摘要
在全球老龄化挑战不断加剧和各国多层次养老保障体系改革完善的背景下,企业年金作为多层次养老保险体系中第二层次补充养老保险的重要组成部分,在提供养老保障制度供给,提高老年生活水平方面发挥着巨大的作用。正是因为企业年金对于经济社会发展有着如此重要的作用,从建立之初开始就受到了各国的普遍重视,理论界与实务界也对企业年金制度的发展进行了长时间的系统研究。从上个世纪末开始,企业年金治理与风险控制逐步成为国际养老保障前沿与热点领域。特别在2008年国际金融危机发生之后,企业年金乃至整个养老保险基金的风险控制问题成为摆在各国政府面前亟待解决的难题。国际金融危机的蔓延由金融领域传导资本市场,进而再影响实体经济,这对于和宏观经济以及资本市场等领域有着天然联系的企业年金必然会造成严重的后果。因而企业年金合理的治理结构、安全的投资营运、有效的风险控制成为关乎经济发展和社会稳定的重要条件。
就全球企业年金治理和风险控制的发展来说,由于发达国家和发展中国家在企业年金发展过程中处于不同的阶段和水平,其运用的治理结构和风险控制手段存在明显的差异性,而企业年金治理及风险控制内嵌于特定的制度环境,具有超越于一般技术和机制层面的制度性约束,不同文化背景下企业年金治理结构及安全营运,有其明显的差异性的制度特征,如何从纷繁复杂的企业年金治理结构的外观下,揭示文化、习俗、传统等因素,如何影响企业年金治理机制的形成及运行,揭示企业年金治理各方博弈的制度文化条件,揭示非正规制度如何及在何种程度上内在地制约正规制度的形成及路径依赖特征,这是非西方国家实施企业年金有效管理的前提条件和关键性约束条件,也是需要强化的研究课题。因此中国的企业年金在进行治理结构选择和防范风险方面必然具有中国自身的特色。其治理机制和风险控制模式可以借鉴国外在该领域的治理原则,但是也应当避免对国外模式的生搬硬套以及由此造成的制度依赖,以期维护国家的金融安全和稳定。中国的企业年金发展经历了近20年的发展,由最初的企业补充养老保险发展而来。2004年随着《企业年金试行办法》和《企业年金基金管理试行办法》的颁布,中国以信托型为特点的企业年金制度正式建立起来,可以说整个制度的建设还处于初级阶段。更应当学习和借鉴其它国家企业年金风险控制的有益经验,立足于我国养老保险改革20多年的具体实践,从中提炼出能够反映我国国情的企业年金治理结构的基本理论内核和发展脉络,分析我国企业年金治理结构及其风险控制的制度化约束条件,探讨我国企业年金有效监管的制度框架和政策思路,具有重要的理论和决策价值,以及重要的现实意义。企业年金合理治理机制的构建从根源上讲,都是为后续的企业年金风险管理服务的,因而论文研究的重点也主要集中在企业年金如何通过治理机制的选择从而做好风险控制工作；在新形势下,如何对现有的企业年金运行和风险管理体系进行进一步的完善。最终通过论文研究,提出中国在企业年金治理与风险控制方面的政策建议。
本文分为七章,从整体结构上可以分为三个部分。第一部分主要阐述了企业年金治理与风险控制的相关理论,进而分别对治理结构和风险控制进行分析,主要包括论文第一章到第三章。第二部分主要探讨了企业年金治理与风险控制之间的互动关系,提出了两者之间的约束条件和传导机制,主要是论文第四章。第三部分针对我国企业年金治理与风险控制发展的现状,分析了我国企业年金治理与风险控制的核心要素,以及与之相关的环境因素和配套机制,最后提出相应的政策建议,包括第五章到第七章。
具体的内容与观点如下：
第一章企业年金治理与风险控制的理论基础。本章是理论研究的出发点,首先梳理了企业年金治理与风险控制的理论基础以及最新的发展。企业年金治理的相关理论经历了从传统的治理理论到公司治理理论再到养老金治理理论的发展过程。作为企业年金治理理论的基石,养老金理论近年来获得了长足的发展。《OECD企业年金治理准则》及其修订版的问世,为企业年金治理带来了框架性的指导建议。对于风险控制理论,本文主要探讨了风险管理理论和风险监管理论。从中可以看出金融风险管理和监管也不再基于传统的风险管理模式,而是向全面性的,基于风险的管理方向迈进。企业年金治理和风险控制发展的理论与最新发展将为我国构建完善的企业年金治理与风险控制框架提供参考依据。
第二章企业年金治理结构分析。本章首先基于《OECD企业年金治理准则》的要求阐述了企业年金治理结构的一般结构框架,企业年金的治理主要分为内部治理与外部治理两个方面。内部治理主要表现为基于风险的内控机制,而外部治理则主要体现在政府监管部门的监管以及中介机构和行业自律组织的协调补充。本章第二部分从国际比较的视角,分析具有典型意义的发达国家企业年金的治理结构,为后续企业年金治理结构趋同性和差异性分析奠定了基础。论文从制度分析入手,从经济达尔文主义对治理结构趋同性和差异性的解释；制度变迁角度对治理结构趋同性和差异性的解释；路径依赖与制度互补性的角度对治理结构趋同性和差异性的解释三个角度分析了影响企业年金治理结构趋同性和差异性的正式制度因素与非正式制度因素。
第三章企业年金治理的风险控制分析。本章首先按照与治理是否相关的原则,在企业年金运营过程的众多风险中选取了与治理直接相关的风险和与治理间接相关的风险两类。与治理直接相关的风险主要是委托代理风险,而与治理间接相关的风险包括投资风险和操作风险。其次,本章对上述风险产生的成因进行了分析,企业年金委托代理风险主要是由于信息不对称、契约不完全、剩余索取权与剩余控制权不匹配以及风险链条过长所造成的。投资风险则受到一国经济发展、资本市场环境、监管环境等多方面的影响。操作风险则与人的因素有关,这直接与企业年金计划的内控机制相联系。在对风险识别和成因进行了分析之后,对相应风险的评估方法进行了简要介绍。本章最后探讨了风险控制的主要方法。
第四章企业年金治理与风险控制互动分析。本章首先对企业年金治理与风险控制互动的意义进行了探讨。治理与风险控制的互动将对经济发展、社会稳定、社会保障制度和资本市场的发展产生深远的影响。论文总结了企业年金治理与风险控制互动的传导机制,包括以风险为基础的企业年金内控机制；企业年金的信息披露和报告制度；企业年金各治理主体选择机制和培育体系,总结出企业年金治理与风险控制中由企业年金治理到企业年金风险控制再到企业年金治理双向循环过程,整个过程伴随从缴费到给付的企业年金运作始终。本章最后对企业年金治理与风险控制的约束机制进行了分析,并初步探讨了两者之间互动的绩效关系。
第五章我国企业年金治理与风险控制的现状分析和评价。本章梳理了我国企业年金发展历史,并就当前企业年金治理与风险控制中的现状进行了分析和评价。
第六章我国企业年金治理及其风险控制的影响因素分析。本章首先对我国企业年金治理及其风险控制的外部环境进行了分析。明确治理与风险控制中政府与市场机制之间的关系以及相互之间的责任分摊,其次划分政府与市场之间的边界,有效发挥两者对企业年金治理与风险控制发展的协同效应,最后研究了我国企业年金治理及其风险控制的相关配套机制。文章第二部分分析了企业年金治理的核心要素,主要是从企业年金治理中各个当事人的角度进行研究。第三部分则是分析了我国治理结构的风险源头和风险链条,这些都是基于我国信托型企业年金治理中信托关系和委托关系所产生的。最后文章基于行为金融学的理论,对我国企业年金治理及其风险控制中利益相关者的行为进行了研究。
第七章我国企业年金治理及其风险控制的政策研究。首先主张构建我国企业年金治理与风险控制的长效机制。在企业年金治理方面则是完善我国企业年金治理结构和治理机制,与我国多层次社会保障体系改革相结合,探索适合中国企业年金的治理结构,在风险控制方面则是着重构建适合我国企业年金治理及其风险控制发展的监管体系,主要从风险约束机制、风险监督机制、风险分散机制和风险补偿机制进行详细阐述。其次强调完善企业年金治理及其风险控制发展的外部环境和配套机制。外部环境包括资本市场、代理人市场和中介市场的建设,配套机制主要涉及激励分配机制、法律制度、文化认同以及信任制度。
论文可能的创新点包括以下三个方面：
1、在对各国企业年金治理结构进行分析的基础上,从制度分析角度研究了企业年金治理结构的趋同性和差异性,并对其影响因素进行了阐述。现阶段绝大多数文献对企业年金治理结构主要还是属于综述阶段,着重在于介绍不同治理结构的异同,并从法律体系角度简单的阐述了各国采用不同治理结构的原因,尚未从制度分析的角度对企业年金治理结构的趋同性和差异性进行研究。本文从制度分析的角度出发,依据经济达尔文主义、制度变迁理论、以及路径依赖和制度互补性的分析思路,对企业年金治理过程中的治理结构趋同性和差异性进行了论述,这是本文的创新点之一。
2、在企业年金治理与风险控制的文献综述中可以看出当前绝大多数文献几乎都是单就企业年金治理与风险控制两者之一进行分析论述,没有从理论角度将两者结合起来进行研究。本文将企业年金治理研究与风险控制分析纳入一个整体的分析框架进行研究,尝试探寻两者之间互动的理论联系,探索性地论述了企业年金治理与风险控制互动之间的传导机制以及约束条件,并对两者之间互动的绩效评估做了初步研究,有助于进一步深化对这一问题的研究。
3、论文结合我国企业年金发展的现状和趋势,依据企业年金治理与风险控制互动的分析思路,创新性地提出了反映我国制度环境特点的企业年金治理与风险控制的政策思路,强调了我国必须构建企业年金治理与风险控制的长效机制,并注重企业年金制度环境的培育,特别是需要加强文化认同以及信任制度的建设。
With development of old-age problem and establishment of national multi-level old-age security system, occupational pension makes an important role as one of the supplementary old-age insurance. Occupational pension is a plan that the employers establish for employees or build by both of them. So the research on occupational pension governance and risk-control becomes a cutting-edge and hot issue, especially in the stage of financial crisis, all the countries in the world worry about how to resolve the problem of old-age security governance and risk-control, including occupational pension. The spread of financial crisis conducting from financial sector to capital market, then further affects the real economy, because of occupational pension has natural links with financial field, capital market and real economy, it must be a considerable impact in the occupational pension development. As this reason, occupational pension structure, safely investment and effectual risk-control have become one of important conditions related to economic development and social stability.
Comprehensive study on the occupational pension governance and risk-control in China. As the developed and developing countries develop in different stages and levels of occupational pension, there are some differences in governance structure and risk-control selection. Occupational pension governance and risk-control embedded in a specific environment, it exceeds the general technological level and mechanism constrains. Different cultural backgrounds have different system characteristics in occupational pension governance structure and safety running. How to reveal culture, customs, tradition and other factors in the appearance of complex occupational pension system? How to reveal the game between participants? How to reveal the non-formal institution that affects the forms and path-dependent features of the formal institution inherently? They are prerequisites and key constraints of how to manage occupational pension effectively in non-western countries, and also target of my research itself. So Chinese occupational pension governance and risk-control have their own characteristics. Although institution can learn from abroad in principles, it should also avoid copying foreign models and avoid dependence completely in order to safeguard the country's financial security and stability. Chinese occupational pension institution builds in 2004. From that time, how to establish occupational pension governance and risk-control has become a problem facing to the practical and academic fields. Currently, domestic and foreign academic fields of pension fund governance and risk-control mainly concentrate on the general mechanisms and the technical level, lacking of original research from the institutional environment, social and cultural environment, institutional restraints and the path dependence, especially based on the specific economic in China. So we must explore the occupational pension governance and risk-control methods, make sure it can run safely, with Chinese social and economic characteristics. Thus, this study will use international comparative analytic method to compare with the typical developed and developing countries in the field of occupational pension governance and risk-control from the economic and social development, cultural and so on
This paper has 7 chapters. We can divide it into three parts. The first part is the theory of occupational pension governance and risk control, including chapter 1, chapter 2 and chapter 3. The second part is the interactive relationship between governance and risk control. The third part is the situation of occupational pension governance and risk control in China, and then gives some suggestions for the policy.
The chapter one is the theoretical principle of occupational pension governance and risk control. The occupational pension governance theory is from traditional governance theory to corporate governance and then to the pension governance. OECD pension fund guideline gives the framework for the pension fund governance. The risk control theory contains risk management and risk supervision.
The chapter two describes the general structure of occupational pension. It contains internal governance and external governance. The internal governance has the mechanism of risk-based internal control, and the external governance contains supervision of government, mediator and industry self-regulatory organization. From the international comparison, we analyze the governance structure in developed and developing country and finally explain why there has homoplasy and otherness.
The chapter three is the analysis of occupational pension risk control.this chapter divides the risk into two types, one is directly related to governance and another is indirectly related to governance. The risk directly related to governance is agency risk. The risks indirectly related to governance are investment risk and operation risk. All the risks have their own reason. In the last part, we provide the methods for risk control.
The chapter four is the interaction between occupational pension governance and risk control. The interaction has a important significant for economic development, social stability, social security and capital market. Then we analyze the transmission mechanism of governance and risk control, including internal control, disclosure and report, the selection and cultivating mechanism for governance body. The process of interaction is from governance to risk control and then to governance.
The chapter five is the situation of occupational pension governance and risk control in China. It analyzes and evaluates for the situation.
The chapter six is analysis of occupational pension governance and risk control in China. First, it analyzes the relationship between government and market in occupational pension governance and risk control. Second, it talks about the supporting mechanism for governance and risk control. Third, using behavioral finance, we analyze the behavior of stakeholder in the occupational pension governance and risk control.
The chapter seven is the policy research for enterprise governance and risk control. It gives the policy in the outside environment and supporting mechanism. Outside environment contains capital market, agency market and intermediary market. Supporting mechanism contains incentive and allocation mechanism, legislation, cultural identity and trust institution. At last, we give the policy to risk control from risk control mechanism, risk supervision mechanism, risk dispersal mechanism and risk compensation mechanism.
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