摘要
提供恰当形式的薪酬是激励和约束公司管理层作出符合股东利益决策的重要手段。在薪酬契约设计中,薪酬业绩敏感度的设定是核心。相应的,薪酬业绩敏感度影响因素构成薪酬契约研究的核心。基于对现有理论和文献的梳理发现,薪酬业绩敏感度影响因素的研究分为两类,本文将其分别定义为非权衡视角与权衡视角。非权衡视角下的研究基于实证研究中发现的事实,那就是高强度的薪酬业绩敏感度契约并不是上市公司实践中的普遍现象。由于非权衡视角下的研究认为只要提高薪酬业绩敏感度,公司治理效率就能得到改善。相应的,该类研究着眼于寻找高强度薪酬业绩敏感度契约缺失的原因。权衡视角下的研究关注到管理层基于规避薪酬风险而实施的机会主义行为,因此,提高薪酬业绩敏感度并非直接带来治理效率的改善,薪酬业绩敏感度的设定是一个利益权衡的过程。相应的,该类研究从权衡的视角识别影响薪酬业绩敏感度设定的因素。
管理层可以通过实施四类机会主义行为规避薪酬风险,其分别为决策视野冲突、过度投资、薪酬动机盈余管理与管理层权力寻租。因此,薪酬契约设计需要分别置于以上四类机会主义行为情境中以识别薪酬业绩敏感度的影响因素。根据实施基础,本文将机会主义行为划分为信息冲突型与权力冲突型。信息冲突型机会主义行为的实施基于股东与管理层之间的信息不对称。由于管理层拥有信息优势,因此股东利用薪酬契约作为激励手段时,需要考虑相应的激励成本。这类激励成本属于信息成本,其构成管理层的超额收益。相应的,股东必须在信息成本和剩余损失之间进行权衡,薪酬业绩敏感度的设定成为代理成本权衡的过程。信息冲突型机会主义行为情境下影响因素的识别以经典委托代理理论中的激励模型为工具。基于扩展信息结构下的激励模型的构建与求解,本文识别以信息成本为中介影响代理成本权衡取向的因素。相应的,其为影响薪酬业绩敏感度设定的因素。权力冲突型机会主义行为的实施基于公司决策层级结构与激励结构失配。失配致使管理层影响薪酬契约的签订与执行,薪酬契约中包含无激励价值的权力租金。管理层会对权力收益与寻租成本进行权衡,相应的,薪酬业绩敏感度的设定成为管理层权力寻租权衡的结果。权力冲突型机会主义行为情境下影响因素的识别以多元回归模型为工具。基于构建的多元回归模型,本文识别我国上市公司中,以寻租成本为中介影响权力寻租权衡取向的治理结构。相应的,其为影响薪酬业绩敏感度设定的因素。
本文的主要研究内容和结论如下：
第一,公司价值由一系列具有现时与长期效应的经营活动共同创造,相对而言,具有长期效应的经营活动风险更大。为了规避业绩波动造成的薪酬风险,管理层可能采取有损公司长期利益的增长策略,决策视野冲突由此产生。相应的,薪酬契约设计需要置于决策视野冲突的代理冲突情境下。
相对于道德风险,决策视野冲突的信息结构扩展于管理层掌握努力分配的私人信息。此时,信息成本表现为保险成本,即股东向风险厌恶的管理层业绩被错误判断的可能性提供的超额补偿。相应的,薪酬业绩敏感度的设定需要权衡保险成本与剩余损失。本文构建了包含股价与会计利润两个业绩指标的激励模型。由于股价汇总反映了所有经营活动的预期收益,将会计利润纳入信号集中起着调节决策视野和控制信号集整体风险的作用。出于业绩信号的多元化,薪酬业绩敏感度设定包含两个维度：单个业绩指标被赋予的绝对权重以及业绩指标之间的相对权重。绝对权重决定激励总强度,相对权重决定决策视野。对于单个业绩指标被赋予的绝对权重,其受该业绩指标的风险影响。业绩风险以保险成本为中介影响代理成本权衡取向。具体表现为：业绩风险越大,该业绩指标被赋予的绝对权重越小。对于业绩指标之间的相对权重,与单个业绩指标被赋予的绝对权重类似,其同样受业绩风险影响。然而由于相对权重与决策视野的调节相关,因此,业绩风险对相对权重的影响不再是单调性的。具体表现为：在产出价值没有变化的前提下,随着会计利润指标风险的下降,会计利润与股价被赋予的相对权重经历先上升后下降的过程；而随着股价指标风险的上升,会计利润与股价被赋予的相对权重经历加速上升的过程。因此,在决策视野冲突的代理冲突情境下,本文识别业绩风险为影响薪酬业绩敏感度设定的因素。
第二,上市公司规模是影响管理层薪酬的重要因素。规模越大,管理层的薪酬水平也越高。由于基于公司规模的薪酬相对于基于业绩的薪酬是低风险的,因此,出于规避薪酬风险,管理层可能在违背净现值法则的前提下进行项目投资,由此导致公司规模扩张出最优水平,股东财富受损。因此,需要将薪酬契约设计置于过度投资的代理冲突情境下。
相对于道德风险,过度投资的信息结构扩展于管理层掌握项目质量的私人信息。本文将项目质量划分为未来现金流与风险两个层面。通过扩展信息结构下的激励模型求解发现,在过度投资的代理冲突情境下,信息成本表现为信息租金溢出效应。信息租金为股东激励管理层提供真实的项目质量信息所支付的超额报酬。其具有外部性特征,表现为如果给予那些较低未来现金流或较低风险的的项目较高的信息租金,激励成本将变得昂贵而使股东难以承受,因为那些拥有更高质量项目的管理者会索要更大的信息租金。因此,薪酬业绩敏感度的设定需要权衡信息租金溢出效应与剩余损失。由于公司增长机会越大,管理者拥有高质量项目的可能性越高,因此,信息租金溢出效应随公司增长机会的增大而边际递减。相应的,公司增长机会以信息租金溢出效应为中介影响代理成本权衡取向。具体表现为：公司增长机会越大,薪酬业绩敏感度越高；随着增长机会的上升,业绩风险与薪酬业绩敏感度之间的负相关关系递减。即对于增长机会很小或没有增长机会的公司而言,业绩风险与薪酬业绩敏感度之间存在负相关关系;而对于增长机会大的公司而言,业绩风险与薪酬业绩敏感度之间存在正相关关系。因此,在过度投资的代理冲突情境下,本文识别增长机会为影响薪酬业绩敏感度设定的因素。
第三,薪酬契约以业绩信号集作为契约基础,会计盈余是常被使用的业绩信号。由于会计盈余的契约作用以及会计政策的可选择性,掌握公司会计系统的管理层会出于规避薪酬风险而进行损害股东财富的盈余管理。相应的,薪酬契约的设计需要置于薪酬动机盈余管理的代理冲突情境下。
相对于道德风险,薪酬动机盈余管理的信息结构扩展于管理层掌握会计政策选择的私人信息。通过扩展信息结构下的激励模型求解发现,在薪酬动机盈余管理的代理冲突情境下,信息成本具有保险成本的特征。为了区别基于自然状态随机性的保险成本,本文将其定义为基于会计系统的保险成本。基于会计系统的保险成本源于会计政策的可选择性,而会计政策影响会计盈余,这导致作为业绩信号的会计盈余不仅包含产出信息,也包含人为噪音,股东无法直接或低成本的分辨。相应的,薪酬业绩敏感度的设定需要权衡基于会计系统的保险成本和剩余损失。会计盈余质量以基于会计系统的保险成本为中介影响代理成本权衡取向。表现为会计盈余质量越差,薪酬业绩敏感度越低。本文从盈余持续性和操纵性应计两个层面分析盈余质量对薪酬业绩敏感度的影响,结论表明薪酬业绩敏感度与盈余持续性正相关,而与操纵性应计额负相关。因此,在薪酬动机盈余管理的代理冲突情境下,本文识别盈余质量为影响薪酬业绩敏感度设定的因素。
第四,管理层承担薪酬风险意味着其参与公司剩余分享,公司的所有权结构被改变,管理层拥有抗衡股东大会与董事会的的权力。表现在薪酬契约上,管理层可能影响薪酬契约的签订与执行,从而产生自定薪酬现象。因此,薪酬契约设计需要置于权力寻租的代理冲突情境下。
管理层通过权力寻租规避薪酬风险,这不仅表现为使得有利于自身的薪酬安排得以通过,还表现为在薪酬契约执行过程中通过盈余管理操纵表现业绩,并通过再谈判为自身谋取超额租金。相应的,薪酬与真实业绩敏感度降低,而薪酬与账面盈利和账面亏损业绩敏感度的非对称性增大。通过构建多元回归模型,本文从整体上识别我国上市公司中,对于权力寻租权衡具有显著影响力的治理结构。实证结果表明独立董事比例越低、政府机构控股、信息披露透明度越差,管理层薪酬与公司真实业绩敏感度显著越弱；未设置薪酬委员会、政府机构控股、信息披露透明度越差,管理层薪酬与账面盈利业绩敏感度显著越强。由此,可以判定薪酬委员会设置状态、董事会独立性、控股股东经济属性、信息披露透明度是我国目前上市公司中,影响管理层薪酬契约签订与执行,从而影响薪酬业绩敏感度设定的因素。
The fundamental issue the corporate governance deals with is to induce managers to make decisions consistent with shareholders'interests by providing appropriate compensation contracts. In the design of compensation contracts, pay performance sensitivity setting is the core. Accordingly, the study on the influencing factors of pay performance sensitivity constitutes the core of compensation contracts study. Based on existing theories and literatures, the study on the influencing factors of pay performance sensitivity can be divided into two categories which are defined as non-trade-off perspective and trade-off perspective in this thesis. The non-trade-off perspective is based on the empirical studies which discover the fact that high intensity compensation contract is not common in the practice. These studies believe that the agency problem can be eased as long as the pay performance sensitivity increases. Accordingly, such literatures focus on finding the reasons of low pay performance sensitivity. On the other hand, the studies based on the trade-off perspective pay attention to the opportunistic behaviors of managers aimed to avoiding compensation risk. Thus, the increase of pay performance sensitivity does not mean the improvement of governance efficiency. The setting of pay performance sensitivity is a process of trade-off.
Managers can avoid compensation risk by the implementation of following opportunistic behaviors:the conflict of decision-making horizon, overinvestment, earnings management and rent seeking of managerial power. Accordingly, the design of compensation contract should place in context of above opportunistic behaviors in order to identify the influencing factors of pay performance sensitivity. According to the foundation of opportunistic behaviors, this thesis divides them into information-based conflict and power-based conflict. Information-based conflict results from the information asymmetry between shareholders and managers. The managers have information superiority. Thus, shareholders should consider the incentive costs while providing compensation contracts. Incentive costs are information costs which are excess benefits of managers. Accordingly, shareholders should trade off information costs and surplus loss. The setting of pay performance sensitivity becomes a process of trade-off of agency costs. The identification of influencing factors of pay performance in the context of information-based conflict takes the incentive models of the classic principal-agent theory as the tool. Based on the incentive models, we identify the particular factors influencing the trade-off orientation. Correspondingly, the identified factors are factors influencing the setting of pay performance sensitivity. Power-based conflict results from the mismatch of decision-making hierarchy and incentive structure. Such mismatch causes managers to influence the signing and implementation of compensation contracts. Therefore, the compensation contains power rents. The managers will trade off the benefits and the rent-seeking costs. The setting of pay performance sensitivity becomes a process of managerial rent seeking trade-off. The identification of influencing factors of pay performance sensitivity in the context of power-based conflict takes the multiple regression models as the tool. Based on the multiple regression models, we identify the particular governance structures influencing trade-off orientation in listed companies. Correspondingly, the identified factors are governance structures influencing the setting of pay performance sensitivity.
The main contents and results are as follow:
Firstly, corporate value is created by a series of business activities with short-term or long-term effects. Long-term business activities contain greater risks relatively. In order to avoid the risk of pay fluctuations, the managers may adopt growth strategy which is detrimental to the long-term growth. The conflict of decision-making horizon arises. Accordingly, the design of compensation contracts need to place in the context of such opportunistic behavior.
Contrast to moral hazard, the information structure of the conflict of decision-making horizon expands in the aspect of distribution of efforts. In the context of such opportunistic behavior, the information costs are insurance costs which are the remuneration the shareholders offer for the possibility of wrong performance evaluation. Accordingly, the pay performance sensitivity settings need to trade off the insurance costs and the surplus loss. We construct an incentive model containing two performance indicators which are stock price and accounting profit. As the stock price reflects the summary of the expected return of all business activities, the accounting profit plays the role of adjusting decision horizon and controlling the overall risks. Because of the diversification of signals, the setting of pay performance sensitivity consists of two dimensions:the absolute weight and relative weight. The absolute weight determines the intensity of incentive while the relative weight determines the decision-making horizon. The risk of performance indicators affects the absolute weight which is demonstrated as the greater the performance risks are, the smaller the absolute weight is. Similar to the absolute weight, the relative weight is subject to risk. However, due to the role the relative weight plays in the decision-making horizon, the relationship between performance risk and relative weight is no longer linear. On the condition of unchanging output value, as the decrease in the risk of accounting profit, the relative weight of accounting profit and stock price increases and then decreases. As the increase in the risk of stock price, the relative weight of accounting profit and stock price goes through an accelerated process. Thus, we identify performance risk as the influencing factor of the setting of pay performance sensitivity.
Secondly, the scale of listed company is an important factor affecting managerial compensation. The larger the scale is, the higher the pay levels of managers are. The pay based on scale is less risky than the pay based on performance. Therefore, the managers may violate the rule of net present value to avoid compensation risk, which leads to the uneconomic expansion of company size and the damage of shareholders'wealth. Accordingly, the design of compensation contracts need to place in the context of such opportunistic behavior.
Contrast to moral hazard, the information structure of overinvestment expands in the aspect of project quality. We categorize project quality into future cash flows and risk level. Based on the extended incentive model, we find the information costs display as the information rent spillover effects. Information rent is the excessive return the shareholders offer to incentive the managers to provide real project quality information. It has the characteristic of externality, which means shareholders must offer higher information rent to the managers with higher quality project than the amount they provide for the lower quality project. Therefore, the shareholder should trade off the information rent spillover effects and the surplus loss when they set the pay performance sensitivity. The greater the growth opportunity the company has, the greater the likelihood the managers possess high quality project. Therefore, the marginal spillover effects decline as the growth opportunity increases. Correspondingly, the growth opportunity affects the trade-off orientation via spillover effects. The greater the growth opportunity the company has, the higher the pay performance sensitivity should be set. As the increase of growth opportunity, the negative relation between risk and pay performance sensitivity declines. To the companies with a little or no growth opportunity, the risk and pay performance sensitivity is negatively related. However, to the companies with big growth opportunity, the risk and pay performance sensitivity is positively related. Thus, we identify growth opportunity as the influencing factor of the setting of pay performance sensitivity.
Thirdly, compensation contracts are based on a set of signals in which accounting earnings is a regular choice. As the contractual role accounting earnings plays, managers who control the accounting system may conduct earnings management in order to avoid compensation risk. Accordingly, the design of compensation contracts need to place in the context of such opportunistic behavior.
Contrast to moral hazard, the information structure of earnings management expands in the aspect of accounting policies. Based on the extended incentive model, we find the existence of information costs. In order to distinguish the insurance costs relevant with randomness of natural state, we define the information costs here as the insurance costs relevant with accounting system. The insurance costs relevant with accounting system originate from the optional accounting policies which decide the value of earnings. Accounting earnings not only contains output information, but also noises. Signal users cannot distinguish them directly. Therefore, the shareholder should trade off the insurance costs relevant with accounting system and the surplus loss when they set the pay performance sensitivity. The earnings quality affects the trade-off orientation via the insurance costs relevant with accounting system which demonstrated as the worse the earnings quality are, the lower the pay performance sensitivity should be set. We categorize earnings quality into earnings persistency and discretionary accruals. The conclusions are the pay performance sensitivity is positively and negatively related to earnings persistency and discretionary accruals respectively. Thus, we identify earnings quality as the influencing factor of the setting of pay performance sensitivity.
Fourthly, the exposure of compensation risks means that managers participate in residue sharing, which changes the company's ownership structure. The managers are able to contend with the board of directors. In the aspect of compensation, managers may affect the signing and implementation of compensation contracts, which results in the phenomenon of self-determining compensation. Accordingly, the design of compensation contracts need to place in the context of such opportunistic behavior.
Managers seek rents to avoid the compensation risk. They not only make the contracts favorable to themselves to be approved, but also extract rents through renegotiation after earnings management. Accordingly, the sensitivity between compensation and real performance declines while the asymmetry between compensation book profit sensitivity and compensation book loss sensitivity increases. Based on the multiple regression models, we identify the particular governance structures affecting the trade-off orientation. The empirical result shows that the lower the proportion of independent directors and the transparency of the information disclosure are, the weaker the compensation and the real performance are related. The sensitivity between the compensation and. the real performance is lower in the companies controlled by government. The lower the transparency of the information disclosure is, the stronger the compensation and the book performance are related. The sensitivity between the compensation and the book performance is higher in the companies which do not set remuneration committee or controlled by government. Thus, we identify the remuneration committee, the independency of the board of directors, the controlling shareholders and the transparency of information disclosure as the influencing factor of the setting of pay performance sensitivity.
引文
①契约各方在特定条件下,最大化新古典经济理论的一般目标函数(效用、利润或价值)。
② Arrow-Debreu的完美契约是引入不确定性之后的帕累托最优长期契约集合。帕累托长期契约集合包含了当事人对未来商品的相机索取权(state contingent claims),且当事人之间的信息是对称的。完美契约要求规定未来所有状态下的支付,并明确组织在当期和未来的所有决策,因此一当脱离新古典的完美市场假设,那么契约将无法达成。
③最优契约没有任何的信息损耗,因此也没有因此导致的交易费用。
①预见成本源自当事人由于有限理性,不可能预见所有的或然状态；缔约成本原则当事人以一种没有争议的语言将或然状态写入契约中很困难或成本过高；证实成本原则对契约双方共同可观测的重要信息对第三方(如政府)是不可证实的。(Tirole,1997)
①私人裁决也被称为经由契约裁决(ordering through contract)和自动裁决(autonomous ordering),由此强调私人裁决方式的契约性质。
①Lambert、Larker和Verrecchia(1991)曾计算对一名管理人员而言10000份期权的现金等价价值为351260美元。假如管理人员适度规避风险,且有50%的财富同公司的股价联系在一起,则该管理人员不能自由交易的股票期权价值下降为152300美元。如果该管理人员高度规避风险,则价值下降为65900美元。
①关于道德风险(moral harzard)存在着很多不同的理解。广义的理解将道德风险定义为签约后的代理人机会主义行为,以此与逆向选择相对；狭义的理解则从信息结构的角度出发,将道德风险定义为签约后的隐藏行为。其他签约后机会主义行为都可以从道德风险的信息结构进行扩展。本文所提及的道德风险为这种狭义的理解。
①Holmstrom和Milgrom(1987)经典模型的基本设定为：①由于股东是风险中性的,因此EUp[x-W(x)]=UpE[x-W(x)]和Up″=0总是成立,在不影响结论的情况下,可以设定UpE[x-W(x)]=E[x-W(x)]；②对于管理层而言,其期望效用函数与获得的薪酬和投入的努力水平有关。由于风险厌恶的设定,其期望效用函数使用常绝对风险规避Von-Neuman-Morgenstem效用函数,其函数形式为U=-e-pw,其中ρ为绝对风险规避常数,而w为净收入。由于管理层风险规避,因此EU(w)=UE(w)不再成立。从效用函数到期望效用函数的过渡依靠确定性等价方法。
①博弈顺序是建立激励模型的先决条件,其直接影响股东和管理层的信息地位。在后面章节的激励模型中,本节都会描述股东和管理层的博弈顺序。
①非平衡面板数据较好的克服了简单混合数据的样本自相关问题,也克服了平衡面板数据模型的样本选择偏差问题。另外,由于本研究中样本数量较多,而时间趋势不长。如果使用面板模型中的固古大定效应模型会损失很大的自由度。因此,本文使用随机效应模型。
①股票年收益率=(每股股息+期末股票市价—期初股票市价)／每股市价
①有许多常见的分布满足这种条件,如正态分布、指数分布以及均匀分布等。这种假设普遍见于具有非对称信息的委托代理模型中,如Bernardo、cai和luo (2001)、Dutta (2003)等。
①得出6-2式存在两个条件：首先,由于管理层被假定为风险中性,所以期望收入的效用等于期望效用；其次,在这里本节沿用了Holmstrom-Mirrlees(1987)经典模型的假定,那就是期望效用等于期望收入,在后一节的模型设定中,这个假设依旧沿用。
①在均衡状态,管理层汇报的项目质量信息就是真实的项目质量信息。
①这种描述方法可见于Cox、Ross和Rubinstein (1979)、黄小原等(2005)。
②如果所有市场参与方都是风险中性的情况下,那么所有的金融资产(包括期权)都将具有相同的资本成本,即无风险利率。在这样的设定下,使得金融资产未来现金流的现值等于其现时价格的概率就是风险中性概率。
①由于已经在项目风险σ2和项目价值向上波动的幅度t之间建立了联系,因此,汇报关于项目价值向上波动的幅度t的信息相当于汇报项目风险σ2的信息。
①新经济公司是指高新技术行业内的公司,如计算机、软件、网络、通信等。与传统行业公司相比,它们具有规模小、蕴含较大增长能力以及大量集中投入研发费用等特点。
①即便在2000年美国纳斯达克(Nasdaq)股灾后,仍然有很多公司表示它们将重新签发具有新执行价格的股票期权,同时并不打算收回未执行的股票期权。这似乎表明对于新经济公司的管理层而言,薪酬蕴含的风险是他们乐于接受的。
①盈余反应系数是用来衡量某一证券的超额市场回报相对于发行该证券的公司报告盈余中的非预期因素的反应程度。
①引自William R Scott,《财务会计理论(第三版)》,机械工业出版社。
① Subramanyam (1996)、Eli、Ferdinard和Judy (1998)以及Bartov (2001)都证明横截面模型要优于时间序列模型,国内还有一些学者利用会计政策变更来计量操纵性应计,但考虑到会计政策变更的样本较少,且对会计盈余质量的影响也较小,因此,没有采用此计量方法。
①组织的合同结构,通过明确固定薪酬或与具体绩效指标挂钩的激励,限制了大部分人所承担的风险。而剩余风险是资源的随机流入和所承诺的给个人的支付之间的差额的风险。剩余风险承担者被称为剩余索取者。
①Jensen和Murphy曾认为20世纪期权激励的大行其道,其中一个主要原因是管理层权力寻租。他们认为基于期权的薪酬契约不是解决代理问题,而是火上浇油。
[1]埃里克.弗鲁伯顿,鲁道夫.芮切特,姜建强,罗长远(译),新制度经济学——个交易费用分析范式[M],上海三联书店,上海人民出版社,2005。
[2]毕晓芳,周晓苏,盈余质量对会计信息报酬契约有用性的影响及股权特征的交互作用分析[J],《中国会计评论》,2007,55-82。
[3]毕晓方,时效性特征对会计业绩薪酬契约有用性的影响[J],《商业经济与管理》,2006(6)：75-79。
[4]陈东华、陈信元、万华林,国有企业中的薪酬管制与在职消费[J],《经济研究》,2005,2：92-101。
[5]陈东华、陈信元、万华林,国有企业薪酬管制、高管腐败与企业绩效[C],中国第四届实证会计国际研讨会论文集,2005。
[6]陈小悦、杨潜林,实物期权的分析与估值[J],《系统工程理论方法应用》,1998,7(3)：6-9。
[7]陈共荣,李鸥,企业经理人报酬契约的嵌入性结构分析[J],《会计研究》,2009,3：60-63。
[8]陈震,张鸣,业绩指标、业绩风险与高管人员报酬的敏感性[J],《会计研究》,2008,3：47-55。
[9]杜胜利、翟艳玲,2005,总经理年度报酬决定因素的实证分析[J],《管理世界》,8：114-120。
[10]杜兴强,王丽华,高层管理当局薪酬与上市公司业绩的相关性实证研究[J],《会计研究》,2007,1：58-65。
[11]费方域,交易、合同关系的治理和企业——威廉姆森交易成本经济学评述之二[J],《外国经济与管理》,1996,6。
[12]费方域,企业的产权分析[M],上海三联书店,上海人民出版社,1998。
[13]《基于信息结构的内部控制策略与激励机制：企业内生财务体系构建》课题组,激励强度、公司治理与企业业绩研究综述[J],《会计研究》,2008,10：60-65。
[14]郭春梅,蔡继荣,激励扭曲与经营者短期行为[J],《重庆工商大学学报(社会科学 版)》,2005,2：92-95。
[15]郝颖、刘星、林朝南,我国上市公司高管人员过度自信与投资决策的[J],《中国管理科学》,2005,13：142-148。
[16]黄小原、庄新田,非对称信息条件下实物期权最优投资问题研究[J],《管理科学学报》,2003,6(6)：28-33。
[17]黄群慧,控制权作为企业家的激励约束因素：理论分析与现实解释意义[J],《经济研究》,2000,1：41-47。
[18]李增泉,激励机制与企业绩效——一项基于上市公司的实证研究[J],《会计研究》,2000,1：24-30。
[19]李增泉,孙铮、刘凤委,企业绩效与薪酬契约——基于最优契约论的解释及经验证据[C],东亚会计与经济学杂志年会论文,2005。
[20]李增泉,国家控股与公司治理的有效性——项基于中国证券市场的实证研究[M],经济科学出版社,2005.
[21]刘凤委、孙铮、李增泉,政府干预、行业竞争与薪酬契约——来自国有上市公司的证据[J],《管理世界》,2007,9：76-84。
[22]刘怀珍,欧阳令南,经理私人利益与过度投资[J],《系统工程理论与实践》,2004,10。
[23]卢锐,管理层权力、薪酬契约与绩效[M],经济科学出版社,2007。
[24]吕长江、赵宇恒,国有企业管理者激励效应研究——基于“最优契约论”与“管理权力论”的比较分析[C],管理会计与改革开放30年研讨会暨余绪缨教授诞辰86周年纪念会会议论文,2008。
[25]吕长江,赵宇恒,国有企业高层管理者激励效应研究——基于管理者权力的解释,工作论文,2008。
[26]刘斌、刘星、李世顺、何顺文,CEO薪酬与企业业绩互动效应的实证检验[J],《会计研究》,2003,3：35-39。
[27]罗大伟,万迪防,关于管理者薪酬的研究综述[J],《管理工程学报》,2002,4：80-86。
[28]罗富碧,冉茂盛,杜家廷,高管人员股权激励与投资决策关系的实证研究[J],《会计研究》,2008,8：69-76。
[29]雷光勇,陈若华,管理层激励与会计行为异化[J],《财经论丛》,2005,7：42-47。
[30]迈克尔.詹森,孙经纬(译),组织战略的基础[M],上海财经大学出版社,2008。
[31]迈克尔.詹森,童英(译),企业理论——治理、剩余索取权和组织形式[M],上海 财经大学出版社,2008。
[32]权小锋,吴世农,吴芳,管理层权力、私有收益与薪酬操纵——来自中国国有上市企业的实证证据[J/OL],中国金融学术研究网,2010。
[33]缮新明、刘善敏,上市公司经营者报酬结构性差异的实证研究[J],《经济研究》,2003,8：55-63。
[34]唐清泉、朱瑞华、甄丽明,我国高管人员报酬激励制度的有效性——基于沪深上市公司的实证研究[J],《当代经济管理》,2008,2：59-65。
[35]唐雪松、周晓苏、马如静,上市公司过度投资行为及其制约机制的实证研究[J],《会计研究》,2007,9：44-52。
[36]李丹、贾宁,盈余质量、制度环境与分析师预测[J],《中国会计评论》,2009,4：351-370。
[37]王裙,双重博弈中的激励与行为——对转轨时期国有企业管理层激励不足的一种新解释[J],《经济研究》,2001,8：71-78。
[38]王克敏,王志超,高管控制权、报酬与盈余管理——一基于中国上市公司的实证研究[J],《管理世界》,2007,7：111-119。
[39]王艳,孙培源,杨忠直,经理层过度投资与股权激励的契约模型研究[J],《中国管理科学》,2005,2：127-131。
[40]魏刚,高级管理层激励与上市公司经营业绩[J],《经济研究》,2000,3：31-37。
[41]胡铭,上市公司高层经理与经营绩效的实证分析[J],《财贸经济》,2003,4：59-62。
[42]魏明海,卢锐,管理层风险报酬的有效性分析[J],《当代财经》,2004,3：98-101。
[43]吴育辉,吴世农,高管激励：激励还是自利?——来自中国上市公司的证据[J/OL],中国金融学术研究网,2010。
[44]夏立军,盈余管理计量模型在中国股票市场的应用研究[J],《中国会计与财务研究》,2003(2)：95-123。
[45]肖继辉、彭文平,高管人员报酬与业绩的敏感性-来自中国上市公司的证据[J],《经济管理》,2002,18：4-16。
[46]肖继辉、彭文平.上市公司总经理报酬业绩敏感性研究[J],《财经研究》,2004,30：34-43。
[47]徐晓阳,范永武,财务会计信息与公司治理——一项以管理报酬契约为中心的研究综述[J],《当代财经》,2001,6：63-66。
[48]谢德仁,企业剩余索取权：分享安排与剩余计量[M],上海三联书店,上海人民出 版社,2001。
[49]谢德仁,经理人激励的业绩基础选择：理论分析与经验证据[J],《会计研究》,2004,7：55-60。
[50]辛清泉,林斌,王彦超,政府控制、经理薪酬与资本投资[J],《经济研究》,2007,8：111-122。
[51]杨贺、柯大钢、马春爱,经理人控制对高级管理人员报酬制定影响的实证研究[J],《管理科学》,2005,3：28-32。
[52]杨瑞龙,聂辉华,不完全契约理论：一个综述[J],《经济研究》,2006,2：104-114。
[53]张先治,财务信息在契约中的作用[J],会计研究,2000,9：12-16。
[54]张先治,股票期权理论在公司激励中的应用研究[J],《会计研究》,2002,7：16-24。
[55]张先治,内部管理控制论[M],北京：中国财政经济出版社,2004。
[56]张俊瑞、赵进文、张建,高级经理激励与上市公司经营绩效相关性的实证分析[J],《会计研究》2003,9：29-34。
[57]张维迎,《企业的企业家——契约理论》[M],1995,上海三联书店,上海人民出版社。
[58]张维迎,《博弈论与信息经济学》[M],1996,上海三联书店,上海人民出版社。
[59]张维迎,所有制、治理结构与委托代理关系[J],《经济研究》,1996,9：3-15。
[60]张维迎,控制权丧失的不可补偿性与国有企业兼并中的产权障碍[J],《经济研究》,1998,7：3-14。
[61]张鸣,陈震,高管报酬隐性激励的实证研究[J],《财经研究》,2006,3：56-63。
[62]张俊瑞,赵进文,张建,高级经理激励与上市公司经营绩效相关性的实证分析[J],《会计研究》,2003,9：29-34。
[63]张川、潘飞、J.Robinson,非财务指标采用的业绩后果实证研究——代理理论vs.权变理论[J],《会计研究》,2008,3：39-46。
[64]周其仁,市场里的企业：一个人力资本与非人力资本的特别合约[J],1996,6：71-79。
[65]周其仁,“控制权回报”和“企业家控制的企业”——“公有制经济”中企业家人力资本产权的案例研究[J],《经济研究》,1997,5：31-42。
[66]周嘉南,黄登仕,上市公司高级管理层报酬业绩敏感度与风险之间关系的实证研究[J],《会计研究》,2006,4：44-50。
[67]周嘉南,报酬业绩敏感度与风险之间关系的理论与实证研究[D],博士学位论文打印稿,西南交通大学,2006。
[68]周红霞,欧阳凌,企业非效率投资行为研究综述——基于股东与管理层利益冲突的视角[J],《管理科学》,2004,12：23-29。
[69]支晓强,童盼,管理层业绩报酬敏感度、内部现金流与企业投资行为——对自由现金流和信息不对称理论的一个检验[J],《会计研究》,2007,10：73-81。
[70]张国清、赵景文,资产负债项目可靠性、盈余持续性及其市场反应[J],《会计研究》,2008,3：51-57。
[71]赵秀云、李敏强、寇纪淞,风险项目投资决策与实物期权估价方法明[J],《系统工程学报》2000,15(3)：243-246。
[72]甄丽明,唐清泉,管理层风险偏爱、报酬激励与企业R&D投入——基于我国上市公司的经验研究[C],第三届中国管理学年会论文集,2008。
[1]Aggarwal.R, and A. Samwick,1997, Managerial compensation, strategic competition, and relative performance evaluation:theory and evidence, Dartmouth College.
[2]Aghion, P., and J. Tirole,1997, "Formal and Real Authority in Organization", Journal of Political Economy,105(1):1-29.
[3]Alchian, A. A., and H. Demsetz,1972, "Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization", American Economic Review,72:777-95.
[4]Amihud, Y., and B. Lev.,1981, "Risk Reduction as a Managerial Motive for Mergers", Bell Journal of Economics,12:65-105.
[5]Antle, R., Bogetoft, P., and Stark, A. W.,2004, "Incentive Problems and Investment Timing Options", Working Paper, Yale School of Management.
[6]Antle, R. and J. Demski, October 1988, "The Controllability Principle in Responsibility Accounting", The Accounting Review,700-18.
[7]Antle, R. and J. Fellingham, September 1997, "Models of Capital Investment With Private Information and Incentives:A Selective Review", Journal of Business Finance and Accounting,887-908.
[8]Antle, R., and J. Fellingham, Supplement 1995, "Information Rents and Preferences Among Information Systems in a Model of Resource Allocation", Journal of Accounting Research,41-63.
[9]Antle R, A Smith, "An Empirical Investigation of the Relative Performance Evaluation of Corporate Managers", Journal of Accounting Research,1986,24(1):1-39.
[10]Baber, W.R., S-H. Kang, K.R.Kumar,1999, "The Explanatory Power of Earnings Levels vs Earnings Changes in the Context of Executive Compensation", The Accounting Review,10:459-72.
[11]Baiman, S.,1990, "Agency Research in Accounting:A Second Look, "Accounting Organizations and Society,341-71.
[12]Baiman, S., and K, Sivaramakrishnan, October 1991, "The Value of Private Pre-Decision Information in a Principal-Agent Context", The Accounting Review, 747-66.
[13]Baiman, S., and R.Verrecchia, July 1995, "Earnings and Price-Based Compensation Contracts In the Presence of Discretionary Trading and Incomplete Contracting", Journal of Accounting and Economics,93-121.
[14]Banker, R., and A. Thevaranjan,2000, "Goal Congruence and Evaluation of Performance Measures", working paper, University of Texas at Dallas.
[15]Baker G., M. Jensen and K.J. Murphy,1988, "Compensation and Incentives:Practice vs Theory", Journal of Finance,43(3):593-616.
[16]Baker G., "Incentive Contracts and Performance Measurement",1992, Journal of Political Economy,100:598-614.
[17]Banker. R and S. Datar.,1989, "Sensitivity, Pricision, and Linear Aggregation of Accounting Signals", Journal of Accounting Research.
[18]Bebchuk, L., J. Fried and D.Walker,2002, Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation, University of Chicago Law Review.
[19]Bebchuk, L. and J. Fried,2002, Pay Without Performance:the Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation, Harvard University Press.
[20]Berle A. A. and G.C. Means.1932, The Modern Corporation and Private Property. New York.
[21]Bernardo, A. E., Cai, H.B. and Luo, J.,2001, "Capital Budgeting and Compensation with Asymmetric Information and Moral Hazard", Journal of Financial Economics., 61:311-44.
[22]Bernardo, A. E., Cai, H.B. and Luo, J.,2004, "Capital Budgeting and in Multi-division Fims:Information, Agency and Incentives", Review of Financial Studies,17:739-67.
[23]Brina. J. hall and J. B. Libmna,1998, "Are CEOs Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?"The Quarterly Journal of Economies,8:653-91.
[24]Bushman R., R. Indjejikian,1993, "Accounting Income, Stock, Price, and Managerial Compensation", Journal of Accounting and Economics,16:3-23.
[25]Bushman, R, R. Indjejikian and A.Smith,1996, "CEO Compensation:the Role of Individual Performance Evaluation", Journal of Accounting and Economics,4:161-93.
[26]Bushman, R., Indjejikian, R., and M. Penno,2000, "Private Pre-Decision Information, Performance Measure Congruity and the Value of Delegation", working paper, University of Michigan.
[27]Chandra S. M., D.L. McMonauguy, and D. H. Gobeli,2000, "Effectiveness of CEO Pay-for-performance", Review of Financial Economics,9:1-13.
[28]Cheng S.,2005, Managerial Entrenchment and Loss-shielding in Executive Compensation, University of Michigan, Working Paper.
[29]Coase, Ronald H.,1960, "The Problem of Social Costs", Journal of Law and Economics,3(1),1-44.
[30]Core J.E. and Guay W. R.,2002, The Other Side of the Trade-off:the Impact of Risk on Executive Compensation, University of Pennsylvania.
[31]Core J.E. and Guay W.R.,1999, "The Use of Equity Grants to Manage Optimal Equity Incentive Levels", Journal of Accounting and Economics,28(2):151-184.
[32]Coughlan A. and R. Schmidt,1985, "Managerial Compensation, Management Turnover, and Firm Performance:an Empirical Investigation", Journal of Accounting and Economics,7(123):43-66.
[33]Cox, J., Ross, S., and Rubinstein, M.,1979, "Option Pricing:A Simplified Approach, Journal of Financial Economics",7:222-64.
[34]Datar, S, Kulp, S., and R. Lambert,2000, "Balancing Performance Measures", forthcoming, Journal of Accounting Research.
[35]Dechow P. and R. Sloan,1991, "Managerial Incentives and The Horizon Problem ", Journal of Accounting and Economics,14(1):51-89.
[36]Demsetz, H.,1983, "The Structure of Ownership and the Thorey of the Firm", Journal of law and economics,16:375-390.
[37]Demski, J., and R. Dye, Spring 1999, "Risk, Return, and Moral Hazard", Journal of Accounting Research,27-56.
[38]Dickens, W.T., Katz, Lang, Kevin, et, al.1987, "Employees,Crime,Monitoring and the Efficiency Wage Hypothesis", NBER Working Paper. National Bureau of Economic Research.
[39]Dutta.S.,2003, "Capital Budgeting and Managerial Compensation:Incentive and Retention Effects", The Accounting Review,78(1):71-93.
[40]Fama E.,1980, "Agency Problem and the Theory of the Firm", Journal of Political Economy",88(2):288-307.
[41]Fama, E. and M. Jensen,1983a, "Agency Problems and Residual Claims", Journal of Law and Economics,26, no.2,327-49.
[42]Fama, E. and M. Jensen,1983b, "Separation of Ownership and Control", Journal of Law and Economics,26:301-25.
[43]Feltham, G., and J. Xie, July 1994, "Performance Measure Congruity and Diversity in Multi-Task Principal/Agent Relations", The Accounting Review,429-453.
[44]Feltham, G.A. and J.A.Ohlson,1996, "Uncertainty Resolution and the Theory of Depreciation Measurement", Journal of Accounting Research,209-304.
[45]Firth, M., P. Fung and O. Rui,2006, "Corporate Performance and CEO Compensation in China", Journal of Corporate Finance,12:693-714.
[46]FitzRoy, Felix R. and Dennis Mueller,1984, "Corporation and Conflict in Contractual Organization", Quarterly Review of Economics and Business,24(4)
[47]Garen.J,1994, Executive-Compensation and Principal-Agent Theory, Journal of Political Economy,102(6):1175-99.
[48]Gaver, J., K.Gaver, J.Austin,1995, "Additional Evidence on Bonus Plans and Income Management", Journal of Accounting Economics,19 (1):3-28.
[49]Gaver, J., and K.Gaver,1998, "The Relation between Nonrecurring Accounting Transaction and CEO Cash Compensation", The Accounting Review,74:235-53
[50]Gibbons R., K.J. Murphy,1992a, "Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns:Theory and Evidence", Journal of Political Economy,100 (3) 468-505.
[51]Grossman S. and O. Hart,1986, "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership:A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration", Journal of Political Economy,94.
[52]Grossman S., and O.Hart,1983, "An Analysis of the Principal-agent Problem", Econometric,51:7-45.
[53]Hart,0., and B. Holmstrom,1986, "The Theory of Contracts", in Advances in Economic Theory (T. Bewlely, editor), Cambridge University Press.
[54]Hart, O.D., Firms,1995, Contracts and Financial Structure, Oxford:Clarendon.
[55]Hall B., and Leibman J.,1998, "Are CEOs Really Paid Like Bureaucrats", Quarterly Journal of Economics.
[56]Hartzell, J., and L. Starks,2003, "Institutional Investors and Executive Compensation", Journal of Finance,7:85-107.
[57]Haubrich J.,1994, "Risk Aversion, Performance Pay, and the Principal-agent Problem", Journal of Political Economy,102(2):258-276.
[58]Hemmer, T., Kim, O., and R. Verrecchia,2000, "Introducing Convexity Into Optimal Compensation Contracts", Journal of Accounting and Economics.
[59]Healy, Paul M.,1985, "The Effect of Bonus Schemes on Accounting Decisions, " Journal of Accounting and Economics,85-107.
[60]Holmstrom B.,1979, "Moral Hazard and Observability", The Bell Journal of Economics,10:74-91.
[61]Holmstrom B.,1982a, "Moral Hazard in Teams", The bell Journal of Economics, 13(2):324-40.
[62]Holmstrom B.,1982b, Managerial Incentive Schemes:a Dynamic Perspecive, Essays in Economics and Management in Honour of Lars Wahlbeck, Helsinki, Finland.
[63]Holmstrom B., and P. Milgrom,1987, "Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives", Econometrics,55:303-28.
[64]Holmstrom B., P. Milgrom.,1991, "Multitask Principle-agent Analyses:Incentive Contract, Aasset Ownership, and Job Design", Journal of Law, Economics and Organization,7:24-52.
[65]Holmstrom B.,1992, Contracts and the Market for Managerial:Comment. Contract Economics, Lars Wein and Hans Wijkander, Blackwell Publishers.
[66]Ittner, C.D., A. Larcker,1998, "Are Nonfinancial Measures Leading Indicators of Financial Performance? An Analysis of Customer Satisfaction", Journal of accounting research,36:1-35.
[67]Ittner, C.D., Lambert, R., and A. Larcker,2003, "The Structure and Performance Consequences of Equity Grants to Employees of New Economy Firms", Journal of Accounting and Economics,34:89-127.
[68]Ittner, C.D., Lambert, R., and M. V. Rajan,1997, "The Choice of Performance Measures in Annual Bonus Contracts", Accounting Review,72 (April):231-55.
[69]Jensen M.,1983, "Organization Theory and Methodology", Accounting Review,50 (April)
[70]Jensen M., K. Meckling,1976, "Theory of the Firm:Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure ", Journal of Financial Economics,3:305-360.
[71]Jensen M.C.,1986, "The Agency Cost and Cash Flow:Corporate Finance and Takeovers", American Economic Review,76 (2):323-329.
[72]Jensen M., K.J. Murphy,1990, "Performance Pay and Top-management Incentives", Journal of Political Economy,98(2):225-264.
[73]Jewitt, I.,1988, "Justifying the First-order Approach to Principal-agent Problems".Econometric,56:1177-90.
[74]Jin, L.,2002, "CEO Compensation, Diversification, and Incentives", Journal of Political Economy,66:29-63.
[75]Kang, D.L and A.B.Sorensen,1999, "Ownership Organization and Firm Performance", Annual review social,25:121-44.
[76]Kato,.T, and Long, C., "Executive Compensation, Firm Performance, and Corporate Governance in China:Evidence from Firms Listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges", http://ssrn.com/abstract=555794,2205
[77]Kim, O. and Y.SUH,1993, "Incentive Efficiency of Compensation Based on Accounting and Market Performance", Journal of Accounting and Economics,25-53
[78]Knight, F.,1964(1921), Risk, Uncertainty and Profit, New York:A.M.Kelley
[79]Kreps, D.,1990, Moral Hazard and Incentives, Chapter 16 A Course in Microeconomic Theory, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ,577-617.
[80]Kreps, D.,1990, The Revelation Principle and Mechanism Design, Chapter 18 in A Course in Microeconomic Theory,, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 661-719.
[81]Lambert, R., Spring 1986, "Executive Effort and the Selection of Risky Projects", The Rand Journal of Economics,77-88.
[82]Lambert, R.A., and D.F.Larcker, "An analysis of the Use of Accounting and Market Measures of Performance in Executive Compensation Contracts", Journal of accounting research(supplement 1987):85-125.
[83]Lambert, R.A.,2001, "Contracting Theory and Accounting", Journal of Accounting and Economics,32:3-87.
[84]Lambert R., D. Larcker,1991, R. Verrecchia, "Portfolio Considerations in Valuing Mangerial Compensation", Journal of Accounting Reseach,29(1):129-49.
[85]La porta, R., F., Lopez-de-silanes, and A., Shleifer, R.W., Vishny,1999, "Corporate Ownership Around the World, Law and Finance", The journal of finance,54:471-517.
[86]May, D.,1995, "Do Managerial Motives Influence Firm Risk Reduction", Journal of Finance,50:1291-1301.
[87]Mengistae,.T, and Xu, L.C.,2004, "Agency Theory and Executive Compensation: the Case of Chinese State-owned Enterprises", Journal of Labor Economics.,22, 315-337.
[88]Merchant, K.,1987, Why Firms Disregard the Controllability Principle, Bruns and Kaplan, (editors), Accounting and Management:Field Study Perspectives, Harvard Business School Press,316-338.
[89]Mirrlees J.,1974, "Notes on Welfare Economics, Information, and Uncertainty", Essays on Economic Behavior Under Uncertainty, North Holland, Amsterdam.
[90]Mirrlees J.,1976, "The Optimal Structure of Incentives and Authority Within an Organization", The Bell Journal of Economics,7:105-131.
[91]Morck, R., A.shleifer, and R.vishny,1988, "Management Ownership and Market Valuation", Journal of financial economics, (20):293-315.
[92]Murphy K. J.,1985, "Corporate Performance and Managerial Remuneration:an Empirical Analysis", Journal of Accounting and economics,7 (123):11-41.
[93]Murphy K. J.,1986, "Incentives, Learning, and Compensation:A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation of Managerial Labor Contracts", Rand Journal of Economics 17, (Spring)
[94]Murphy K. J.1998, "Managerial Compensation", Handbook of Labor Economics, Vol Ⅲ, North Holland.
[95]Murphy K.J.,2003, "Stock-based Pay in New Economy Firms", Journal of Accounting and Economics,34:129-47.
[96]Myers, S. C., and Majluf N. C.,1984, "Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have Information that Investors Do not Have", Journal of Financial Economics,13:187-222.
[97]Oyer, P., Schaefer, s.,2005, "Why Do Some Firms Give Stock Options to All Employees?:an Empirical Examination of Alternative Theories", Journal of Financial Economics,76 (1) 99-133.
[98]Prendergast, C.,1999, "The Provision of Incentives In Firms", Journal of Economic Literature,7-63.
[99]Prendergast, C.,2002, "The Tenuous Tradeoff between Risk and Incentives", Journal of Political Economy,110:1071-1102.
[100]Rasmusen, E.,1994, Game and Information:An Introduction to Game Theory, Cambridge:Blackwell Publisher.
[101]Rui. Albuquerque and Jianjun Miao,2006, CEO Power, Compensation and Governance, Working Paper.
[102]Shavell S.,1979, "Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principle and Agent Relationship", Bell Journal of Economy,10(1):55-73.
[103]Stein, J.C.,2003a, Agency, Information and Corporate Investment, In George Constantinides, Milton Harris, Rene Stulz, eds., Handbook of the Economics of Finance, Amsterdam:North-Holland.
[104]Stein, J.C. Agency,2003b, information and corporate investment, Handbook of Economics and Finance.
[105]Umanatha, N.S., Ray, M.R., and T. L. Campbell,1996, "The Effect of Uncertainty and Information Asymmetry on the Structure of Compensation Contracts:A test of Two Competing Models", Management Science,42:868-74.
[106]Williamson, O.E.1975, Markets and Hierarchies:Analysis and Antitrust Implications, New York:Free Press.
[107]Watts, zimmerman,1978 (Jan), "Towards a Positive Accounting Theory of Determination of Accounting Standards", The Accounting Review,112-134.
[108]Yang, Xiaokai and Ng, Yew-Kwang,1994, "The Theory of Firm and Structure of Residual Rights", Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization.
[109]Zhang, Weiying,1994, Entrepreneurial Ability, Personal Wealth and Assignment of Principalship:An Entrepreneurial-Contractual Theory of the Firm, D. Phil Thesis, Oxford University.