摘要
2006年2月15日,我国发布了以公允价值运用为最大亮点的新会计准则体系。正当我国会计界积极贯彻实施新会计准则之时,在大洋彼岸的美国爆发了严重的金融危机并由此引发了对公允价值会计准则的巨大争论,其涉及面之广和影响层次之高,是美国会计界提出公允价值概念并逐步实施公允价值会计准则近50年来所前所未有的。尽管这一争论最终以财务会计准则委员会的适度让步和美国证监会的表态而暂告一段落,但是这一争论还远没有结束。因此,在愈演愈烈的国际金融危机背景下,研究和反思公允价值会计准则实施后企业的行为变化和契约设计,是财务和会计理论界急需解决的一理论和现实问题。
基于上述原因,论文以非理性为研究主线,探讨了公允价值会计政策选择以及公允价值会计对企业投资行为异化和管理报酬契约设计的影响等问题,以期为我国公允价值会计准则的完善、企业行为异化的有效抑制和管理报酬契约设计的改进提供理论支持和对策建议。论文共分为九章:
第1章是绪论。首先给出了论文选题的理论价值及现实意义;其次总括了论文的研究内容、研究框架并对相关概念进行了界定;最后提出了论文的主要创新点。
第2章是相关文献回顾与评述。该章对公允价值运用、企业投资行为和报酬契约的相关文献进行了简要的回顾与评述,为论文的后续研究提供研究基础和背景。
第3章为论文研究的理论基础。该章在介绍和评析企业契约理论、行为公司财务理论和公司治理理论的基础上,探讨了上述理论与公允价值会计政策选择、企业投资行为异化和管理报酬契约设计之间的关系。
第4章为论文研究的方法基础。该章在介绍进化博弈理论的基础上,分析了进化博弈理论应用于企业会计政策选择研究的可行性;在介绍委托代理理论的基础上,分析了委托代理理论与管理报酬契约设计的关系;在介绍信号传递理论的基础上,分析了会计政策选择的信号传递作用,以期为企业的公允价值会计政策选择和管理报酬契约设计的研究提供有针对性的方法支撑。
第5章是公允价值会计政策选择研究。该章先是从理性角度分析上市公司管理当局的公允价值会计政策选择立场是否是完全理性的,在此基础上,从有限理性角度运用进化博弈的复制动态方法对上市公司管理当局的公允价值会计政策选择立场进行趋同分析。
第6章是公允价值会计对企业投资行为异化的影响研究。该章在分析公允价值计量属性运行缺陷的基础上,探讨了公允价值会计对非理性的公司管理者和外部投资者过度乐观或过度悲观心理的影响,再分别以管理者和投资者非理性为线索,运用行为公司财务理论研究了公允价值会计对企业投资行为异化的影响。
第7章是公允价值会计对管理报酬契约设计的影响研究。该章针对上市公司实施公允价值会计准则后,其营业利润是由管理者努力和公允价值变动共同决定的现实情况,对传统的委托代理模型进行了拓展研究,并对是否包含公允价值变动损益的管理报酬契约设计进行静态比较,分析了公允价值变动损益对管理报酬契约设计的影响。
第8章为对策建议。在以上各章研究的启示基础上,从完善我国会计制度、证券市场发展以及公司治理入手,提出了完善公允价值会计准则、抑制企业投资行为异化和改进管理报酬契约设计的对策建议。
第9章为结论。总结了以上各章的主要研究结论,提出了论文的局限性及后续研究设想。
综上,在国内外相关研究的基础上,论文以非理性为研究主线,立足于公允价值运用背景,研究的创新点主要体现在以下几个方面:
①我国上市公司管理当局的公允价值会计政策选择并不是完全理性的,存在着明显的趋同效应。上市公司最终选择哪种会计政策,取决于高质量上市公司和低质量上市公司采用相同会计政策的得益之和与高质量上市公司和低质量上市公司采用不同会计政策的得益之和的比较。
②企业实施公允价值会计准则后,当市场行情看涨时,非理性的公司管理者和外部投资者都会对公司未来前景更加乐观,企业发生过度投资的可能性更大;当市场行情看跌时,非理性的公司管理者和外部投资者都会对公司未来前景更加悲观,企业发生投资不足的可能性更大。
③企业实施公允价值会计准则后,当管理者和股东对公允价值变动损益的均值估计一致时,是否包含公允价值变动损益对管理报酬契约设计没有影响;当管理者和股东对公允价值变动损益的均值估计存在差异时,是否包含公允价值变动损益的管理报酬契约设计就存在差异。
On February 15,2006, Chinese ministry of finance issues New Enterprise Accounting Principle, Which is most highlighted by the practice of fair value. In the very act of carrying out New Enterprise Accounting Principle by Chinese Accounting Circles, the serious financial crisis breaks out in America on the other shore of ocean, and so the tremendous controversy on Fair Value Accounting Principle happens, What it involve and impact are strange since 50 years of bringing forward Fair Value Accounting Principle and putting it in practice by American Accounting Circles. In despite of this controversy abeyance finally by moderate concession of Financial Accounting Standards Board and declaration of American Securities Regulatory Commission, but it doesn’t end off. So under the background of international financial crisis, studying and thinking of enterprise’s behavior change after the actualization of Fair Value Accounting Principle, is a theoretic and practical problem exacting to be resolved by financing and Accounting Circles.
Based on the above mentioned reason, in order to offer theoretic support and policy suggestions for perfecting Fair Value Accounting Principle, restraining corporation behavior alienation and improving the design of incentive contract,from the clue on irrationality, fair value accounting police choice, corporation investment behavior alienation and the design of managers’incentive contract are discussed by canonical method in this paper. It is divided into nine parts altogether.
Chapter 1 is introduction. First, It proposes the theoretic value and the practical meaning of the research, then it introduces the contents, architecture and defines the basic concept, and the analytical prerequisite for the following research, finally it offers the theory foreshadowing and the analytical prerequisite for the following research.
Chapter 2 is review of literatures. Interrelated literature on the practice of fair value, corporation investment behavior and the design of incentive contract are reviewed briefly, offering the research foundation and background for the following research.
Chapter 3 is theoretic foundation. Based on the introduction and review of enterprise contract theory, behavioral corporate finance theory and corporate governance theory, the relationship among above mentioned theories, the practice of fair value, investment behavior alienation and the design of managers’incentive contract were discussed.
Chapter 4 is method foundation. In this part, evolutionary games theory is firstly introduced to analyze feasibility of applying to research accounting police choice, principal-agent theory is firstly introduced to discuss the relationship between it and the design of managers’incentive contract, and signaling game theory is recommended to study the signaling function of accounting police choice. Such this offers method support for the research on fair value accounting police choice and the design of managers’incentive contract.
Chapter 5 is the analysis of fair value accounting police choice. In this part, from the clue on rationality, Whether the choice standpoint of Chinese listed companies’fair value accounting police is rational is analyzed, then from the angle of bounded rationality, the choice standpoint of Chinese listed companies’fair value accounting police is discussed by polymorphic population model of evolutionary games theory.
Chapter 6 is the study on the effect of fair value accounting on corporation investment behavior alienation. Based on the review on run limitation of fair value, the effect of fair value accounting on the over- optimism or over- pessimism of irrational managers and investors is discussed, then form the clue on irrational managers and investors, the effect of fair value accounting on corporation investment behavior alienation is analyzed by behavioral corporate finance theory.
Chapter 7 is the study on the effect of fair value accounting on the design of managers’incentive contract. After listed companies introduce Fair Value Accounting Principle,their business earnings are codetermined by managers’effort and the change of fair value, traditional principal-agent model is extended, and the static compare the designs of managers’incentive contract between including sound value flexible loss and profit and not-including them is made, so the effect of sound value flexible loss and profit on the design of managers’incentive contract is analyzed.
Chapter 8 is some policy suggestions. Based on summarizing the inspiration of the positive study conclusions of above every part and proceeded with consummating accounting institutions, securities business’evolution and corporate governance, policy proposals of how to consummate Fair Value Accounting Principle, restrain corporation investment behavior alienation and improve the design of managers’incentive contract are put forward.
Chapter 9 is conclusion. The primary conclusions of the above every part are summarized, my view on the limitation of the thesis and direction studied further in the future are brought forward.
Based on combination of correlative researches, form the aspect of irrationality, established in the practice of fair value, the following contents are the main innovation points in this paper:
①The fair value accounting choices of Chinese real estates listed companies are bounded rationality, and there is remarkable tendency.Which accounting police is chosen ultimately, lies on the compare between the sum of benefit of high quality listed companies and low quality listed companies adopting same accounting police and it of high quality listed companies and low quality listed companies adopting different accounting police.
②After the fair value accounting rule is adopted by listed companies, when the market is expected to rise, irrational managers and investors are more optimistic about corporation’foreground,the probability of over- investment is more, corporation investment behavior alienation is more serious, but when the market is expected to fall, irrational managers and investors are more pessimistic about corporation’foreground, the probability of under- investment is more.
③After the fair value accounting rule is adopted by listed companies, when the mean of sound value flexible loss and profit estimated by managers and it estimated by investors are the same, there are not the difference between the effect of design of managers’incentive contract which include sound value flexible loss and profit and it which does not include sound value flexible loss and profit. When the mean of sound value flexible loss and profit estimated by managers and it estimated by investors are not the same, there are difference between the effect of design of managers’incentive contract which include sound value flexible loss and profit and it which does not include sound value flexible loss and profit.
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