摘要
近年来,控股大股东与中小股东之间的代理问题成为公司治理研究的焦点。Shleifer、Vishny、Johnson等人的研究均认为,控股大股东对中小股东的利益侵占是现代公司最核心的代理问题,Johnson等甚至用“隧道挖掘”一词来形象地描述控股股东的侵占行为。然而,最新的研究表明,控股大股东对中小股东的利益侵占是与公司管理层合谋的结果。因为大股东并不直接参与公司的日常经营管理,很少直接过问公司的具体事务,对公司的具体运作程序也不是十分熟悉,要想转移公司利益,只有与管理者结成联盟才能实现。中国市场是一个新兴加转轨市场,由于发展时间短,保护投资者的相关法律体系和司法体系不健全,而且政府采用行政手段代替经济手段和法律手段对经济运行过度干预,导致上市公司中国有股“一股独大”的畸形股权结构,国有控股股东利用其绝对控股地位与管理者合谋掠夺中小股东利益的行为相当严重。控股大股东与管理者的合谋侵占行为不仅损害了中小股东的利益,而且扰乱了社会经济秩序,降低了社会福利。因此深入研究上市公司大股东-管理者合谋现象,寻求有效的防范对策具有非常重要的意义。
本文基于委托代理理论、契约理论等理论工具,采用规范分析与实证研究相结合的方法,对大股东与管理者合谋的成因及影响因素、合谋对大股东治理效率的影响等问题进行了系统的研究。本文的主要工作可以归纳为以下几个方面：
本文首先分析了上市公司大股东与管理者合谋的成因。我们的研究认为,大股东、管理者目标与公司目标不一致,大股东、管理者与中小股东间信息不对称以及大股东与管理者私人利益相互依存三个因素共同促成了大股东和管理者合谋的形成。
本文探讨了影响上市公司大股东-管理者合谋程度的因素。理论分析和实证检验的结果均表明：公司股权结构和董事会构成等内部治理结构和公司所在地区的法治化水平、政府对经济的干预程度等外部治理环境对合谋程度产生了显著的影响。而内部治理结构又取决于外部治理环境,所以影响大股东-管理者合谋程度的根本因素是外部治理环境。
本文对大股东-管理者合谋对公司治理效率的影响进行了理论分析和实证检验,研究结果表明：大股东与管理者的合谋不会强化大股东对管理者的监督,相反会弱化大股东的监督强度；大股东与管理者的合谋侵占行为与公司价值增长是相悖的,大股东没有动力采用股权激励这种最有效的长期激励方式使管理者的利益与公司整体利益相容,从而导致激励机制的扭曲,激励效率下降；投资形成的控制性资源或资产是大股东和管理者获取合谋收益的主要来源。在合谋的条件下,大股东选择投资于一个项目的标准是从这个项目所获得的股权收益和合谋收益之和的净现值大于零,而不是这个项目的NPV大于零,这样的投资决策会导致次优投资和过度投资的非效率性投资。
最后,本文提出了抑制大股东与管理者合谋侵占的对策措施。文章认为,影响大股东与管理者的合谋掠夺行为的根本因素是公司外部治理环境,因此,要抑制上市公司控股大股东与管理者的合谋行为,降低代理成本,最根本的途径,是从改善外部治理环境入手。
In recent years, agency issue between controlling major shareholders and managers has become the focus of research in corporate governance field. Shleifer, Vishny and Johnson all thought that controlling major shareholders' invading to minority shareholders benefit is the core agency issue of modern company. Johnson et al. even use "tunneling" to describe the controlling shareholders'invading to minority shareholders. However, the newest research indicated that controlling major shareholders'invade to minority shareholders is the result of collusion with corporate managers. Because controlling shareholders rarely care about specific affairs of companies and only managers have the real capability to transfer company profits to private income, so major shareholders have to cooperate with managers and take advantage of managers' professional skill to realize their private interests. The Chinese market is an emerging and switching market. Because the development time is short, the investor legal protection system is not perfect, and moreover the government excessively uses administrative method to intervene economical movement instead of economic means and legal means, Chinese listed companies have formed the abnormal ownership structure of "one share dominates exclusively", which leads to serious invading of state-owned controlling shareholders to minority shareholders through collusion with corporate managers. Collusion between majors shareholders and managers not only damage interests of minority shareholders, but also upset the social economic order and harm the social welfare. So it is very important to further investigate collusion between major shareholders & managers of listed companies and seek effective precaution countermeasures.
Based on Principal-agent theory and contract theory, This article analysed the cause and influence factors of collusion between major shareholders & managers, and the influence of collusion on corporate governance efficiency using both normative analysis method and positive method. The groundwork of this article can be summed up for the following several points:
This article firstly analyzed the cause of major shareholder-manager collusion. Our research thought that the goals of major shareholders and managers are inconsistent with those of companies, major shareholders and managers have information asymmetry with minority shareholders, and private interests of major shareholders and managers are interdependent, which lead to collusion between major shareholders and managers.
This article investigated the influence factors of major shareholder-manager collusion extent. The result of theoretical analysis and positive research both indicated that both corporate ownership structure, board of directors'constitution and so on internal governance structure and external governance environment including legalization level, government intervention degree and so on exert prominent influence on collusion. While internal governance structure depends on external governance environment, external governance environment is the basic influence factor.
This article analyzed the influence of major shareholder-manager collusion on corporate governance efficiency. The result of theoretical analysis and empirical examination both support the following conclusion:Firstly, major shareholder-manager collusion cannot strengthen major shareholders'supervision over managers, instead it attenuates the supervision. Secondly, major shareholder-manager collusion contradicts corporate value promotion, so there is no force for major shareholders to drive managers' benefit compatible with corporate benefit by means of stock ownership incentive, which leads to distortion of incentive mechanism and drops the incentive efficiency. Thirdly, controlling resources out of investment is the basic source of collusion income. Under collusion condition, the criterion that major shareholders choose an investment project is that the sum of stockholder rights income and collusion income is bigger than zero, instead of the net present value of the project is bigger than zero. Such investment decision will lead to second optimal investment and over investment.
Finally this article proposed some measures of guard against collusion between controlling major shareholders and managers. It argues that since the basic factor affecting the extent of collusion between controlling shareholders and managers of listed companies is the external governance environment, so the basic way of guard against collusion is to improve the external governance environment.
引文
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