摘要
2005年12月国资委提出，集团整体上市将成为2006年国企改革的趋势和亮点。本文正是从这个资本市场中的现实问题入手，在充分考虑我国国有企业改革路径与我国企业集团所处的转型经济环境的基础上，从交易费用理论、信息经济学、新兴市场与转型经济理论角度，提出了“中国企业集团是否应该整体上市?”问题的理论分析框架。
我们通过理论分析，认为上市公司母公司的企业集团既是是政府推进国有企业改革的成果，也是政府实现经济快速发展战略的工具，在我国25年的市场经济改革中，发挥了独特的作用。特别是对于我国这样一个处在转型经济时期的国家，企业集团的出现弥补了市场机制的不足，提高了经济效率。同时，作为国有资产三级监管体系的中间环节，企业集团担任了出资人的角色，部分解决了长期以来困扰国有企业的“所有者缺位”问题，起到了积极作用。
在实证研究的基础上，我们进一步得出了一些结论：(1)本文首先论证了我国企业集团背景对上市公司业绩和公司价值有着显著的影响；(2)不同性质实际控制人将通过集团背景，对上市子公司的业绩和公司价值将产生显著影响；(3)在不同的改革路径下形成的国有企业集团中，市场对于以国有企业剥离资产实现上市的模式评价显著偏低、市场对实际控制人属于“企业集团背景”或类似集团功能的“国有资产经营公司”的评价显著由于“政府或国资委”。
在上述结论的基础上，我们认为“国有企业是否应该整体上市?”，必须首先细分为不同类型，其中采用“分拆重组上市模式”的国有企业，通过整体上市能够增加市场价值；而采用“整体重组上市模式”从而形成的“母公司(集团公司)→上市公司”组织结构则有利于增加上市子公司价值，从而使所有国有上市公司的最终所有人——国家能够享受到公司价值最大化的福利。
在回答了哪一类国有企业适于整体上市的问题后，紧接着又产生了一个新的问题，即如果对“分拆重组上市模式”的国有企业进行整体上市，应该怎样进行会计计量与确认?企业的整体上市不仅涉及的会计业务复杂，更重要的是其会计政策的选择具有“经济后果”。特别是大型国有企业海外上市业务，涉及标的价值庞大，因此符合中国国情特色的企业合并会计准则以及恰当的会计政策选择将涉及国有资产安全与增值、保值问题。
在第二部分的研究中，我们首先将此类国有企业的整体上市定义为“回整上市”模式，并通过规范研究的方法讨论该业务的会计计量属性，针对我们的转型经济特整体，提出“修正的权益结合法”的概念；并且通过TCL集团上市的案例，提出了分析企业合并会计政策选择动机的理论框架，期望为正在制定中的我们《企业会计准则——企业合并》提供了一些建议性的意见。
本文的创新点主要包括以下几个方面：
1、同类研究主要是以国外市场的制度背景为基础，很少涉及转轨经济下中国企业集团对上市公司的影响，尤其是结合中国市场经济体制改革的研究几乎是空白。本研究紧扣中国企业集团演进的历史过程以及市场变迁的制度背景(比如产权制度的缺失、市场失灵、行政主导下的企业合并、母公司剥离资产上市等)，结合新兴市场特点(如国有资产退出相关行业存在障碍、市场垄断和过度竞争并存、管制不利与管制过度等现象)，以及我国企业集团独特的成长路经探求我国企业集团的特征、作用以及政策意义。为考察我国企业集团独特的产生、发展以及意义提供了一个全新的视角，对“企业集团是否应该整体上市”的现实问题提供了理论分析框架。
2、本文首次将控制权性质、企业集团背景、上市公司业绩联系起来，揭示了以往研究文献所忽略的影响我国上市公司业绩和行为的重要因素。这些研究结论为理解我国上市公司特征、评估公司价值提供了新的视角。
3、本文针对我国国企改革遗留问题——“剥离形成的企业集团”不利于上市公司价值和业绩，提出了“回整上市”的解决思路，并讨论了该业务的计量属性，提出了“修正的权益结合法”的概念。这些讨论为那些适合通过企业集团与上市子公司合并、实现整体上市业务所涉及的会计问题提供了思路，也使本文从“问题的提出”到“问题的解决方案”有始有终，成为一个完整的理论体系。
4、有关“企业集团”的定义在国内鲜有统一的认识。本文对其的界定方法既考虑了国情，同时也尽量的与国际主流的定义保持一致，从而使我们的研究与国内外相关研究具有可比性。本文在考虑了有关“企业集团”的经济学理论定义、国家统计局定义、国家工商总局定义的基础上，首次将“系”的概念融入其中。
5、在数据信息方面，由于2004年起证监会要求上市公司在年报“第四章：股本变化及股东情况“新增”公司与实际控制人之间的产权及控制关系的方框图”一栏。相对于前人的研究，我们拥有了更多关于上市公司直接股东、实际控制人等方面的信息，则对于我们研究实际控制人、控股股东以及上市公司之间的公司
治理特征提供了更完整的信息。
According to State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of State Council(SASAC), enterprises group to go public will become the highlighted trend in 2006. This paper starts from the problem in real economic life that whether the group in China should go public as a whole, considering the transitional economy background that Chinese enterprises groups stuck in. And the author hope to exploit some theoretic framework or ideas, helping the reasonable decision process by regulatory watchdogs.
Our paper finds that the groups as the controlling ownerships of listed companies are the result of economy institution reform and also the tools by government to facilitate the "catch-up strategy" , which have sped up the economic development and furthered the institutional changes. Most important of all, the enterprises group improved the economic efficiency by resolve the problems caused by market default. Additionally, as the middle one in "Three-Tier Supervision System of Stated-owned Assets" , the groups acted up as the owners, filling the void of owners.
Based on the theoretic analysis and empirical study, we come to the following tentative conclusions, hoping it useful to inspire the further researches:
(l)This paper supported the assumption that groups in China have
influences on the performances and firm values of the listed companies
that affiliated to groups.
(2)Difference natures in ultimate controlling shareholders will cause the
different influences on their affiliated listed companies;
(3)As for the state-owned groups evolved along the different reform paths,
the market valued "Spinned-off Model" lowest, "Three-Tier System"
next, and the listed companies with a real functional group ranked
highest.
On the above evidences, the paper answered the questions from SASAC. Firstly, we shall divide all enterprises groups into several categories according to their evolvement paths. Then, as for the "Spinned-off Type" group, we suggest the merge between the parent companies and listed companies, which will increase their market values. Whereas the positive influences from the group born out of " Group Restructure Type" , to maintain the structure of group-listed companies seems reasonable, anyway.
Another new question comes out after we identify which type group need go public as a whole, that how to recognize and measure the transactions if we restructured the spinnedned-off group by merging the group and affiliated listed companies as a whole? As far as the economic effect is concerned, the accounting issue related to group' s going pubic has profound influences, especially when it comes to aboard listing. Thus, the accounting standard on business combination, which fit for the special situations in China but also converging to the internationally recognized standard, is the event put on the top of agenda.
Therefore, in the second part, we defined the special
transaction-re-emerging to go public" , which refers to the method that
merge the parent-son companies come from former spinnedned-off restructure in state-owned enterprises reform. And we discuss the measurement attribute of the "re-emerging to go public" before bringing forward the concept "modified pooling of interests" . In order to make the analysis more detailed, we use the case study of TCL Group, to illustrate the reasoning process.
As for the creative points in this paper, we conclude them as follows:
(l)This paper discusses the characteristics and influences of China' s enterprises group in the background of transitional economy, based on the path along which the group evolved. We develop this paper by resort to the institutional economics, theory of property right and agency theory, at the same time, clinging to the unique in institutional environment in China, which provides the analysis framework for the research on
enterprises group, and for the question from SASAC.
(2)The researches involved the same topic with us are almost based in the
foreign institutional environment, and few dip into the group' s
influence in China' s transitional economic background. This paper
firstly related the nature of ultimate controlling shareholders to
business group and performances of listed companies, providing the
researchers a new standpoint to consider the factors that impact the
listed companies.
(3)This paper brings forward the "re-emerging to go public" solution
to the problems left by SOEs reform, and then the modified pooling of
interests method is discussed. These discussions provides the idea
flashes on the combination business by members of spinned-off group,
constructing the integrated theory system by providing solution to the
problems we pick up at the beginning.
(4)There exists no consensus on the conception or definition of business
group in China. The definition this paper gives out considers the standard
highly recongnized by international community, and also clings to the
unique institutional environment in China.
(5)As for the data, we use the information about the shareholders most
recently required to disclose in 2004, which unfolds the explicit relation
among the ultimate shareholders and direct controlling shareholders.
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