摘要
加入WTO后，外资银行在我国迅速发展，已经成为我国银行业的重要组成部分。在我国市场政策的影响下，外资银行当前进入模式的选择蕴含着未来决策的灵活性，不仅可以选择独立发展模式中的分行转制法人银行，也可以选择股权合作再并购或退出。现有文献对外资银行的动态进入模式研究较少，并且未能契合我国市场和政策的现实背景。因此，本文将立足外资银行发展和研究现状，应用博弈论、实物期权和期权博弈理论，从市场特征和银行特征角度构建外资银行动态进入模式框架并分析其进入模式选择的影响因素。主要研究内容与结论如下：
首先，利用博弈论方法拓展现有静态信贷竞争混合策略均衡模型至多期。研究表明，在多期信贷竞争中本地银行老客户所带来的信息优势将逐渐减弱甚至消除，只有本地银行的甄别能力优势能够存在并影响多期信贷竞争均衡。针对混合策略模型不易于拓展的缺陷，本文在Salop模型的基础上建立包含甄别能力、经营效率和网点数量的多期信贷竞争模型，并得到纯策略均衡结果，作为外资银行动态进入模式研究的基础。
其次，在“少数股权”政策背景下运用实物期权理论对外资银行股权合作模式进行研究。对政策不确定性影响的研究表明，“少数股权”政策放开时间以及学习能力的增加将促使股权合作的外资银行提高努力程度。进一步，建立股权合作外资银行的并购和退出的实物期权模型，研究发现政策对并购期权和退出期权价值分别造成负向和正向影响，而股权合作的机会成本低、经营效率低和股权比例高的外资银行更有可能维持股权合作，即减小并购与退出的可能。
然后，在“法人化导向”政策背景下运用实物期权理论对外资银行独立发展模式进行研究。研究表明，“法人化导向”政策下外资银行选择先分行后转制法人银行的价值更大，并且对本地市场熟悉、经营效率较高且资金实力较强的外资银行转制意愿更强。进一步，“法人化导向”政策通过限制外资分行业务范围的同时放开外资法人银行业务范围，以及降低外资法人银行运营资金的要求，可以促使外资分行积极转制。
接着，在我国区域特征的基础上利用实物期权理论建立外资银行动态进入模式模型。研究表明，在我国这种规模很大且拥有高质量客户小区域和低质量客户大区域的市场上，外资银行当前倾向于选择既在小区域独立发展又入股本地银行的复合模式进入，这样可以既增加未来并购的谈判力又通过学习效应降低在本地市场的信息劣势，进而在政策限制小的情况下执行并购期权进入整个市场，而在政策限制大的情况下执行扩张期权在整个市场独立发展。
最后，使用期权博弈方法对本地银行引资竞争和外资银行进入模式进行了研究。对资金充足外资银行进入模式的研究结论表明，只有经营效率很高的外资银行才会选择独立发展，其余情况下外资银行都会选择入股规模较大的本地银行，即引资竞争期权博弈均衡的领导者。进一步，本文研究了外资银行资金受限的情况，经营效率较低的外资银行将以较小股权比例入股规模较大的本地银行或独立发展；经营效率较高的外资银行将入股规模较小的本地银行。
With the rapid development in China after joining the WTO, foreign banks havebecome an important part of the banking system.The entry modes at present will endowthe foreign banks with decision flexibilities under the impact of particular market andpolicy in China.They can transfer their branches intosubsidiaries when entering throughGreenfield investment, and either merger or exit when entering through equitycooperation. However, the existing studies ignore the influence of the strategies in thefuture and the realistic background of our market.And they have not paid much attentionto the entry modes of foreign banks from the dynamic point of view.Therefore, thisdissertation, which focuses on the characteristics of banks and market in China,analyzes the dynamic entry modes of foreign banks using the game theory and realoption theory. The conclusions are as follows.
Firstly, the existing single-phase model of credit competition is expanded to amulti-phase model which achieves the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium (MSNE).It isshowed that, the information superiority from old customers of domestic banks in themulti-period credit competition will gradually be reduced and even eliminated. Only theinformation superiorityfrom screening ability can affect the multi-phase competitionequilibrium.For the reason that the MSNE model cannot expand conveniently, amulti-phase Salop model of credit competition which achieves the pure strategy Nashequilibrium is established. The new model, which contains the screening ability, bankefficiency and the number of branches, can be used as the base of the further researches.
Secondly, the equity cooperationmodel under the minority ownershiprestriction isstudied.The results show that the foreign banks with high learning ability will do betterwhen the release timing of policy restriction is longer. Moreover, a real option model onthe merging and exit options is developed when consideringboth the uncertainties of therelease timing of policy restriction and market scale. It is shown that the policyrestriction will decrease the value of merging option while increase the exit optionvalue.And the foreign banks with lower opportunity cost or less efficiency or higherequity stake tend to continue cooperating with domestic banks.
Thirdly, the phenomenon that branches of foreign banks transform into subsidiariesis studied by a real option approach. It is shown that foreign banks prefer to establishbranches in order to obtain the profit right now as well as exercise transformation optionwhen the market is large enough. The foreign banks with more information or higherefficiency or larger asset scale tend to transform earlier. In addition, the policy promotesthe transformation through restricting the scope of business of branches as well asreducing the capital requirements and releasing banking business of subsidiaries.
Fourthly, the dynamic entry modes model is established based on the regioncharacteristics. When there are two regions with different quality client and market scalejust like China’s market, the foreign bank will enter through complex entry mode. As aresult, the foreign banks can both accumulate the bargaining power and reduce thedisadvantage of information through learning effects. Then foreign banks will enter thewhole market either through merger when the policy restriction does not exist orthrough Greenfield investment when the policy still exists in the future.
Lastly, the entry modes of foreign banks under the impact of domestic banks’strategy are studied by the option game approach. The results show that, only theforeign banks with enough asset and very high efficiency will enter through Greenfieldinvestment. Others will choose to cooperate with larger domestic banks, which are theleaders in the option game equilibrium. Furthermore, the foreign banks with limitedasset and low efficiency will choose to become a shareholder of larger domestic bankswith few equities or Greenfield investment. And the foreign banks with limited assetand high efficiency willcooperate with the smaller domestic banks.
引文
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