自由资本模型工业品生产函数的构造方法，并将关税包含在交易成本中。
由于理论推导难以得出显性解，本文对主要外生变量进行数值模拟，以便于反映南南区域一体化的经济效应。本文还对南南区域一体化的贸易效应和投资效应进行实证检验，检验结果与数值模拟结果基本相符。第一，南北、南南区域一体化各自对南方成员国的总体贸易效应方向不确定，南北国家之间的人均资本差异增加了南北区域一体化的贸易创造效应，而南北国家关税税率差异降低了这种效应；由于区域经济一体化的资本聚集效应，南北区域一体化导致南方成员国资本流出，而南南区域一体化导致资本流入。第二，成员国经济规模越大，南南区域一体化的贸易收益越少，而投资收益越多。第三，成员国人均资本越多，南南区域一体化的贸易收益越多；当人口数量固定不变时，成员国人均资本越多，投资收益也越多。第四，关税税率较低的成员国，南南区域一体化的贸易收益越多；随着对外关税税率降低，南南区域一体化成员国的实际使用资本份额首先减少，当关税税率达到并低于某一临界值时，资本迅速向这一南方国家聚集。
本文还检验了中国目前参与南南区域一体化的贸易效应和投资效应。由于中国参与南南区域一体化，中国从伙伴国进口增加，从区域外国家进口减少，同时存在贸易创造和贸易转移效应。同时，中国也增加了对伙伴国的出口，因此南南区域一体化对中国的总体贸易效应方向为正。通过参与南南区域一体化，中国吸引了更多来自于区域外部的投资，同时也增加了对伙伴国的投资流出。中国与普通发展中国家开展区域一体化的贸易效应与投资效应明显，而与自由港国家和地区进行一体化的贸易与投资效应并不显著。
This article inspected the trade effect and investment effect of the South-Southregional integration from the two aspects of the economic theory and empirical test,and discussed the achievements of China's participation in the South-South regionalintegration on this basis. Since the reform and opening up, especially in the first fewyears of the21st century, Chinese paid more attention to the economic and tradeexchanges with developed countries, especially to attracting foreign investment andexporting products to developed countries. Along with the growing power of China`seconomy, trade friction increased. Some developed countries issued economicpolicies such as "purchasing local goods","manufacturing backflow", and establishedthe "cross-sectoral trade law enforcement agencies" in order to limit China productsto gain more world market share. Affected by the economic crisis, some developedcountries implemented "quantitative easing" policy, so the China`s foreign currencyreserves accumulated by exporting commodities, the accumulation of foreigncurrency reserves of depreciate significantly. After joining WTO, at the same time ofactively promoting the multilateral trade negotiations, China also participated andestablished regional economic integration organizations in order to fully integrate intothe world economy system, and these regional integration organizations mostlybelonged to the South-South regional integration organization.In the currentinternational economic situation, the research on the economic effect of South-Southregional integration can deepen our understanding of China`s participation inSouth-South regional integration, and reasonable guide China's future internationalregional integration policies and economic and trade policies.
The theoretical derivation based on increasing returns to scale and monopolycompetition market structure, in order to measure the South-South regionalintegration and trade effect through the construction of national welfare function. Inthe theoretical part, the differences between the south and the north were reflected intwo aspects. First, the relative endowment was different. The southern countries were relatively abundant in labour, and the northern countries abundant in capital.According to the theory of comparative advantage, the southern countries exportedagricultural products intensively using labour resources, and the northern countriesexported industrial products intensively using capital. There were constant returns toscale in agricultural production, while increasing returns to scale in industrialproduction. Second, the import tariff rates were different. The import tariff rate ofnorthern countries was relatively lower, and the opening degree was higher, while therate of southern countries was higher. On the basis of the analysis of the trade effect,in order to investigate the investment effects of South-South regional integration,capital would be looked as a kind of transnational flowing factor, and the actualinternational capital distribution would be used uo measure the investment effect ofSouth-South regional integration. In order to reduce the complexity of the model andfocus attention to main points, in the analysis of investment effect, this article usedindustrial production function constructing method of footloose capital model, andput tariffs into the transaction cost.
Becausse it was difficult to obtain explicit solutions from the teoreticalderivation, this paper numerically simulated main exogenous variables in order toreflect the economic effect of the South-South regional integration. This paper alsoempirically tested the trade effect and the investment effect of the South-Southregional integration, and the result was consistent with that of mumerical simulation.First, the direction of the overall trade effect of NSRTA and SSRTA was uncertain.The difference of per capita capital between the south and the north incrased the tradecreation effect of NSRTA, while the difference of tariff rates reduced this effect;NSRTA led to the capital outflow from the south member states, and and south-southregional integration led to capital inflows due to the the capital accumulation effect.Second, the larger the economic scale of member states, the less the trade revenue ofSSRTA, and the more the investment of SSRTA. Third, the more capital per capita ofmember states, the more the trade revenue of SSRTA; if the population was constant,the more capital per capita of member states, the investment inflow effect of SSRTAalso became larger. Fouth, the lower the menber states tariff, the more the SSRTAtrade revenue; with the external tariff gradually reduced, the actual capital share of SSRTA firstly reduced; when the tariff rate reached a critical value, capital swiftlyaggregated into this southern country.
We also examined the trade and investment effect of SSRTA participated byChina. Due to China's participation in the South-South regional integration, China`simport from partner countries increased, import from countries outside the regionimport reduced, and the trade creation and trade diversion effect both existed.Meanwhile, China also increased the export to SSRTA partners, and so the directionof SSRTA trade effect was positive. By participating in South-South regionalintegration, China attracted more investment from outside, and also added theinvestment outflow to the partners. The trade and investment effect was obvious ofthe regional integration between China and ordinary developing nations, while that ofSSRTA between China and port coutries was not significant.
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