摘要
剥离部门已成为企业,尤其是大型企业去除低效部门、退出非核业务、调整战略、摆脱财务困境、改善管理和优化组织结构的重要途径。然而,在现实企业中,有的部门容易剥离,有的则很难被剥离,有的只是一部分被剥离。这些现象提出了问题：企业中为什么会存在剥离难易不同的部门,尤其是存在那些难以剥离的“没有利润”的费用部门?一个部门从企业中剥离出去的条件是什么?对此问题的研究有助于企业识别自身的组织冗余和低效部门,有助于定量地理解企业组织结构、企业资源配置理论、分工理论和定价机制的选择。本论文以效率为准则,讨论了部门的市场替代型剥离和不完全剥离以及企业任务剥离的判别条件,主要研究内容如下：
建立部门和企业的模型并定义它们的效率。本论文将部门或企业的成本划分为原料资源成本和控制资源成本。于是,部门模型表述为：部门的实际利润等于部门收入减去部门消耗的控制资源成本和部门加工处理的原料资源和控制资源的成本。企业模型表述为：企业的实际利润等于企业收入减去企业加工处理的原料资源成本和消耗的控制资源成本。部门和企业的效率被定义为：在设定期间,部门或企业的实际利润与其消耗的控制成本的比值。
从所有权分配视角定义企业部门剥离概念。部门的所有权由若干个基本权利组成,每个基本权利又可以分割为若干个部分。因此,企业部门剥离是指部门的所有权一部分或全部被分离出去。即部门剥离至少包含以下三项之一：(1)部门的所有权中至少有一项基本权利被分拆出去,(2)在部门的所有权中,至少有一项基本权利的一部分被分割出去,(3)部门的股份一部分或全部被转让出去。只有一部分所有权分离出去称为不完全剥离,全部所有权分离出去称为完全剥离(以下简称剥离)。
构建部门的剥离判据并定义剥离难度概念。推导出企业部门的剥离边界方程和剥离函数,依此得到部门剥离判据：当剥离函数小于零时,企业应剥离部门；当剥离函数大于零时,应保留部门；当剥离函数等于零时,剥离和保留部门的企业效率是相等的。剥离难度等于剥离函数。当部门的剥离难度值大于零并且值越大时,部门越难以剥离；当部门的剥离难度值小于零且其值越小时,部门越容易被剥离。另外,企业内部交易定价的不确定性不影响部门的剥离判别。
导出企业所需资源和企业中间产品的有效配置条件。当企业需要的资源稀缺程度较高时,该资源应由企业内部的部门来配置,当资源的稀缺程度较低时,应由市场来配置；当企业的中间产品稀缺程度较低时,应采取在企业内部配置的方式,当中间产品的稀缺程度较高时,应采取市场配置的方式。剥离边界方程是定量划分资源或中间产品稀缺程度高低的分界标准,此标准就是企业资源或中间产品的有效配置边界。
导出两种定价机制的边界。当部门的剥离函数大于零时,应由组织权力对部门提供的资源进行定价,当剥离函数小于零时,应由市场机制对部门提供的资源进行定价；当剥离函数大于零时,应采取市场机制对企业的中间产品进行定价,当剥离函数小于零时,应采取组织权力对企业的中间产品进行定价。部门剥离边界方程定量地确定了组织权力和市场这两种定价机制的边界。从资源和中间产品的稀缺性来说：稀缺程度较高的资源应由组织权力来配置和定价,稀缺程度较低的资源应由市场来配置和定价；稀缺程度较低的中间产品应由组织权力来配置和定价,稀缺程度较高的中间产品应由市场来配置和定价。
提出部门的不完全剥离条件。推导出在满足或不满足剥离条件的情况下部门的不完全剥离函数,由此得到部门不完全剥离应满足的条件：在不满足剥离条件的情况下,部门的不完全剥离函数大于零,并且不完全剥离函数对部门持股比例的导数小于等于零；在满足剥离条件的情况下,存在使不完全剥离函数大于零的持股比例。
建立企业任务模型和剥离条件。企业任务模型表述为：任务产生的实际利润等于任务收入减去任务要整合的原料资源成本和控制资源成本以及任务要消耗的控制资源成本。任务效率定义为：任务的实际利润与任务消耗的控制资源成本的比值。推导出企业需求型任务的剥离边界方程和剥离函数。由此建立了企业需求型任务的剥离判别条件：当剥离函数小于零时,企业应剥离任务；反之,企业应自己做任务。推导出市场需求型已有任务的剥离边界方程和剥离函数,以此建立了市场需求型已有任务的剥离判别条件：当此剥离函数大于零时,企业应剥离任务,反之,应自己做任务。此外,还得到不满足剥离条件的情况下,企业需求型已有任务的不完全剥离判别条件：任务的不完全剥离函数大于零且它对任务资本分摊比例的导数小于等于零。
分析了部门集的剥离条件。部门集是具有某些相同性质或牵涉到同一事件的一些部门的集合。可通过对企业组织的剖分和部门的抽取两种方式来得到一个部门集。部门集可合并为一个部门来研究,其剥离和不完全剥离判别条件与一个部门是相似的。
研究了某特大型国有企业剥离办学部门的决策问题。应用本论文得到的部门剥离决策分析理论和方法讨论了市场购买和自己办学这两种知识获取途径的选择,并对办学部门作了不完全剥离的分析。
Divesting division has become an important way for corporation to get rid of inefficient units, exit non-core businesses, select strategic positions, throw off financial difficulties and bankruptcy, improve management, and optimize organizational structures. However, divesting some divisions is easy, but some, especially the cost divisions that do not generate profits, are difficult to divest, and there are the divisions that are just partly divested. Why do these phenomena occur? What is the condition of divesting a division or of it existing within the corporation? The researches of these questions can help a corporation identify its redundant organization and inefficient divisions, have a quantitative understanding of the corporate organizational structure, resource allocation theory, theory of division of labor and choice of pricing mechanism. Based on efficiency, this dissertation focuses on the conditions of the market-substitute type divestiture and incomplete divestiture of the division and task of the corporation. The main research contents are as follows:
Models of the division and corporation are built, and each efficiency is defined.The dissertation divides the cost of division or corporation into both raw material resource cost and control resource cost. The division model is a formula that the division's actual profit is equal to its revenues less its costs of the raw material resources and control resources it processe and the control resources it consume. The corporate model is an expression that corporate actual profit is equal to the corporate incomes less its costs of both processed raw materials resources and consumed control resources. The efficiency of the division or the corporation is defined as a ratio of the actual profit of the division or the corporation to each control costs consumed in a period.
The divestiture of corporate division is defined from the perspective of distributing division ownership. This ownership consists of several fundamental rights,and each of these fundamental rights can be further divided into some parts.Thus, it is defined as a division divestiture that some or all of the division ownership are separated out from the corporation. That contains at least one of the following three:(1) at least one of the fundamental rights is separated from the ownership,(2) the ownership at least have one fundamental right whose a part is segmentalized out,(3) some or all of the division's shares are sold. Separating a part or all of the ownership from the corporation is called incomplete divestiture or complete one.
The divestiture criterion of a division is structured,and difficult degree of divestiture is defined.The dissertation proposes the divestiture boundary equation and divestiture function of the division,and from them the divestiture criterion is established:When the function is less than zero, the division should be divested; when the function is greater than zero, the division should be retained; and when the function is equal to zero,divesting and retaining the division have the same corporate efficiency. The difficult degree of divestiture is equal to the function,and when it is more than zero, the larger its value, the more difficult to divest division; when it is less than zero, the smaller its value, the more easily to divest division.In addition, the uncertainty of the internal transaction pricing of corporation and its division does not affect the divestiture criterion.
Efficient allocation condition of resource a corporation needs or intermediate product produced by a corporation is derived. When the scarcity degree of the resource is relatively high, it should be supplied by the division, and when the scarcity degree is relatively low, it should be provided by the market; When the scarcity degree of the intermediate product is relatively low, this product should be allocated within the corporation, and when its scarcity degree is relatively high, it should be directly sold in the market. The divestiture boundary equation is a divide of the scarcity degree being high or low,and this divide is a boundary of efficient allocation for the resource or the intermediate product.
A boundary of two pricing mechanisms is presented in the dissertation. When the divestiture function is greater than zero, pricing of the resource provided by the division should be completed by the organizational power, or pricing of the intermediate product should be done by the market;When the function is less than zero, pricing of the resource should be done by the market,or pricing of the intermediate product should be done by the organizational power. The divestiture boundary equation quantificationally determines a frontier of the two pricing mechanisms:organizational power and market.According to the scarcity degree, the resource whose scarcity degree is high should be allocated by the organizational power, and the resource whose scarcity degree is low should be allocated by the market; the intermediate product whose scarcity degree is low should be allocated by the organizational power,and the intermediate product whose scarcity degree is high should be allocated by the market.
The condition of incomplete divestiture of a division is founded. The dissertation proposes the division's incomplete divestiture function and founds the incomplete divestiture condition:When the divestiture condition of the division is not satisfied, the incomplete divestiture function is greater than zero and the derivative of the function with respect to ratio of the shares held by the corporation is less than or equal to zero; When the divestiture condition is satisfied, there is the division shares'ratio that makes the function be greater than zero.
The model and divestiture condition of corporate task are established. It is described for the task model that the task's actual profit is equal to its revenues minus the costs of the raw material resources and control resources integrated by the task and the control resources the task consumes. The dissertation proposes the divestiture boundary equation and divestiture function of the corporation-need type task and market-need type existing task,and builds their divestiture conditions:the former's divestiture function is less than zero and the latter's divestiture function is greater than zero.Otherwise,under not satisfying the divestiture condition of the task,the dissertation sets up also the incomplete divestiture condition of the corporation-need type existing tasks:its divestiture function is greater than zero and the derivative of the function with respect to ratio of the task capital apportionment by the corporation is less than or equal to zero.
The divestiture condition of divisions set is discussed. The divisions set is a group of divisions which are related to the same nature, or an event. It can be obtained by the organizational partition or the extraction,and seen as a division to establish its divestiture condition.
The dissertation finally discusses the choice of divesting the division that engages in teaching and training in a large state-owned company. The divestiture condition of the division is applied to choose the access to knowledge in two way:market buy and own school, and the condition of incomplete divestiture is used for this case.
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