摘要
我国的政策性农业保险自实施以来取得了巨大的成就。2012年农业保险保费收入达240.6亿元人民币,为1.83亿户次提供了9006亿元的风险保障,向2818万受灾群众支付赔款148亿元。农业保险覆盖率显著提高,种植业保险覆盖率达到35%,森林保险覆盖率也达到57.19%。农业保险在承保品种上已覆盖了农、林、牧、副、渔业的各个方面,开办区域也扩展至全国。中央财政保费补贴总额420亿元,补贴险种已达15种,包括玉米、水稻、油料、小麦、青稞、马铃薯、棉花、糖料、奶牛、能繁母猪、育肥猪、牦牛、藏系羊、天然橡胶和森林保险等。就种植业来讲,中央财政补贴比例东部为35%,中西部地区为40%,地方政府补贴25%,保费中农户只需承担35%.-40%的比例。养殖业保险中,中西部补贴50%,东部补贴40%,地方配套补贴30%,政府总的补贴率高达保费的80%-90%。政府对农业保险的财政支持减少了参保农民的投保费用,刺激了他们参保的积极性。
自2011年起,政府将农业保险绩效评估工作提上了日程,先后将四川、内蒙古、安徽、江苏设为农业保险绩效评价试点,而农业保险绩效评价离不开对农业保险主体利益的分析。
基于此,本文综合运用福利经济学、计量经济学、公共财政学、博弈论的相关理论和方法,在已有研究的基础上将定性和定量分析结合,对农业保险补贴主体的利益及其博弈行为进行了研究,并据此提出相关的设想和建议。本研究的主要内容及结论如下：
第一,对农业保险的行业性质进行了研究。其目的是为了给农业保险利益主体的福利分析寻找理论依据。研究表明：农业保险行业具有自然垄断属性,这就决定了完全竞争模型在分析中是不适用的,传统的供需模型不能用来分析保险市场的行为,只能用其他方法来分析农业保险市场主体的利益或福利。农业保险市场之所以是自然垄断市场是基于以下判断：其一,农业保险产品在使用时具有排他性和非竞争性,只有投保的农户才能享受农业保险的保障,并且一个农户享受农业保险服务的数量不会影响到其他农户享受的农业保险服务的数量；其二,农业保险有效需求不足,这是由农户对农业保险的实际支付能力、农业保险替代品众多及政府强大的灾后救济能力等因素决定的；其三,农业保险的供给具有成本弱增性,由于农业保险市场是一个大型资本密集型产业,需要投入大量的基础设施,因此,单个保险经营机构经营农业保险业务的成本要低于多家保险经营机构的经营成本；其四,我国农业保险的实践表明农业保险行业是具有垄断性质的,虽然目前经营农业保险的保险机构有二十多家,但就某一地区(或省份)中的农业保险经营机构而言,数目多的有六、七家,少的则只有一家,垄断特征明显。
第二,分析了农业保险主体的利益诉求。政策性农业保险计划涉及中央政府、地方政府、保险公司、农户(龙头企业等)四个层次的主体,依据市场经济的要求,每个主体都有自己的利益诉求。政府利益表现为经济利益和非经济利益两种,其中,经济利益包括农业保险补贴后产生的农户、保险公司利益及“外部性”收益部分,具体表现为农业风险的规避、农业生产的稳定、农户生活水平的提高等。农业保险计划中政府分为中央政府和地方政府两级,二者追求的一部分经济利益是相同的,但侧重点不同：中央政府更侧重于整体利益,重在全局,而地方政府更侧重于局部利益,倾向于实现本地利益的最大化。中央政府更看重农业保险计划的政治利益,而地方政府中的某些行政人也会追求自身的一些政治利益。地方利益相对于中央利益具有其独立性,因而会产生地方保护主义及资源竞争中的非理性。
在政策性农业保险计划中,保险公司是农业保险业务的经营主体,在政策实施的过程中,也在谋求自己的利益,包括经营利润、竞争优势、政府的补贴及优惠的政策等。受农业风险特点约束,如果没有政府支持,保险公司不提供便宜的保单,如果政府支持,保险公司间会为了争补贴、争优惠而产生非理性竞争。农业保险经营机构在经营农业保险时不但面临客户的道德风险,自身也存在道德风险问题。
农户在农业保险计划中也是追求利益最大化的理性人。受小农生产方式、农业商品化率低、收入水平低、政府救灾力度等因素的影响,农户渴望保险,但投保意识淡薄,缺乏主动投保欲望,对价格的关心基于对农业风险的关心。对商业保险公司服务态度及理赔速度的不满也使农户对保险公司缺乏信任。农户主要追求预期收益最大化,也希望农业保险理赔速度快、保险公司的服务态度好、保障水平高等。
当各主体利益目标一致时,各主体间就会合作；目标不一致时,各主体间将会出现竞争。这里的合作指的是主体间按照保险计划的要求行动,无勾结、无共谋。
第三,用平均成本定价法分析了政府补贴对农业保险主体福利的影响,认为政府对农户的保费补贴使农业保险需求曲线右移,从而使农户福利及保险公司福利都增加。对于生产管理费用补贴来讲,它可以减少保险公司经营成本,如果保险公司将保费定于原来的水平,则保险公司获得全部补贴利益；如果将保费定于新的成本点水平,则农户获得全部补贴利益,如果保险公司将保费水平定于两者之间,则政府的经营费用补贴福利为农户和保险公司共同占有。总之,不论是保费补贴还是经营管理费用补贴的福利均在农户和保险公司之间划分,具体的分配比例取决于保险公司制定的保费价格水平的高低。对于保费补贴的福利,不论农业保险市场上供给是否受限,保费补贴的总福利都是大于补贴成本的,不存在“无谓损失”,并且,供给受限时的补贴福利大于供给不受限时的补贴福利。对于经营管理费用同样也不存在“无谓损失”,政府的补贴收益是大于成本的。
第四,研究了农业保险主体间的博弈行为。包括纵向主体间的博弈及横向主体间的博弈,纵向主体间的博弈包括中央政府与地方政府间的博弈、政府与保险公司间的博弈、保险公司与农户间的博弈等；横向主体博弈包括地方政府间的博弈及保险公司间的博弈两种。不论是纵向主体还横向主体博弈,博弈的核心基本上都在于保险资源的占用、保险责任的承担等问题,依据各主体利益诉求的不同,各主体间博弈的结果也不同。由于补贴资金对农业保险的刺激作用都是一样的,因此,中央政府与地方政府的补贴比例不取决于模型,而取决于双方的谈判能力。但是,在中央和地方的博弈中,地方政府更愿意偷懒,在现实中的表现为地方政府对农业保险的补贴比例小于中央政府。对于保险公司来讲,只要农业保险的参与率足够大,保险公司有利可图,不管政府有没有补贴,保险公司还是愿意经营农业保险的,如果农业保险参与率不够大,只要政府的补贴能够弥补其损失,保险公司还是能够经营农业保险业务的。对于农户来讲,只要农户参保的预期收益大于不参保时的预期收益,那么农户就会购买农业保险。农业保险主体间的纵向博弈易产生“偷懒行为”,横向博弈易产生“道德风险”。
第五,研究了农业保险计划的合作机制及合作的稳定性。农业保险计划可以通过监督机制、互惠机制、剩余索取权的赋予来实现各主体间的合作。只有合作收益大于违规收益时,各参与主体才会选择长期合作。合作收益与违规收益的差额与新一轮博弈收益占前一轮博弈收益的权重正相关。随着博弈的进行,博弈双方对对手的博弈决策越来越了解,越来越能够根据上一次博弈的经验推断出本次对手的博弈策略,对投机者来讲,可能的投机机会越来越少,违规的可能性越来越小,合作的可能越来越大。
Policy-oriented agricultural insurance in China has made great achievements since the beginning. In2012, the agricultural insurance premium income has reached24.06billion Yuan and guaranteed900.6billion Yuan for183million families. In this year, the insurance company has paid14.8billion Yuan to the28.18million victims afflicted by a natural disaster. The coverage of agricultural insurance has increased dramatically. Crop insurance coverage has reached35%and Forest57.19%. The subsidies species of agricultural insurance had covered all the aspects of the farming, forestry, animal husbandry, sideline and the fishery. The central government subsidies area has also extended to the whole country and the total amount of subsidies has reached42billion Yuan in recent years. The varieties the central government subsidies includes the insurances of rice, corn, wheat, oilseeds, cotton, potato, barley, sugar, to sow, cow, pig, yak, Tibetan sheep, natural rubber and forest, etc. For the crop insurances, the proportion took by the central government are35%of the insurance premium in east areas and40%in central and west areas. The proportion farmer take is only35%-40%of the premium. The proportion of aquaculture insurance is50%in central and west areas and40%in east. The local government also shared30%of the premium, so, the total share the government takes is between80%and90%. The subsidies reduce the farmers'expenditure for agricultural insurance and enhance the enthusiasm of farmers buying enthusiasm.
Since2011, the government began the work of performance evaluation of agricultural insurance; set Sichuan, Neimenggu, Anhui, Jiangsu provinces as the evaluation pilots of agricultural insurance performance. However, the work of agricultural insurance evaluation is dependent on the analysis of the subjects'interests related.
So, this paper uses the theories and method of welfare economics, econometrics, public finance and game theory to analyze the interests and beavertails of subsidies related subjects in agricultural insurance and put forward some new ideas and suggestions. The main contents and conclusions of this study are as follows:
First, the dissertation analyzes the nature of agricultural insurance industry which purpose is to find the theoretical basis of following welfare analysis. Studies have shown that agricultural insurance industry is natural monopoly. So it is not applicable of the perfect competition model in the analysis. The traditional model of supply and demand can't be used to analyze the behavior of the insurance market, so it has to use other methods for the he welfare analysis of agricultural insurance related subjects. Agricultural Insurance is monopolistic because of its sub-additivity in operation, rivalry in consumption but not excludability, insufficiency of its demand and, the last, the agricultural insurance market practice in Chinese.
Second, the dissertation analyzes the interests of the subjects related in agricultural insurance. Policy-oriented agricultural insurance plans have four levels of subjects: central government, local governments, insurance companies, farmers. Each subject has its own interest in a market economy. The interests of the government include two kinds: economic and non-economic. Economic welfare includes the reduced spending of farmers, the profits of insurance company and "externalities" of subsidies. Economic interests embodied in risk aversion, the stability of agricultural production, improvement of living standards of farmers and so on. In agricultural insurance plan, the government is divided into two levels of the central government and local government which economic interests are part of same but different emphasis:the central government focuses more on the overall interest and political stability while the local governments tend to maximize the interests of the local. The interests'local governments'pursuit are relatively independent, which can produce local protectionism and the irrational competition for resources.
As the operators of agricultural insurance business, Insurance Companies seek the maximum of their benefit including profits, competitive advantage, government subsidies and preferential policies, etc. Because of the characteristics of agricultural risk, insurance company does not provide cheap agricultural insurance without government support. If the government support, insurance companies can produce irrational competition. When the insurance companies operating agricultural insurance, they will face moral risks come from not only the farmers', but also their selves.
Farmers are the biggest beneficiary of the agricultural insurance plan. Because of small-scale production mode, the low agricultural commercialization rate and the relief efforts after disaster, farmers also want to get the maximum of their utility. They desire insurance, but lack of initiative for participation, concern more about the price than the agricultural risk. The attitude of insurance company and the speed of insurance claims make the farmers lack of trust of insurance company. They want maximize the income, better service attitude and faster claims.
When interests between different subjects are consistent, cooperation will happen, when they degree, betrayal will be. Cooperation means the subjects behave according the rules of agricultural insurance plan, no collusion no conspiracy.
Third, the dissertation uses AC curve to analyze the impact of subsidies. Government premium subsidies for farmers move the agricultural insurance demand curve to the right, and thus increase the farmers'and insurance companies'welfare. For operating expenses subsidies, it can reduce the operational costs of the insurance company. If insurance companies price at the original level, they will get the full benefit of subsidies. If they price at the new point, farmers will get the full benefit. If they price between the two points, farmers and company will share the benefits. So, the benefits of premium subsidies and operating expenses subsidies are divided between farmers and agricultural company. The proportion depends on the level of premium. The benefit of the subsidies always greater than the subsidy costs regardless of the limit of insurance supply in the market. The welfare of subsidy is more when supply is limited, and there is no deadweight loss in subsidy plan.
Fourth, the dissertation studies the game behavior between the agriculture related subjects which includes vertical and horizontal relationship. The vertical game includes the games between central government and local government, government and insurance companies, insurance companies and farmers etc. Horizontal games include the games among local governments and insurance companies. The key of game are insurance resource, proportions of premium, etc. the result of the game are different accord the players different interests. Due to the effect of the subsidies come from the central and local governments are the same, the proportions between they two do not depend on the model, which depends on both sides of the negotiation skills. But, in the central and local game, local governments more willing to be opportunism, the proportion they take is less than the central government. For the company, if the participation rate of agricultural insurance is high and the business is profitable, insurance company is willing to operate agricultural insurance despite the subsidies. If the proportion is not high, the insurance company is able to operate agricultural insurance business as long as the government subsidies can make up for the loss. As long as the farmers expected returns greater than the benefit not to buy agricultural insurance, farmers will buy agricultural insurance. Vertical game between agricultural insurance subjects generates "lazy behavior" and horizontal game tends to create "moral hazard".
Fifth, the dissertation studies the cooperative mechanism of agricultural insurance plans and the stability of cooperation. Agricultural insurance scheme can achieve the cooperation between different subjects through the building of supervise mechanism, reciprocity mechanism, the given of residual claims to farmers. Only cooperation benefits are greater than the betray income, players will choose long-term cooperation. The gap between the cooperation income and the betray income is positively related to the weight of a new round of game revenue in the previous round of game gains. As the game repeats, the players in game get more and more understanding to their opponent's strategy and deduce their own strategy more and more accurately according to the experience. For the betray, this means the chance and benefit of betray get fewer and fewer, the possibility of cooperation is more and more big.
引文
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