摘要
作为规范市场竞争的基本法律,反托拉斯法或反垄断法、竞争法在西方成熟市场经济国家有着“自由企业大宪章”、“经济宪法”等称谓,可见其对于市场经济体制的意义以及在整个法律体系中的重要性。1890年《谢尔曼法》的出台具有十分重要的意义。该法不仅仅是许多学者眼中现代经济法产生的重要标志,以其为基础发展起来的美国联邦反托拉斯法也是目前全球一百多部竞争法或反垄断法的共同“祖先”,迄今为止仍是全世界范围内体系最为严密、执法经验最为丰富、理论最为发达的一部竞争法。其120多年的发展历程为其他国家或者地区提供了极为丰富而宝贵的竞争法制经验。“以史为鉴,可以知兴衰”。对于他国法制历史经验的研究同样有助于对本国问题的思考。特别是在经济领域的法律政策方面,由于意识形态涉及较少,可资借鉴之处会更多一些。因此,对美国联邦反托拉斯法历史经验的总结不仅具有重要的理论价值,也对我国《反垄断法》的完善和实践有着直接的、重要的应用价值。
美国联邦反托拉斯法的产生有着深刻的历史背景,与其所处时代和美国的政治、法律传统密不可分。1890年《谢尔曼法》出台后,基于对其实施状况的不满,就有了1914年《克莱顿法》和《联邦贸易委员会法》。这三部国会立法奠定了联邦反托拉斯法的基本框架,此后主导制度演化的主角则变成了联邦法院、特别是联邦最高法院。在其百年历史中逐渐发展出当代各国竞争法普遍采用的各项制度及理论,并伴随着政治经济社会变迁和理论发展而发生周期性的宽严变化。在其历史演进中,也逐渐形成了联邦反托拉斯法在美国社会的独特地位,包括理念上与宪法相类比、一直处于国家经济政策的核心地位、以及发达的竞争文化体现出的美国社会的普遍认同；在其历史发展中,经济学界也从一开始的漠不关心到逐渐参与其中,发展到今天经济学获得了美国联邦执法机构和学者所普遍承认的中心地位,为联邦反托拉斯法更好地适用提供了有力的支持；该法具有良好的实施机制,拥有强有力的联邦执法机构,独特的三倍损害赔偿和私人执行制度,联邦法院也通过富有弹性的判断标准塑造了该法如今的面貌。美国联邦反托拉斯法的上述特点或者说经验对其他国家或者地区影响极大,为所有的后来者提供了宝贵的制度和理论经验,其竞争政策在国家经济政策中的重要地位、对于效率的强调、经济学思想及工具的引入、私人执行以及其他大量实施方法的创造及应用,均有着世界性的影响。中国《反垄断法》立法和实施已经有过借鉴,未来也应更多地关注美国联邦反托拉斯法的百年历史经验。
As the basic law regulating competition in the market, antitrust law or anti-monopoly law, competition law in the western mature market economy countries has the crown of "Magna Carta of free enterprise","economic constitution" and other titles. It shows its significance to the market economic system as well as in the whole the importance of the legal system. The Sherman Act, introduced in1890has a very important significance. The law is not only an important symbol of modern economic law's emergence in the eyes of many scholars, its development based the U.S. federal antitrust law which based on The Sherman Act is the common "ancestor" of more than100global competition law or antitrust today. And from then on the U.S. federal antitrust law still has the most stringent system, the most experienced law enforcement and the most developed theory in the world. Its120years of development for other countries or regions provides a very rich and valuable competition legal experience."Taking history as a mirror, can know rise and decline". Research on the historical experience of his country's legal system also contributes to the thinking of our own problems. Especially in the economic sphere of legal policy, because ideology involving less, reference places will be more. Therefore, the summary of the historical experience of the U.S. federal antitrust law not only has an important theoretical value, improve and practice of China's "anti-monopoly law," it also has a direct and important value to the improvement and practice of China's anti-monopoly law.
The generation of the U.S. federal antitrust law has the profound historical background, and the age and American political, legal tradition are inseparable. After the introduction of the1890Sherman Act, based on their dissatisfaction with the status of implementation, the1914Clayton Act and Federal Trade Commission Act were enacted. The three Congressional legislations laid the basic framework of the federal antitrust laws. Then the leading roles of promoting system evolution became the federal courts, especially the Supreme Court. In the next hundred years, it has gradually developed various systems and theories which generally accepted by the contemporary competition laws, and along with the political, economic and social change and theoretical development it has had cyclical changes between the tolerance and severe to business. In its historical evolution, the federal antitrust law has gradually gained a unique status in American society, including the concept analogy with the Constitution, the core position of the national economic policy, as well as a strong culture of competition which reflected the universal sense of identity in American society. In its historical development, economic circles also changed from the beginning of the indifference to gradually involved. And now the economics is widely accepted by the federal law enforcement agencies and scholars as the key role in the federal antitrust law, and provides its more effective enforcement with a strong support. The law also has good implementation mechanism. There are strong federal law enforcement agencies, the unique treble damages system and private enforcement regime. The federal courts have also through the elastic criteria shaped the law's now appearance. The above characteristics or experiences of the U.S. federal antitrust law have a great impact on other countries or regions, and provide valuable institutional and theoretical experience for all the latecomers. The important position in the country's economic policy of its competition policy, the emphasis for efficiency economic thought and tools, the creation of private enforcement and other implementation methods and applications, have a worldwide impact. China's anti-monopoly law legislation and implementation have already learned from the American experience, and in the future should be more concerned about the centuries-old experience of the U.S. federal antitrust laws.
引文
① Robert J. Samuelson, Competition's Anxious Victory, THE WASHINGTON POST, Feb.2,2005, at A-23.
② 当然,反垄断法与反不正当竞争法之间并非界限清晰。而美国1914年《联邦贸易委员会》第5条事实上也可以作为对大量不正当竞争行为的追究依据,联邦贸易委员会也负有反对各种市场上的欺诈行为、保护消费者的职责。可参见孙晋、李胜利：《竞争法原论》,武汉大学出版社2011年版,第16-23页。
① 史际春、赵忠龙：《竞争政策：经验与文本的交织进化》,《法学研究》2010年第5期,第104-112页。
① [美]迈克尔·D.温斯顿：《反垄断经济学前沿》,张嫚、吴绪亮、章爱民译,东北财经大学出版社2007年版,第3页。
② [德]曼弗里德·诺伊曼：《竞争政策——历史、理论及实践》,谷爱俊译,北京大学出版社2003年版,“前言”部分。
① 可参见漆多俊：《经济法基础理论》,法律出版社2008年第4版,第37页。
② See Nicola Giocoli, Competition vs. Property Rights:American Antitrust Law, the Freiburg School and the Early Years of European Competition Policy (May 1,2007). Journal of Competition Law and Economics,2009. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=987788.
① 参见孙辛勤、李胜利：《房地产政策与法规》,中国物资出版社1998年版,第21页。
① 参见刘宗绪等著：《世界近代现代历史专题30讲》,西北大学出版社1996年版,第147页。
② 1807年,英国为与拿破仑作战,炮击美国战舰“切萨皮克号”,强征舰上海员。此举激起美国人强烈的反英情绪,1807年12月,美国国会通过《禁运法案》,禁止一切船只离开美国前往外国港口。但禁运并没能给英国造成伤害,反而使美国经济陷入全面瘫痪。1807年至1808年,美国出口下降88%,进口下降59%,农产品价格不断下跌,工业消费品供应发生严重困难,财政出现巨额亏空。为此,《禁运法案》不得不在1809年初取消。然而,正是在这个禁运风潮期间,航海业、对外商业的萧条促使大量的资金投入到制造业,美国制造业得到空前发展,东北部制造业逐渐兴起,为19世纪60年代工业化率先在那里完成打下了良好的基础。参见吴学安：《美国贸易保护主义的前世今生》,《国际商报》2009年2月17日,第2版；韩家炳：《美国1807年(禁运法案)的代价与影响》,《安徽师范大学学报(人文社会科学版)》2003年第2期。③ 美国《禁运法案》取消后,英国继续劫掠美国船只,加上美国国内西部扩张主义者的鼓动,1812年美英正式交战。这场战争对美国经济的影响和禁运十分相似,对外贸易和航海业陷入长期萧条和停滞,而制造业却飞速发展,对英国霸权构成了真正威胁。参见韩德强：《美国崛起之路对中国的启示——对美国历史上贸易保护和自由贸易之争的思考》,《经济纵横》1999年第8期。
④ [美]丹尼尔·雷恩：《管理思想的演变》,赵睿等译,中国社会科学出版社2000年版,第107页。
⑤ 牛文光：《美国社会保障制度的发展》,中国劳动社会保障出版社2004年版,第126页。
⑥ See A. D. Neale, The Antitrust Laws of the U.S.A., The Origins and Historical Development of Antitrust,1960, at 11-18.
① 参见[美]伯纳德·施瓦茨：《美国法律史》,王军等译,法律出版社2007年版,第139-140页。
② 由于普尔组织要仰赖于各铁路公司的自愿参与,缺乏足够的强制力,因而在某些商业危机爆发时,常常会被内部人所破坏。所以,后来在19世纪末的经济危机中,摩根等银行家通过控股公司的方式,组建了四大公司控制了全国的铁路网,形成了一个巨大的铁路大帝国。
③ 参见[台]赖源河编审：《公平交易法新论》(第三版),台湾元照出版社2005年版,第48页。
① 薛波主编,潘汉典总审订：《元照英美法辞典》,法律出版社2003年版,第1360页。
② [美]伯纳德·施瓦茨：《美国法律史》,王军等译,法律出版社2007年版,第141页。
③ [美]彼得·科利尔、戴维·赫罗维兹：《洛克菲勒家族传》,周越、叶晓玲等译,中国时代经济出版社2004年版,第37页。
④ [美]彼得·科利尔、戴维·赫罗维兹：《洛克菲勒家族传》,周越、叶晓玲等译,中国时代经济出版社2004年版,第37页。
⑤ 参见[台]张耀东：《贸易管制》,台湾学生书局1973年版,第1-9页。
① 参见漆多俊：《时代潮流与模块互动——“国家调节说”对经济法理论问题的破译》,载漆多俊主编：《经济法论丛》(第十三卷),中国方正出版社2007年版,第1-51页。
② 转引自[美]伯纳德·施瓦茨：《美国法律史》,王军等译,法律出版社2007年版,第144页。
③ 转引自[美]伯纳德·施瓦茨：《美国法律史》,王军等译,法律出版社2007年版,第144页。
④ 杨生茂、刘绪贻总主编：《美国通史》(第三卷),人民出版社2002年版,第215页。
⑤ [美]劳伦斯·M.弗里德曼：《美国法律史》,苏彦新等译,中国社会科学出版社2007年版,第486页。
⑥ [美]劳伦斯·M.弗里德曼：《美国法律史》,苏彦新等译,中国社会科学出版社2007年版,第487页。
① 转引自[美]彼得·科利尔、戴维·赫罗维兹：《洛克菲勒家族传》,周越、叶晓玲等译,中国时代经济出版社2004年版,第46页。
② 参见杨生茂、刘绪贻总主编：《美国通史》(第三卷),人民出版社2002年版,第276-283页。
① 绿背纸币运动是美国历史上的一次农民运动,系19世纪70年代农民反对通货收缩的运动。在南北战争期间,联邦政府的税收收入不足以支付战争所需,在政府负债累累之后,1861年,为了筹措南北战争费用,国会授权财政部直接发行了4.31亿无铸币和黄金担保的纸币。为了防止假币,当时使用了难以照相复制的绿色油墨,由于技术上的原因,钞票背面使用了比正面深的绿色,由此被称为“绿背票”(greenback)。人们当然更信任金银等“硬币”,特别是当联邦军队节节败退的时候。在市场贬值流通,广大的持有人(主要是农民)受到极大损失。战后,银行家和工业资本家要求债务人以金元偿债,并要求政府收缩通货,收回流通中的绿背纸币,共和党政府企图撤销绿背纸币。随着自给自足农业经济向农业商品经济的转变,美国农场主由硬币主义转向通货膨胀主义,由自由放任主义转向政府干预主义。农民也反对撤销绿背纸币,反对恢复硬币支付,为此发起了绿背纸币运动,坚决要求用贬值的绿背纸币清偿债务(主要是国债),并于1874年组织绿背党(又称“独立国民党”)展开斗争,并积极参加竞选。后来又有工人参加,组成绿背劳工党。这一反对通货收缩的斗争长达三十年之久。参见陈明：《绿背纸币运动的历史背景、思想渊源及影响》,《史林》2003年第6期,第113-117页；张翼：《美国物价二百年》,《世界博览》2008年第3期,第46-48页。
② 杨生茂、刘绪贻总主编：《美国通史》(第三卷),人民出版社2002年版,第193页。
③ Thomas D. Morgan, Cases and Materials on Modern Antitrust Law and Its Origins, St. Paul, Minn.:West Group,1994. p20.
① Thomas D. Morgan, Cases and Materials on Modern Antitrust Law and Its Origins, St. Paul, Minn.:West Group,1994. P22.
② Craft v. Mc Conoughy,79 ILL.346 (1875).
③ Richardson v. Buhl, 77 Mich.632,43 N.W.1102(1889).
④ 根据网上资料,1889年3月9日堪萨斯通过了全美第一部反托拉斯法。参见：Today in Kansas History, http://www.historyorb.com/countries/usa/kansas.2009-08-03.
⑤ 参见[台]赖源河编审：《公平交易法新论》(第三版),台湾元照出版社2005年版,第51-52页。
① 参见王海燕、吕平：《美国的反托拉斯法促进美国的技术创新了吗》,《中国软科学》2003年第3期,第89-93页。
② Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific Railroad Company v. Illinois,118 U.S.557 (1886).
③ 而在其之前,作为Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific Railroad Company v. Illinois,一案的直接后果,1887年制订了《州际商务法》,据此成立了州际商务委员会对跨州铁路实施监管。但是由于该法案自身的语言含糊,加之联邦最高法院的保守立场,使得该委员会除了对铁路过去的违反商业法案的错误进行惩罚外,几乎再无其他权力。参见[美]劳伦斯·M.弗里德曼：《美国法律史》,苏彦新等译中国社会科学出版社2007年版,第491-493页。
① 参见丛日云：《基督教传统与古典自由主义论纲》,载《在上帝与恺撒之间——基督教二元政治观与近代自由主义》,上海三联书店出版社2003年版,“导言”部分。
② 转引自负杰：《有限政府论：思想渊源与现实诉求》,《政治学研究》2005年第1期,第10-18页。
③ 当然,美国的放任政策有其特殊之处,是同贸易保护主义、政府鼓励措施相结合的放任主义,是典型的内外有别。 1791年亚历山大·汉密尔顿提交的《制造业报告》中已经完整地提出了这种政策,此后美国长期实施的高关税政策、对铁路建设的巨大支持(如赠与巨额的土地资源)、对本国工业的扶持等等,无一不体现了这一政策。当然,该政策最终取得了巨大成功。但是,高关税政策也使美国农业和农民受害颇深,同时促进了美国工业的集中和垄断,因为关税壁垒稳定了国内市场行情,有利于大企业之间建立价格协定、普尔和各种联合体。受高关税保护的工业部门大多较早地形成了垄断。糖业托拉斯总经理哈夫曼承认：“高关税乃托拉斯政策”。具体可参见杨生茂、刘绪贻总主编：《美国通史》(第三卷),人民出版社2002年版,第198-205页；Ha-Joon Chang:《抽掉梯子——自由贸易的“真实历史”》,李胜利译,载《新政治经济学评论》第3卷(总第七期),浙江大学出版社2007年版,第52-82页。
① 转引自杨生茂、刘绪贻总主编：《美国通史》(第三卷),人民出版社2002年版,第202页。
② Tenement-House Cigar Cases,98 N. Y.98. (1885).
③ 李胜利：《“模块论”：中西方国家经济法的产生、发展与互动》,载陈云良主编：《国家调节说的理论与实践》,法律出版社2008年版,第137-163页。
④ 王名扬教授指出,作为一个控制经济活动的工具而言,它不是一个创新,因为此前美国某些州中已经成立了类似的委员会。该委员会的重要性不仅在于它是联邦政府第一个控制经济活动的委员会,而且是因为它表示经济活动已经超过州的控制范围,必须由联邦政府控制。参见王名扬：《美国行政法》,中国法制出版社1995年版,第174-175 页。
① 在该次大选中胜出、成为美国第23位总统的本杰明·哈里森(1833年8月20日—1901年3月13日)也支持制定一部联邦反托拉斯法,《谢尔曼法》就是在其任内出台的。
② Cong.Rec.2456(1890).
① Cong. Rec.2460 (1890).
② Cong. Rec.2462 (1890).
③ Thomas D. Morgan, Cases and Materials on Modern Antitrust Law and Its origins, West Publishing Co.1994, p 25-26.
④ Cong. Rec.1768(1890).
⑤ 参见孔祥俊：《反垄断法原理》,中国法制出版社2001年版,第63页。
① Thomas D. Morgan, Cases and Materials on Modern Antitrust Law and Its origins, West Publishing Co.1994, p 22.
② [美]劳伦斯·M.弗里德曼：《美国法律史》,苏彦新等译,中国社会科学出版社2007年版,第503页。
③ 参见[美]小杰伊·德雷特勒：《Licensing of Intellectual Property》(英文版),清华大学出版社2003年版,第398页。
④ See Bruce Bringhurst, Antitrust and the Oil Monopoly:The Standard Oil Cases,1890-1911, Westport, Conn.:Greenwood Press,1979.
① [美]理查德·A.波斯纳著：《反托拉斯法》(第二版),孙秋宁译,中国政法大学出版社2003年版,第37-38页。
② Cong. Rec.2456 (1890).
③ 威廉·霍华德·塔夫脱(William Howard Taft,1857年9月15日—1930年3月8日)的职业生涯在美国也堪称传奇,他先是州法院和联邦巡回法院的法官,并担任过美国司法部副部长、陆军部部长等政府要职,然后于1909年-1913年成为美国第27任总统,1921-1930年间,他被第29任总统沃伦·G·哈丁(President Warren G. Harding)提名为美国联邦最高法院的首席大法官。这也成就了他作为一个法律人毕生的梦想。这也是迄今为止唯一一位既做过美国总统,又做过联邦最高法院法官的美国人。
④ 参见孔祥俊：《反垄断法原理》,中国法制出版社2001年版,第66-67页。
② [美]劳伦斯·M.弗里德曼：《美国法律史》,苏彦新等译,中国社会科学出版社2007年版,第505页。
① See Thomas D. Morgan, Cases and Materials on Modern Antitrust Law and Its origins, West Publishing Co.1994, P30.
② 史蒂芬·格罗弗·克利夫兰(Stephen Grover Cleveland,1837年3月18日一1908年6月24日),美国第22和24任美国总统,也是美国史上唯一一位担任了两任但并非连续任期的总统。
③ "That which belongs to commerce is within the jurisdiction of the United States, but that which does not belong to commerce is within the jurisdiction of the police power of the State.... Doubtless the power to control the manufacture of a given thing involves in a certain sense the control of its disposition, but... affects it only incidentally and indirectly." See United States v. E. C. Knight Co.,156 U.S.1 (1895).
① 转引自[美]劳伦斯·M.弗里德曼：《美国法律史》,苏彦新等译,中国社会科学出版社2007年版,第505-506页。
② 杨生茂、刘绪贻总主编：《美国通史》(第三卷),人民出版社2002年版,第213页。
③ 参见[美]劳伦斯·M.弗里德曼：《美国法律史》,苏彦新等译,中国社会科学出版社2007年版,第506页。
④ See United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association,166 U.S.290 (1897).
① United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association,166 U.S.290 (1897).
② Cong. Rec.3145(1890).
③ Cong. Rec.2460(1890).
④ [美]劳伦斯·M.弗里德曼：《美国法律史》,苏彦新等译,中国社会科学出版社2007年版,第504页。
① 转引自[美]赫伯特·霍温坎普：《联邦反托拉斯政策——竞争法律及其实践》(第三版),许光耀、江山、王晨译,法律出版社2009年版,第60页。
② James William Coleman, Law and Power:the Sherman Antitrust Act and its Enforcement in the Petroleum Industry, Social Problem, Vol.32, No.3, Feb.1985.
① 转引自任东来、孙庆：《第八大案：20世纪美国反托拉斯垄断的第一枪——北方证券公司诉美国案(1904)》,载任东来、陈伟、白雪峰等著：《美国宪政历程：影响美国的25个司法大案》,中国法制出版社2005年第2版,第133-146页。
① 参见任东来、孙庆：《第八大案：20世纪美国反托拉斯垄断的第一枪——北方证券公司诉美国案(1904)》,载任东来、陈伟、白雪峰等著《美国宪政历程：影响美国的25个司法大案》,中国法制出版社2005年6月第2版,第133-146。
② 塔夫脱总统在1908年大选中向选民允诺一旦当选,就会全力追究标准石油公司案。他主张在法律体系内解决问题,在其任内发起了90起针对大企业的反托拉斯诉讼,当时最大的企业美国钢铁公司也在被告之列,最终也获得了成功。
③ Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States,221 U.S.1 (1911).
④ "… a consciousness that the freedom of the individual right to contract, when not unduly or improperly exercised, was the most efficient means for the prevention of monopoly". See Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States,221 U.S.1(1911).当然,亦有资料显示是代伊大法官导入了合理规则(Justice Day introduced the "rule of reason" which stated effectively that if a restraint of trade was ancillary to a legitimate business transaction, and reasonable in the eyes of the contracting parties and the general public, then such restraints of trade were not illegal.) Available at http://law.jrank.org/pages/13656/United-States-v-Standard-Oil.html#ixzzONxW5uvQb,2011-03-08.
⑤ U.S. v. AMERICAN TOBACCO CO.,221 U.S.106 (1911).
① Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D.Park & Sons Co.,220 U.S.373(1911).
① See A.L.A. SCHECHTER POULTRY CORPORATION v. UNITED STATES,295 U.S.495 (1935).
① Chicago Board of Trade v. United States,238 U.S.231 (1918).
① Chicago Board of Trade v. United States,238 U.S.231 (1918).
② 参见[美]赫伯特·霍温坎普：《联邦反托拉斯政策——竞争法律及其实践》(第三版),许光耀、江山、王晨译,法律出版社2009年版,第278-279页。
③ United States v. Trenton Poteries,273 U.S.392 (1927).
④ Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States,356 U.S.1 (1958).
① Peltier, Jean-Mari, Defending the Cornerstone of Cooperation, Rural Cooperatives, Vol.72, No.4.
② 可参见[美]乔纳森·休斯、路易斯·P凯恩：《美国经济史》(第7版),邸晓燕、邢露等译,北京大学出版社2011年版,第478-487页,第499-511页。
③ 当然,近年来不少人认为2007年美国次贷危机引发的全球性经济危机比大萧条还要严重。
④ [美]斯坦利·L·恩格尔曼、罗伯特·E·高尔曼主编：《剑桥美国经济史》(第三卷：20世纪),蔡挺、张林、李雅菁译,中国人民大学出版社2008年版,第218页。
⑤ 富兰克林·德拉诺·罗斯福(Franklin Delano Roosevelt,1882年1月30日—1945年4月12日),美国31位、第32任总统(1933年3月4日——1937年1月20日,1937年1月20日——1941年1月20日,1941年1月20日——1945年1月20日,1945年1月20——1945年4月12日)美国历史上唯一蝉联四届(第四届未任满)的总统。罗斯福在大萧条和第二次世界大战中扮演了重要的角色,领导了美国社会的转型,并赢得了第二次世界大战,被普遍认为是美国历史上最伟大的总统之一。
⑧ [美]斯坦利·L·恩格尔曼、罗伯特·E·高尔曼主编：《剑桥美国经济史》(第三卷：20世纪),蔡挺、张林、李雅菁译,中国人民大学出版社2008年版,第230页。
① [美]斯坦利·L·恩格尔曼、罗伯特·E·高尔曼主编：《剑桥美国经济史》(第三卷：20世纪),蔡挺、张林、李雅菁译,中国人民大学出版社2008年版,第707页。
② Schechter Poultry Corp v. U.S.,295 U.S.495 (1935).
③ 参见[美]乔纳森·休斯、路易斯·P凯恩：《美国经济史》(第7版),邸晓燕、邢露等译,北京大学出版社2011年版,第518页。
④ See Butler v. U.S.,279, U.S.1 (1936).
⑤ [美]乔纳森·休斯、路易斯·P凯恩：《美国经济史》(第7版),邸晓燕、邢露等译,北京大学出版社2011年版,第518页。
① Christina Romer, Why Did Prices Rise During the 1930s?. The Journal of Economic History, Volume 59, Issue 01. March 1999, pp 167-199.
② Harold Cole & Lee Ohanian, New Deal Policies and the Persistence of the Great Depression:A General Equilibrium Analysis. Journal of Political Economy,112 (4):779-815, (2004).
③ Richard Posner, A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement. The Journal of Law and Economics,13(2):365-419 (1970). See Table 1 and 15, page 366.
④ Carl Shapiro, Competition Policy in Distressed Industries, Remarks as Prepared For Delivery to ABA Antitrust Symposium:Competition as Public Policy May 13,2009. Available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/245857.htm.2009-05-07.
① [美]赫伯特·霍温坎普：《反垄断事业——原理与执行》,吴绪亮、张兴、刘慷等译,东北财经大学出版社2011年版,第60页。
② Antitrust Modernization Commission, Report and Recommendations, April 2007.
① See United States v. Aluminum Company of America,148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir.1945).
② 也有资料显示是因为这四位法官是因为在此前曾经卷入过当事人之间的诉讼,而被迫要求回避。See Spencer WeberWaller, The Antitrust Legacy of Thurman Arnold, ST. JOHN'S L. REV.569,591-92 (2004).
③ See Alcoa and beyond:Toward a "structural" approach to section 2, http://www.clt.astate.edu/crbrown/alcoa.htm. 2012-01-12.
④ See United States v. Aluminum Company of America,148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir.1945).
① 黄勇、董灵：《反垄断法经典判例解析》,人民法院出版社2002年版,第149页。
② 这七家电影制片商分别是：Paramount, Universal, MGM, Twentieth Century-Fox, Warner Bros., Columbia and RKO.
③ Hollywood May 3,1948:U.S. Supreme Court decides Paramount antitrust case, http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/us-supreme-court-decides-paramount-antitrust-case.2012-08-25.
④ United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc.,334 U.S.141 (1948).
① Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States,356 U.S.1 (1958).
② Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States,356 U.S.1 (1958).
③ Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,370 U.S 294 (1962).
① 参见韩伟：《美国<横向合并指南)的最新修订及启示》,《现代法学》2011年第3期,第151-164页。
② 参见[美]J·E·克伍卡、L·J·怀特编著：《反托拉斯革命——经济学、竞争与政策》,林平、臧旭恒等译,经济科学出版社2007年版,“导言”部分。
① Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.,433 U.S.36 (1977).
① Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc.,441 U.S.1 (1979).
② PSKS, Inc. v. Leegin, Inc.,127 S. Ct.2712 (2004).
① See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.,127 S. Ct 2705,2714,2720 (2007).
② Jason A. Casey, The Rule of Reason After Leegin:Reconsidering the Use of Economic Analysis in the Antitrust Arena, SUFFOLK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW, Vol. XLII:919-938. (2009).
③ see Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat'l Football League,555 U.S.1168,130 S. Ct.2216 (2010).
④ United States v. AT&T,552 F.Supp.131 (D.D.C.1982).
① United States v. Microsoft Corp.,253 F.3d 34 (D.C.Cir.2001).
② [美]迈克尔·D·温斯顿：《反垄断经济学前沿》,张嫂、吴绪亮、章爱民译,东北财经大学出版社2007年版,第58页。
③ 具体可参见丁茂中：《美国现代反托拉斯法发展简史(九)》,http://dingmaozhong.bokee.com/6902916.html, 2012-08-26.
① 具体可参见韩伟：《美国<横向合并指南>的最新修订及启示》,《现代法学》2011年第3期,第151-164页。
② Carl Shapiro, The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines:From Hedgehog to Fox in Forty Years, Antitrust law Journal, Vol. 11,2010:701-759.
③ Joseph Farrell, Carl Shapior. Antitrust Evaluation of Horizontal Mergers:An Economic Alternative to Market Definition.The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, Vol.10,2010.
③ See Edward Valdespino, Shifting Viewpoints:The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvement Act, A Substantive or Jurisdictional Approach, TEXAS INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL. VOL.45:457-485. (2009).
① Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law, Ch.2A, at 288 (3d ed.2006).
② 英国的Hartford是一家再保险公司,美国司法部在美国地方法院指控,它同美国的保险公司在英国制定保单时存在有共谋行为。Hartford和英国政府在案件中指出,这种行为根据英国法律是合法的。初审法院法官认为根据Timberlane案所确立的方法(合理管辖规则)分析,不应由美国法院管辖；上诉法院法官运用同样的方法,但却得出了相反的结论。在终审中,最高法院的多数法官抛弃了合理管辖原则,转而采用效果原则,结果判决被告败诉。See Hartford Fire Insurance v. California,509 U.S.764 (1993).
① Adams v. Burke,84 U.S.453 (1873).
② 王先林：《知识产权与反垄断法——知识产权滥用的反垄断问题研究》(第二版),法律出版社2008年版,第101页。
③ Hovenkamp, Herbert J., IP and Antitrust Policy:A Brief Historical Overview (December 2005). U Iowa Legal Studies Research Paper No.05-31. Available at SSRN:http://ssrn.com/abstract=869417 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.869417.
④ 参见王先林：《知识产权与反垄断法——知识产权滥用的反垄断问题研究》(第二版),法律出版社2008年版,第101页。
⑤ Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Co.,243 U.S.502 (1917).
① SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp.,645 F.2d 1195,1203 (2d Cir.1981).
② 参见王先林：《知识产权与反垄断法——知识产权滥用的反垄断问题研究》(第二版),法律出版社2008年版,第105-113页。
③ U.S. Dep't of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm'n, Antitrust Enforcement and Intellectual Property Rights:Promoting Innovation and Competition (2007).
④ Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc.04.1329 (2006).
① Hovenkamp, Herbert J., IP and Antitrust Policy:A Brief Historical Overview (December 2005). U Iowa Legal Studies Research Paper No.05-31. Available at SSRN:http://ssrn.com/abstract=869417.
② 参见漆多俊：《市场、调节机制与法律的同步演变——世纪之交的回顾与展望》,载漆多俊主编：《经济法论丛》(第一卷),中国方正出版社1999年版,第1-24页。
① David J. Gerber, International Antitrust Convergence:The Real and Imagined Roles of U.S. Antitrust Law, Prepared for the 2005 ABA Spring Antitrust Meeting, March 30,2005, in Washington, D.C..
② "The purpose of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act is to prevent undue restraints of interstate commerce, to maintain i appropriate freedom in the public interest, to afford protection from the subversive or coercive influences of monopolistic endeavor. As a charter of freedom, the Act has a generality and adaptability comparable to that found to be desirable in constitutional provisions." See Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. U. S.,288 U.S.344,359-60,53 S.Ct.471,474,77 L.Ed.825 (1933).
① "The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade. It rests on the premise that the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield the best allocation of our economic resources, and lowest prices, the highest quality and the greatest material progress, while at the same time providing an environment conducive to the preservation of our democratic political and social institutions." See Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United States,356 U.S.1,4 (1958).
② "Antitrust laws in general, and the Sherman Act in particular, are the Magna Carta of free enterprise. They are as important to the preservation of economic freedom and our free-enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our fundamental personal freedoms. And the freedom guaranteed each and every business, no matter how small, is the freedom to compete -- to assert with vigor, imagination, devotion, and ingenuity whatever economic muscle it can muster." United States v. Topco Associates, Inc.,405 U.S.596,610 (1972).
③ "The Sherman Antitrust Act of July 2,1890,26 Stat.209,15 U.S.C.1, has been likened to a charter of economic liberty. expressing a national policy akin to constitutional principles in importance and impact upon the general welfare. " United States v. Azzarelli Construction Co. and John F. Azzarelli,612 F.2d 292 (7th Cir.1979).
④ Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Trinko,540 U.S.398,415 (2004).
⑤ See Mueller, Charles E., Antitrust law:the Magna Carta of the free enterprise system, Antitrust Law and Economics Review (1996).
① 我国有学者指出：美国在独立战争胜利之后,选择了“自由至上,兼顾秩序”的制宪理想,并以此为基础建立了一套稳固的国家制度。而这是由美国“自由至上”的建国历程所决定的。参见林慕华：《自由与秩序——政治文化视角下的中美制宪选择比较》,《岭南学刊》2007年第5期,第52-56页。
② 参见孔祥俊：《反垄断法原理》,中国法制出版社2001年版,第19-20页。
③ 第十四修正案的strict, intermediate, "rational basis with bite" and rational basis四项规则分别对应于反托拉斯法的per se, quick look, rule of reason, and a sort of rule-of-reason-minus这四项。See Ben Shartsis, The Curious Parallels Between Antitrust and Constitutional Law, http://cblr.columbia.edu/archives/12032,2012-7-19.
③ Paul H. Brietzke, The Constitutionalization of Antitrust:Jefferson, Madison, Hami,22 Val. U. L. Rev.275 (1988), pp.275-330.
④ Thomas C. Arthur, Workable Antitrust Law:The Statutory Approach to Antitrust, June,1988,62 Tul. L. Rev.1163.
⑤ 王中美：《关于兼并中反垄断规制的经济学与法学分析——美国反托拉斯法的经验》,载漆多俊主编：《经济法论丛》(第十四卷),中国方正出版社2008年版,第97-124页。
① 参见李国海：《经济民主：反垄断法的宪政价值》,载漆多俊主编：《经济法论丛》2011年上卷,武汉大学出版社2011年版,第26-44页。
② Rudolph J. R. Peritz, Competition Policy in America,1888-1992:Hi story, Rhetoric, Law. New York:Oxford University Press,1996, p.272.
③ 参见李胜利：《反垄断法再分配功能初探》,《河北法学》2008年第8期,第48-51页。
① See Carl Shapiro, Competition Policy in Distressed Industries, Remarks Prepared for Delivery to American Bar Association Antitrust Symposium (May 13,2009), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/245857.htm. 2012-07-21.
② Lawrence J. White, Antitrust Policy and Industrial Policy:A View from the U.S., White, Lawrence J., Antitrust Policy and Industrial Policy:A View from the U.S. (January 14,2008). NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No.08-05. Available at SSRN:http://ssrn.com/abstract=1091244 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1091244.
③ STANDARD OIL CO. v. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION.340 U.S.231 (71 S.Ct.240,95 L.Ed.239).
④ NATIONAL SOCIETY OF PROFESSIONAL ENGINEERS. v. UNITED STATES.435 U.S.679 (1978).
① See Joe Miller, Obama moving America "toward socialism", available at http://voices.washingtonpost.com/44/2010/09/joe-miller-obama-moving-americ.html,2011-04-18当然,部分美国人对于奥巴马政府救市计划更具讽刺意义的称呼是lemon socialism (See Paul Krugman, Bailouts for Bunglers, The New York Times, February 1,2009.),是指称政府强行干预市场机制,让该倒闭的公司不倒闭,该付出代价的股东和企业主却把责任转移到国库和纳税人头上,造成企业赚钱时归自己,亏钱时归大家的劫贫济富式的资本主义。
② See Carl Shapiro, Competition Policy in Distressed Industries, Remarks Prepared for Delivery to American Bar Association Antitrust Symposium (May 13,2009), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/245857.htm. 2012-07-21.
③ See Carl Shapiro, Competition Policy in Distressed Industries, Remarks Prepared for Delivery to American Bar Association Antitrust Symposium (May 13,2009), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/245857.htm. 2012-07-21.
① Russell W. Damtoft, The Relationship Between Competition Policy and Industrial Policy:The Historical Experience of the United States, UNCTAD Intergovernmental Committee of Experts on Competition Law and Policy, Geneva, Switzerland, July 7,2009.
② See Michael Porter, The Competitive Advantage of Nations, New York:Free Press, (1998) 662-665.
③ Robert Driscoll and Jack Behrman, eds., National Industrial Policies, Cambridge, Mass.,1984, at 5, quoted in Lawrence J. White, "Antitrust and Industrial Policy:A View from the U.S.," Working Paper 08-04, Reg-Markets Center, January 2008.
④ Jeffrey A. Hart, Can Industrial Policy Be Good Policy?, Conference on The Political Economy of Policy Reform, Tulane University, New Orleans, Louisiana, November 9-10,2001.
⑤ 杨志国：《政府经济职能国际比较及实证研究》,吉林大学2009年博士论文,第73页。
② United States, Competition Policy, Industrial Policy and National Champions, Global Forum on Competition,19 & 20 February 2009. DAF/COMP/GF/WD (2009) 37.
③ United States, Competition Policy, Industrial Policy and National Champions, Global Forum on Competition,19 & 20 February 2009. DAF/COMP/GF/WD (2009) 37.
① Deborah Platt Majoras, "National Champions:I Don't Even Think it Sounds Good," Remarks at the International Competition Conference/EU Competition Day, Munich, Germany, March 26,2007.
② 当然,也有学者认为美国事实上存在各种各样的产业政策,跟其他国家并无重大区别。See Christian H. M. Ketels, Industrial Policy in the United States, Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Volume 7, Numbers 3-4 (2007),147-167.
① 徐士英：《竞争文化与和谐社会——论中国反垄断立法的社会基础》,《江西财经大学学报(哲学社会科学版)》2005年第6期,第1-7页。
② Turkish Competition Authority, Competition Culture, available at http://www.rekabet.gov.tr/index.php?Sayfa=sayfaicerikhtml&icId=159&detId=160&ustId=159&Lang=EN,2012-07-22.
③ Sally Southey, Building a Competition Culture, available at http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/01149.html,2012-07-24.
④ Danish Competition Authority & Danish Consumer Agency, Competition Culture, Foreword, June 2010.
② Maurice E. Stucke, Better Competition Advocacy, St. John's Law Review, Vol.82, Iss.3 (2008),951-1036.
③ James C. Cooper, Paul A. Pautler, Todd J. Zywicki, Theory and Practice of Competition Advocacy at the FTC, Antitrust Law Journal, Vol.72.2005,1091-1112.
① Andrew Heimert, Maintaining a Culture of Competition-The Work Never Ends, Asian Competition Forum, Hong Kong Polytechnic University, December 5,2011.
② Antitrust Division Emphasizes Importance of Markets and Competition, http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/division-update/2011/competition-advocacy.html.2012-07-24.
③ Andrew Heimert, Maintaining a Culture of Competition-The Work Never Ends, Asian Competition Forum, Hong Kong Polytechnic University, December 5,2011.
④ Antitrust Division Emphasizes Importance of Markets and Competition, http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/division-update/2011/competition-advocacy.html.2012-07-24.
⑤ See James C. Cooper, Paul A. Pautler, Todd J. Zywicki, Theory and Practice of Competition Advocacy at the FTC, Antitrust Law Journal, Vol.72.2005,1091-1112.这在当时引起了广泛关注,甚至登上了《纽约时报》的头版。也被一些美国学者作为FTC进行有计划的竞争宣导活动的开端。Also see Timothy J. Muris, Creating a Culture of Competition: The Essential Role of Competition Advocacy, Prepared Remarks Before International Competition Network, Panel on Competition Advocacy and Antitrust Authorities, Naples, Italy. September 28,2002.
⑥ Deborah Platt Majoras, Promoting a Culture of Competition, Remarks Before the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Beijing, China, April 10,2006.
① Report of the American Bar Association, Section of Antitrust Law, Special Committee to Study the Role of the Federal Trade Commission, in 65 Antitrust and Trade Regulation Report S-23 (Apr.6,1989).
② Andrew J. Strenio, Jr., Press Release, FTC's Advocacy Program is Effective and Efficient (June 8,1987).
③ Deborah Platt Majoras, A Dose of Our Own Medicine:Applying a Cost/Benefit Analysis to the FTC's Advocacy Program (2005).
④ Timothy J. Muris, Creating a Culture of Competition:The Essential Role of Competition Advocacy, Prepared Remarks Before International Competition Network, Panel on Competition Advocacy and Antitrust Authorities, Naples, Italy. September 28,2002.
⑤ 例如,根据state action doctrine.对于那些被明确地被州政府授权并得到了州政府有效监管的行业,其行为免于接受联邦反托拉斯法的审查,FTC对此几乎毫无办法。See James C. Cooper, Paul A. Pautler, Todd J. Zywicki, Theory and Practice of Competition Advocacy at the FTC, Antitrust Law Journal, Vol.72.2005,1091-1112.
⑥ Arnold C. Celnicker, The Federal Trade Commission's Competition and Consumer Advocacy Program,33 ST. Louis U. L.J.393-400 (1989).
① Timothy J. Muris, Creating a Culture of Competition:The Essential Role of Competition Advocacy, Prepared Remarks Before International Competition Network, Panel on Competition Advocacy and Antitrust Authorities, Naples, Italy. September 28,2002.
② Andrew Heimert, Maintaining a Culture of Competition—The Work Never Ends, Asian Competition Forum, Hong Kong Polytechnic University, December 5,2011.
① Quoted from Alberto Pera, Changing Views of Competition, Economic Analysis and EC Antitrust Law,2008 Macerata Lecture on European Economic Policies at the University of Macerata, Italy.
① Giocoli, Nicola, Competition vs. Property Rights:American Antitrust Law, the Freiburg School and the Early Years of European Competition Policy (May 1,2007). Journal of Competition Law and Economics,2009. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=987788.
② Leonard, Thomas C. (Tim), American Progressivism and the Rise of the Economist as Expert (July 2006). Available at SSRN:http://ssrn.com/abstract=926635 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.926635.
③ Cong. Rec.2460 (1890).
④ United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am.,148 F.2d 416,427 (2d Cir.1945)在判决书中,汉德法官提出："Moreover, in so doing it was not necessarily actuated by economic motives alone. It is possible, because of its indirect social or moral effect, to prefer a system of small producers, each dependent for his success upon his own skill and character, to one in which the great mass of those engaged must accept the direction of a few. These considerations, which we have suggested only as possible purposes of the Act, we think the decisions prove to have been in fact its purposes."
⑤ [美]赫伯特·霍温坎普：《反垄断事业——原理与执行》,吴绪亮、张兴、刘慷等译,东北财经大学出版社2011年版,第41页。
① [德]曼弗里德·诺依曼：《竞争政策——历史、理论及实践》,谷爱俊译,北京大学出版社2003年版,前言部分。
② 胡甲庆：《反垄断法的经济逻辑》,厦门大学出版社2007年版,第26页。
③ 1936 Att'y Gen.Ann. Rep.22.
③ [美]托马斯·O·巴尼特：《竞争法与竞争政策的现代化——来自美国普通法的经验》,李胜利译,《安徽法学》2008年第2期,第39-43页。
⑤ Lawrence J. White, Economics, Economists, and Antitrust:A Tale of Growing Influence, NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No.08-07, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1091531.
⑥ Posner, Richard A., A Program for the Antitrust Division, University of Chicago Law Review,38 (Spring 1971), pp. 500-536.
⑦ Green, Mark J., The Closed Enterprise System. New York:Grossman,1972, p.128.
① [美]J·E·克伍卡、L·J·怀特编著：《反托拉斯革命——经济学、竞争与政策》,林平、臧旭恒等译,经济科学出版社2007年版,“导言”部分。
② Daniel A. Crane, Enforcing Competition Law with Multiple Agencies and Private Enforcers,[日]新世代法政策学研究,Vol.10(2011), pp.55-56.
③ Scherer, F.M., Sunlight and Sunset at the Federal Trade Commission, Administrative Law Review,42 (Fall 1990), pp. 461-487.
④ "an author and teacher of economics whose philosophical deductions had, perhaps, fortification from experience as Deputy Commissioner of Corporations and as an employee in the Bureau of Corporations." (251 U.S.417,448).
⑤ Lawrence J. White, The Growing Influence of Economics and Economists on Antitrust:An Extended Discussion, NYU Working Paper No. EC-08-03, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1281895.
⑥ [美]托马斯·O·巴尼特：《竞争法与竞争政策的现代化——来自美国普通法的经验》,李胜利译,《安徽法学》2008 年第2期,第39-43页。
① White, Lawrence J., The Growing Influence of Economics and Economists on Antitrust:An Extended Discussion (February 1,2008). NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No,08-07; Reg-Markets Center Working Paper No.08-05. Available at SSRN:http://ssm.com/abstrat=1091531 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1091531.
② 韩伟：《美国<横向合并指南>的最新修订及启示》,《现代法学》2011年第3期,第151-164页。
③ Mueller, Willard R, The Revival of Economics at the FTC in the 1960s, Review of Industrial Organization,25 (August 2004), pp.91-105.
④ White, Lawrence J., The Growing Influence of Economics and Economists on Antitrust:An Extended Discussion (February 1,2008). NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No.08-07; Reg-Markets Center Working Paper No.08-05. Available at SSRN:http://ssrn.com/abstract=1091531 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1091531.
⑤ Ginsburg, Douglas H. & Fraser, Eric M., The Role of Economic Analysis in Competition Law (May 16,2010). Getting the Balance Right:Intellectual Property, Competition Law and Economics in Asia, Ian McEwin, ed., Hart Publishing, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN:http://ssrn.com/abstract=1610189.
① See Appalachian Coal v. United States,288 U.S.344,373-74 (1933) (characterizing particular agreements among competitors as "stabiliz[ing] market prices" and not "detrimental to fair competition").
② Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,370 U.S.294,344 (1962).
③ 霍温坎普教授指出：今天我们所说的“哈佛学派”一词,主要指那些从20世纪30年代到60年代的经济学家和反垄断学者著作的学术合辑,而不是指一种构成最近30年来反垄断分析特征的哈佛方法。参见[美]赫伯特·霍温坎普：《反垄断事业——原理与执行》,吴绪亮、张兴、刘慷等译,东北财经大学出版社2011年版,第36页。
④ U.S. v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.,118 F. Supp 41 (1953).
① 司法部反托拉斯局的经济政策办公室(the Economic Policy Office)后来转变为经济分析组(the Economic Analysis Group, EAG).
② Kauper, Thomas E., The Role of Economic Analysis in the Antitrust Division before and after the Establishment of the Economic Policy Office:A Lawyer's View, Antitrust Bulletin,29 (Spring 1984), pp.111-132.
③ [美]托马斯·O·巴尼特：《竞争法与竞争政策的现代化——来自美国普通法的经验》,李胜利译,《安徽法学》2008年第2期,第39-43页。
① White, Lawrence J., The Growing Influence of Economics and Economists on Antitrust:An Extended Discussion (February 1,2008). NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No.08-07; Reg-Markets Center Working Paper No.08-05. Available at SSRN:http://ssm.com/abstract=1091531 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1091531.
③ [美]托马斯·O·巴尼特：《竞争法与竞争政策的现代化——来自美国普通法的经验》,李胜利译,《安徽法学》2008年第2期,第39-43页。
④ Charles A. James, Antitrust in the Early 21 st Century:Core Values and Convergence, at the Program on Antitrust Policy in the 21st Century (May 15,2002), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/11148.htm.
⑤ [美]理查德·A·波斯纳：《反托拉斯法》,孙秋宁译,中国政法大学出版社2003年版,“第二版序言”部分。
⑥ [美]托马斯·O·巴尼特：《竞争法与竞争政策的现代化——来自美国普通法的经验》,李胜利译,《安徽法学》2008年第2期,第39-43页。
① Douglas H. Ginsburg, Originalism and Economic Analysis:Two Case Studies of Consistency and Coherence in Supreme Court Decision Making,33 HARV. J. OF L. & PUB. POL'Y 217,218 (2010).
② 433 U.S.36 (1977).
③ United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.,388 U.S.365 (1967).
④ 442 U.S.343 (1979).
⑤ Ginsburg, Douglas H. and Fraser, Eric M., The Role of Economic Analysis in Competition Law (May 16,2010). Getting the Balance Right:Intellectual Property, Competition Law and Economics in Asia, Ian McEwin, ed., Hart Publishing, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN:http://ssrn.com/abstract=1610189.
⑥ Ginsburg, Douglas H. and Fraser, Eric M., The Role of Economic Analysis in Competition Law (May 16,2010). Getting the Balance Right:Intellectual Property, Competition Law and Economics in Asia, Ian McEwin, ed., Hart Publishing, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN:http://ssrn.com/abstract=1610189.
① 王忠宏：《哈佛学派、芝加哥学派竞争理论比较及其对我国反垄断的启示》,《经济评论》2003年第1期,第72-74、85页。
② 参见任剑新：《美国反垄断思想的新发展——芝加哥学派与后芝加哥学派的比较》,《环球法律评论》2004年夏季号,第234-245页。
③ [美]J·E·克伍卡、L·J·怀特编著：《反托拉斯革命——经济学、竞争与政策》,林平、臧旭恒等译,经济科学出版社2007年版,“导言”部分。
④ 例如在Brown Shoe Co.案中,出于对竞争者减少的担忧,法院支持了行政机构禁止了该项合并,而不管该合并是否真的实质性地减少了竞争。See Brown Shoe Co. vs. U.S.370 US 294 (1962).;而在Topco Associates一案中,法院 提出,横向协议应该用自身违法规则予以分析,而不管这些企业之间究竟是存在共谋,还是仅仅为了更好、更有效率地利用资源而进行的合作。(Horizontal agreements were considered per se illegal independently on whether they were collusive or just of cooperative nature, aiming at allowing a better and more efficient use of resources.) See U.S. vs. Topco Associates,405 US 596 (1972).
① 当然,霍温坎普教授指出,哈佛学派在20世纪70年代末期经历了一次重大转变。事实上,今天“哈佛学派”一词主要指那些从20世纪30年代到60年代的经济学家和反垄断学者著作的学术合辑,而不是指一种构成最近30年来反垄断分析特征的哈佛方法。……现今的哈佛学派比芝加哥学派稍微多一些干预主义,但是主要差别在于具体细节。霍温坎普教授在书中声称这一哈佛学派的立场是该书一贯主张的,而且也是现今联邦法院最支持的立场。参见[美]赫伯特·霍温坎普：《反垄断事业——原理与执行》,吴绪亮、张兴、刘慷等译,东北财经大学出版社2011年版,第36页。
② [美]J·E·克伍卡、L·J·怀特编著：《反托拉斯革命——经济学、竞争与政策》,林平、臧旭恒等译,经济科学出版社2007年版,“导言”部分。
③ 参见[美]赫伯特·霍温坎普：《联邦反托拉斯政策——竞争法律及其实践》(第三版),许光耀、江山、王晨译, 法律出版社2009年版,第66-68页。
① [美]J·E·克伍卡、L·J·怀特编著：《反托拉斯革命——经济学、竞争与政策》,林平、臧旭恒等译,经济科学出版社2007年版,“导言”部分。
② [美]J·E·克伍卡、L·J·怀特编著：《反托拉斯革命——经济学、竞争与政策》,林平、臧旭恒等译,经济科学出 版社2007年版,“导言”部分。
① [美]J·E·克伍卡、L·J·怀特编著：《反托拉斯革命——经济学、竞争与政策》,林平、臧旭恒等译,经济科学出版社2007年版,“导言”部分。
② 参见任剑新：《美国反垄断思想的新发展——芝加哥学派与后芝加哥学派的比较》,《环球法律评论》2004年夏季号,第234-245页。
① 参见黄进喜、朱崇实：《美国反托拉斯法中的经济学理论发展及启示》,《厦门大学学报(哲学社会科学版)》2010年第3期,第51-58页。
② Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc.,504 U.S.451. (1992).
③ 参见黄进喜、朱崇实：《美国反托拉斯法中的经济学理论发展及启示》,《厦门大学学报(哲学社会科学版)》2010年第3期,第51-58页。
④ 韩伟：《美国<横向合并指南>的最新修订及启示》,《现代法学》2011年第3期,第151-164页。
⑤ See Joseph Farrell, Carl Shapior. Antitrust Evaluation of Horizontal Mergers:An Economic Alternative to Market Definition. The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, Vol.10,2010.
① Christine A. Varney, "Vigorous Antitrust Enforcement in this Challenging Era" (speech, Center for American Progress, May 11,2009).事实上,在Varney就任助理司法部长之前,就明确表示了对该报告的不同意见,认为其结论是“不适当的”(not appropriate),并表示就该报告的重新讨论将会是她就职后的最优先工作之一(one of the first things)。因此舆论普遍预计到了这一结果。See Varney Confirmed as DOJ Antitrust Head, Obama Picks Signal Shift to More Aggressive Enforcement Antitrust Alert, http://www.akingump.com/communicationcenter/newsalertdetail.aspx?pub=2137. 2012-08-20.
② See FTC Withdraws Agency's Policy Statement on Monetary Remedies in Competition Cases; Will Rely on Existing Law, available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2012/07/disgorgement.shtm,2012-08-25.
③ AD of DOJ, Statement of the Department of Justice's Antitrust Division on Its Decision to Close Its Investigation of Perdue's Acquisition of Coleman Natural Foods, May 2,2011, http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2011/270591.htm.
④ Brian Baxter, AT&T's Bid for T-Mobile Is Officially Dead, http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/2011/12/att-t-mobile-dead.html.2012-08-20.
① Yan Li & Russell Pittman, The proposed merger of AT&T and T-Mobile:Are there unexhausted scale economies in U.S. mobile telephony?, EAG 12-2, April 2012, http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/eag/discussion-papers.html.2012-08-20.另参见FCC, Annual Report and Analysis of Competitive Market Conditions With Respect to Mobile Wireless, Including Commercial Mobile Services (14th Report). Washington:Federal Communications Commission, May 20,2010.; AAI, The
Effect of AT&T's Acquisition of T-Mobile Is Likely to Substantially Lessen Competition. Washington, DC:American Antitrust Institute, August 2011.
② Michael S. Jacobs, Essay on the Normative Foundations of Antitrust Economics, North Carolina Law Review 74 (1995): 219-266.
③ Porter, M. E. (2001) Competition and antitrust:Toward a productivity-based approach to evaluating mergers and joint ventures, The Antitrust Bulletin, Winter,919-958.
① Robert D. Atkinson & David B. Audretsch, Economic Doctrines and Approaches to Antitrust, The Information Technology & Innovation Foundation, January 2011.
② 当前已经持续几年的全球性金融危机大致可以作为现实经济生活中个体和组织的“非理性”(irrational)的佐证。
③ Porter, M. E. (2001) Competition and antitrust:Toward a productivity-based approach to evaluating mergers and joint ventures, The Antitrust Bulletin, Winter,919-958.
④ Allan Naes Gjerding, "nnovation Economics:Part Ⅰ:An Introduction to Its Birth and International Context, International Business Economic Working Paper 25, Center for International Studies, Aalborg University, Aalborg, Denmark,1997. http://www.business.aau.dk/ivo/publications/working/wp25.pdf..2012-08-15.
⑤ Robert D. Atkinson & David B. Audretsch, Economic Doctrines and Approaches to Antitrust, The Information Technology & Innovation Foundation, January 2011.
① Robert D. Atkinson & David B. Audretsch, Economic Doctrines and Approaches to Antitrust, The Information Technology & Innovation Foundation, January 2011.
① Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,475 U.S.574 (1986).
② Robert D. Atkinson & David B. Audretsch, Economic Doctrines and Approaches to Antitrust, The Information Technology & Innovation Foundation, January 2011.
③ 庞瑞芝：《美国和欧盟竞争政策的发展动态及启示》,《经济纵横》2006年第7期,第56-58页、17页。
① John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, Atlantic Publishing, Hardback, October 2007, p397.
② 如前文所述,《谢尔曼法》的制定有各种因素的影响,包括民粹主义、反“大的”东西的传统等等,亚当·斯密的自由主义传统也是其中的一项重要因素。
③ David M. Hart, Antitrust and Technological Innovation in the US:Ideas, Institutions, Decisions, and Impacts,1890-2000, Research Policy 30, no.6 (2001).
④ William H. Page, Ideological Conflict and the Origins of Antitrust Policy, Tulane Law Review 66, no.1 (1991).
① [美]杰伊·皮尔·乔伊主编：《反垄断研究新进展：理论与证据》,张嫚、崔文杰等译,东北财经大学出版社2008年版,“前言”部分。
② 有美国学者通过对1967-2007年联邦最高法院的反托拉斯案件审理的实证分析中得出如下结论：在过去40年间,最高法院在办案中越来越依赖经济分析。最高法院对于反托拉斯经济学的依赖也成为了下面三个趋势的基础：(1)被告方胜诉率上升；(2)大法官之间同意意见比率上升；(3)司法部(作为法庭之友提供专家意见或者作为一方当事人)的意见被最高法院采纳的比率上升。See Leah Brannon & Douglas H. Ginsburg, Antitrust Decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court,1967 to 2007, Competition Policy International, Volume 3. Number 2. AutumN 2007.
③ William Kovacic, The influence of economics in antitrust law, Economic Inquiry,30 (2),294-306 (1992).
① Robert D. Atkinson & David B. Audretsch, Economic Doctrines and Approaches to Antitrust, The Information Technology & Innovation Foundation, January 2011.
② Joseph A. Schumpeter, Science and Ideology, American Economic Review 39, no.2 (1949):345-359.
③ Robert D. Atkinson & David B. Audretsch, Economic Doctrines and Approaches to Antitrust, The Information Technology & Innovation Foundation, January 2011.
④ Stephen Calkins, Competition Law in the United States, Research Paper 07-14, Wayne State University Law School, Detroit, MI,2007.
① Robert D. Atkinson & David B. Audretsch, Economic Doctrines and Approaches to Antitrust, The Information Technology & Innovation Foundation, January 2011.
② 参见漆多俊：《经济法基础理论》(第四版),法律出版社2008年版,第133页。
③ [美]赫伯特·霍温坎普：《反垄断事业——原理与执行》,吴绪亮、张兴、刘慷等译,东北财经大学出版社2011年版,第46页。
① 在Leegin案中,最高法院以5：4的投票决定转售价格维持(resale price maintenance, RPM)行为按照合理规则而非自身违法规则进行审查,从而改写了最高法院将近1个世纪的立场。See Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.,551 U.S.877(2007).这在学术界引起了极大争论。各州也反应不一,例如马里兰州甚至颁布法令确定对转售价格维持行为进行自身违法审查,作为对最高法院Leegin案的回应。之后分别于2010年和2011年在纽约和加利福尼亚两家法院审理的类似案件出现了不同的结果。See Barbara T. Sicalides, The Latest on Leegin and Resale Price Maintenance-Should Manufacturers Rest Easy after the Tempur-Pedic Decision?, The Antitrust Counselor (Vol.5.2), April 2011.
② 霍温坎普教授曾提出,经历重大转变的哈佛学派的新立场是如今联邦法院最支持的立场。其中一个背景就是,大部分芝加哥学派的文章都被收录在了经济学期刊和法律评论集。以及由波斯纳、博克和其他人所著的争论性文章中。相比之下,虽然哈佛学派的新立场也有广泛的学术读者群,但它呈现在主要以反垄断法官和律师为阅读人群的多卷法学论文中。法律论文一般比学术著作的辩论性要少得多,而且它们更倾向于反应法律而不是批判法律。参见[美]赫伯特·霍温坎普：《反垄断事业——原理与执行》,吴绪亮、张兴、刘慷等译,东北财经大学出版社2011年版,第36-37页。
③ See William E. Kovacic, Competition Policy in the European Union and the United States:Convergence or Divergence?, Bates White Fifth Annual Antitrust Conference Washington, D.C. June 2,2008.
① See Teles, Steven M., The Rise of the Conservative Legal Movement, Princeton University Press,2008. Complexity & Judicial Training on Appeals, Second Annual Research Symposium on Antitrust Economics and Competition
② Michael R. Baye, Joshua D. Wright, Is Antitrust Too Complicated for Generalist Judges? The Impact of Economic Policy, September 25-26th,2009.
① 参见[美]理查德·A·波斯纳：《反托拉斯法》(第二版),孙秋宁译,中国政法大学出版社2003年版,第313页。
② Joseph C. Gallo, Kenneth Dau-schmidt, Joseph L. Craycraft, Charles J. Parker, Department of Justice Antitrust Enforcement,1955-1997:An Empirical Study, Review of Industrial Organization 17:75-133,2000.
③ California v. American Stores Co.-495 U.S.271 (1990).
② 参见[美]赫伯特·霍温坎普：《联邦反托拉斯政策——竞争法律及其实践》(第三版),许光耀、江山、王晨译,法律出版社2009年版,第653页。
① 后来,visa和万事达卡与上述原告之间以同意判决(consent decree)的方式结案,但是,针对美国运通的案件2011年仍在继续。See Timothy S Longman, David S Turetsky, US Government Enforcement, The Antitrust Review of the Americas 2012, Section 2:United States-Special Enforcement. Available at http://www.globalcompetitionreview.com/reviews/36/sections/127/united-states-special-enforcement/.2012-08-09.
② [美]理查德·A·波斯纳：《反托拉斯法》(第二版),孙秋宁译,中国政法大学出版社2003年版,第330页。
③ [美]赫伯特·霍温坎普：《联邦反托拉斯政策——竞争法律及其实践》(第三版),许光耀、江山、王晨译,法律出版社2009年版,第654页。
④ 参见[美]理查德·A·波斯纳：《反托拉斯法》(第二版),孙秋宁译,中国政法大学出版社2003年版,第331页。在该书中,波斯纳法官举例说,在他40年前进入司法界之后,就一再为各州司法部长办公室的律师们所做的案件摘要和辩论质量之低劣感到震惊,以至于决定在公开发表的意见中予以批评。而一位州司法部长对此的解释是,他们获得的拨款有限,故提供的工资水平非常低,很难雇佣到能干的律师。
① 李国海：《反垄断法实施机制研究》,中国方正出版社2006年版,第49页。
② 独立于总统的州际贸易委员会系根据1887年的《州际商务法》成立,开创了联邦政府控制经济活动的榜样,其最初的控制对象是铁路运输企业,以后逐渐扩张到其他的州际商业活动。同时王名扬教授指出,作为一个控制经济活动的工具而言,它不是一个创新,因为此前美国某些州中已经成立了类似的委员会。该委员会的重要性不仅在于它是联邦政府第一个控制经济活动的委员会,而且是因为它表示经济活动已经超过州的控制范围,必须由联邦政府控制。参见王名扬著：《美国行政法》,中国法制出版社1995年版,第174—175页。
③ 参见[美]J·E·克伍卡、L·J·怀特编著：《反托拉斯革命——经济学、竞争与政策》,林平、臧旭恒等译,经济科学出版社2007年版,第24页。
④ 转引自[美]J·E·克伍卡、L·J·怀特编著：《反托拉斯革命——经济学、竞争与政策》,林平、臧旭恒等译,经济科学出版社2007年版,第24页。
① See Thomas Catan, This Takeover Battle Pits Bureaucrat v Bureaucrat, Wall Street Journal,12 April 2011, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703784004576221100894386950.html.2012-07-30.
② U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, U.S. antitrust manual, Fourth Edition, Last Updated December 2008. p 1-2.
③ See Antitrust Division, available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/index.html,2012-08-28.
④ U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, U.S. antitrust manual, Fourth Edition, Last Updated December 2008. p 1-2. ① 例如,设在纽约的办公室负责康涅狄格,缅因,马萨诸塞州,新罕布什尔州,北新泽西州,纽约州,罗得岛和佛
蒙特等地的反托拉斯调查和诉讼业务。
① FTC, Federal Trade Commission Operating Manual-Investigations (Chapter Three), p1.
② FTC, Federal Trade Commission Operating Manual-Investigations (Chapter Three), p1.
③ FTC, About the Bureau of Competition, available at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/about.shtm,2012-07-27.
④ 根据FTC官方资料,消费者保护局下设如下办公室：Division of Advertising Practices, Division of Consumer and Business Education, Division of Enforcement, Division of Financial Practices, Division of Marketing Practices, Division of Planning and Information, Division of Privacy and Identity Protection。
① U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, U.S. antitrust manual, Fourth Edition, Last Updated December 2008. p Ⅶ-4.
② U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, U.S. antitrust manual, Fourth Edition, Last Updated December 2008. p Ⅶ-5-6.
① U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, U.S. antitrust manual, Fourth Edition, Last Updated December 2008. p Ⅶ-8.
② Yochi J. Dreazen & John R. Wilke, Justice Department, FTC Deal Dividing Merger Reviews Collapses, WALL ST. J., May 21,2002, at B6.
④ See J. Thomas Rosch, Theoretical and Practical Observations on Cartel and Merger Enforcement at the Federal Trade Commission, Remarks before the George Mason Law Review's 14th Annual Symposium on Antitrust Law Washington, DC, February 9,2011.
① [美]理查德·A·波斯纳：《反托拉斯法》(第二版),孙秋宁译,中国政法大学出版社2003年版,第330页。
② 参见李国海：《反垄断法实施机制研究》,中国方正出版社2006年版,第56页。
③ 参见王健：《反垄断法的私人执行——基本原理与外国法制》,法律出版社2008年版,第6-7页。
④ 对此,郑鹏程教授经研究认为,《谢尔曼法》的起草者、参议员谢尔曼认为,反垄断损害赔偿的数额应当与维持私人诉讼的难度相当,为此,他最初提出了双倍损害赔偿,但很快又放弃了这一构想。但是此后在提交给参议院的最后草案中重新出现了双倍损害赔偿条款。而当该草案提交给司法委员会之后,该草案的起草者之一、参议员霍尔(Hoar)认为,双倍赔偿是不够的,于是他模仿了英国议会于1623年颁布的一部有关垄断的成文法中的相关规定,将谢尔曼草案中的双倍损害赔偿改为三倍损害赔偿。参见郑鹏程：《美国反垄断法三倍损害赔偿制度研究》,《环球法律评论》2006年第2期,第165-173页。
① Daniel L. Rubinfeld. Antitrust Damages. Research Handbook on the Economics of Antitrust Law (Einer Elhauee. editor). November 21.2009.
② See AMC, ReportE and Recommendations April 2007, p.269.
③ AMC, Report and Recommendations, April 2007, p.246.
④ J. Thomas Rosch, Striking a Balance? Some Reflections on Private Enforcement in Europe and the United States, International Chamber of Commerce Annual Meeting, New York City, New York, September 24,2008.
⑤ Stephen Calkins, In Praise of Antitrust Litigation:The Second Annual Bernstein Lecture,72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.1,5-6 (1998). Trading:Implications for Productivity Growth in the Economy 2 (Oct.19,2006), available at
① Irwin Stelzer, Notes for Talk at Workshop on Private Enforcement of Competition Law Sponsored by Office of Fair Oct%2019,%2006.pdf.2012-08-02. http://stelzerassoc.com/Speeches/Implications%20for%20Productivity%20Growth%20in%20the%20Economy%20OFT%20 REV., Spring 2008,879-918.
② Robert H. Lande & Joshua P. Davis, Benefits from Private Antitrust Enforcement:An Analysis of Forty Cases, USF L. REV., Spring 2008,879-918.
③ Robert H. Lande & Joshua P. Davis, Benefits From Private Antitrust Enforcement:An Analysis of Forty Cases, USF L. Trading:Implications for Productivity Growth in the Economy 2 (Oct.19,2006), available at
④ Irwin Stelzer, Notes for Talk at Workshop on Private Enforcement of Competition Law Sponsored by Office of Fair Oct%2019,%2006.pdf.2012-08-02. http://stelzerassoc.com/Speeches/Implications%20for%20Productivity%20Growth%20in%20the%20Economy%200FT%20
⑤ [美]理查德·A·波斯纳：《反托拉斯法》(第二版),孙秋宁译,中国政法大学出版社2003年版,第313页。
① Robert H. Lande & Joshua P. Davis, Comparative Deterrence from Private Enforcement and Criminal Enforcement of the U.S. Antitrust Laws, University of San Francisco Law Research Paper No.2010-17, available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1565693.2012-08-02.
② J. Thomas Rosch, Remarks to the Antitrust Modernization Commission (June 8,2006), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/rosch/Rosch-AMC%20Remarks.June8.final.pdf,2012-08-02.
③ FTC:WATCH No.708, Nov.19,2007, at 4.
④ William E. Kovacic, Competition Policy in the European Union and the United States:Convergence or Divergence?, Bates White Fifth Annual Antitrust Conference Washington, D.C. June 2,2008.
① Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,127 S. Ct.1955 (2007).对于该案,许多学者认为这种事实抗辩标准很有问题,由于信息不对称,反托拉斯案件的原告通常并不占有共谋协议的证据,在法庭调查之前就要求出示这类证据是不合理的。See Scott Dodson, Pleading Standards after Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, Virginia Law Review, Vol.93 2007:135-143.
② 参见[美]托马斯·O·巴尼特：《竞争法与竞争政策的现代化——来自美国普通法的经验》,李胜利译,《安徽法学》2008年第2期,第39-43页。
③ Robert H. Lande & Joshua P. Davis. Comparative Deterrence from Private Enforcement and Criminal Enforcement of the U.S. Antitrust Laws, University of San Francisco Law Research Paper No.2010-17, available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1565693.2012-08-02.
④ Daniel A. Crane, Optimizing Private Antitrust Enforcement, VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW,675-723, Vol.63:3 (2010).
⑤ J. Thomas Rosch, Striking a Balance? Some Reflections on Private Enforcement in Europe and the United States, International Chamber of Commerce Annual Meeting, New York City, New York, September 24,2008.
① Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig.,105 F. Supp.2d 682 (E.D. Mich.2000), aff'd,332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir.2003).
② High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig.,936 F. Supp.530 (1996).
③ see Stephen Calkins, Coming to Praise Criminal Antitrust Enforcement, in European Competition Law Annual 2006: Enforcement of Prohibition of Cartels,343,355 (Claus-Dieter Ehlermann & Isabela Atanasiu eds.,2007).
① Robert H. Lande & Joshua P. Davis, Benefits From Private Antitrust Enforcement:An Analysis of Forty Cases, USF L REV., Spring 2008,879-918.
② AAI, Comments of the American Antitrust Institute Working Group on Remedies, June 17,2005.
③ ABA. letter. March 11.2002.
④ AMC, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS,247 (2007).
⑤ Daniel A. Crane, Optimizing Private Antitrust Enforcement, VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW,675-723, Vol.63:3 (2010).
⑥ Einer Elhauge, Disgorgement as an Antitrust Remedy,76 Antitrust Law Journal No.1 (2009).
⑦ 原告的反托拉斯损害赔偿利息只有在判决确定后才开始计算,而在诉讼阶段被告无需支付这部分利息。由于反托拉斯案件往往拖延时间很长,所以这部分金额有时会相当大。
⑧ 是指没有参与到反竞争行为中的企业通过跟随不法行为人涨价而获得利益。
⑦ See J. Gregory Sidak & David J. Teece, Dynamic Competition in Antitrust Law,5 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON.581, 600 (2009).
① See Herbert Hovenkamp, Restraints on Innovation,29 CARDOZO L. REV.247 (2007).
② Daniel A. Crane, Optimizing Private Antitrust Enforcement, VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW,675-723, Vol.63:3 (2010).
③ 根据美国学者的研究,反托拉斯私人诉讼案件从提起到结案,其延续时间往往是一般的联邦民事案件持续时间的三倍。See Steven C. Salop & Lawrence J. White, Economic Analysis of Private Antitrust Litigation,74 GEO. L. J.1001, 1009(1986).而如今普通的反托拉斯私人诉讼案件一般也要拖延6年以上。See Daniel A. Crane, Optimizing Private Antitrust Enforcement, VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW,675-723, Vol.63:3 (2010).
④ Daniel A. Crane, Optimizing Private Antitrust Enforcement, VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW,675-723, Vol.63:3 (2010).
⑤ See Robert H. Lande, Five Myths about Antitrust Damages,40 U.S.F. L. REV.651 (2006).
⑥ Peter G. Bryant & E. Woodrow Eckard Jr., Price Fixing:The Probability of Getting Caught, Review of Economic and Statistics 531 (1991).
⑦ 参见[美]理查德·A·波斯纳：《反托拉斯法》(第二版),孙秋宁译,中国政法大学出版社2003年版,第319-322页。
① Thorelli, H. B. (1955) The Federal Antitrust Policy:Origination of an American Tradition. Baltimore:The Johns Hopkins University Press, p.76.
② 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2000).
③ Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co.,405 U.S.251,262 (1972).
④ Irwin Stelzer, Notes for Talk at Workshop on Private Enforcement of Competition Law Sponsored by Office of Fair Trading:Implications for Productivity Growth in the Economy 2 (Oct.19,2006), available at http://stelzerassoc.com/Speeches/Implications%20for%20Productivity%20Growth%20in%20the%20Economy%200FT%20 Oct%2019,%2006.pdf.2012-08-2.
⑤ Robert H. Lande & Joshua P. Davis, Benefits From Private Antitrust Enforcement:An Analysis of Forty Cases, USF L. REV., Spring 2008,879-918.
⑥ Robert H. Lande & Joshua P. Davis, Benefits From Private Antitrust Enforcement:An Analysis of Forty Cases, USF L REV., Spring 2008,879-918.
① Frank Easterbrook, Detrebling Antitrust Damages,28 J.L. & ECON.448 (1985).
② Milton Handler, The Judicial Architects of the Rule of Reason,10 ABAANTTTRUST SECTION 21,21 (1957).
③ Robert M. Langer, Resale Price Maintenance -PO90400 WORKSHOP, Comment to 2009 FTC Workshop:Resale Price Maintenance Under the Sherman Act and the Federal Trade Commission Act 10, available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/resalepricemaintenance/00001.pdf.2012-08-02.
④ R. Hewitt Pate, Assistant Attorney General Antitrust Division of U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Law in the U.S. Supreme Court, Presented at British Institute of International and Comparative Law Conference London, England, http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/204136.htm,2012-07-29.
① R. Hewitt Pate, Assistant Attorney General Antitrust Division of U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Law in the U.S. Supreme Court, Presented at British Institute of International and Comparative Law Conference London, England, available
at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/204136.htm,2012-07-29.1903年的《加快法案》 (the Expediting Act) 允许反托拉斯民事案件直接上诉,但是在1974年该法修订取消了自动上诉权利后,最高法院接受的反托拉斯案件就大大缩减了。See Pamela Jones Harbour, The Supreme Court's Antitrust Future:New Directions or Revisiting Old Cases?, the antitrust source. December 2007.
② R. Hewitt Pate, Assistant Attorney General Antitrust Division of U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Law in the U.S. Supreme Court, Presented at British Institute of International and Comparative Law Conference London, England, available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/204136.htm,2012-07-29.
③ See United States v. Nat'l Retail Lumber Dealers Ass'n,40 F. Supp.448,455 (D. Colo.1941).
④ See United States v. Alcoa,148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir.1945).
⑤ William F. Baxter, Separation of Powers, Prosecutorial Discretion, and the "Common Law" Nature of Antitrust Law,60 Tex. L. Rev.661,666(1982).
⑥ Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States,288 U.S.344,360 (1933).
① 例如United States v. E. C. Knight Co.,156 U.S.1 (1895), Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States,175 U.S.211(1899).在后一个案件中,最高法院指出：”…the affiants say that, in their opinion, the prices at which pipe has been sold by defendants have been reasonable. We do not think the issue an important one, because, as already stated, we do not think that, at common law, there is any question of reasonableness open to the courts with reference to such a contract."
② United States v. Trenton Potteries Co..273 U.S.397 (19271.
③ United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.,310 U.S.218 (1940).
④ United States v. Realty Multi-List, Inc.,629 F.2d 1351,1362-63 (5th Cir.1980).
⑤ See Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.,127 S.Ct.2736 (2007). (Breyer, J., dissenting).
⑥ See Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States,356 U.S.1 (1958).
① Patrick L. Anderson, Theodore R. Bolema, Ilhan K. Geckil, Damages in Antitrust Cases, AEG Working Paper 2007-2.
② Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.,127 S.Ct.2705,2718 (2007).
③ See Pamela Jones Harbour, The Supreme Court's Antitrust Future:New Directions or Revisiting Old Cases?, the antitrust source, December 2007.
④ Wood, William C, Costs and Benefits of Per Se Rules in Antitrust Enforcement,38 Antitrust Bull.887 (1993).
⑤ United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n,166 U.S.290,329 (1897). ("plain and ordinary meaning of such language is not limited to that kind of contract alone which is in unreasonable restraint of trade, but all contracts are included in such language, and no exception or limitation can be added without placing in the act that which has been omitted by congress").
⑥ See Standard Oil Co. v. United States,221 U.S.64 (1911).
⑦ Nikhil Parikshith, Demystifying the Rule of Per se and Rule of Reason in the Indian Context, Final Repoer Prepared for the Competition Commission of India, JUNE 2011.
⑧ See United States v. American Tobacco Co.,221 U.S.106 (1911).
① See Chicago Board of Trade v. United States,238 U.S.231 (1918).
② See Michael A. Carrier, The Rule of Reason:An Empirical Update for the 21st Century (September 29,2009). George Mason Law Review, Vol.16, No.827,2009. Available at SSRN:http://ssrn.com/abstract=1480440.
③ 根据美国学者的实证研究,在1977-1999年之间,只有4%的反托拉斯案件真正进入到了法院对反竞争效果和促进竞争效果的衡量阶段。See Michael A. Carrier, The Real Rule of Reason:Bridging the Disconnect,1999 B. Y.U. L. REV.1269.而在1999-2009年之间,这一比例为2%。See Michael A. Carrier, The Rule of Reason:An Empirical Update for the 21st Century (September 29,2009). George Mason Law Review, Vol.16, No.827,2009. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1480440.
④ NATIONAL SOCIETY OF PROFESSIONAL ENGINEERS. v. UNITED STATES.435 U.S.679 (1978).
⑤ Herbert H. Naujoks, Monopoly and Restraint of Trade Under the Sherman Act,5 Wis. L. REV.129,133 (1929).
⑥ Standard Oil Co. v. United States,221 U.S.99,104 (1911). (concurring & dissenting in part).
⑦ See, e.g., Standard Oil,221 U.S. at 93-96 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing that precedent directed the Court to hold illegal any contract that restrained trade "directly," and therefore that the Court erred in its adoption of the permissive rule of reason).
⑧ Stucke, Maurice E., Does the Rule of Reason Violate the Rule of Law? (September 12,2008). UC Davis Law Review, Vol. 42, No.5,2009. Available at SSRN:http://ssrn.com/abstract=1267359.
① 布兰代斯大法官代表最高法院明确了合理规则(Rule of Reason)的含义：判断一项限制是否违法,法院通常应考虑该限制性贸易行为中所有的事实,特别是那些特有的部分；在该限制发生之前和之后的状况；该限制的本质和效果,现实性和可能性,以及限制的历史,罪恶的存在,采纳某种救济措施的原因,获得救济的目的和结果。See Chicago Board of Trade v. United States,238 U.S.231 (1918).
② [美]赫伯特·霍温坎普：《联邦反托拉斯政策——竞争法律及其实践》(第三版),许光耀、江山、王晨译,法律出版社2009年版,第278-279页。
③ Markham, Jesse W., Sailing a Sea of Doubt:A Critique of the Rule of Reason in U.S. Antitrust Law (August 24,2011). Fordham Journal of Corporate and Financial Law, Forthcoming; Univ. of San Francisco Law Research Paper No.2011-25. Available at SSRN:http://ssrn.com/abstract=1916223.
④ See, e.g., Daniel A. Crane, Rules Versus Standards in Antitrust Adjudication,64 WASH. & LEE L. REV.49,49 (2007).
⑤ Stucke, Maurice E., Does the Rule of Reason Violate the Rule of Law? (September 12,2008). UC Davis Law Review, Vol. 42, No.5,2009. Available at SSRN:http://ssrn.com/abstract=1267359.
⑥ Michael A. Carrier, The Rule of Reason:An Empirical Update for the 21st Century (September 29,2009). George Mason Law Review, Vol.16, No.827,2009. Available at SSRN:http://ssrn.com/abstract=1480440.
⑦ Michael A. Carrier, The Real Rule of Reason:Bridging the Disconnect,1999 B.Y.U. L. REV.1265,1267.
① See ABA Antitrust Section, Monograph NO.23, The Rule of Reason,10 (1999). Also see Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Reconciling the Harvard and Chicago Schools:A New Antitrust Approach for the 21st Century,82 IND. L.J.345,347 (2007).
② See Cont'l Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc.,277 F.3d 499,509 (4th Cir.2002).
③ United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co.,438 U.S.422,476 (1978).
④ Waller, Spencer Weber, Justice Stevens and the Rule of Reason,61 SMU L. Rev. xx (2009).
⑤ Timothy Muris, The Federal Trade Commission and the Rule of Reason:In Defense of Massachusetts Board,66 ANTITRUST L.J.773,793 (1998).
① United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.388 U.S.365 (1967).
② Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.,433 U.S.57-58 (1977).
③ State Oil v. Kahn.,522 U.S.18 (1997).
① PSKS, Inc. v. Leegin, Inc.,127 S. Ct.2712 (2004).
② See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.,127 S. Ct.2705,2714,2720 (2007).
③ Jason A. Casey, The Rule of Reason After Leegin:Reconsidering the Use of Economic Analysis in the Antitrust Arena, SUFFOLK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW, Vol. XLII:919-938. (2009).
④ see Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat'l Football League,555 U.S.1168,130 S. Ct.2216 (2010).
① AMC, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 38 (Apr.2007).
② [美]迈克尔·D.温斯顿：《反垄断经济学前沿》,张嫚、吴绪亮、章爱民译,东北财经大学出版社2007年版,第14页。
③ 参见[德]马克思·韦伯：《论经济与社会中的法律》,张乃根译,中国大百科全书出版社1998年版,第62页。
① NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla.,468 U.S.104,109 (1984).
② Lemley, Mark A. & Leslie, Christopher R, Categorical Analysis in Antitrust Jurisprudence (November 1,2007). Iowa Law Review, Vol.93, p.1207,2008; Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No.348. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1026967.
③ Herbert Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy:The Law of Competition and Its Practice 265 (3d ed.2005).
① Texaco Inc. v. Dagher,547 U.S.1,4 (2006).
② Lemley, Mark A. & Leslie, Christopher R., Categorical Analysis in Antitrust Jurisprudence (November 1,2007). Iowa Law Review, Vol.93, p.1207,2008; Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No.348. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1026967.
① J. Thomas Rosch, Striking a Balance? Some Reflections on Private Enforcement in Europe and the United States, International Chamber of Commerce Annual Meeting, New York City, New York, September 24,2008.
② William E. Kovacic, Competition Policy in the European Union and the United States:Convergence or Divergence?, Bates White Fifth Annual Antitrust Conference Washington, D.C. June 2,2008.
③ [德]库尔特·马尔克特：《美国反托拉斯法的现状和发展趋势》,载[德]松尼曼：《美国和德国的经济与经济法》,南京大学中德经济法研究所译,法律出版社1991年版,第151页。
④ 王晓晔：《紧盯国际卡特尔——美国反托拉斯法及其新发展》,《国际贸易》2002年第3期,第39-43页。
⑤ 例如Kovacic曾指出,过去30年间80个新制定了竞争法的国家中,大部分属于民法法系,因而其竞争执法体制更依赖类似于欧盟的行政执行体制。See William E Kovacic, Competition policy in the European Union and the United States:convergence or divergence in the future treatment of dominant frms? COMPETITION LAW INTERNATIONAL, October 2008.
⑥ 白艳：《美国反托拉斯法/欧盟竞争法平行论——理论与实践》,法律出版社2010年版,王传丽撰“序Ⅱ”。
⑦ Louis VOGEL, introduction de la globalisation du droit des affaires:mythe ou realite? Editions Pantheon-Assas, Paris,2002,p.7.转引自白艳：《美国反托拉斯法/欧盟竞争法平行论——理论与实践》,法律出版社2010年版,王传丽撰“序 Ⅱ”。
① 参见[美]斯坦利·L·恩格尔曼、罗伯特·E·高尔曼主编：《剑桥美国经济史》(第三卷：20世纪),蔡挺、张林、李雅菁译,中国人民大学出版社2008年版,第3页。
① David J. Gerber, International Antitrust Convergence:The Real and Imagined Roles of U.S. Antitrust Law, Prepared for the 2005 ABA Spring Antitrust Meeting, March 30,2005, in Washington, D.C..
① 参见漆多俊：《市场、调节机制与法律的同步演变——世纪之交的回顾与展望》,载《经济法论丛》第一卷,中国方正出版社1999年版,第1-24页。
② 原告在哥斯达黎加有香蕉种植园,后来美国联合果品公司(United Fruit Co.)煽动哥斯达黎加军政府将原告在当地的香蕉园加以征收,此后被告又买下种植园,从而垄断了对美国的香蕉出口。原告在美国地方法院起诉,案件最后上诉至联邦最高法院。See American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co.-213 U.S.347 (1909).
③ 1928年,美国铝公司ALCOA (Aluminum Company of American)在加拿大设了一家独立子公司——加拿大铝业有限公司。1935年加拿大铝公司在瑞士与几家欧洲公司组成一个名为Alliance的国际卡特尔,各自限制铝的产量。不过美国铝公司并没有直接参与订立该国际卡特尔协议。美国政府于1937年对美国铝公司、加拿大铝公司以及它们的董事、经理、股东等共63人提起反垄断诉讼,指控的行为多达140项。由于美国铝公司本身并未参与卡特尔协议,且该卡特尔在国外运作,参与者均非美国公司,最初,美国地方法院判决ALCOA公司并未违反《谢尔曼法》。原告方提起上诉,巡回上诉法院接手,由法官勒尼德·汉德(Learned Hand)审理。该案提出并解决了多个联邦反托拉斯法的重大问题。See United States v. Alcoa,148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir.1945).
① 1976年蒂姆伯伦木材公司诉美洲银行案(Timberlane lumber Co. V. Bank of America.)案情与American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co案近似：原告控告被告美洲银行与美国及洪都拉斯的有关人员合谋,阻止原告在洪都拉斯的业务。原告认为被告目的是为了把洪都拉斯的木材出口掌握在由被告控制和资助的少数人手里。一审采纳了“外国国家行为学说”,以对美国外贸缺乏“直接和实质性效果”为由驳回起诉。原告上诉,联邦第九巡回法院的乔依法官(Choy)认为一审判决的理由不当,但也批评1945年判决未考虑其他国家利益,亦未考虑其他所有涉外因素。在权衡了8项因素后,法院决定,本案中美国反托拉斯法的域外适用,同洪都拉斯政府的有关经济政策相抵触；美洲银行的行为对洪都拉斯的经济有着重要的影响,这种影响比起对美国的市场竞争的影响更为突出,而行为又发生于美国境外,因此法院决定不适用美国的反托拉斯法。See Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America 549 F.2d 597 (9d Cir.1976).
② 英国的Hartford是一家再保险公司,美国司法部在美国地方法院指控,它同美国的保险公司在英国制定保单时存在有共谋行为。Hartford和英国政府在案件中指出,这种行为根据英国法律是合法的。初审法院法官认为根据Timberlane案所确立的方法(合理管辖规则)分析,不应由美国法院管辖；上诉法院法官运用同样的方法,但却得出了相反的结论。在终审中,最高法院的多数法官抛弃了合理管辖原则,转而采用效果原则,结果判决被告败诉。See Hartford Fire Insurance v. California,509 U.S.764 (1993).
③ 该案中美国司法部指控被告日本公司在日本合谋固定价格,被告每年按照这个价格向美国出口传真纸达610万美元。审理中日本政府曾作为法庭之友(amicus curiae)出具反对意见,认为对于一项发生在日本国内的商业行为适用美国反托拉斯法,是违反一般的国际法准则的。一审中地方法院以不能对仅仅全部发生在其他国家的行为提起反托拉斯的刑事指控为由,驳回了原告的起诉。但是最终上诉法院推翻了一审裁决,还是确认了该项指控。See United States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co.,109 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.1997).
① Randolph Tritell & Elizabeth Kraus, The Federal Trade Commission's International Antitrust Program, available at http://www.ftc.gov/oia/competition.shtm,2012-08-09.
② "Increased transparency and accountability of government actions; Expanded and deeper cooperation between U.S. and overseas competition enforcement authorities; and Greater convergence of competition regimes." See International Competition Policy Advisory Committee to the Attorney General and Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, Final Report (Feb.2000), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/icpac/finalreport.html.2012-07-09.
③ "Mindfulness of other jurisdictions'interests; Respect for other jurisdictions'legal, political and economic cultures; Trust in each other's actions; and Ongoing dialogue on all aspects of international competition policy and enforcement." See Rachel Brandenburger, The Many Facets of International Cooperation at the Antitrust Division, Remarks as Prepared for
① AD, Antitrust Division Manual, Fourth Edition, Chapter I. Organization and Functions of the Antitrust Division. International Bar Association Midyear Conference, Madrid, Spain. June 15,2012. Competition Policy and Deregulation Group, Ha Noi, Viet Nam 24 February 2006.
② USA, National Experience in Competition Law Technical Assistance:A US Perspective,2006/SOM1/CPDG/007, Competition Policy and Antitrust Enforcement,77 CHICAGO-KENT L. REV.101 (2001); Assessing Aid:What Works, What
③ See William E. Kovacic, Institutional Foundations for Economic Legal Reform in Transition Economies:The Case of and Lesson Learned in Uganda,48 J. LEGAL EDUC.101,107-108 (1998). Doesn't and Why, World Bank Policy Research Report; Cohn, Stuart R., Teaching in a Developing Country:Mistakes Made Competition Policy and Deregulation Group, Ha Noi, Viet Nam 24 February 2006.
④ USA, National Experience in Competition Law Technical Assistance:A US Perspective,2006/SOM1/CPDG/007, http://www.ftc.gov/oia/agreements.shtm,2012-08-10.
⑤ FTC, International Antitrust and Consumer Protection Cooperation Agreements, available at
① Rachel Brandenburger, Intensification of International Cooperation:The Antitrust Division's Recent Efforts, Remarks as Prepared for The American Chamber of Commerce, Brussels, Belgium, February 17,2012.
② FTC, International Antitrust and Consumer Protection Cooperation Agreements, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/international/docs/usaus7.htm,2012-08-10.
③ Rachel Brandenburger, Intensification of International Cooperation:The Antitrust Division's Recent Efforts, Remarks as Prepared for The American Chamber of Commerce, Brussels, Belgium, February 17,2012.
④ 参见[美]戴维J·格伯尔：《二十世纪而欧洲的法律与竞争——捍卫普罗米修斯》,冯克利、魏志梅译,中国社会科学出版社2004年版,第212-213页。
⑤ Salil K. Mehra, Antitrust by Other Means:Haley on Form and Function, WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW, VOL.8. P333-343 (2009).
⑥ Rachel Brandenburger, Intensification of International Cooperation:The Antitrust Division's Recent Efforts, Remarks as Prepared for The American Chamber of Commerce, Brussels, Belgium, February 17,2012.
① See Umut Aydin, Promoting Competition:European Union and the Global Competition Order, Prepared for Presentation at the Biennial Conference of the EUSA, Los Angeles, CA,23-25 April 2009.
② 甚至加拿大的该法案也是大部分从同时期纽约州的悬而未决的法案复制而来。See Casey W. Halladay, The Origins of Canada's Cartel Laws, Can L. R.157-163 (2012).
③ P. Clarke and S.G. Corones, Competition Law and Policy. Cases and Materials, first ed., Oxford University Press, Melbourne,1999, p.1.
④ A.I. Tonking & R. Baxt (Eds), Australian Trade Practices Reporter, CCH, Sydney,2005, p.150.
① David K Round, Jeremy Tustin & Kerrie Round, Australasian Competition Law:History, Harmonisation, Issues and Lessons, Competition Policy Foundations for Trade Reform, Regulatory Reform and Sustainable Development (2006).
② See H.M. Donaldson,'The development of New Zealand competition law', in Ahdar (ed.), Competition Law and Policy in New Zealand, p.12.
③ David K Round, Jeremy Tustin & Kerrie Round, Australasian Competition Law:History, Harmonisation, Issues and Lessons, Competition Policy Foundations for Trade Reform, Regulatory Reform and Sustainable Development (2006).
④ OECD, Competition Law and Policy in Latin America:A Peer Review (2006), available at http://www.sourceoecd.org/emergingeconomies/9264014985,2012-08-17.
⑤ 参见[德]曼弗里德·诺伊曼：《竞争政策——历史、理论及实践》,谷爱俊译,北京大学出版社2003年版,第46页。
⑥ 参见白艳：《美国反托拉斯法／欧盟竞争法平行论——理论与实践》,法律出版社2010年版,王传丽撰“序Ⅱ”。
① 参见[德]曼弗里德·诺伊曼：《竞争政策——历史、理论及实践》,谷爱俊译,北京大学出版社2003年版,第52页。
② See Umut Aydin, Promoting Competition:European Union and the Global Competition Order, Prepared for Presentation at the Biennial Conference of the EUSA, Los Angeles, CA,23-25 April 2009.
③ 参见李国海：《英国竞争法》,法律出版社2008年版,第10页。
④ See Tony Freyer, Regulating Big Business:Antitrust in Great Britain and America,1880-1990, Cambridge University Press,234-268 (1992).
① 参见[德]曼弗里德·诺伊曼：《竞争政策——历史、理论及实践》,谷爱俊译,北京大学出版社2003年版,第54-55页。
② 参见[美]戴维J·格伯尔：《二十世纪而欧洲的法律与竞争——捍卫普罗米修斯》,冯克利、魏志梅译,中国社会科学出版社2004年版,第332-333页。
③ Kurt E. Markert, Recent Developments in German Antitrust Law,43 Fordham L. Rev.697 (1975).
④ 其中的竞争规则明显受到美国联邦反托拉斯法的影响。See Andreas Weitbrecht, From Freiburg to Chicago and Beyond-the First 50 Years of European Competition Law, EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW REVIEW, VOL 29. ISSU 2, p.81-88 (2008).
⑤ 随着1993年的《马斯特里赫特条约》(Maastricht Treaty)的生效,为了体现更广泛的政策追求,欧洲经济共同体(EEC)更名为欧洲共同体(European Community, EC),然后根据2009年的《里斯本条约》(Treaty of Lisbon),又演化为今天的欧洲联盟(the European Union, EU)。
⑥ 白艳：《美国反托拉斯法/欧盟竞争法平行论——理论与实践》,法律出版社2010年版,第31页。
⑦ See Joel Davidow, The Worldwide Influence of United States Antitrust,35 A NTITRUST BULL.603 (1990).
① 参见王晓晔：《欧共体竞争法》,中国法制出版社2001年版,第7页。
② Gifford, Daniel J. & Robert T. Kudrle. "European Union competition law and policy:how much latitude for convergence with the United States?" Antitrust Bulletin, Fall, pp.727-780 (2003).
③ See Umut Aydin, Promoting Competition:European Union and the Global Competition Order, Prepared for Presentation at the Biennial Conference of the EUSA, Los Angeles, CA,23-25 April 2009.
④ Tony A. Freyer, Comparative Antitrust Enforcement and Business History, available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/hearings/single_firm/docs/219385.htm,2012-08-19.
⑤ See Alejandro Leon-Vargas, Modernization of European Community Competition Law:A Comparative Analysis With Some Procedural Issues of U.S. Antitrust Law, (2001). LLM Teses and Essays. Paper 28. available at htp://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/stu_llm/28.2012-08-17.
⑥ See P.H. Karmel and M. Brunt, The Structure of the Australian Economy, revised ed., F.W. Cheshire, Melbourne,1963, pp.94-95.
⑦ 孙晋、王菁：《(澳大利亚2008年合并指南>评析——兼论我国经营者集中控制制度的立法完善》,载漆多俊主编《经济法论丛》(第二十卷),武汉大学出版社2011年版,第303-331页。
① [日]村上政博：《日本禁止垄断法》,姜珊译,法律出版社2008年版,第1页。
② [日]根岸哲、舟田正之：《日本禁止垄断法概论》(第三版),王为农、陈杰译,中国法制出版社2007年版,第8页。
③ Lee, MH, Recent Developments in the treatment of collusion by the korean courts, (2005)4:2 Journal of Korean Competition Law 155 at 157.
④ 该准则的基本精神事实上源于1930年代,那时的国际卡特尔严重泛滥,被认为有害于世界经济。See Woolcock,Stephen, International Competition Policy and the World Trade Organization, The LSE Commonwealth Business Council Trade Forum in South Africa (2007). Available at http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/intemationalTradePolicyUnit/pd/intemationalCompetitionPolicyAndTheWorldTradeOrgani zation.pdf.2012-08-17.
⑤ 徐士英、杨超：《WTO竞争政策与中国反垄断立法(下)》,《社会科学》2004年第10期,第48-57页。
⑥ [英]马赫·M·达芭：《反垄断政策国际化研究》,肖兴志、丁宁等译,东北财经大学出版社2008年版,第208页。
① 王晓晔、陶正华：《WTO竞争政策及其对中国的影响》,《中国社会科学》2003年第5期,第49-60页。
② See George Stephanov Georgiev, Contagious Efficiency:The Growing Reliance on U.S.-Style Antitrust Settlements in EU Law, Utah Law Review. Dec.2007.
① 韩立余：《欧盟反托拉斯法的现代化》,《法学家》2004年第5期,第142-151页。
② David J. Gerber, Two Forms of Modernization in European Competition Law, Fordham International Law Journal, Volume 31, Issue 5 2007.
③ Commission Notice on the handling of complaints by the Commission under Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty, O J C 101,27.4.2004, (para 16).
① See George Stephanov Georgiev, Contagious Efficiency:The Growing Reliance on U.S.-Style Antitrust Settlements in EU Law. Utah Law Review. Dec.2007.
② Gippini-Fournier, Eric, The Modernisation of European Competition Law:First Experiences with Regulation 1/2003 (Report to FIDE Congress 2008). FIDE CONGRESS 2008, Vol.2:The Modernisation of European Competition Law-Initial Experiences with Regulation 1/2003, Heribert Franz Koeck and Margit Maria Karollus, eds., Nomos/facultas.wuv, Vienna,2008. Available at SSRN:http://ssrn.com/abstract=1139776.
③ 参见王中美：《经济理性与法学逻辑的融会贯通——中国反垄断并购审查实体标准与程序的得与失》,《现代法学》2011年第2期,第65-71页。
④ Barbora Jedlickova, Australian and US Developments of Competition Law and RPM:Who Is Right?
⑤ 参见[台]赖源河编审：《公平交易法新论》(第三版),台湾元照出版公司2005年版,第87页。
① 徐士英、杨超：《WTO竞争政策与中国反垄断立法(下)》,《社会科学》2004年第10期,第48-57页。
② See William E. Kovacic, Competition Policy in the European Union and the United States:Convergence or Divergence?, Bates White Fifth Annual Antitrust Conference Washington, D.C. June 2,2008.
③ Margaret Bloom, Substantial Antitrust Convergence:Developed Country Antitrust Enforcement is Converging on a Consumer Welfare Basis, ABA Antitrust Section Spring Meeting, Washington, DC. March 30-April 1,2005.
④ [德]曼弗里德·诺伊曼：《竞争政策——历史、理论及实践》,谷爱俊译,北京大学出版社2003年版,“前言”部分。
① 欧盟委员会竞争总局的首席经济学家主要负责竞争总局中的经济学事务,在应用欧盟竞争法时提供独立的经济学和计量经济学方法指引,并在具体案件中提供出庭支持。同时与委员会其他机构以及学术界保持合作,以解决具有争议性的经济学议题。See EC, The role of the Chief Competition Economist, available at http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/competition/economist/role_en.html,2012-08-18.
② William E. Kovacic, Competition Policy in the European Union and the United States:Convergence or Divergence?, Bates White Fifth Annual Antitrust Conference Washington, D.C. June 2,2008.
③ Speech by Commissioner Mario Monti:A reformed competition policy: achievements and challenges for the future, Center for European Reform, Brussels 28 October 2004.
④ See Farrell, J., and Saloner, G., (1985), Standardization, Compatibility, and Innovation, Rand Journal of Economics, 16:70-83; Farrell, J., and Saloner, G, (1986), Installed base and Compatibility:Innovation, Product Preannouncement and Predation,American Economic Review,76:940-955; Katz, M.L. and Shapiro, C., (1985), Network Externalities, Competition and Compatibility, American Economic Review,75(3):424-440.; Katz, M. and Shapiro,C., (1986), Product Compatibility Choice in a Market with Technological progress, Oxford Economic Papers, Special Issue on the New Industrial Economics.
① William E. Kovacic, Competition Policy in the European Union and the United States:Convergence or Divergence?, Bates White Fifth Annual Antitrust Conference Washington, D.C. June 2,2008.
② Margaret Bloom, Substantial Antitrust Convergence:Developed Country Antitrust Enforcement is Converging on a Consumer Welfare Basis, ABA Antitrust Section Spring Meeting, Washington, DC. March 30-April 1,2005.
③ John H. Shenefield, Statement Before the 17th Annual Corporate Counsel Inst.Oct.4,1978, noted in Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 50,388. (1978).
④ See Commission Notice on Immunity from Fines and Reduction in Fines in Cartel Cases,2002 OJ (C45) 3. Available at europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2002/c_045/c_04520020219en00030005.pdf,2012-08-18.
⑤ See Elisa Mariscal & Carlos Mena-Labarthe, Leniency Programs in Latin America:"New" Tools for Cartel Enforcement, Competition Policy International, Volume 6 Number 2. Autumn 2010.
⑥ See Bruno L Peixoto,Lanna Peixoto Advogados, Brazil:Cartel and Leniency, available at http://www.globalcompetitionreview.com/reviews/20/sections/76/chapters/798/brazil-cartels-leniency/,2012-08-19.
① See George Stephanov Georgiev, Contagious Efficiency:The Growing Reliance on U.S.-Style Antitrust Settlements in EU Law, Utah Law Review. Dec.2007.
② See Temple Lang, Commitment Decisions and Settlements with Antitrust Authorities and Private Parties under European Antitrust Law, in:Barry Hawk (ed.), International Antitrust Law and Policy:Fordham Corporate Law 2005,2006, chap.13 at p.270.
③ See Schweitzer, Heike, Commitment Decisions in the EU and in the Member States:Functions and Risks of a New Instrument of Competition Law Enforcement within a Federal Enforcement Regime (2012). e-Competitions Bulletin, Special Issue on Commitment Decisions, August 2,2012, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN:http://ssrn.com/abstract=2101630.
④ See George Stephanov Georgiev, Contagious Efficiency:The Growing Reliance on U.S.-Style Antitrust Settlements in EU Law, Utah Law Review. Dec.2007.
⑤ 参见[日]村上政博：《日本反垄断法的历史与发展——对日本早期反垄断法的反思》,聂孝红译,载王晓晔、伊从宽主编：《竞争法与经济发展》,社会科学文献出版社2003年版,第20-33页。
⑤ D. Daniel Sokol & William H. Hastie, Monopolists Without Borders:The Institutional Challenge of International Antitrust in a Global Gilded Age, Berkeley Bus. L.J.37, Spring,2007.
① Lessons to be learnt from the experiences of young competition agencies, Competition Policy Implementation Working Group, International Competition Network, Annual Conference, Capetown, South Africa,3-5 May 2006.
② William J. Kolasky, A Culture of Competition for North America, Before "Economic Competition Day:Shared Experiences".Anthropology Museum Auditorium Federal Competition Commission, Mexico City, Mexico. June 24,2002.
③ Sally Southey, Building a Competition Culture, http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/01149.html, 2012-08-28.
④ OECD, Competition Law and Policy in Argentina, Policy Brief, Oct.2006.
⑤ 欧盟委员会也充分注意到这一问题,因此一直在提倡“共同竞争文化”(common competition culture)。See Commission of the European Communities.2003, Draft Commission Notice on Cooperation within the Network of Competition Authorities. October. Available online at http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition.2012-08-20.
① OECD, Competition Advocacy:Challenges for Developing Countries, available at www.oecd.org/dataoecd/52/42/32033710.pdf.2012-08-10.
② 尽管由于历史的原因,该文件认为“社会主义竞争和资本主义竞争有着本质的区别,它是在生产资料公有制的基础上,在国家计划指导下开展的”,但该文件明确鼓励不同经济成分、企业之间采取合法的手段进行竞争,并指出必须打破地区封锁和部门分割,这使得该文件在中国竞争立法过程中具有了某种开创性意义。参见李胜利：《制定(反垄断法)背景下我国<反不正当竞争法)的修订与完善研究》,安徽大学2003年硕士学位论文,第7页。
③ 参见李胜利：《分立还是合并：中国反垄断法立法例的选择》,《河北法学》2000年第1期,第154-155页。
① 例如,2007年在北京召开的一次研讨会上,时任司法部副助理司法部长的Masoudi就发表了他对于中国反垄断法草案中有关滥用市场支配地位条款的意见。See Gerald F. Masoudi, Some Comments on the Abuse-Of-Dominance
Provisions of China's Draft Anti-Monopoly Law, available at www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/225357.pdf.2012-08-21.
② 这方面材料可参见美国联邦贸易委员会、司法部以及美国律师协会等机构的官方网站上的有关资料：http://www.ftc.gov/oia/competition.shtm; http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/articles/index.html.; http://apps.americanbar.org/intlaw/committees/business_regulation/antitrust/policy.shtml.
③ See Randolph Tritell and Elizabeth Kraus, The Federal Trade Commission's International Antitrust Program, January 2012, available at www.ftc.gov/bc/international/docs/ftcintantiprogram.pdf.2012-08-21.
① DOJ, The Antitrust Division's International Program, available at www.justice.gov/atr/public/intemational/program.pdf. 2012-08-21.
② 一是相互及时通报各自竞争政策及反垄断执法方面的重要动态；二是通过开展竞争政策和法律方面的活动,加强双方的能力建设；三是根据实际需要,双方进行反垄断执法经验交流；四是就反垄断法律和相关配套立法文件的修改提出评论意见；五是就多边竞争法律和政策交换意见；六是在提高企业、其他政府机构以及社会公众竞争政策和法律意识方面交流经验。参见《中美共同签署反托拉斯和反垄断合作谅解备忘录》,http://www.gov.cn/gzdt/2011-07/27/content_1914969.htm.2012-08-21.
③ DOJ, The Antitrust Division's International Program, available at www.justice.gov/atr/public/intemational/program.pdf. 2012-08-21.
④ See Timothy J. Muris, Creating a Culture of Competition:The Essential Role of Competition Advocacy, Prepared Remarks Before International Competition Network, Panel on Competition Advocacy and Antitrust Authorities, Naples, Italy. September 28,2002.
① Andrew Heimert, Maintaining a Culture of Competition-The Work Never Ends, Asian Competition Forum Hong Kong Polytechnic University, December 5,2011.
② William Lewis, The Power of Productivity:Wealth, Poverty, and the Threat to Global Stability (2004), University of Chicago Press, p.293.
③ 中国企业自20世纪90年代以来日益增多地面临外国的反倾销指控,以及令国际社会惊叹的“中国价格”现象,可以说也部分地体现了中国企业较强的国际竞争力。
③ See William J. Kolasky, United States and European Competition Policy:Are There More Differences Than We Care to Admit?, Before the European Policy Center Brussels, Belgium April 10,2002.
④ See William J. Kolasky, United States and European Competition Policy:Are There More Differences Than We Care to Admit?, Before the European Policy Center Brussels, Belgium April 10,2002.
① 史际春、赵忠龙：《竞争政策：经验与文本的交织进化》,《法学研究》2010年第5期,第104-112页。
② 这方面的精辟论述可见漆多俊：《经济法基础理论》(第四版),法律出版社2008年版,第10-13页。
① [日]栗田诚；《日本的规制改革与反垄断法及竞争政策》,张军建译,载漆多俊主编：《经济法论丛》第十卷,中国方正出版社2005年版,第357-370页。
② 关于日本反垄断法的历史发展详细情况,可参见[日]村上政博：《日本禁止垄断法》,姜珊译,法律出版社2008年版,“中文版序言”和“序言”部分,第1-21页；[日]根岸哲、舟田正之：《日本禁止垄断法概论》(第三版),王为农、陈杰译,中国法制出版社2007年版,第10-17页。
③ 转引自韩伟：《后危机时代的竞争制度拓展》,载漆多俊主编：《经济法论丛》(第二十卷),武汉大学出版社2011年版,第332-357页。
④ 徐士英、应品广：《竞争文化的培育和发展——从日本竞争主管机关竞争执法、竞争推进谈起》,《江苏大学学报(社会科学版)》2011年第5期,第64-70页。
① 可参见徐士英、应品广：《竞争文化的培育和发展——从日本竞争主管机关竞争执法、竞争推进谈起》,《江苏大学学报(社会科学版)》2011年第5期,第64-70页。
① William E. Kovacic, Competition Policy in the European Union and the United States:Convergence or Divergence?, Bates White Fifth Annual Antitrust Conference Washington, D.C. June 2,2008.
② Tony A. Freyer, Comparative Antitrust Enforcement and Business History, available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/hearings/single_firm/docs/219385.htm,2012-08-19.
① William E. Kovacic, Competition Policy in the European Union and the United States:Convergence or Divergence?, Bates White Fifth Annual Antitrust Conference Washington, D.C. June 2,2008.
② Ginsburg, Douglas H. & Fraser, Eric M., The Role of Economic Analysis in Competition Law (May 16,2010). Getting the Balance Right:Intellectual Property, Competition Law and Economics in Asia, Ian McEwin, ed., Hart Publishing, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN:http://ssm.com/abstrac=1610189.
③ 《最高人民法院关于审理因垄断行为引发的民事纠纷案件应用法律若干问题的规定》第12条：当事人可以向人民法院申请一至二名具有相应专门知识的人员出庭,就案件的专门性问题进行说明。第13条：当事人可以向人民法院申请委托专业机构或者专业人员就案件的专门性问题作出市场调查或者经济分析报告。经人民法院同意,双方当事人可以协商确定专业机构或者专业人员；协商不成的,由人民法院指定。人民法院可以参照民事诉讼法及相关司法解释有关鉴定结论的规定,对前款规定的市场调查或者经济分析报告进行审查判断。
④ 参见：《广东开庭审理首例反垄断纠纷案奇虎诉腾讯索赔1.5亿元》,http://legal.people.com.cn/GB/17689750.html, 2012-08-21。
① 可参见孙晋、李胜利：《竞争法原论》,武汉大学出版社2011年版,第245-246页。
② 时建中：《我国《反垄断法》的特色制度、亮点制度及重大不足》,《法学家》2008年第1期,第14-19页。
② 这方面已经有多篇论文对我国最高人民法院在宏观经济中的作用进行讨论。可参见鲁篱：《论最高法院在宏观调控 中的角色定位》,《现代法学》2006年第6期,第107-113页；侯猛：《最高人民法院如何规制经济——外部协调成本的考察》,《法商研究》2004年第6期,第58-68页,等等。
① Waller, S. W, Neo-Realism and the International Harmonization of Antitrust Law:Lessons from Antitrust, University of Kansas Law Review,42:557 (1994).
② A. E. Rodriguez, Does Legal Tradition Affect Competition Policy Performance?, The International Trade Journal, Volume ⅩⅪ, No.4, Winter 2007,417-454.
③ Newberg, J., Mexico's New Economic Competition Law:Toward the Development of a Mexican Law of Antitrust, Columbia Journal of Transnational Law,31:587-609 (1994).
④ Cassey Lee, Legal Traditions and Competition Policy, P. Cook, R. Fabella & C. Lee (Eds.), Competitive Advantage and Competition Policy in Developing Countries, UK:Edward Elgar Publishing, pp.54-78, (2007).
② William J. Kolasky, United States and European Competition Policy:are There More Differences than We Care to Admit?, Before the European Policy Center Brussels, Belgium April 10,2002.
① 关于该理论详见漆多俊教授：《经济法基础理论》,法律出版社2008年第四版,第10-64页。
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[43]Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co.,405 U.S.251,262 (1972).
[44]United States v. Nat'l Retail Lumber Dealers Ass'n,40 F. Supp.448,455 (D. Colo. 1941).
[45]United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.,310 U.S.218 (1940).
[46]United States v. Realty Multi-List, Inc.,629 F.2d 1351 (5th Cir.1980).
[47]NATIONAL SOCIETY OF PROFESSIONAL ENGINEERS, v. UNITED STATES.435 U.S.679 (1978).
[48]Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,475 U.S.574 (1986).
[48]Cont'l Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc.,277 F.3d 499,509 (4th Cir.2002).
[50]United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co.,438 U.S.422 (1978).
[51]State Oil v. Kahn.,522 U.S.18 (1997).
[52]NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla.,468 U.S.104,109 (1984).
[53]Texaco Inc. v. Dagher,547 U.S.1,4 (2006).
[54]American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co.-213 U.S.347 (1909).
[55]Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America 549 F.2d 597 (9d Cir.1976).
[56]United States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co.,109 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.1997).