摘要
在电信重组和3G牌照发放的全业务运营大背景下,电信竞争日益加剧,如何促进电信有效竞争,如何对电信竞争进行有效规制具有十分重要的现实意义。关于有效竞争的研究较多,但研究多集中在针对市场准入、互联互通和价格管制进行研究,缺乏系统性。因此,系统地建立适合我国国情的有效竞争目标体系、监测体系、措施体系和评估体系,从而使我国电信业形成“在保持一定产业集中度,发挥规模经济效益的同时,促进产业内企业间适度竞争活力”的有效竞争态势,这正是本文研究的基点。
基于上述研究目的,本文使用定性、定量和对比研究的方法,综合运用模糊综合判断法和层次分析法等理论工具对有效竞争规制进行了理论研究。本文先后建立了电信市场有效竞争目标体系,该体系主要包括电信市场结构、运营商的市场行为、电信市场绩效和消费者福利四个指标；有效竞争监测体系,该体系包括定性指标的监测和定量指标阀值的确定,其中对市场集中度、市场份额及价格上限三个核心指标进行了定量的测算；有效竞争措施体系,本文认为仅靠结构性管制措施短期内难以见效,必须结合一系列非对称管制措施,各措施相互补充,相互协调；有效竞争评估体系,本文采用模糊综合判断法和层次分析法,主要用于政策措施实施后的后评估,建立了有效竞争政策评估的一般框架。
本文首次从有效竞争目标体系、监测体系、措施体系和评估体系四个角度系统地探讨了我国电信市场的有效竞争规制,结合各国经验和我国当前实际,引进模糊综合判断法和层次分析法,做了大量创新性工作,弥补了现有研究的不足。
Under the background of telecom reorganization and issuance of 3G licenses, telecom competition is aggravated day by day. It is of great practical significance to research how to promote effective competition in telecom market and how to regulate the telecom competition effectively. There are many researches on effective competition, but more researches concentrated on market access, interconnection and price regulation, which is not systematic. Therefore, it is the basic point of this paper to establish the target system, monitoring system, measure system and evaluation system of effective competition which is suitable to China's national conditions, so that to keep China's telecom industry in a state of effective competition, that is, to encourage'appropriate competition between enterprises within telecom industry, while maintain a certain degree of concentration and promote scale economic benefit.
To achieve the aims above, qualitative approach, quantitative approach and comparative method are employed. Fuzzy Comprehensive Judging method and Analytic Hierarchy Process method are applied comprehensively as well to make theoretical research on effective competition regulation.4 systems are established in this paper, that is, target system, monitoring system, measure system and evaluation system of effective competition. There are 4 indicators in the effective competition target system, namely, telecom market structure, market behavior of operators, market performance and welfare of consumers. To the effective competition monitoring system, the detection of qualitative indicators and the determination of threshold value of quantitative indicators are included in this system, and 3 core indicators are measured quantitatively, that is, market concentration, market share and price cap. As for the effective competition measure system, the paper holds that it would be difficult to prove effective in short term rely on structural measures alone, but a series of asymmetric regulation measures should be combined to complement mutually and coordinate to each other. For effective competition evaluation system, Fuzzy Comprehensive Judging method and Analytic Hierarchy Process method are employed to make post-assessment for the implementation of policies and measures. And a general framework of effective competition policy assessment is established as well.
It is the first time to research effective competition regulations of telecom market in China from the following 4 perspectives, that is, target system, monitoring system, measure system and evaluation system. Combined with experiences of other countries and current actual situation in China, with Fuzzy Comprehensive Judging method and Analytic Hierarchy Process method, this paper makes a lot of innovative studies to make up for the limitations of existing studies.
引文
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