摘要
一直以来被冠以投资者利益守护者和金融市场看门人称号的信用评级机构，在解决市场信息不对称方面的作用得到了市场和监管机构的普遍认可。但信用评级质量却在显著下降，无论是1997年的东南亚金融危机，还是2001年的安然丑闻都引发了公众对信用评级信息价值的担忧。2007年美国爆发的次贷危机又一次把信用评级机构推到了批判的风口浪尖。鉴于信用评级行业的重要地位和其不断遭人诟病的负面表现，加强对信用评级行业的监管就显得尤为重要。
本文把信用评级行业的监管界定为官方监管和声誉约束两部分，按照官方监管和声誉约束两条主线，对我国信用评级行业监管展开研究。官方监管能够纠正市场失灵，克服其自身不能解决的缺陷。声誉约束是市场内生的机制，是信用评级行业有效运行的重要保障。两者各有其不可替代的功能优势，因此需要“看得见的手”和“看不见的手”有机结合，共同推动信用评级行业健康有序的发展。
信用评级行业存在的负外部性、自然垄断、信息不对称和利益冲突造成了市场失灵，因此需要官方监管来矫正。信用评级行业健康有序的运行还需要声誉约束的有效发挥。信用评级行业声誉约束的重要性不仅源于信用评级行业自身的特性，还源于声誉约束是官方监管的重要补充。通过构建声誉约束模型，分析了信用评级机构在追逐声誉租金过程中的行为以及投资者和发行方的反应。此外声誉约束作用的发挥需要一定的外部条件和环境，主要包括交易必须反复进行、适度的竞争机制、失信行为的惩罚机制和对声誉形成长期的预期。
美国信用评级行业监管最初完全是靠声誉约束，后来逐渐过渡到声誉约束为主，官方监管为辅的模式。2006年《美国信用评级机构改革法案》明确了美国证监会对NRSROs的直接监管，次贷危机的爆发和演变促成了“多德法案”的出台，进一步完善了对信用评级行业的监管。因此有必要对美国信用评级行业及其监管的历史和现状进行梳理、分析和反思，从而为我国信用评级行业监管提供借鉴和启示。
不同于美国，我国信用评级行业监管一直以官方监管为主导，忽略声誉约束。从单一主体监管阶段转变为目前多主体多层次监管阶段。通过深入考察我国评级行业官方监管的实施现状，发现主要存在着资质认证不合理、利益冲突监管不完善和信息披露监管不健全三个方面的问题。对我国信用评级行业声誉约束运行的客观条件进行分析，发现存在四个方面的障碍，包括甄别机制不通畅、控制机制不健全、竞争格局不合理和利益导向不正确。
基于我国信用评级行业官方监管的分析，以问题为导向，采用博弈分析方法，对官方监管机制的构架进行了研究。以信用评级机构、官方监管当局为参与人，按照静态博弈、有限理性演化博弈和完全理性动态博弈的逻辑顺序展开。并针对我国信用评级行业多头监管的现实情况，对我国信用评级官方监管机构的最优监管水平以及高效率监管纳什均衡的条件进行了分析。
鉴于声誉约束在信用评级行业监管中的重要地位，本文从理论和实证两个方面对我国信用评级行业的声誉约束进行了分析。由于我国信用评级行业的产生与发展属于政府驱动型，有别于西方的市场驱动型，因此考察我国信用评级行业的声誉约束时，需要确定声誉约束的可行性，即声誉约束实施基础是否存在，并以此为基础通过模型分析对声誉约束的机理进行了阐述。实证研究方面，则以2008-2011年发行的中期票据为研究样本，对我国信用评级行业的声誉约束进行了实证分析。结果显示出我国信用评级行业尽管存在着声誉约束，但力度不强。
在以上分析的基础上，从加强官方监管和声誉约束两个方面提出了对策建议。加强官方监管的具体措施包括建立统一协调的监管主体、优化行业资格认证制度、强化利益冲突管理以及引入非请求评级制度。加强声誉约束作用的具体措施包括促进信息披露的有效性、充分发挥信用评级行业协会的作用、弱化监管对信用评级结果的依赖以及建立和完善市场退出机制。
Credit rating agencies are regarded as the proctector of investors and thegatekeeper of financial markets, and its positive role of resolving the marketinformation asymetry is widely confirmed by the market and the regulatory body. Butthe quality of credit rating is descending. The southeast Asian financial crisis in1997and the Anron Scandal in2001cause the public to worry about the information valueof credit rating. The American subprime mortgage crisis happened in2007provokedintense critisim of credit rating agencies. Because of the important role of crdit ratingindustry and its bad performance, it is very important to increase the regulation on thecredit rating industry.
In my view, the regulation on the credit rating industry is composed of two partsincluding official regulation and reputation mechanism, so accordingly the researchon China’s credit rating industry is arranged by the two main lines.Official regulationcan fix the problem of market failure and overcome the market defect which can notbe solved by itself. Reputation mechanism is a type of self discipline. It promotes thecredit rating agencies to provide high quality service and product, which is theimportant security to make the credit rating industry work effectively. Meantimereputation mechanism can close the door to interest group capture of the regulatorybody. So the official regulation and the reputation mechanism should combineeffectively to maintain the healthy and orderly development of the credit ratingindustry.
There exist negative externality, natural monopoly, information asymmetry andconflict of interests in credit rating industry. These features cause the market failure.So the official regulation is needed to fix the problem. Reputation mechanism isimportant as well not only because of the features of the credit rating industry, butalso its role of supplement to official regulation. The Dittrich model is displayed toexplain how the reputation mechanism works. Four external conditions are essentialto make the reputation work well including the repeated transactions, appropriatecompetition structure, penalties on misconduction and the long-time expectation onrepuatation.
Initially America’s credit rating industry completely relied on reputation
mechanism. And then it relies mainly on reputation while making official
supervision subsidiary. The Credit Rating Act in2006identies the direct regulation
power of SEC. The subprime mortgage crisis induces the issue of Dodd-frank Act, which perfects the regulation on credit rating industry. So the analyze on the historyand current situation of credit rating industry and its regulation is useful for China tolearn lessons. Different from American’s style, China’s regulation on credit ratingindustry develops from the phase of single regulatory body to that of multipleregulatory bodies and layers. Based on deep researches on the currect situation ofregulation on China’s credit raing industry, it can be concluded that there existdefects in two ways. On the one hand is the problems in official regulation, includingthe unreasonable recognition, the flawed management on conflicts of interest and theunsoundness of information disclosure. On the other hand is the problems in thefunction of the reputation mechanism, including the unsondness of distinguishmechanism, the ureasonable competition structure and the incorrect benefitmotivation.
Further, based on the above analysis, led by the problems of China’s officalregulation of credit rating industry the study on the construction of offcial regulationof credit rating industry is developed. The game theory is used to analyze the actionsof credit rating agency and regulatory body following the order of static game,evolutionary game and dynamic game. And based on the feature of multipleregulatory bodies in China’s credit rating industry, the researches are conducted toget the optimal regulation level and the conditions to meet Nash equilibrium ofoptimal regulation.
Because of the important role of reputation mechanism, this paper anaylzes thereputation effect of China’s credit rating industry from the theoretical aspect and theempirical aspect. Because our credit rating industry is motivated by the government,which is different from American’s, the feasibility of reputation mechanism isidentified, that is whehther the base of repuatation mechanism exists. After that, theempirical studies is developed. The result shows that the effect of reputation exists,but the intensity is limited.Based on the above analysis, the policies are proposed to strengthen the officialregulation and reputation discdipline. To strengthen the official regulation, it needs tobuild the only regulatory body, optimize the recognition mechanism, enhance themanagement on conflicts of interests and introduce unsolicited rating mechanism. Tostrengthen the reputation discipline, it needs to improve the effectiveness ofinformation disclosure, promote the acting role of industry association, decrease therating-based regulation and build the market exit mechanism.
引文
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