摘要
经济文献中最为传统的主题就是金融危机。从历史的角度看,伴随着经济的全球化、信息化,现代金融危机的爆发,从诱因、实现机制、影响范围、危害程度都发生了深刻的变化,对经济的破坏程度愈来愈烈,这使得政府对金融危机的救助成为不可避免的一个议题。
金融是现代经济的核心。金融机构是现代经济信用链条的中心环节。金融危机爆发后,由于金融脆弱性原因,大量问题金融机构的出现对整个金融系统的稳定,乃至经济体系的安全造成了严重的威胁。进入20世纪中后期,金融危机的爆发趋于频繁。据世界银行统计,20世纪70年代后期到2000年间,世界上共有93个国家先后爆发了112场系统性银行危机,还有46个国家发生了51次局部性危机。而且20世纪90年代以来爆发的金融危机呈现出了新的特点,不仅表现为货币危机的频率提高,而且更多是货币和银行双重危机同时出现,即银行体系和外汇市场同时遭受双重打击。双重危机的爆发和其巨大的传染性,往往导致大量的金融机构破产,使得各国的问题金融机构在金融危机爆发下不断增多,成为政府在应对金融危机中非常棘手的问题。
尽管在理论界对于金融危机、问题金融机构,是任由市场自发调节还是政府救助存在的争议由来已久,但各国还是普遍采取了相应的救助措施。传统的救助模式分为三个层次：政府救助、同业救助、自我救助,实践证明,政府救助是最直接、最及时、效果最明显的方式。因此,当金融危机成为一种公共危机的情况下,政府救助首当其冲。政府金融危机救助的主体主要有两类：财政和央行,救助的方式主要有：财政政策和金融政策。但由于财政和央行在一国宏观经济运行中的职能、作用、政策实施条件及侧重点不同,因此两项政策的实施能否有效的协调配合,减少政策抵消、形成合力,从而解决面临的问题,就成为一个难点和重点。各国政府和学术界都非常重视对两大政策及其协调配合的研究。在金融危机背景下,对问题金融机构的救助同样面临这样的难题。因此,危机背景下,对问题金融机构救助的财政、金融政策及其协调的研究,具有非常现实的意义。
正是基于上述考虑,本文拟采用历史分析法、案例分析法、实证分析法等,分析问题金融机构面临不同问题时的救助政策配合模式,并通过构建一系列的评价指标体系对其进行效果评价。
绪论部分首先对研究涉及到的基本概念和研究范畴进行了界定,并概括了总体的研究框架。文中问题金融机构包含了储蓄性和投资性的金融机构。金融危机发生后其存在的问题主要体现在：流动性不足、不良资产和资本金不足三个方面。通常危机中对问题金融机构的救助分为两类：对可持续经营和不可持续经营的问题金融机构救助,并对财政和金融救助政策进行了界定。为了紧密围绕主题分析,对研究范畴进行了必要的假定：面对危机选择政府救助而不是市场自由出清；谁救—财政和央行；救谁-问题金融机构整体,对具体救助对象选择不做分析；假定政府有足够的财力实施财政救助政策,央行具有相当的独立性,以使金融政策有效、迅速。
第二,以文献综述的方式,对问题金融机构救助中财政金融政策协调的理论基础,从三个层次进行了分析。一是通过金融脆弱性理论及金融脆弱性对危机的影响机理的分析,得出危机中对问题金融机构救助的必然结论,同时指出,救助的方式是改善问题金融机构的资产负债表。二是通过对预期和预期管理的分析,为政府作为救助主体提供了理论基础,该部分还提出了预期管理的工具,以及预期改善对于政府救助政策效果评价的作用、指标等。三是对财政和金融救助政策的协调,即分工和配合进行了理论分析。分工取决于二者最后贷款人和最后支付人的职能：央行救助在危机发生初期为主,以最后贷款人方式提供短期流动性；财政救助在危机发生的中后期为主,以最后支付人的方式解决不良资产、资本金不足以及破产清偿等问题。政策配合则以IS-LM模型为基础,以短期流动性救助和股权注资救助为例进行了分析。
第三,从历史的角度,比较分析了问题金融机构救助的国际经验。通过对历史上较为典型的重大危机救助的分析,回顾了历次危机救助中采取的财政金融政策及其配合情况。通过对美国、欧洲、日本三种金融体制下对问题金融机构救助的分析,阐述了不同金融体制中财政金融政策配合的特殊性和一般性。以上分析为本文的研究提供了丰富的事实依据。
第四,包括第四章和第五章两个章节,为文章的核心部分之一。第四章阐述了对具有可持续经营性的问题金融机构的救助。分三种情况：流动性不足、不良资产和资本金不足,来分析财政金融救助政策的分工和配合。第五章阐述了对不具有可持续经营性的问题金融机构退市的救助,分两种情况：兼并重组和破产,来分析财政金融救助政策的分工与配合。并得出一般性的结论。
第五,采取理论分析和实证分析相结合的方法,构建了问题金融机构救助政策效果的评价体系。本章以理论分析为基础,依据各项函数的内在要求构建了评价指标体系。评价指标体系分为三层：政府声誉影响的评价、问题金融机构救助效果的评价和政府救助对市场预期改善效果评价。最后,通过实证分析的方法,对我国问题金融机构救助的政策效果进行了评价分析,并得出相关的结论和建议。
在研究方法上,本文以理论分析和实证分析相结合、归纳和演绎相结合的方法,遵循提出问题、分析问题、解决问题的研究思路。
本文可能的创新之处在于：
第一,研究视角的创新：从财政政策和金融政策协调的角度来分析微观问题金融机构的救助,并将协调分为：分工和配合两层含义进行全文的分析。第二,运用宏观均衡分析模型：IS-LM模型,对微观问题金融机构救助政策协调进行了理论分析,为文章核心部分的分析提供了理论基础。第三,研究内容的创新：在危机救助中,将问题金融机构划分为可持续经营和不可持续经营两大类来实施,并针对不同的救助目标和对象提出了具体的政策协调措施。第四,构建了救助政策协调的效果评价体系。
Journal of Economic Literature is the most traditional themes of financial crisis. From a historical perspective, along with economic globalization, information technology, modern financial crisis broke out, from incentives, implementation mechanism, the affected areas, the extent damage, profound changes have taken place, more and more damage on the economy strong, This makes the government bailout of the financial crisis become an unavoidable issue.
Finance is the core of modern economy. Financial institutions, credit the modern economy the central link in the chain. Financial crisis, the financial fragility of reason, a large number of problems financial institutions appear on the entire financial system stability, security and even economic system led to serious threats. The late 20th century, the financial crisis broke out, tend to frequent. According to World Bank statistics, in the late 70s of the 20th century to 2000, the world has erupted a total of 93 countries with systemic banking crisis in 112 games, there are 46 countries were 51 partial crisis. And since the 90s of the 20th century the financial crisis shows the new features, not only to increase the frequency of currency crises, and more dual-currency and banking crises occurred simultaneously, and that the banking system and foreign exchange markets also suffered a double blow. Double the crisis and its huge infectious, often leads to a large number of financial institutions in bankruptcy, has contributed to a problem financial institutions under the growing financial crisis, a government response to financial crisis in a very difficult problem.
Despite the financial crisis in theoretical circles, the problem financial institutions, is let the market self-regulation or the existence of the controversial government assistance a long time, but the country is generally taken to the appropriate relief measures. The traditional aid model is divided into three levels: government bailout, industry assistance, self-rescue, proven, government assistance is the most direct and timely, the most dramatic way. Therefore, when the financial crisis becomes a public crisis, the Government rescues bear the brunt. Government rescue of the main financial crisis there are two categories:financial and central bank, the way relief are:fiscal policy and monetary policy. However, due to financial and central bank in a country's macro-economy in the functions, roles, policy implementation conditions and different emphases, so the two can effective implementation of the policy coordination, reduce the policy cancellation, join forces to solve problems has become a difficult and key. Governments and academics attach great importance to coordination of the two major policy and research. In the context of the financial crisis, the rescue of the problem financial institutions also faces these problems. Therefore, the crisis context of the problem financial institutions, financial aid, and the coordination of monetary policy has very real significance.
It is based on the above considerations, this paper uses historical analysis, case analysis, empirical analysis method, analysis of problem financial institutions face different problems of aid policy with model and by constructing a series of evaluation index system evaluate the effect of its.
Introduction part of the first studies related to the basic concept and scope of the study were defined, and summarized the overall research framework. Paper, the problem of financial institutions includes savings and investment in financial institutions. After the financial crisis a problem of its aspects:the lack of liquidity, bad assets and capital of less than three. The problem is usually a crisis in the rescue of financial institutions is divided into two categories:on the sustainable management and sustainable management of the problem does not rescue financial institutions, and fiscal and financial aid policies have been defined. In order to close around the theme of analysis, research scope, the necessary assumption:the face of crisis choose the free government assistance rather than market clearing; who save-Finance and Central Bank; save who-the problem of financial institutions as a whole, makes the object of specific relief options analysis; assume that the government has sufficient financial resources to implement financial aid policy, the central bank has considerable independence, to make monetary policy effective, fast.
Second, the literature review of the way, rescue financial institutions on issues of financial and monetary policy coordination theory, from the three levels analyzed. First, through financial vulnerability and financial fragility theory of the impact of the crisis mechanism, and analyze the crisis in the rescue of financial institutions on the issue of the inevitable conclusion, noting that the way aid is to improve the problem of financial institutions balance sheet. Second, by expectations and expectations of management for the Government as a relief organization to provide the theoretical foundation, some also raised the expectations of the management tools, and is expected to improve the Government's Evaluation of the role of aid policy, indicators. Third, fiscal and financial aid policy coordination, that division of labor and cooperation is analyzed theoretically. Division of labor depends on the lender of last resort and the final payment of both human functions:the central bank assistance early in the crisis, mainly to provide short-term lender of last resort liquidity; financial rescue in the crisis of the late mainly to the final payer resolve non-performing assets, insufficient capital, and bankruptcy issues. Policy with IS-LM model, short-term liquidity relief and equity capital injection of aid as an example.
Thirdly, from a historical perspective, comparative analysis of the problem financial institutions assistance of international experience. Through history, the more typical analysis of major crisis assistance, assistance in the review of previous crisis, fiscal and financial policies adopted and cope with the situation. By the United States, Europe, Japan under the system of three financial aid on the problem of financial institutions to explain the different financial systems with financial policy in the special and general. The above analysis provides a wealth of factual basis.
The fourth, including two chaptersⅣandⅤ, as one of the core of the article. The four chapter on the issue of sustainable management of the rescue financial institutions. Divided three ways:the lack of liquidity, bad assets and capital shortage, to analyze the fiscal and financial aid policy and coordination division. ChapterⅣdo not have a sustainable business issues delisting of the rescue of financial institutions, points to two situations:mergers and acquisitions and bankruptcies, to analyze the fiscal and financial aid policies of the division of labor and cooperation, and to draw general conclusions.
Fifth, a theoretical analysis and empirical analysis of the method, the problem financial institutions to build effective aid policy evaluation system. This chapter is based on theoretical analysis, based on the inherent requirements of the function construct the evaluation index system. Evaluation index system is divided into three levels:impact assessment of the government's reputation, the problem of evaluation of effectiveness of financial institutions and government relief assistance to improve the results of the evaluation of market expectations. Finally, empirical analysis, the problem of financial institutions on China's policy of aid effectiveness was evaluated by analysis and draw appropriate conclusions and recommendations.
The research method, this paper theoretical analysis and empirical analysis, the combination of induction and deduction methods, to follow questions, analyze and solve the problem of thinking.
The innovation lies in this article may:
First, the study of Innovation:from fiscal policy and monetary policy coordination issues in terms of micro-financial institutions, relief, and coordination are divided into:the division of labor and the full text with the analysis of two meanings. Second, the use of macro-equilibrium model:IS-LM model, the micro relief of problem financial institutions to conduct a theoretical analysis of policy coordination, the core part of the analysis for the article provides a theoretical basis. Third, the research content of the innovation:aid in the crisis, the issue of sustainable management of financial institutions and non-divided into two categories to the implementation of sustainable management, and assistance for different objectives and targets put forward specific policy coordination measures. Fourth, build rescue effects of policy coordination in the evaluation system.
引文
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②混合型债务工具包括了可转换债券、长期优先股和累积性优先股,其具有债务和股本双重性质。
③事实上,巴塞尔协议并未列出全部的工具,而是设定了某些必须要满足的标准,为创新资本金补充方式预留了空间。
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