地方政府融资平台效率研究
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摘要
自上世纪80年以来,我国城市现代化建设逐步推进,城市基础建设逐渐加快,所需资金规模日益增长,而地方政府城建资金却相对不足,为缓解地方财政压力,各级地方政府先后开办了一些“市政公司”、“城投公司”或“交通公司”等经济实体,专业投资公司、建设投资公司相继成立,我国地方政府融资平台的雏形开始形成。
     1994年我国开始实施分税制财政体制,对中央和地方的财权、事权进行了重新划分,中央政府和地方政府的财政收入能力发生了极大的改变,而中央政府与地方政府的支出责任却并没有做出相应的调整,使得财权不断上移而事权不断下降,税制改革一方面使得地方政府的税收收入在总收入中的比重被削减、地方政府对地方企业减免税收的权利被削弱;另一方面其支出责任的划分依然表现出计划经济体制时期的特点,并没有随着税收划分模式的改变而做出相应的变化,地方政府仍然需要承担提供基本公共品的责任。这种财权与事权的不均衡决定了地方政府在城市基础设施领域巨大的资金缺口,地方政府所承担的扩大城市基础设施建设,加速地方区域经济结构调整和产业升级,完善社会、教育、医疗保障制度等促进社会经济发展、保障民计民生的公共责任不断加大,给地方财政带来了巨大经济压力和负担,使得地方财政逐渐捉襟见肘而缺口日益增大。
     与此同时,我国《中华人民共和国预算法》第二十八条明确规定,“地方各级预算按照量入为出、收支平衡的原则编制,不列赤字。除法律和国务院另有规定外,地方政府不得发行地方政府债券。”中国人民银行1996年颁布的《贷款通则》第十七条规定,“借款人应当是经工商行政管理机关(或主管机关)核准登记的企(事)业法人、其他经济组织、个体工商户或具有中华人民共和国国籍的具有完全民事行为能力的自然人。”这从法律方面限制了政府直接借贷的可能性,政府要想融资,必须要有新的方式和突破。
     地方政府通过建立融资平台,绕开各种制度障碍大规模融资举债来进行城市基础设施建设,尤其在2008年美国次贷危机爆发而使得全球经济遭受重创的时期,我国为应对全球性经济危机,为提振信心,帮助中国的出口型为导向的经济克服外部需求疲软所带来的巨大冲击,我国采取了适度宽松的货币政策和积极的财政政策,推出以基础设施投资为主要内容的四万亿元经济刺激计划。为了进行大规模基础设施建设,地方政府通过将财政资金、土地、国有股权等注入到融资平台的资本金中,使得地方融资平台出现了井喷式发展,平台数量从2008年上半年的约3000家,贷款余额约为1.7万元亿迅速扩至2009年末的8221家,贷款余额约为7.38万亿。截止2010年末,我国地方政府融资平台数量约为一万余家,较2008年年末增长25%以上。
     近年来,由于地方政府融资平台的信贷规模不断扩大,地方政府偿债风险加大,因此国务院主管部和有关监管金融部门要求加强对地方政府融资平台公司的管理,要求全面清理和整顿政府融资平台的债务,明确提出“对还款来源主要依靠财政性资金的公益性在建项目,除法律和国务院另有规定外,不得再继续通过融资平台公司融资”。在严格控制的背景下,地方融资平台仍面临着严峻的信贷政策环境。今年以来,经济下行压力较大,全国信贷投速减缓,房地产调控政策力度不减趋势未变,地方政府融资平台通过资本市场和土地财政融资的前景也不乐观,面临着艰难的融资环境,再加之地方政府融资平台融资模式相对单一,主要通过银行信贷进行融资,从而使得大量的平台债务集中在商业银行。同时商业银行也将政府融资平台作为贷款发放的主要对象和客户。所以,地方政府融资平台很大一部分资金是来源于商业银行的贷款。此外,地方政府融资平台很多项目属于非经营性项目,资金投入量较大,项目本身的经营性收入较少或者根本不产生回报,难以通过自身的经营现金流来实现贷款本息的全覆盖。而且政府融资平台短期内一般会承担多个建设项目,往往需要大量举债,不能有效控制负债规模,造成其资产负债率普遍较高,资产质量不断下降,最终使得政府融资平台的融资功能逐渐丧失,融资平台的债务风险不断加大。
     虽然我国地方政府融资平台普遍存在融资渠道单一,责任主体定位模糊,信息不透明,缺乏内外部约束,债务风险较大等缺点,但我国地方政府融资平台作为针对我国政府职能和政府融资目的的特殊性而产生的一种政府融资方式,它的产生和发展突破了地方政府融资在财政体制上、法律上等方面的束缚,有效满足地方政府的融资需求,促进经济增长及结构调整,实现资金集成,有利于拉动社会投资,推动地方政府公共建设项目的市场化运作。本文旨在通过建立适当的指标体系,以科学、系统、合理的方式对政府融资平台做出效率评价,为政府融资平台效率评价建立科学合理的框架,为其运作和发展提供科学的标准和依据,从而提高地方政府融资平台的效率。本文从经济效率的一般含义出发,结合地方政府融资平台的特殊性,对地方政府融资平台的效率做出理论探讨和界定,以可获得性、实用性和动态性的一般原则为指导,选取在经济性投入、经济性产出、社会性产出等方面具有代表性的指标,以科学的方法建立地方政府融资平台的指标体系,为地方政府融资平台的效率评价提供科学、系统和精确的依据。
The80's of the last century, our country city modernization is just at the initial stage, our country city infrastructure construction is accelerated gradually, the scale of funds needed to expand increasingly, and the local government of urban construction funds is relatively short, to relieve the financial pressure of local government, local governments have set up some " Municipal Corporation "," the city investment company " or " traffic company " and other economic entities, professional investment companies, construction investment companies have been established, the prototype of our country local government financing platform began to form.
     The reform of tax distribution system in1994has greatly changed the t fiscal revenue ability contrast between the central government and the local government, and expenditure responsibility division did not make corresponding adjustment, this made property rights continue to shift and power drop ceaselessly, on one hand the tax reform made the local government tax revenue in the proportion of total income be cut, the right of relieving the local business tax is weakened; on the other hand the expenditure responsibilities division still showed the planned economy period features, and do not make corresponding changes with the tax division pattern changes, local government still needs to undertake the provision of basic public product responsibility. After reforming the tax distribution system in1994, the local finance income accounted by78%in1993dropped sharply to44.3%, while the local government finance expenditure proportion has decreased only2%, local government fiscal funds can not meet the need of city construction investment. This kind of Imbalance between property rights and the governance makes the local government produce huge financing gap in the city infrastructure construction, the public liability of expanding city infrastructure construction, accelerating regional economic structure adjustment and industrial upgrade, improving the social, educational, medical security system and promoting social and economic to develop, protecting people's livelihood continues to increase, it has brought huge economic pressure and burden to the local finance, and made the gap of the local finance gradually increase day by day.
     At the same time, China promulgated" the Budget law of the people's Republic of china", the twenty-eighth clearly defined " local budget must be in accordance with the principle of making both ends meet, balancing payments system, the deficit is not included. In addition to legal and otherwise provided by the State Council, the local government may not issue local government bonds." In1996the people's Bank of China issued the " the general law of loan ", the seventeenth defined," the borrower should be enterprises industry corporate, other economic organizations, individual industrial and commercial household registered by the industrial and commercial administrative organs (or authority) or natural persons who have the completely civil capacity with the people's Republic of China nationality."
     In the current legal system of our country, local government through the establishment of the investment and financing platform, bypassed all kinds of system obstacles of massive financing debt for city infrastructure construction, especially in2008the United States sub-loan crisis and the global economy battered, our country has adopted the moderately loose monetary policy and vigorous finance policy and launch four trillion economic stimulus plan of infrastructure investment being as the main contents to cope with the global economic crisis, to help boost the confidence, to help export oriented economy to overcome the huge impact that the weak external demand brings. In order to carry out large-scale infrastructure construction, local governments injected the financial capital, land, state-owned shares as capital investment and make local financing platform appear in the development of blowout, the number of platforms rapidly expanded from the first half year of2008about3000, loan amount about17000billion to the number of platforms in the end of2009about8221, the loan amount about73800billion. By the end of2010, the number of local government financing platform was about ten thousand, the number grew25%more than that in the end of2008.
     In recent years, local government financing platform credit scale is continually expanding, local government debt risk has increased, the main department of the State Council and the relevant regulation of the financial sector called for strengthening the management of local government financing platform, ask various local government and financial institutions as soon as possible clearing the debt of the local government financing platform and put forward clearly " the commonweal construction projects which rely on the fiscal capital as the main source of repayment, in addition to legal and otherwise provided by the State Council, should not continue financing through local government financing platform ". In the strict control environment, local government financing platform faced a severe credit policy environment. Since this year, economy downward pressure is big, the national credit investment slow down fast, the policy of estate adjusting and controlling has not changed, the prospects that local government financing platform financing through the capital market and land finance are not optimistic, local government financing platform faced with difficult financing environment, coupled with the type of financing being relatively single, local government financing platform mainly financed through commercial bank, so debt is concentrated in commercial banks. The main financing method of local government financing platform is bank credit, and commercial banks regard the government financing platform as the main lending customer, the great proportion of the credit funds mostly lend to local government financing platforms. In addition, the projects of local government financing platform are mostly commonweal and need large amount of capital investment, the projects yield very low or no return, it's difficult to repay debt through its operating cash flow. Local government financing platform generally take on multiple projects in short-term and often need debt financing, it can not effectively control the scale of debt and make the ratio of liabilities to assets generally high, the asset quality of local government financing platform drops ceaselessly and it's function of financing losses in the end, thus it's widening the local government financing platform debt risk. By the end of2010, the debt of local government financing platform is4971billion which is46.38%of local government debt balance, wherein the debt of the government bearing the responsibility for repayment is3137billion, the debt of the government bearing the responsibility for security is8143billion, other related debt is1019billion.
     Although local government financing platform in our country has shortcomings with single financing channel, a fuzzy positioning of main responsibility, opaque information, lacking of external constraint, and debt risks, the produce and development of local government financing platform as a government financing way which as a result of the function of our country government and the specificity of government financing goal breakthrough the bondage of financial system and legal aspects in the financial system, it effectively meets the local government financing demand, promote economic growth and structural adjustment, realize capital integration, help to stimulate social investment, promote the market operation of local government public construction projects. This paper aims to establish the appropriate index system and make efficiency evaluation with scientific, system, reasonable approach, to establish a scientific and reasonable framework for the government financing platform efficiency evaluation, to provide a scientific standard and basis for its operation and development, to improve the efficiency of government financing platform. This article have made a theoretical discussion based on the general meaning of the economic efficiency and combined with the specificity of the local government financing platform, select representative index in the economic investment, economic output and social output in the general principles of availability, practicability and dynamic nature, establish a index system of the local government financing platform with a scientific method, provide a scientific, system and accurate basis for the efficiency evaluation of local government financing platform.
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