摘要
在新破产法制定以前,我国学者对重整法律制度已经做过大量的研究。但是,以往的研究更多地关注重整制度的基本理论和立法模式,对重整法律实施过程中的问题尚无系统全面的分析。而且以往的研究或者过于纠缠于理念的辨析,或者停留在对国外理论的粗线条概括。我国新破产法第八章一共用二十五条规定重整制度,实际上远远不足以涵盖重整实践中复杂的法律经济问题。我国新破产法实施将近一年,本论文以重整法律制度的实践为背景,研究公司重整中当事人的自治和法律规制之间的原理,为立法者完善立法和司法者解释和适用法律提供洞见,恰逢其实。
公司重整制度涉及的当事人众多,经济利益经常变动,法律关系错综复杂,必须找到一条贯穿重整程序始终的主线。本文抓住契约这条主线,运用法与经济学的基本分析思路,从契约角度研究公司重整。本文的基本命题是:重整制度设计就是对重整中涉及的大量复杂的契约进行法律经济分析,做出符合公平效率的契约安排。立法的原则和规则设计以及法官对法律的解读和适用都围绕这个基本命题展开。为了具体阐述这个命题,本文在主体部分通过以下章节安排进行论述:
第一章,契约的法律经济分析基础。这一章介绍了完备契约和不完备契约的基本理论问题。完备契约不需要规制,不完备契约是法律需要规制的契约。法律通过两种形式规制不完备契约:第一,法律提供备用性规则;第二,法律提供强制性规则。其中,法律提供强制性规则是立法对契约的管制。管制契约类似于管制市场,因为在两种情况下政府都改变了私人交易。法律规制不完备契约首先要规制契约信息的公布,鼓励当事人及时公布相关的谈判信息。怎样在契约当事人以及法官之间合理配置剩余控制权,是契约规制的另一项重要内容。最后,鉴于规制者本身也是不完备的,所以法经济学在肯定公权力规制在经济上和法律上的必要性时,主张尊重意思自治的优先性。法官在具体适用法律的过程中也要遵循这种思路。第一章是全文的铺垫,在此基础上进入对重整中的公司契约的分析。
第二章,重整中的公司契约结构。本章首先对公司契约的基本理论进行梳理,在此基础上构建重整中的公司的基本契约框架。尽管重整状态下的公司在法律上是不同于原来公司的新的法律实体,从法经济学角度分析,重整中的公司仍然是对应于原来公司所留下的财产的一系列契约组成的契约束。公司的实质不过是组成公司的当事人所缔结的不同契约的载体。不同的契约组成契约束,这个契约束的结点就是一个称为“公司”的法律实体。重整中的公司只不过是“公司”这种法律实体在特定时期的特殊形态,其作为契约的本质没有发生变化,只不过结点变成DIP、TIP、或者CIP,相应的契约当事人发生一定的变化,契约内容发生一定变化。总之,公司法的契约分析适用重整中的公司。本章完成理论上的过渡,为以下各章对公司重整进行具体的契约分析奠定基础。
第三章,重整契约的性质。第二章完成了对重整中的公司契约框架的构建,接下来的问题是,重整制度的立法设计应该采用什么模式,完全契约自治式的模式还是完全按照制定法的规制?如果允许自治,司法裁判中应该怎样把握?本章首先追溯重整制度的法律与经济根源,即债务融资。然后在对重整制度的各派观点进行比较分析的基础上,本文把重整法律制度设计的目标归纳为保护重整中的公司财产的价值并使之最大化。具体制度设计原则就是在综合考察成本、收益、激励、效率、和公平这些参数的基础上鼓励当事人在内部化成本收益的基础上进行谈判。对于谈判不能解决的问题或者谈判没有效率的问题,如外部性和机会主义,进行规制。法官也要根据这个原则解读并适用法律。本章通过对重整契约制度的性质进行理论上的概括和总结,为以下各章对重整中的具体契约设计提供了理论和分析方法的支持。
第四章,重整方案的契约分析。重整方案是重整契约分析的集中体现。重整方案本身就是一个庞大的契约束,其主要当事人包括债务人、债权人、股东、重整融资人、雇员、社区等。本章对重整方案中的主要子契约—债务人债权人契约、劳资契约、债务人与其他利益相关者之间的契约做了法律与经济分析。另外,本章以债务人和债权人契约为样本,对重整契约做了简单的谈判博弈分析。重整当事人正是以重整方案谈判为背景,形成不同的契约关系。重整方案的谈判首先必须解决好信息披露,只有充分的信息披露才能保证谈判博弈达成有效率的重整安排。信息披露的重点是重整中的公司的价值评估。所以,本章通过对重整方案谈判的博弈分析,进一步明确重整契约中自治与规制的关系,即必须对信息披露和价值评估等问题进行适度规制,才能保证私人谈判的公平和效率。
第五章,重整融资的契约分析。重整融资是决定重整成败的关键,因而是最重要的重整契约。重整融资制度的本质是通过给予重整融资请求权以优先地位来减轻或消除潜在融资人对重整未来及其请求权回收的不确定性产生的顾虑。作为新的资本的提供者,重整融资人自然成为重整中的公司契约束的一部分。所以,从本质上看,重整融资是当事人重新谈判并重新缔约的结果,法经济学的契约理论完全适用重整融资的分析。只要契约是在公平合理的基础上达成的,就必然会提升重整中的公司的价值。实证研究也表明一般情况下重整融资能够提高重整效率并提升重整中的公司的价值。但是,由于重整融资契约当事人的谈判地位不同,而且融资契约谈判的一方当事人实质上是代表重整中的公司的多方利益关系人的利益进行谈判,所以重整融资契约很容易产生负外部性。所以,有必要对这种契约加以规制,抑制当事人操纵契约谈判并通过融资契约转移价值,损害其他当事人的利益。
第六章,重整中的公司治理的契约分析。这一章是本文的重心。重整中的公司治理的目标是实现重整中的公司的价值最大化,重整中的公司契约设计也围绕这个目的展开。公司治理的核心问题是控制权问题,根据法经济学的基本原理,公司的剩余所有权人掌握公司的控制权,找到公司的剩余所有权人之后再解决代理成本问题,就是公司治理的基本路径。但是,重整中的公司不论在资本结构还是利益关系人等方面都与正常营运的公司表现出很大的不同,使得重整中的公司的控制权问题和代理问题更加复杂。主张债权人控制重整中的公司治理的学者认为应该从动态的角度研究重整中的公司治理。但是反对的观点认为当公司处于重整状态时,很难准确界定剩余所有权人。对重整中的公司的管理层规制同样适用信托义务和商业判断规则,只不过管理层信托义务的对象发生了改变,指向重整中的控制权人。但是重整中的控制权人又不是确定的,而是随着重整中的公司经营状况的变化而变化。另外,由于重整中的公司的投资者的行为可能损害许多原来的担保债权人的利益,重整中的公司控制权人对原来的担保债权人也负有信托义务。最后,管理层或者当前债务人在重整收购活动中也负有信托义务。对这些信托义务需要灵活实用的解释,才能满足重整中的公司价值最大化的现实需求。本章在论述重整中的公司治理的复杂性的基础上,对其具体的治理问题,包括重整融资和市场化条件下重整中的公司治理做了具体的研究。总之,重整中的公司治理是当事人在立法、司法、与市场规制的约束条件下自治谈判的结果。
第七章,预重整的理论与实证分析。这一章既是对预重整的契约分析,也是对本文作者主要观点的照应。预重整制度是契约自治和契约规制制度的完美结合。本章通过对预重整制度进行理论和实证研究,表明完全靠当事人谈判难以实现有效率的公司解困目标,任何整齐划一的契约管制也无法实现有效率的公司解困目标。只有在立法和司法对当事人谈判提供适当的制度支持的条件下最大限度地发挥当事人的意思自治,才能实现重整制度的价值目标。
Before the adoption of the new bankruptcy law, scholars have made extensive researches on reorganization. The past literature focuses more on basic theories and mode of legislation of reorganization instead of comprehensive analysis on the implementation of this legal system. Moreover, the past research either focuses too much on ideology or limits on general introduction of foreign theories. There are twenty five articles in China's new bankruptcy law regulating reorganization which are far from sufficient to cover the legal and economic problems in real practice of reorganization. Since the new bankruptcy law has been in effect for less than one year, it is the right time to bring out this dissertation which, based on the practice of reorganization, studies the principles of the relation between contract autonomy and contract regulation by law, providing insights for the legislature and court.
Reorganization concerns too many interested parties whose economic interests are inconstant and legal relations are complex which demand finding a common thread running through the whole reorganization process. This article grasps contract as the common thread and uses law and economics as basic idea of analysis to explore corporate reorganization from the perspective of contract. The core topic of this thesis is: The design of reorganization is to make legal and economic analysis on the large amount of complex contracts involved in reorganization and make contractual arrangement in conformity with equality and efficiency. The principle and rules of law making and the construction and application of law by the court are based on this core topic. In order to make specific illustration of this topic, this article deploys its body according to the following chapters:
Chapter one is on the basics of legal and economic analysis of contract. This chapter introduces the basic theories of complete and incomplete contract. Complete contract does not need regulation while incomplete contract needs legal regulation. The law regulates incomplete contract in two ways: First, it provides defaults rules; Second, it provides mandatory rules. The mandatory rule constitutes mandatory regulation of contract which is analogous to regulating the market since under both circumstances the government changes private transaction. The first thing to do in regulation of incomplete contract is to regulate the disclosure of contract information to encourage the interested parties to timely disclose relevant bargaining information. Another important factor in contract regulation is to allocate residual control rights among the contract parties and the court. Last but not the least, law and economics maintain to grant contract autonomy priority to contract regulation due to the fact that the regulator is itself incomplete. The court should follow these ideas in construction and implementation of law. The first chapter lays the foundation for the whole article and leads to the analysis of reorganized corporation contracts.
Chapter two is on the contract struture of reorganized corporation. This chapter first describes the basic theories of corporate contract and based on these theories establish basic contract structure for reorganized corporation. Although the reorganized corporation is a legally discrete corporation from the original corporation, it is, from the perspective of law and economic, still a nexus of contracts against a pool of assets left by the original corporation. The legal entity named corporation is no more than a carrier on which a nexus of contracts formed by corporate parties exist. Various contracts form a bundle of contracts and the nexus of this bundle of contracts is a legal entity named "corporation". The reorganized corporation is simply a specific state of the "corporation" in a particular time. Its nature is still a nexus of contract except the nexus is in the form of DIP , TIP, or CIP and the corresponding parties and contents of contracts have changed. In a word, the contractual analysis of corporate law applies reorganized corporation. This chapter is a theoretical transition leading to actual contractual analysis of corporation reorganization.
Chapter three is on the nature of contracts in reorganization. After the establishment of contractual structure of reorganized corporation, the following question is how to mode the legislation of reorganization system. Shall we allow complete contract autonomy or to impose complete contract regulation? If contract autonomy is allowed, how should the court control contract autonomy and regulation? Fisrt, this chapter traces the legal and economic origin of reorganization system, that is, debt financing. Then, after a comparative analysis of the points of different schools, this article concludes that the legal design of reorganization system should be aimed at the protection and maximization of the value of assets. The specific principle is to make a comprehensive valuation of such factors as cost, benefit, incentive, efficiency and equality and encourage the parties to negotiate on the precondition of internalizing costs and benefits. And the issues, such as externality and opportunism, which can not be solved through negotiation or can not achieve efficiency through negotiation should be regulated. The court also follows this principle in constructing and implementing the law. This chapter makes a theoretical summarization of the nature of contracts in reorganization, which provides theoretical and methodological support for the specific contract designs in the following chapters.
Chapter four is on the contractual analysis of the plan of reorganization. The plan of reorganization is the typical reflection of contractual analysis of reorganization. The plan itself is a large bundle of contracts. Its main parties include the debtor, the creditors, equity holders, DIP financers, employees, and the community. This chapter makes legal and economic analysis on the main subcontracts of the plan—the contract between the debtor and the creditors, the contract between employees and employer, the contract between the debtor and other interested parties. In addition, this chapter makes a bargaining contract analysis based on the sample of debtor and creditor bargaining. It is based on the bargaining on the plan of reorganization that the parties form different contract relations. The bargaining on the plan depends on information disclosure. On by adequate information disclosure can the bargaining lead to efficient reorganization arrangement. The major information to be disclosed is the valuation of the reorganized corporation. Therefore, this chapter, through analysis on the bargaining of the plan of reorganization, further clarifies the relation between contract autonomy and regulation in corporation reorganization. We must make appropriate regulation on such issues as information disclosure and valuation in order to ensure equality and efficiency of private contract bargaining.
Chapter five is on the contractual analysis of DIP financing. DIP financing is crucial to the success of reorganization and therefore is the most important reorganization contract. The essence of DIP financing is to alleviate or eliminate the worry of potential financers toward the uncertainty of the future of reorganization and their claims by securing their claims with priority. As provider of new money, the DIP financer becomes a party of the bundle of contracts of the reorganized corporation. So the DIP financing is in nature a process of renegotiation and recontracting. The contract theory of law and economics applies the analysis of DIP financing. As long as the contract is formed on reasonable equality, DIP financing will enhance the value of the reorganized corporation. Empirical study also proves that generally DIP financing improves the efficiency of reorganization and enhance the value of the reorganized corporation. But since the bargaining positions of DIP financer are unequal, and one party of the negotiation is actually representing multiple interests of the reorganized corporation, DIP financing contract tends to create externality. It is therefore necessary to impose regulation on this kind of contract to prevent the parties to damage the interests of other parties by manipulating contract bargaining and transferring value.
Chapter six is on the contractual analysis of the governance of reorganized corporation. This chapter is the center of this dissertation. The governance of reorganized corporation is aimed at maximizing the value of the reorganized corporation and the system of the reorganized corporation contract is designed in accordance with this purpose. The core of corporate governance is control right. The law and economics literature maintains that the residual owner of the corporation enjoys the control right and the basic road map of corporate governance is to find out the residual owner and solve the agency problem. But the reorganized corporation is quite different from the corporation in normal business operation in bother capital structure and stake holders which makes its control rights and agency problems more complicated. The proponents of creditor-control governance of reorganized corporation suggest viewing the governance of reorganized corporation from a dynamic perspective. The opponents suggest that it is very hard to define the residual owner in a reorganized corporation. The regulation of management of reorganized corporation applies fiduciary duty and business judgment rule as well except that the object of fiduciary duty changes and points at the control rights holder in reorganized corporation. The control rights holder in reorganized corporation is not constant but changes with the change of the business situation of the reorganized corporation. In addition, since the act of the investors of the reorganized corporation might damage the interests of the original secured creditors, the control rights holder of the reorganized corporation also bears fiduciary duty to the original secured creditors. Last, the management or the debtor also bears fiduciary duty in the merger and acquisition in reorganization. But these fiduciary duties require flexible and practical interpretation for the purpose of satisfying the actual demand of maximizing the value of the reorganized corporation. This chapter, based on recognizing the complexity of governance of reorganized corporation, also makes specific research on the governance of reorganized corporation under the condition of DIP financing and marketized reorganization. In conclusion, the governance of reorganized corporation is the consequence of contractual bargaining under the restraints of legal and market regulation.
Chapter seven is on the theoretical and empirical analysis of prepackaged reorganization. This chapter is not only an analysis of prepackaged reorganization but also a response to the main idea of this dissertation. The prepackaged reorganization is a perfect combination of contract autonomy and regulation. This chapter, based on the theoretical and empirical analysis of prepackaged reorganization, further proves that it is unlikely to realize efficient solution of corporate distress by solely depending on private contracting or rigid contract regulation. Only by allowing the maximization the contract autonomy under the institutional support of legislature and court can the value and object of reorganization system be realized.
引文
1 参见韩长印:《建立我国破产财团制度刍议》,《法学》1999年第5期,页52-55。
2 See Douglas G.Baird and Thomas H.Jackson,Bargaining After the Fall and the Contours of the Absolute Priority Rule,55 U.Chi.L.Rev.740(1988).
3 David G.Epstein,Bankruptcy and Related Law 6eh Edition,p.131.Law Press · China,Beijing,Aug.,2005.
4 原文是:Bankruptcy Estate.A debtor' s legal and equitable interests in property at the beginning of a bankruptcy case where the property is subject to administration.See Bryan A.Garner,Black" s Law Dictionary,Eighth Edition.P157.
5 原文是:The commencement of a case under section 301,302,or 303 of this title creates an estate.Such estate is comprised of all the following property,wherever located and by whomever held:,See Michael J.Holleran etc.,Bankruptcy Code Manual,2003 Edition,p.581 and p.585,2003West Thomson business.
6 Charles J.Tabb and Ralph Brubaker,Bankrutcy Law:Principles Policies,and Practice,Anderson Publishing Co.2003,p.612.
7 例如,Douglas G.Baird,Revisiting Auctions in Chapter 11,36 J.L.& Econ.633(1993).
8 例如,Lynn M.Lopueki,Strange Visions in a Strange World:A Reply to Professors Bradley and Rosenzweig,91 Mich.L.Rev.79(1992-1993).
9 Frank H.Eastbrook and Daniel R.Fishel,Contractual Freedom in Contract Law:Articles & Comments;The Corporate Contract.89 Colum.L.Rev.1422(1989).
10 Ronald Coase,The Nature of the Firm,4 Economica(1937),pp390-397.
11 以下内容参见张维迎著:《产权·激励与公司治理》,第76-77页,北京,经济科学出版社,2005年7月第一版。
12 See M.C.Jensen and W.H.Meckling,Agency costs and the theory of the firm,Journal of Financial Economics 3(1976)308-309.
13 Frank H.Eastbroo kand Daniel R.Fishel,Contractual Freedom in Contract Law:Articles & Comments;The Corporate Contract.89 Colum.L.Rev.1425-1428(1989).
14 Charles J.Tabb and Ralph Brubaker,Bankruptcy Law:Principles,Policies,and Practice,Anderson Publishing Co.2003,p595.
15 11 U.S.C.§1123(b)(4).
16 Charles J.Tabb and Ralph Brubaker,Bankruptcy Law:Principles,Policies,and Practice,Anderson Publishing Co.2003,p595.
17 尽管文中几个案例当事人是合伙,这并不影响本文研究的可信度。
18 Corporate Bankruptcy:Economic and Legal Perspective,Edited by Jagdeep S.Bhandari and Lawrence A.Weiss Cambridge University Press 1996 pp.ⅹⅰ-ⅹⅱ.
19 贺丹:《破产重整控制权的法律配置》,中国政法大学2006年博士论文,第6页。
20 本文通过历史研究方法揭示了DIP制度的真实含义,参见第二章第二节。
21 本文作者在伊利诺大学学习期间旁听《法律的实证分析》这门课时,托马斯·尤伦教授做过这个阐述。
22 科斯、哈特等著,拉斯·沃因 等编,李风圣主译:《契约经济学》,译者前言,经济科学出版社,2003年10月第二版。
23 Robert Cooter & Thomas Ulen,Law and Economics,4~(th) Edition,Parson Addition Wesley,p.218.
24 See Robert Cooter & Thomas Ulen,Law and Economics,4~(th) Edition,Parson Addition Wesley,p.218.
25 以下内容参见:Jefferey L.Harrison,Law and Economics 2~(nd) Edition,pp84-90,LAW PRESS·CHINA(2004)
26 科斯、哈特等著,拉斯·沃因 等编,李风圣主译:《契约经济学》,译者前言,经济科学出版社,2003年10月第二版。
27 See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner,Strategic Contraetual Inefficiency and the Optiml Choice of Legal Rules,101 Yale L.J.729,730(1992).
28 Russell Korobkin,The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules,83 Connell L.Rev.609.
29 See Robert Cooter & Thomas Ulen,Law and Economics,4~(th) Edition,Parson Addition Wesley,pp.218-224.
30 目前国内学者对英文regulation一般译成“管制”,有时译成“规制”。本文作者在阅读英文文献的过程中发现regulation在不同的语境下含义是不同的,有时是强制性的,有时是非强制性的。在本论文中,本文作者把regulation理解成“规制”,这种规制包括强制性规制和非强制性规制,前者就是一般意义上的管制。我的逻辑是,英文文献提到备用性规则或者赋权型立法模式时也用regulation这个术语,显然这里的regulation是非强制性的,或者说是服务性的。而英文文献提到强制性规则时也用regulation这个术语,这时regulation改变了私人的交易,显然这时regulation是强制性的,例如下文所讲的契约管制(regulate contract)。所以,我理解其他学者所说的管制或者监管应该是一种强制性的规制。有关管制或监管可以参见以下著述:席涛:《美国监管:从命令-控制到成本-收益分析》,中国社会出版社2006年7月;徐晓松:《公司资本监管与中国公司治理》,知识产权出版社,2006年1月。
31 See Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen,Law and Economics,Third Edition Addison-Wesley p.205.
32 See Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen,Law and Economics,Third Edition Addison-Wesley p.206.
33 See Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen,Law and Economics,Third Edition Addison-Wesley pp.84-85.
34 See Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen,Law and Economics,Third Edition Addison-Wesley p.82.
35 See Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen,Law and Economics,Third Edition Addison-Wesley p.85.
36 See Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen,Law and Economics,Third Edition Addison-Wesley pp.88-89.
37 See Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen,Law and Economics,Third Edition Addison-Wesley p89.
38 科斯、哈特等著,拉斯·沃因等编,李风圣主译:《契约经济学》,经济科学出版社,2003年10月第二版,第137页。
39 See Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen,Law and Economics,Third Edition Addison-Wesley p212.
40 See Thomas S.Ulen,The Coasean Firm in Law and Economics,18 J.Corp.L.308-309(1992-1993).
41 See John C.Coffee,Jr.,The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law:Essay on the Judicial Role,89 Colum.L.Rev.1662(1989).
42 See John C.Coffee,Jr.,The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law:Essay on the Judicial Role,89 Colum.L.Rev.1662(1989).
43 815 F.2d 429((?)~(th) Cir.1987).
44 See John C.Coffee,Jr.,The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law:Essay on the Judicial Role,89 Colum.L.Rev.1664(1989).
45 Frank H.Eastbrook and Daniel R.Fishel.Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law:Articles&Comments:The Corporate Contract.89 Colum.L.Rev.1417(1989).
46 有的学者似乎把公司法规则归纳为三类:强制性规则、赋权型规则、和推定性规则(备用性规则)。参见傅穹:《重思公司资本制度》,法律出版社2004年11月,页27-37。本文认为备用性规则包括赋权型规则,因为当事人可以通过约定绕过(contract around)赋权型规则。
47 张维迎:《产权·激励与公司治理》,经济科学出版社,北京,2005年7月第一版,第180页。
48 See Stephen M.Bainbridge,Corporation Law and Economics,Foundation Press 2002,p.200.
49 See Stephen M.Bainbridge,Corporation Law and Economics,Foundation Press 2002,p.204.
50 Frank H.Eastbrook and Daniel R.Fishel,Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law:Articles & Comments:The Corporate Contract,89 Colum.L.Rev.1430(1989).
51 Frank H.Eastbrook and Daniel R.Fishel,Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law:Articles & Comments:The Corporate Contract,89 Colum.L.Rev.1431(1989).
52 但是,如果资本市场不完备,价值发现机制扭曲,则难以通过资本市场评判公司治理,从而造成无效率。
53 Frank H.Eastbrook and Daniel R.Fishel,Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law:Articles & Comments:The Corporate Contract,89 Colum.L.Rev.1430(1989).
54 See Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen,Law and Economic& Third Edition Addison-Wesley pp.150-151
55 Frank H.Eastbrook and Daniel R.Fishel,Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law:Articles & Comments:The Corporate Contract,89 Colum.L.Rev.1436(1989).
56 See Frank H.Eastbrook and Daniel R.Fishel,Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law:Articles &Comments:The Corporate Contract,89 Colum.L.Rev.1436(1989).
57 See Frank H.Eastbrook and Daniel R.Fishel,Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law:Articles &Comments:The Corporate Contract,89 Colum.L.Rev.(1989) pp.1436-1437
58 I.Fisher.Elementary Principles of Economics,New York:Macmillan,1923,P.27.转引自,[南]斯韦托扎乐·平乔维奇著,蒋琳琦 译:《产权经济学-一种关于比较体制的理论》,北京,经济科学出版社,1999年3月第一版,第28页。
59[南]斯韦托扎尔.平乔维奇著,蒋琳琦译:《产权经济学-一种关于比较体制的理论》,北京,经济科学出版社,1999年3月第一版,第29页。
60 参见:[南]斯韦托扎尔·平乔维奇著,蒋琳琦 译:《产权经济学-一种关于比较体制的理论》,北京,经济科学出版社,1999年3月第一版,第62-68页。
61 张维迎:《产权·激励与公司治理》,经济科学出版社,北京,2005年7月第一版,第166页。
62 张维迎:《产权·激励与公司治理》,经济科学出版社,北京,2005年7月第一版,第167页。
63 See John C.Coffee,Jr.,The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law:An Essay on the Judicial Role,89 Colum.L.Rev.1622(1989).
64 See John C.Coffee,Jr.,The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law:An Essay on the Judicial Role,89 Colum.L.Rev.1678(1989).
65 See John C.Coffee,Jr.,The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law:An Essay on the Judicial Role,89 Colum.L.Rev.1621,1622(1989).
66 Mark S.Scarberry et.,Business Reorganization in Bankruptcy Cases and Materials,Second Edition,West Group 2001,p.447.
67 Michael J Nolleran,Donna Larsen Holleran,John D.Macmickle,John B.Corr,Bankruptcy Code Manual,Thomson West,2003 Edition.P.20
70 See Stephen M.Bainbridge,Corporate Law and Economics,Foundation Press 2002,p.72.
71 See id.,p.73.
72 Richard A.Posner,forward in "Corporate bankruptcy:economic and legal perspectives" Edited by Jagdeep S.Bhandari and Lawrence A.Weiss Cambridge University Press 1996.
73 Michae I C.Jensen,Agency costs of free cash flow,corporate finance,and takeovers,reprinted in "Corporate bankruptcy:economic and legal perspectives" Edited by Jagdeep S.Bhandari and Lawrence A.Weiss Cambridge University Press 1996,pp.11-12.
74 Id.,p.13.
75 Douglas G.Baird,A World Without Bankruptcy,50 Law & Contemp.Probs,173,183-84(1987);Thomas H.Jackson,Bankruptcy,Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements,and the Creditors" Bargain,91 Yale L.J.857,858-71(1982);Thomas H.Jackson & Robert E.Scott,On the Nature of Bankruptcy:An Essay on Bankruptcy Sharing and the Creditors" Bargain,75 Va.L.Rev.155,178(1989).
76 Douglas G.Baird & Thomas H.Jackson,Corporate Reorganizations and the Treatment of Diverse Ownership Interests:A Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy,51 U.Chi.L.Rev.97,101-09;Thomas H.Jackson & Robert E.Scott,On the Nature of Bankruptcy:An Essay on Bankruptcy Sharing and the Creditors" Bargain,75 Va.L.Rev.155,164-69(1989).
77 See Susan Block-Lieb,The Logic and Limits of Contract Bankruptcy,2001 U.Ill.L.Rev.503,511.
78 James W.Bowers,Groping and Coping in the Shadow of Murphy" s Law:Bankruptcy Theory and the Elementary Economics of Failure,88 Mich.L.Rev.2097,2104(1990).
79 James W.Bowers,Groping and Coping in the Shadow of Murphy" s Law:Bankruptcy Theory and the Elementary Economics of Failure,88 Mich.L.Rev.2097,2124,2140,41(1990).
80 Robert K.Rasmussen,An Essay on Optimal Bankruptcy Rules and Social Justice,1994 U.Ill.L.Rev.503.
81 Adler,Finance' s Theoretical Divide and the Proper Role of Insolvency Rules,67 S.Cal.L.Rev.1118,19(1994).
82 Alan Schwartz,Bankruptcy Contracting Reviewed,109 Yale L.J.343(1999-2000).
83 Alan Schwartz,Bankruptcy Contracting Reviewed,109 Yale L.J.346,347(1999-2000).
84 Lopucki教授曾经在发给笔者的电子邮件中阐述此观点,并多次告诫笔者在重整研究中慎用法经济学。当然,Thomas Ulen和另外一些法经济学者承认Lopucki的一些观点是正确的,但指出他所反对的法经济学破产法学者恰恰是过于相信市场的学者。
85 Lopucki,Contract Bankruptcy:A Reply to Alan Schwartz,109 Yale L.J.317(1999-2000).
86 Id.at p.325.
87 Id.at p.326.
88 Id.at pp.327-328.
89 Id.at pp.329-331.
90 Lopucki,A Team Production Theory of Bankrputcy Reorganization,57 Vand.L.Rev.749.(2004)
91 Margaret M.Blair and Lynn A.Stout,A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law,85 Va.L.Rev.247(1999).
92 Lopucki,A Team Production Theory of Bankrputcy Reorganization,57 Vand.L.Rev.754.(2004).
93 Lopucki,A Team Production Theory of Bankrputcy Reorganization,57 Vand.L.Rev.778.(2004).
94 Elizabeth Warren,Bankruptcy Policymaking in an Imperfect World,92 Mich.L.Rev.356.(1993).
95 Elizabeth Warren,Bankruptcy Policymaking in an Imperfect World,92 Mich.L.Rev.354-355.(1993).
96 See Susan Block-Lieb,The Logic and Limits of Contract Bankruptcy,2001 U.Ill.L.Rev.503,526.
97 See Susan Block-Lieb,The Logic and Limits of Contract Bankruptcy 2001 U.Ill.L.Rev.503,526.
98 See Susan Block-Lieb,The Logic and Limits of Contract Bankruptcy,2001 U.Ill.L.Rev.503,536.
99 Alan Schwartz,A Contract Theory Approach to Business Bankruptcy,107 Yale L.J.1838(1998).
100 Steven Schwarcz,Rethinking Freedom of Contract:A Bankruptcy Paradigm,77 Tex.L.Rev.515(1999).
101 Alan Schwartz,A Contract Theory Approach to Business Bankruptcy,107 Yale L.J.1810(1998).
102 Steven Schwarcz,The Easy Case fot the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy,47 Duke L.J.432(1997).
103 Adler,Finance" s Theoretical Divide and the Proper Role of Insolvency Rules,67 S.Cal.L.Rev.1118-19,1832(1994).
104 See Susan Block-Lieb,The Logic and Limits of Contract Bankruptcy,2001 U.Ill.L.Rev.503,528 -29.
105 Alan Schwartz,Bankruptcy Contracting Reviewed,109 Yale L.J.343(1999).
106 Robert K.Rasmussen,The Ex Ante Effects of Bankruptcy Reform on Investment Incentives,72Wash.U.L.Q.1177(1994).
107 See Barry E.Adler,A Theory of Cozporate Insolvency,72 N.Y.U.L.Rev.375-80(1997).
108 See Barry E.Adler,A Theory of Corporate Insolveney,72 N.Y.U.L.Rev.345(1997).
109 Robert K.Rasmussen,The Ex Ante Effects of Bankruptcy Reform on Investment Incentives,72Wash.U.L.Q.1163(1994).
110 See Elizabeth Warren and Jay Westbrook and Pauline J.Westbrook,The Law of Debtors and Creditors,third edition Little,Brown & Company(Company)Limited P.663.
111 Robert K.Rasmussen and David A.Skeel,The Economic Analysis of Corporate Bankrulptcy Law,3 Am.Rankr Inst.L.Rev 85.
112[美]斯蒂芬A.罗斯、伦道夫W.威斯特菲尔德、杰弗利F.杰富著,吴世农等译:《公司理财》,第六版,机械工业出版社2005年3月第一版,第271页。
113[美]斯蒂芬A.罗斯、伦道夫W.威斯特菲尔德、杰弗利F.杰富著,吴世农等译:《公司理财》,第六版,机械工业出版社2005年3月第一版,第304页。
114 对于处在困境中的公司的管理层的信托义务,存在不同的理论和判例实践。有的观点主张管理层仅对债权人负信托义务,有的主张对债权人和股东负信托义务。本文采纳后一种观点。详见第六章,重整中的公司治理。
118 张维迎:《信息、信任与法律》,北京,生活·读书·新知三联书店,2006年9月第二版,第83页。
119 See Amitai Aviram,A Note on Economic Theories of The Firm,Florida State University College of Law Law and Economics Working Paper No.06-31.
120 参见第六章重整中的公司治理的相关内容。
121 11 U.S.C.§364(3)(4),参见第六章相关内容。
122 See Steven L.Schwarcz,Rethinking Freedom of Contract:A Bankruptcy Paradigm,77 Tex.L.Rev.563,579(1999).
123 See Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen,Law,and Economics,Third Edition Addison-Wesley pp.193-194.
124 See Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen,Law and Economics,Third Edition Addison-Wesley pp.194-197.
125 See Thomas H.Jackson and Robert E Scott,An Essay o Bankruptcy Sharing and the Creditors" Bargain,75 Va.L.Ray.191-192(1989)
126 R.S.Pinellas Motel Partnership v.Ramada Inns,Inc.(In re R.S.Pinellas Motel Partnership),2Bankr.113(Bankr.M.D.Fla.1979).See Thomas H.Jackson and Robert E Scott,An Essay on Bankruptcy Sharing and the Creditors" Bargain,75 Va.L.Rev.185,186(1989).
127 Thomas H.Jackson and Robert E Scott,An Essay on Bankruptcy Sharing and the Creditors' Bargain,75 Va.L.Rev.186(1989).
128 中国新破产法并没有债权人和投资人直接控制重整做出规定。参见70、71、73、78条。
129 See Robert K.Rasmussen,An Essay on Optimal Bankruptcy Rules and Social Justice,U Ill.L.Rev.1,4(1994).
130 See Robert K.Rasmussen,An Essay on Optimal Bankruptcy Rules and Social Justice,U.Ill.L.Rev.19,20(1994).
131 See Robert K.Rasmussen,An Essay on Optimal Bankruptcy Rules and Social Justice,U Ill.L.Rev.31,32(1994).
132 Mark S.Scarberry et.,Business Reorganization in Bankruptcy Cases and Materials,Second Edition,West Group 2001,pp.3-4.
133 Mark S.Scarberry et.,Business Reorganization in Bankruptcy Cases and Materials,Second Edition,West Group 2001,pp.1-2.
134 曼昆著,桑小民 译,《经济学原理》第三版,机械工业出版社2003年8月第一版,第172页。
135 见前引曼昆书第174页。
136 参见:张维迎著:《信息、信任与法律》生活·读书·新知三联书店,2006年9月版,第83页。
137 黄文艺:《外部性、正当性、有效性》,载于前引张维迎著书第286页。
138 同注5,页187。
139 See Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen,Law and Economics,Third Edition Addison-Wesley pp.150-151
140 Amitai Aviram,A Note on Economic Theories of The Firm,Florida State University College of Law:Law And Economics Working Paper No.06-21.
141 See Russell Korobkin,The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules,83 Cornell L.Rev..613.614(1998).
142 这是一个被法经济学教材广泛引用的经典案例,基本案情是一位磨坊主作为货主把损坏的曲柄轴交给一位承运人,由后者运送曲柄轴给制造商进行修理。
143 See Russell Korobkin,The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules,83 Cornell L.Rev.,618,619(1998).
144 Russell Korobkin,The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules,83 Cornell L.Rev.670(1998).
145 Robert K.Rasmussen,Debtor's Choice:A Menu Approach to Corporate Bankruptcy,71Tex.L.Re.62(1992).
146 Robert K.Rasmussen,Debtor's Choice:A Menu Approach to Corporate Bankruptcy,71Tex.L.Re.63(1992).
147 See Robert K.Rasmussen,Debtor' s Choice:A Menu Approach to Corporate Bankruptcy,71 Tex,L.Re,55,56(1992),
148 这里的充分保护是指充分保护条款本身,即不论当事人是否明示,法律必须对债权人进行充分保护,也不允许当事人通过约定放弃。上文提到的充分保护是指充分保护的具体标准。两者并不矛盾,即首先强制性充分保护,然后用备用性规则规定充分保护的具体标准和内容。由于具体标准根据具体个案确定,故为定做的备用性规则(tailored default)。
149 See Thomas H.Jackson,Bankruptcy,Non-bankruptcy Entitlements,and the Creditors" Bergain,91 Yale L.J.861-871(1982).
150 按照现代重整观念,整体出售也足通过第11章程序,也属于广义的重整。
151 例如:11 U.S.C.§1121,中国破产法第第70条。
152 In re Northeast Dairy Coop.Fed' n,Inc.,73 B.R.239(Bankr.N.D.N.Y.1987).
153 In re Central Medical Center,Inc.,122 B.R.568(Bankr.E.D.Mo.1990).
154 1129(a)(11).
155 Mark S.Scarberry et.,Business Reorganization in Bankruptcy Cases and Materials,Second Edition,West Group 2001,pp754-755.
156 In re Nite Lite Inns United States Bankruptcy Court,S.D.Cal.,1982 17 B.R.367.
157 Mark S.Scarberry et.,Business Reorganization in Bankruptcv Cases and Materials,Second Edition,West Group 2001,p.748-749.
158 Douglas G.Baird and Thomas H.Jackson,Bargaining After the Fall and the Contours of the Absolute Priority Rule,55 U.Chi.L.Rev.738(1988).
159 Charles J.Tabb and Ralph Brubaker,Bankruptcy Law Principles,Policies,and Practice,Anderson Publishing Co.,2003,p.658.
160 Charles J.Tabb and Ralph Brubaker,Bankruptcy Law Principles,Policies,and Practice,Anderson Publishing Co.,2003,p.659.
161 See Elizabeth Warren and Jay Westbrook and Pauline J.Westbrook The Law of Debtors and Creditors third edition Little,Brown & Company(Company)Limited p714.
162 以下两个案例参见Charles J.Tabb and Ralph Brubaker,Bankruptcy Law Principles,Policies,and Practice,Anderson Publishing Co.,2003,pp.663-671.
163 See Elizabeth Warren and Jay Westbrook and Pauline J.Westbrook The Law of Debtors and Creditors third edition Little,Brown & Company(Company)Limited p725.
164 See Douglas G.Baird and Thomas H.Jackson,Bargaining After the Fall and the Contours of the Absolute Priority Rule,55 U.Chi.L.Rev.741(1988)
165 See Elizabeth Warren and Jay Westbrook and Pauline J.Westbrook The Law of Debtors and Creditors third edition Little,Brown & Company(Company)Limited p727.
166 See Elizabeth Warren and Jay Westbrook and Pauline J.Westbrook The Law of Debtors and Creditors third edition Little,Brown & Company(Company) Limited pp.704-705.
167 90 B.R.808(Bankr.W.D.Tex.1988).
168 See Elizabeth Warren and Jay Westbrook and Pauline J.Westbrook The Law of Debtors and Creditors third edition Little,Brown & Company(Company) Limited P.705.
169 510(b)条规定:由于债务人或其联营公司撤销(rescission)购买或出售证券,因此而受到损害产生的债权,或者根据502条所承认的对这种债权的补偿(reimbursement)或分担(contribution)所产生的债权,其地位从属于所有高于或等同于该证券代表的权益,除非如果该证券是普通股票,该债权于普通股票享受同等优先权。
170 See Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen,Law and Economics,Third Edition Addison-Wesley p182.
171 See Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen,Law and Economics,Third Edition Addison-Wesley pp.75-77.
174 See Elizabeth Warren and Jay Westbrook and Pauline J.Westbrook The Law of Debtors and Creditors,third edition Little,Broom & Company(Company)Limited P.474.
175 See Douglas G.Baird and Thomas H.Jackson,Bargaining After the Fall and the Contours of the Absolute Priority Rule,55 U.Chi.L.Rev.752-754(1988).
176(150×50%)+(100×50%)=125.
177(50×50%)+(0×50%)=25.
178[(200--150--40)×50%]+(0×50%)=25.
179 See Douglas G.Baird and Thomas H.Jackson,Bargaining After the Fall and the Contours of the Absolute Priority Rule,55 U.Chi.L.Rev.767-768(1988).
180 J.Ronald Trost,Corporate Bankruptcy Reorganizations:For the Benefit of Creditors or Stockholders?,21 UCLA L.REV.540(1973).
181 Mark S.Scarberry et.,Business Reorganization in Bankruptcy Cases and Materials,Second Edition,West Group 2001,p.647.
182 Mark S.Scarberry et.,Business Reorganization in Bankruptcy Cases and Materials,Second Edition,West Group 2001,pp647-648.
183 Mark S.Scarberry et.,Business Reorganization in Bankruptcy Cases and Materials,Second Edition,West Group 2001,pp649-650,662-663,666,667.
184 伊利诺大学香槟分校的Robert Lawless教授持此观点,本文作肯在该校学习期间与该教授曾对此做过交流。
185 See 11 U.S.C.§1125(2005):(a) In this section--(1) "adequate information" means information of a kind,and in sufficient detail,as far as is reasonably practicable in light of the nature and history of the debtor and the condition of the debtor' s books and records,including a discussion of the potential material Federal tax consequences of the plan to the debtor,any successor to the debtor,and a hypothetical investor typical of the holders of claims or interests in the case,that would enable such a hypothetical investor of the relevant class to make an informed judgment about the plan,but adequate information need not include such information about any other possible or proposed plan and in determining whether a disclosure statement provides adequate information,the court shall consider the complexity of the case,the benefit of additional information to creditors and other parties in interest,and the cost of providing additional information.
186 See Elizabeth Warren and Jay Westbrook and Pauline J.Westbrook The Law of Debtors and Creditors,third edition Little,Brown & Company(Company) Limited P.697.
187 See Elizabeth Warren and Jay Westbrook and Pauline J.Westbrook The Law of Debtors and Creditors,third edition Little,Brown & Company(Company) Limitedpp.697-702.
188 当事人称之为所有人/营运人 制度(owner/operator system)。
189 See Elizabeth Warren and Jay Westbrook and Pauline J.Westbrook,The Law of Debtors and Creditors,third edition Little,Brown & Company(Company) Limited P.484.
190 U.S.C.§362(a)(7).
191 See Elizabeth Warren and Jay Westbrook and Pauline J.Westbrook,The Law of Debtors and Creditors,third edition Little,Brown & Company(Company) Limited P.480-481.
192 See Elizabeth Warren and Jay Westbrook and Pauline J.Westbrook,The Law of Debtors and Creditors,third edition Little,Brown & Company(Company) Limited pp.498-499.
193 破产法对对待履行契约和未到期租赁契约的规定是相同的,具体分析方法基本上也是一致的。所以,本文对待履行契约的分析也适用末到期租赁契约,反之亦然。
194 Vern Countryman,Executory Contract in Bankruptcy,57 Minn.L.Rev.439(1973).
195 Charles J.Tabb and Ralph Brubaker,Bankruptcy Law Principles,Policies,and Practice,Anderson Publishing Co.,2003.p.309.
196 Charles J.Tabband Ralph Brubaker,Bankruptcy Law Principles,Policie,and Practice Anderson Publishing Co.,2003.pp.316-317.
197 See Elizabeth Warren and Jay Westbrook and Pauline J.Westbrook,The Law of Debtors and Creditors,third edition Little,Brown & Company(Company) Limited p619.
198 See Elizabeth Warren and Jay Westbrook and Pauline J.Westbrook,The Law of Debtors and Creditors,third edition Little,Broom & Company(Company) Limited pp.593-595.
199 参见(美)大卫·G·爱泼斯坦著:《破产及相关法律》,(英文版)法律出版社2005年8月第一版。页431-432。
200 See 468 F.3d 448-456(7~(th) Cir.2006).
201 11 U.S.C.A.§1113(b)(1):The trustee,after notice and hearing,may use,sell,or lease,other than in the ordinary course of business,property of estate.
202 In re UAL Corp.(URPBPA),443 F.3d 565(7~(th) Cir.2006).
203 443 F.3d 572-573.
204 443 F.3d 573-574.
205[美]大卫·G·爱泼斯坦著:《破产及相关法律》,(英文版)法律出版社2005年8月第一版。页332-333。
206 David A.Skeel,Jr.,The Past,Present and Future of Debtor-in-Possession Financing,25 Cardozo L.Rev.1911(2003-2004).
207 99 U.S.252(1878),id at 1911.
208 Benjamin Wham,Preference in Railroad Receiverships,23 Ill.L.Rev.141,147(1928).
212 Carlos D.Ramirez,Did J.P.Morgen" s Men Add Liquidity? Corporate Investment,Cash Flow,and Financial Structure at the Turn of the Twentieth Century,50 J.Fin.661,664(1995)
213 David A.Skeel,Jr.,The Past,Present and Future of Debtor-in-Possession Financing,25 Cardozo L.Rev.1910(2003-2004).
214 See id.at 1911.
215 See S.Dahiya et al,Detor-in-possession financing and bankruptcy resolution:Empirical evidence,Journal of Financial Economics 69(2003),pp.265-66.
216 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk and Jesse M.Fried,The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy,105 Yale.L.J.891-895(1995-196).
220 See Steven L.Schwarcz,The Easy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy,47 Duke L.J.425-26(1997-98).
221 See id.,p.446-47.
222 See id.,p.447.
223 See id.,p.430.
224 See id.,pp.473-74.
225 See S.Dahiya et al,Detor-in-possession financing and bankruptcy resolution:Empirical evidence,Journal of Financial Economics 69(2003),pp.270-73.
227 See Steven L.Schwarcz,The Easy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy,47 Duke L.J.467-68(1997-98).
228 See Stephen M.Bainfridge,Corporate Law and Economics,Foundation Press,2002,pp.113-114.
229 See Steven L.Schwarcz,The Easy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy,47 Duke L.J.425(1997-98),pp.470-71.
230 Richard A.Posner,Economic Analysis of Law 4~(th) Edition,China Social Science Publishing House Chengcheng Books Ltd.,pp.400-401.
231 See Jay M.Goffman et al,First Day Motions and Orders in Large Chapter 11 Cases,Journal of Bankruptcy Law and Practice 2003,pp.59,60,64.
232 Thomas J.Salerno and Craig D.Hansen,A Prepackaged Bankruptcy Strategy,The Journal of Business Strategy(1991),p.37.
233 Id.
234 George G.Triantis,A Theory of the Regulation of Debtor-in-Possession Financing,46 Vand.L.Rev.902(1993).
235 See David A.Skeel,Jr.,The Past,Present,and Future of Debtor-in-Possession Financing,25Cardozo L.Rev,1923-24(2003-2004).
236 参见11U.S.C.1121,《中华人民共和国企业破产法》第70条、73条。
237 See David A.Skeel,Jr.,The Past,Present,and Puture of Debtor-in-Possession Financing,25Cardozo L.Rev.1925(2003-2004).
238 See Sris Chatterjee et al,"Debtor-in-Possession Financing",Journal of Banking and Finance,28(2004),p.3109.
239 See Stephen M.Bainbridge,Corporate Law and Economics,Foundation Press 2002,p.27.
240 See id.,p.28.
241 See Sandeep Dahiya,Kose John Puri and Gabriel Ramirez,Debtor-in-possession financing and bankruptcy resolution:Empirical evidence,Journal of Financial Economics 69(2003),p.263.
242 See Jay M.Goffman et al,First Day Motions and Orders in Large Chapter 11 Cases,Journal of Bankruptcy Law and Practice 2003,pp.59,60,64.
243 Robert E.Scott and George G.Triantis,Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of Contract Design,Case Western Reserve Law Reserve,pp.190-91.
244 Id.p.191.
245 See Stephen M.Bainbridge,Corporate Law and Economics,Foundation Press 2002,p.29.
246 John O.Ayer et al,Obtaining DIP Financing and UsingCash Collateral,American Bankruptcy Institute Journal,September 2004,p.67.
250 See,Black" s Law Dictionary,Eighth Edition,p278:Bargained-for security that in addition to protecting a creditor' s post-petition extension of credit protects the creditor' s pre petition unsecured claims,which,as a result of that security,obtain priority over other creditors'pre-petition unsecured claims.
251 See Elizabeth Warren and Jay Westbrook and Pauline J.Westbrook The Law of Debtors and Creditors third edition Little,Brown & Company(Company) Limited pp534-538.
252 See Sandeep Dahiya et al,Debtor-in-possession financing and bankruptcy resolution." Empirical evidence,Journal of Financial Economics 69(2003),pp.276-77
253 Robert J.Keach,Stalking Horse Lenders and Good Faith,American Bankruptcy Institute Journal,June 2004,p.28.
254 案例转引自Robert J.Keach文第29-58页。
255 In re Simon Transp.Serv.Inc.,292 B.R.207,216(Bankr.D.Utah 2003).
256 In re Independent & Gas & Oil Producers Inc.,2003 WL 22464027(10~(th) Cir.).
258 See Douglas G.Baird,A World Without Bankruptcy,in Corporate Bankruptcy:Economic and Legal Perspectives,edited by Jagdeep S.Bhandari and Lawrence A.Weiss,Cambridge University Press 1996,pp.31-32.
259 See Robert K.Rasmussen,The Search for Hercules:Residual Owners,Directors,and Corporate Governance in Chapter 11,82 Wash.U.L.Q.1445(2004).
260 See Jay Lawrence Westbrook,The Control of Wealth in Bankruptcy,82 Tex.L.Rev.795,852(2004).
261 David A.Skeel,Jr.,Creditors" Ball:The "New" New Corporate 6overnance in Chapter 11,152U.Pa.L.Rev.920(2003-2004).
262 Id.,p.921.
263 Hamid,Tavakolian,Bankruptcy:An Emerging Corporate Strategy,Sam Advanced Management Journal,Spring 1995,P.18
264 See Thomas S.Ulen,The Coasean Firm in Law and Economics,18 J.Corp.L.301 1992-1993,p.311
265 See Id.,pp.312-313.
266 Rutheford B.Campbell,Jr.and Christopher W.Frost,Managers,Fiduciary Duties in Financially Distressed Corporations:Chaos in Delaware(and Elsewhere),The Journal of Corporation Law,Volume 32,Number 3,Spring 2007,p.492.
267 Id.,p.497.
268 See Stephen M.Bainbridge,Corporation Law and Economics,Foundation Press,2002,p.286.
269 Id.,p.311.
270 Id.,pp.327-328.
271 Id.,pp.269-270.
272 Id.,pp.335-336.
273 这是Lopucki教授在发给本文作者的电子邮件中表述的观点。
274 David A.Skeel.Jr.,Creditors" Ball:The "New" New Corporate Governance in Chapter 11,152U.Pa.L.Rev.918(2003-2004).
275 Robert K.Rasmussen,The Search for Hercules:Residual Owners,Directors,and Corporate Governance in Chapter 11,82 Wash.U.L.Q.1453(2004)
276 Douglas G.Baird and Thomas H.Jackson,Bargaining After the Fall and the Contours of the Absolute Priority Rule,55 U.Chi.L.Rev.762.(1988)
277 Id.,at 766.
278 Douglas G.Baird and Robert K.Rasmussen,Chapter 11 at Twilight,56 Stan.L.Rev.696(2003)
279 David Arthur Skeel,Jr.,The Nature and Effect of Corporate Voting in Chapter 11 Reorganization Cases,78 Va.L.Rev.,480,461(1992).
280 Robert K.Rasmussen,The Search For Hercules:Resldual Owners,Directors,and Corporate Governance in Chapter 11,Wash.U.L.Q.1447(2004).
281 Robert K.Rasmussen,The Search For Hercules:Residual Owners,Directors,and Corporate Governance in Chapter 11,Wash.U.L.Q.1463-1464(2004).
281 Douglas G.Baird,The New Face of Chapter 11,12 Am.Bankr.Inst.L Rev.,pp93-94.
283 David A.Skeel,Jr.,The Past,Present and Future of Debtor-in-Possession Financing,25 Cardozo L.Rev.,1918.(2003-2004).
284 David A.Skeel,Jr.,The Past,Present and Future of Debtor-in-Possession Financing,25 Cardozo L.Rev.1919,1920(2003-2004).
285 Lynn M.Lopucki,The Myth of The Residual Owner:An Empirical Study,82 Wash.U.L.Q.1342(2004).
286 George G.Triantis & Ronald J.Daniels,The Role of Debt in Interactive Corporate Governance,83 CAL.L.REV.1100(1995),p..
287 Lynn M.Lopucki,The Myth of 7he Residual Owner:An Empirical Study,82 Wash.U.L.Q.1343-1344(2004).
288 Id.,pp.1344-45.
289 以下内容参见Lynn M.Lopucki,The Myth of The Residual Owner:An Empirical Study,82 Wash.U.L.Q.1350-1361(2004).
290 471 U.S.343,355(1985).
291 160 B.R.792,797(Bankr.S.D.Tex.1993).
292 82 F.Supp 2d 279,293(D.Del.2000).
293 233 B.R.726,734(Bankr.W.D.Ky.1998)
294 William A.Klein and John C.Coffee.Jr.,Business Organization and Finance-Legal and Economic Principles,Tenth Edition,Foundation Press,2007,pp.279-280.
295 William A.Klein and John C.Coffee.Jr.,Business Organization and Finance-Legal and Economic Principles,Tenth Edition,Foundation Press,2007,pp.255-258.
296 Rutheford B.Campbell,Jr.and Christopher W.Frost,Managers' Fiduciary Duties in Financially Distressed Corporations:Chaos in Delaware(and Elsewhere),The Journal of Corporation Law,Vol.32,Num.3,Spring 2007,p.509.
297 United States Bankruptcy Court,S.D.Ohio,1983 37 B.R.3
301 See David A.Skeel.Jr.,Creditors" Ball:The "New" New Corporate Governance in Chapter 11,152 U.Pa.L.Rev.917,920-22(2003-2004).
302 Id.,at 1916.
303 David A.Skeel,Jr.,The Past,Present and Future of Debtor-in-Possession Financing,25 Cardozo L.Rev.1905,1917(2003-2004).
304 David A.Skeel,Jr.,The Past,Present and Future of Debtor-in-Possession Finaneing,25 Cardozo L.Rev.1905,1918(2003-2004).
305 David A.Skee;,Jr.,The Past,Present and Future of Debtor-in-Possession Financing,25 Cardozo L.Rev.1905,1917(2003-2004).
306 David A.Skeel,Jr.,The Past,Present and Future of Debtor-in-Possession Financing,25 Cardozo L.Rev.1905,1918(2003-2004).
307 Id.
308 Douglas G.Baird,The New,Face of Chapter 11,12 Am.Bankr.Inst.L.Rev.69,81 2004.
309 George G.Triantis,A Theory of the Regulation of Debtor-in-Possession Financing,46 Vand.L.Rev.911(1993).
310 参见http://www.kccllc.net/accesscardio.访问时间2007年12月26日,2008年3月3日
311 See David A.Skeel.Jr.,Creditors' Ball:The "New" New Corporate Governance in Chapter 11,152 U.Pa.L.Rev.917,935(2003-2004).
312 Id.,at,93?.
313 George G.Triantis,A Theoty of the Regulation of Debtor-in-Possession Financing,46 Vand.L.Rev.909(1993).
314 George G.Triantis,A Theory of the Regulation of Debtor-in-Possession Financing,46 Vand.L.Rev.920-23(1993).
315 这里项目是一个广义的概念。包括所有为了维持公司继续营运投入的资金,如支付供应商、公共设施、以及雇员。
316 投资人知道投资结果的概率和或然收益,但法院无法核实这些信息。
317 对于公司A,假定Q大于140;对于公司B,假定Q大于120。
318 总清算资产价值90元,总负债200元,DIP融资债权100元,所以DIP融资人获得45元的清算分配.
119 原作者的结论正好相反,显然有误,本文作者予以更改。
320 原作者的结论正好相反,显然有误,本文作者予以更改。
321 原文认为是风险高的项目,本文作者予以更改。
322 George G.Triantis,A Theory of the Regulation of Debtor-in-Possession Financing,46 Vand.L.Rev.924-25(1993).
323 George G.Triantis,A Theory of the Begulation of Debtor-in-Possession Financing,46 Vand.L.Rev.923-24(1993).
324 Douglas G.Baird,The New Face of Chapter 11,12 Am.Bankr.Inst.L.Rev.69,74,75(2004)
325 Chaim J.Fortgang and Thomas Moers Mayer,Trading Claims and Taking Control of Corporations in Chapter11,12 Cardozo,L.Rev.1,2(1990-1991).
326 See Donald Lee Rome,Business Workout Manual,Second Edition,West Group 2001,S25-4.
327 See Donald Lee Rome,Business Workout Manual,Second Edition,West Group 2001,S25-4,5.
328 In re Missionary Baptist Found of Am.,Inc.667 F.2d 1244(5~(th) Cir.1982).
329 Lorraine Castle Apartments,149 F.2d at 57 58.1d.at page13-14.
330 See Donald Lee Rome,Business Workout Manual,Second Edition,West Group 2001,S25-2.
331 Tung,Confirmation and Claims Trading,90 Nw.U.L.Rev.1684(1996).
332 Id.at page14.
333 See William Beranek and Steven L.Johns,The Emerging Market for Trade Claims of Bankruptcy Firms,Financial Management,Wol.23,No.2,Summer 1994,p.76.
334 Chaim J.Fortgang and Thomas Moers Mayer,Trading Claims and Taking Control of Corporations in Chapter11,12 Cardozo,L.Rev.1,4(1990-1991).
335 Id.
336 See Donald Lee Rome,Business Workout Manual,Second Edition,West Group 2001,S25-1,2.
337 Id.,at p.77.
338 Id.,at p.79.
339 See Donald Lee Rome,Business Workout Manual,Second Edition,West Group 2001,S25-2.
340 Id.,at p.57.
341 Id.,at p.57-58.
342 Robert K.Rasmussen and David A.Skeel.Jr.,Economic analysis of bankruptcy law,3 Am.Bankr.Inst.L.Rev.85,102(1995).
343 58 Bankr.1(Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1985)
344 118 B.R.282(Bankr.W.D.Pa 1990).
345 See Donald Lee Rome,Business Workout Manual,Second Edition,West Group 2001,S25-7,8.
346 See Donald Lee Rome,Business Workout Manual,Second Edition,West Group 2001,S2S-8.
347 100B.R.241(Bankr.W.D.Pa.1988).
348 See Donald Lee Rome,Business Workout Manual,Second Edition,West Group 2001,S25-9.
349 See Donald Lee Rome,Business Workout Manual,Second Edition,West Group 2001,S25-9.
350 Chaim J.Fortgang and Thomas Moers Mayer,Trading Claims and Taking Control of Corporations in Chapter11,12 Cardozo,L.Rev.1,53(1990-1991).
351 81 Bankr.274,279(D.Del.1988).
352 Robert K.Rasmussen and David A.Skeel.Jr.,Economic analysis of bankruptcy law,3 Am.Bankr.Inst.L.Rev.85,101-102(1995).
353 See Donald Lee Rome,Business Workout Manual,Second Edition,West group 2001,S25-9,10.
354 Chaim J.Fortgang and Thomas Moers Mayer,Trading Claims and Taking Control of Corporations in Chapter11,12 Cardozo,L.Rev.1,76-79(1990-1991).
355 Chaim J.Fortgang and Thomas Moers Mayer,Trading Claims and Taking Control of Corporations in Chapter11,12 Cardozo,L.Rev.1,56(1990-1991).
356 See Donald Lee Rome,Business Workout kanual,Second Edition,West Group 2001,S25-11.
357 Lynn M.Lopucki and William C.Whitford,Patterns in The Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large,Publicly Held Companies,78 Cornel1,L.Rev.597,599(1993).
358 11 U.S.C.§ 1123(a)(5)(D)(plan can provide for sale of all or any part of debtor' s assets).
359 Robert K.Rasmussen and David A.Skeel.Jr.,Economic analysis of bankruptcy Jaw,3 Am.Bankr.Inst.L.Ray.85,105(1995).
360 这是理论分析,但是有的学者用实证分析得到相反的结论。参见:Lynn M.Lopucki,The Debtor in Full Control-Systems Failure under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code?.57 Am.Bankr.L.J.247,266-69(1983).不过,笔者搜集了美国2000年到2007年的重整数据,发现撤换管理层的案例并不多.
361 Douglas G.Baird,Revisiting Auctions in Chapter 11,36 J.L.& Econ.633,643(1993)
362 Douglas G.Baird,Revisiting Auctions in Chapter 11,36 J.L.& Econ.633(1993).
363 Douglas G.Baird,Revisiting Auctions in Chapter 11,36 J.L.& Econ.646(1993).
364 Id.,at 647.
365 Id.,at 652-53.
366 John.J.McConnel & Henri Servaes,The Economics of Prepackaged Bankruptcy,Journal of Applied Corporate Finance,SUMMER 1991,Vol.4.2,p.94.
367 Anderson E.R.(1990,October),Companies walk the lihe between debt restructuring and bankruptcy,Business Credit,pp.12-14.转引自:Tavakolian,Bankruptcy:An Emerging Corporate Strategy,SAM Advanced Management Journal,Spring 1995,p.21.
368 参见 BRD(Bankruptcy Research Database),原文:Prepackaged means that the debtor drafted the plan and successfully solicited votes on it before filing the case.Prepackaged cases nearly always are filed solely to modify the company's liability on an issue of junk bonds.Once filed,these cases move very quickly."Prenegotiated" means that the debtor negotiated the terms of the plan with some,but not all creditor groups before filing - even if no prefiling vote was taken on the plan.An example would be a plan to sell the debtor's business,which has been drafted and negotiated with a large secured creditor before filing,but not with trade creditors.
369 Sandra E.Mayerson,Current Developments in Prepackaged Bankruptcy Plans,PLI Order No.AO-00E6,p.339.
370 A.C.Eberhart,W.T.Moore,and R.L.,Roenfeldt,Security Pricing and Deviations from the Absolute Priority Rule in Bankruptcy Proceedings,Journal of Finance(December 1999),pp.1457-1469.
371 Stephen J.Lubben,The Direct Costs of Corporate Reorganization:An Empirical Examination of Professional Fees in Large Chapter 11 Cases,74 Am.Bankr.L.J.509,531.
372 Brian L.Betker,The Administrative Costs of Debt Restructurings:Some Recent Evidence,Financial Management 26(Winter 1997),56.
373 这里大公司的标准是按照美国1989年物价指数资产总额达到或超过一亿美元的公司。参见BRD数据库的解释说明。
374 See John J.McConnell & Henri Servaes,The Economics of Prepackaged Bankruptcy,Journal of Applied Corporate Finance,P.94.
375 See id.
376 See 75 F2d 947(4th Cir.) from,Donald Lee Rome,Business Workout Manual,Second Edition,2001 cumulative upplement,West Group,p.S19-3.
377 英文原文:§1102.Creditors' and equity security holders' committees(b)(1) A committee of creditors appointed under subsection(a) of this section shall ordinarily consist of the persons,willing to serve,that hold the seven largest claims against the debtor of the kinds represented on such committee,or of the members of a committee organized by creditors before the commencement of the case under this chapter,if such committee was fairly chosen and is representative of the different kinds of claims to be represented.
378 英文原文:§1121(a) The debtor may file a plan with a petition commencing a voluntary case,or at any time in a voluntary case or an involuntary case.
379 See Donald Lee Rome,Business Workout Manual,Second Edition,2001 cumulative supplement,West Group,p.s19-11.该款的英文原文:(b) Acceptances or rejections obtained before petition An equity security holder or creditor whose claim is based on a security of record who accepted or rejected the plan before the commencement of the case shall not be deemed to have accepted or rejected the plan pursuant to §1126(b) of the Code unless the equity security holder or creditor was the holder of record of the security on the date specified in the solicitation of such acceptance or rejection for the purposes of such solicitation.A holder of a claim or interest who has accepted or rejected a plan before the commencement of the case under the Code shall not be deemed to have accepted or rejected the plan if the court finds after notice and hearing that the plan was not transmitted to substantially all creditors and equity security holders of the same class,that an unreasonably short time was prescribed for such creditors and equity security holders to accept or reject the plan,or that the solicitation was not in compliance with § 1126(b) of the Code.
380 John C.McConnell & Henri Servaes,The Economics of Prepackaged Bankruptcy,Journal of Applied Corporate Finance,SUMMER 1991,Vol 4.2,P.95.波斯那把这种情况解读为搭便车问题,参见前引波斯那书第403页。
381 See 11USC § 1141(a).
382 互换要约(exchange offer)是重组债务的一种模式,即债权换股权(debt-to-equity)、旧债权换新债权(debt-to-debt)、股权换股权(equity-to-equity)等。
383 11 USC § 502(b)(6)
384 11 USC § 502(b)(7)
385 See Courtney C.Carter,Saving Face in Southeast Asia:The Implementation of Pprepackaged Plans of Reorganization in Thailand,Malaysia,and Indonasea,Bankruptcy Developments Journal 2000,pp.304-306.
386 See Thomas J.Salerno and Craig D.Hansen,A PrepackagedBankruptcy Strategy,The Journal of Business Stragety,January/February 1991.
387 See id.
388 See id.
389 See Sandeep Dahiya,Kose John Puri and Gabriel Ramirez,Bebtor-in-possession financing and bankruptcy resolution:Empirical evidence,Journal of Financial Economics,69(2003),p.261
390 See id.p.261,277.
391 See The McGraw-Hill Companies,Inc.S&P DALLY NEWS,Oglebay Norton Co.March.10,2004and May.7,2004.
392 See The McGraw-Hill Companies,Inc.S&P DAILY NEWS,Bush Industries Inc.April.27,2004.
393 See Donald Lee Rome,Business Workout Manual,Second Edition,2001 cumulative supplement,West Group,p.S19-45.
394 See Brian L.Betker,An Empirical Examination of PrepackaffedBankruptcy,Financial Management,Vol.24,No.1,Spring 1995,P.10&12.
395 See id.pp.9-10.
396 美国二十实际九十年代初这方面的研究很多。可以参见:Stuart C.Gilson,Managing Default:Some Ecidence on How Firms Choose Between Workouts and Chapter 11,Journal of Applied Corporate Finance,Summer 1991,Volume 42:Sris Chatterjee,Upinder S.Dhillon,and Gabriel G.Ramirez,Resolution of Financial Distress:Debt Restructurings via Chapter 11,Prepaekaged Bankruptcies,and Workouts,Financial Management,Vol.25,No.1,Spring 1996.
397 11 U.S.C § 365(a)
398 David · G · Epstein,Bankruptcy and Related Law 6~(th) Edition,LAW PRESS · CHINA,Aug.2005.pp.453-454.
399 See id.
400 11 USC § 1126(b)(1),(2).
401 See Donald Lee Rome,Business Workout Manual,Second Edition,2001 cumulative supplement,West Group,S19-11.
402 See In re Grand Union,case no.98-27912,Bankr.D.N.J.,June 24,1998.
403 See Donald Lee Rome,Business Workout Manual,Second Edition,2001 cumulative supplement,West Group,S19-25,26,27.
404 See Donald Lee Rome,Business Workout Manual,Second Edition,2001 cumulative supplement,West Group,S19-38.
405 124.B.R.211
406 Case No.98-37(Bankr.D.Del.,Jannary 7,1998)
407 Case No.95-33058(Bankr.D.Or.May 12,1995)
408 See Donald Lee Rome,Business Wordout Manual,Second Edition,2001 cumulative supplement,West Group,S19-40,41.
409 See supra note lat page 309.
410 See Donald Lee Rome,Business Workout Manual,Second Edition,2001 cumulative supplement,West Group,s19-41,42.
411 124 B.R.211(Bkrtcy.N.D.Tex.,1991.)
412 Sandra E.Mayerson,Current Developments In Prepackaged Bankruptcy Plans,2002 Practicing Law Institute,p.342.
413 241 B.R.92(Bkrtcy.D.Del,1999.).
414 Sandra E.Mayerson,Current Developments in Prepackaged Bankruptcy Plans,Practising Law Institute Commercial Law and Practice Course Handbook Series,April 11,2002,p.349-352.
415 值得说明的是,本文作者对指南发布后美国纽约南区破产法院受理的预重整案件占全部预重整案件的比例做了比较,考查了2000年后纽约南区法院受理的预重整案件数量以及百分率,并未发现有明显的增加。
416 See Marlene Havranek,The Bank of England and Bank Failures,Insolvency Lawyers,2000.
417 Courtney C.Carter,Saving Face in Southeast Asia:The Implementation of Prepackaged Plans of Reorganization in Thailand,Malaysia,and Jndonesia,17 Bankr.Rev.J.295 p.313.
418 See World Bank,Asian Growth and Recovering Initiative,Financial and Corporate Sector Restructuring:Progress and Constraints 1,Background Paper No.1,1999,p.6.
419 See World Bank,Macroeconomic Update,Malaysia 9(1999),p.6.
420 See Id.at p.7.
421 See World Bank,Asian Growth and Recovering Initiative,Financial and Corporate Sector Restructuring:Progress and Constraints 1,Background Paper No.1,1999,p.36.
422 See Id.
423 See World Bank,Asian Growth and Recovering Initiative,Financial and Corporate Sector Restructuring:Progress and Constraints 1,Background Paper No.1,1999,p.24.
424 See World Bank,Macroeconomic Update,Indonesia 10(1999),p.8.
425 See Sandra E.Mayerson,Current Developments in Prepackaged Bankkruptcy Plans,Practising Law Institute Commercial Law and Practice Course Handbook Series,April 11,2002,pp.353-357.
427 Sris Chatterjee,Upinder S.Dhillon,and Gabriel G.Ramirez,Resolution of Financial Distresst Debt Restructurings via Chapter 11,prepackaged bankruptcies,and work out,Financial Management,Vol.25,No.1,Spring 1996,p.11.
428 Brian L.Betker,An Empirical Examination of Prepackaged Bankruptcy,Financial Management,Vol.24,No.1,Spring 1995,p.4.
429 Sris Chatterjee,Upinder S.Ohillon,and Gabriel G.Ramirez,Resolution of Financial Distress:Debt Restructurings via Chapter 11,Prepackaged Bankruptcies,and Workout,Financial Management,Vol.25,No.1,Spring 1996,p.14.
430 Brian L.Betker,An Empirical Examination of Prepackaged Bankruptcy,Financial Management,Vol.24,No.1,Spring 1995,p.4.
431 See Donald Lee Rome,Business Workout Manual,Second Edition,2001 Cumulative Supplement,West Group,S19-40.
434 李曙光:《经济法的词义解释与研究重心》,《政法论坛》第23卷第6期,页14。
435 John C.Coffee,Jr.,The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporatie Law:An Essay on The Judicial Role,89 Colum.L.Rev.1621
436 李曙光,王佐发:《中国破产法实施的法律经济分析》,《政法论坛》,第25卷第1期,页15。
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3、大卫·D·弗里德曼:《经济学语境下的法律规则》,杨欣欣译,法律出版社2004年1月
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10、张维迎:《产权·激励与公司治理》,北京,经济科学出版社,2005年7月
11、贺丹:《破产重整控制权的法律配置》,中国政法大学2006年博士论文
12、科斯、哈特等著,拉斯·沃因等编,李风圣主译:《契约经济学》,经济科学出版社,2003年10月
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14、[美]斯蒂芬A.罗斯(Stephen A.Ross)伦道夫W.威斯特菲尔德、杰弗利F.杰富著,吴世农等译:《公司理财》,机械工业出版社,2005年3月
15、张维迎:《信息、信任与法律》,北京,生活·读书·新知三联书店,2006年9月
16、曼昆著,梁小民译:《经济学原理》第三版,机械工业出版社2003年8月
17、席涛:《美国监管:从命令-控制到成本-收益分析》,中国社会出版社2006年7月
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