摘要
从本质上看,私募股权基金是以风险企业为“投入品”生产“成熟企业”的企业,私募股权基金的退出则是出售“成熟企业”的行为,因此能否顺利退出所投资的风险企业从而完成“资本的惊险跳跃”不仅关系到前期的投资收益能否实现,而且关系到后期的再投资和再筹资能否顺利进行。近年来学术界对私募股权基金的退出时间和退出方式等问题进行了一定的研究,但总的来看,这些研究无论是从深度还是广度方面都有待进一步拓展。
对退出时间的研究主要是从信息不对称的角度分析私募股权基金退出时间的选择,但是信息不对称理论无法解释所有的退出异常现象,实际上无论是信息不对称还是其他因素都是通过私募股权基金追求最大化的退出收益这一过程影响退出时间选择,因此要解释与私募股权基金退出时间相关的现象,必须建立合理的退出收益函数。
对退出方式的研究则主要是通过比较退出绩效分析不同退出方式的优劣从而为退出方式的现实选择提供建议,然而从现实的选择来看,除由于不同退出方式的刚性要求外,任何一个国家和地区在不同的时期不仅仅表现出对不同退出方式的偏好,更重要的是不同退出方式一直并存。因此退出方式并不存在绝对的优劣,优劣的存在是相对的,私募股权基金应该根据所有风险企业的特征和退出时所处的外部环境相机选择能最大化退出收益的退出方式。
有鉴于此,本文一方面建立了私募股权基金退出的收益函数,在收益函数最大化的条件下,剖析了私募股权基金最优退出时间选择的原理,分析了各种因素对最优退出时间的影响并对部分因素的影响进行了实证；另一方面,本文分析了私募股权基金退出方式的相机选择原理并着重分析了企业价值对退出方式选择的影响。通过理论和实证研究,本文得到如下几点结论：
第一,影响私募股权基金退出时间选择的因素包括私募股权基金及其管理者因素、企业家因素和风险企业因素和外部因素包括私募股权基金行业因素、投资企业行业因素和宏观经济政策的影响。这些影响以资源稀缺和信息不对称两种途径影响退出时间的选择。
第二,实证研究表明,私募股权基金退出过早,年轻私募股权基金退出更早以及技术冲击加速私募股权基金退出的异常现象在我国存在,仅仅从信息不对称的角度无法对这些退出异常现象做全面、有力的解释,必须认识到资源稀缺是私募股权基金选择退出时间的根本性因素。模型分析的结论表明影响资源稀缺的需求方和供给方,即企业家行为和私募股权基金行为都会影响资源稀缺程度,资源越稀缺,私募股权基金倾向较长时间持有质量好的项目,尽快出售质量较差的项目。利率是资本的价格,可以调节私募股权基金产业风险资本的稀缺程度,对私募股权基金产业退出时间结构具有重要影响。
第三,构建了影响退出方式选择的因素体系。这一体系以主观效用为标准,包括退出外收益、退出后企业形态、退出后企业治理、定价方法、定价方式、市场结构、搜寻成本、中介费用、机会成本、市场风险、交易量风险、企业家风险和价格风险十三类因素。在这些因素中,有的因素是外生的与企业状态无关,他们是不同时期和国家不同退出结构的根本原因。而有些因素因企业实际情况不同而不同,这些因素的考虑是内生相机选择的。上市方式的期权激励效应而产生的治理价值是影响最大的内生因素,治理价值与企业规模、企业家的持股比例成正比,这有助于解释上市退出与高收益相关的现象。实证结果也印证了这一理论推理。
第四,宏观经济变量对退出时间和退出方式具有重要影响,其影响机制是通过影响私募股权基金市场资源稀缺的程度和结构产生的。
通过研究本文分别对当前私募股权基金退出加速问题、退出过程中的信息不对称问题、退出方式选择方面以及企业选择退出时间和方式提出了相关的建议。
Private equity funds are enterprise that input risk enterprise to produce mature companies, the exit of private equity funds means to sell their production. Whether the process of selling "mature companies" can execute smoothly to accomplish "the skip of capital" Not only consider the achievement of maximum investment profit of upper stage, but also related to the process of re-investment and refinancing. In recent years, some scholars do some reaches on the timing and way of private equity exit, but, generally speaking, these studies need to be expanded from the depth and breadth. Scholars reached the problem of exit timing from the perspective of asymmetric information, but which can not explain all of the exit homeomorphism, actually, information asymmetry and other factors influence the choice of exit timing through the process of pursuing the maximum return of private equity funds. So if we want to explain all phenomenon of exit timing, we must set up a proper revenue function of exit.
Scholars reached the problem of exit mode by comparing the exit performance of different mode to analysis the advantage and disadvantage of them and give some suggestions to the realistic choice of exit mode. But from the view of reality choice, in addition to the rigid requirements of the different exit, all of the countries and regions during different period not only to show the preferences of different exit ways, more importantly different exit mode coexistence at the same time. Therefore, the advantages and disadvantages are not absolute, but relative. Private equity funds should choose the right exit mode in which can maximize the exit revenue according to the characteristics of all venture firms and the external environment.
Accordingly, on the one hand, we establish revenue function of private equity fund and analysis the principle of mechanism of optimal exit timing, we also analyze the influence of a variety of factors to optimal exit timing and do some empirical analysis; on the other hand, In this paper, we analyze Corresponding selection theory of exit mode of private equity funds and formulate the impact of Enterprise Value on the exit options. Though the theoretical and empirical research, we get some significant conclusions as follows:
Firstly, the factors that influence the choice of exit time include the private equity funds and its manager, the enterpriser, the characteristic of Venture Firm, the business cycle of industry of private equity funds and invested industry and macro economy environment, which influence the exit time from the way of asymmetric information and the scarcity of resource.
Secondly, some experimental evidence show that the phenomenon of early exit of private, equity funds, more early exit of young private equity funds and the accelerating exit for the reason of technology shocks exist not only in American but in china. We can not explain all of these from the respective of information asymmetry, we should the fundamental factor is scarcity of resource. We set up a model to show that the scarcity of resource influence the behavior of private equity funds and the enterpriser. The more scarcity the resources is, the much longer the private equity funds holds the venture project. The interest rate is the price of capital, which regulate the degree of scarcity of venture capital and have a great influence to the exit structure of private equity fund industry.
Thirdly, we constructed a factor system of influencing selection of exit mode. This system considers the subjective utility as a standard, including a side benefit of exit, the situation of enterprise after exit, the Corporate Governance of enterprise after exit, the way of pricing, the mode of pricing, the structure of market, search cost, agent cost, opportunity cost, market risk, liquidity risk, entrepreneurs risk and price risk. Some factors, called exogenous factors, have no relationship to the venture firm, which are the fundamental reasons of different exit structure in different country. Meanwhile some factors, called endogenous factors, change due to the actual situation of enterprises. The governance value which comes from excitation effect of stock option is the most important endogenous factors. The governance value is directly proportional with the enterprise size and Shares held by enterpriser, which is benefit to explain the High-yield-related phenomenon of exit listed exit.The empirical results also confirmed the theoretical reasoning.
Lastly, macroeconomic environment has a great impact on private equity exit, the way of impact is resource scarcity.
Through research, we give some suggestion to the problem of acceleration of exit, asymmetric information in the exit process, exit options as well as the exit timing and options of enterprises.
引文
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