摘要
国际内部审计协会认为,内部审计是一种独立、客观的保证和咨询活动。其目的在于为组织增加价值和提高组织的运作效率。它通过系统化和规范化的方法,评价和改进风险管理、控制和治理过程的效果,帮助组织实现其目标①。改革开放30多年来,以国家为主导的我国金融体制改革取得重大成就,各行公司治理日趋完善,经营业绩不断攀升,在董事会的支持和监管部门的推动下,内部审计的职能与地位得到持续拓展与提升,内部审计在商业银行价值创造中的作用日益显现。
21世纪以来,国际金融市场上所发生的一系列经济金融事件凸显公司治理在全球经济金融稳定与发展中的核心作用。良好的公司治理成为国际资本市场和全球投资者判断上市银行经营业绩和投资价值的重要标志,而内部审计作用的发挥情况亦是投资者判断商业银行公司治理水平的重要指标。开展公司治理评价,既是内部审计推进公司战略,促进商业银行提升竞争发展能力必须实现的跨越,也是内部审计推进风险管理,促进内部控制系统高效运营的重要手段；既是全面展现商业银行治理水平,实现与各利益相关者有效沟通的必然选择,也是内部审计推进管理与服务创新,切实提升履职能力的重要举措。
本文以国内外商业银行公司治理图景比较开篇,在阐释核心竞争力与公司治理、公司治理与内部审计履职能力提升的关系的基础上,指出内部审计开展公司治理评价对于促进商业银行组织发展战略和经营目标实现方面具有重要的意义。论文通过文献综述,深入挖掘受托经济责任理论、契约理论和交易费用理论内涵,并从剖析商业银行公司治理的特殊性和治理结构的有效性入手,围绕商业银行公司治理的脆弱性、外部性和信息不对称性特征,构建起以运行效率评价、IT治理评价、信息披露评价和履行社会责任评价为内容的公司治理评价体系。论文最后从我国商业银行增长方式转变和核心竞争力持续提升出发,提出了未来商业银行内部审计开展公司治理评价需要持续关注的事项。本文注重在理论与实践方面得到更好地结合,亦提供了一些评价的方法,为指导实践指明了方向。
全文分为七个部分：
第一部分为导论。论文在展示全球11家最具代表性的先进银行的公司治理图景的基础上,深入诠释了内部审计开展公司治理评价的内在优势与积极意义,并从商业银行公司治理、外部相关者开展公司治理评价实践、内部审计契约和内部审计开展公司治理评价等4个方面进行了文献综述,为本文选择研究视角,.形成研究思路,确定研究内容与方法作好了铺垫。本研究认为,以内部审计的视角开展商业银行公司治理评价,其核心就是紧紧践行和拓展内部审计职能,以推动和提升商业银行核心竞争力为工作目标,以开展运行效率评价、IT治理评价、信息披露评价和履行社会责任评价为实现途径,有效推动和促进商业银行公司治理水平的持续提升。
第二部分为商业银行公司治理评价的经济学分析。具体包括商业银行公司治理评价的理论基础、商业银行公司治理的特殊性和商业银行治理结构的有效性等三方面内容。本文通过交易费用理论提出内部审计存在的根源,通过契约理论进一步明确了内部审计的职能边界,通过受托经济责任理论寻求公司治理评价的理论依据,并且认为开展公司治理评价,可以有效平衡商业银行各利益相关方的不对称信息,维系委托人与代理人之间的相互制衡,促进委托人与代理人之间的沟通,减少乃至避免低效的“道德风险”和“逆向选择”问题。对于商业银行公司治理的特殊性,本文以美国次贷危机引发的全球金融海啸为例,结合我国的现状,揭示了银行业公司治理的脆弱性、外部性和信息不对称性特征；对于商业银行治理结构的有效性,本文采用规范研究的方法,从股东治理、董事会治理、高管层治理和监事会治理四个层面提出了有效治理的观点。这两个方面的内容为评价体系的搭建,以及第3、4、5、6部分中的评价内容与评价方法的研究作好了铺垫。
第三部分为商业银行运行效率评价。效率是商业银行竞争力的核心内容和重要表现形式。开展效率评价对现代商业银行应对竞争挑战,谋求竞争优势,抵御外部风险,提高经营绩效,实现最大利益具有重要的意义。基于内部审计在公司各种委托代理关系与契约关系中所处的特殊地位,文中以中国工商银行为具体研究对象,以评价单元为载体,从技术效率、配置效率、规模效率和纯技术效率等方面,分析了该行各产品单元、业务线条的组织架构、职责边界、决策规则和激励约束的情况,以及资源配置对公司利益的贡献情况,最后采用DEA分析法对该行境内一级(直属)分行效率情况进行了实证分析,提出了未来对该行持续评价需要关注的方向。
第四部分为商业银行信息披露评价。公司治理是保证披露信息质量的内部制度安排。提高信息披露质量,是提升商业银行市场公信力的重要途径,它对缓解诚信危机,增强投资者信心具有重要的作用。基于内部审计的信息披露评价是商业银行内部调节机制的一个主要组成部分,它将为董事会制定治理政策提供依据,将有助于商业银行降低交易成本,建立契约上的事后解决机制,缩短商业银行自愿信息供给与投资者信息需求之间的期望差距,促进商业银行信息质量的改善。论文在深入剖析我国商业银行信息披露的真实性、及时性和完整性内涵的基础上,就信息披露失真的原因、信息披露的时间特征与方式、信息披露与风险管理、信息披露与信息保密等商业银行信息披露中比较敏感的问题进行了深入分析,并从合规披露,自愿披露,风险披露的角度对我国商业银行信息披露的情况进行了分析；从资本结构与资本充足,信用、市场、操作和流动性风险披露,衍生金融工具信息披露等方面揭示了我国现行法规与巴塞尔银行监管委员会制定的标准之间的差距；从资本结构与资本充足,信用、市场、操作、流动性及其他风险披露,衍生金融工具信息披露,会计和列示政策披露等方面揭示了我国商业银行实际信息披露与国际水平的差距。
第五部分为商业银行履行社会责任评价。强化社会责任既是我国商业银行应对国际竞争、融入国际市场的需要,也是各行提高竞争力和发展质量的需要。企业社会责任在全球化时代日益受到人们的关注,成为世界一流跨国公司继价格竞争、质量竞争之后新一轮国际竞争的重要标志。本文认为,内部审计开展履行社会责任评价,就是着眼于推动利益相关者对履行社会责任的认知,着眼于推动商业银行良好治理环境的不断改善。论文从对股东、对员工、对客户、对同业和对社会公众五个方面提出了商业银行应该承担的社会责任,并以社会效果、社会反应和企业效果为一级指标,构建起商业银行履行社会责任评价体系,采用模糊综合评价法对A银行履行社会责任情况进行了实证,从方法上实现了商业银行之间履行社会责任情况的排序与比较。
第六部分为商业银行IT治理评价。信息与信息技术作为商业银行最重要的资产,其所面临的风险、利益和机会使得IT治理成为商业银行公司治理中最关键的内容。随着商业银行对信息系统依赖性的增强,IT治理对战略目标的实现起到至关重要的作用。IT治理评价是完善IT治理机制的重要内容。对IT治理科学性与有效性的评估过程,就是内部审计为商业银行IT治理提供指导与服务的过程。本文在剖析我国商业银行IT治理现状与面临挑战的基础上,分别就六种治理安排模式和五种IT治理关键决策环节之间的内在联系与最佳组合进行了深入讨论,针对资产收益、净资产收益和收益增长三个不同的绩效目标讨论了IT治理的方法,提出了内部审计的关注要点。
第七部分为商业银行公司治理与有效性评价的动态优化。本文对何谓商业银行的有效公司治理进行了反思,认为商业银行公司治理存在的根本理由在于效率而不在于制衡,制衡若偏离了效率也就丧失了存在的意义,因此公司治理的完善不仅仅是建立一种制衡的权力结构,还要建立有关银行控制权和剩余索取权分配的一整套法律、文化的制度性安排,并使之发挥应有的作用。随着我国商业银行经营模式和增长方式的转变,内部审计对商业银行公司治理评价的内容与方法也需要作出相应的变化。
本文的创新主要体现在研究对象、研究视角、研究内容与方法以及在丰富商业银行内部审计活动的内涵方面。
在研究对象上,本文以商业银行的公司治理评价作为研究对象,这有别于现有的以一般意义上的企业法人的公司治理评价作为对象的研究,国内外直接的研究文献也较为稀少。商业银行作为国民经济的重要组成部分,肩负了重要的战略使命。公司治理的日益完善有助于商业银行提高运行效率,提升风险防范能力,增加公司价值。内部审计开展公司治理评价丰富了商业银行管理的内涵,有利于推动和促进商业银行治理水平的提高。
在研究视角上,在现有关于公司治理评价的研究中,学者们均把实施评价的主体定位为外部监管机构或社会中介机构。因评价者仅站在商业银行的外部,而无法探知或感受商业银行内部的运转情况,故其评价结论的参考作用相对有限。本文以内部审计作为商业银行公司治理的评价主体,该主体作为银行内部的特殊契约,肩负从评价的角度推动组织提高运行效率,增加组织价值的使命,它深谙组织治理现状,故其评价结论对推进和完善商业银行公司治理将会起到更加积极有效的作用。
在研究内容与方法上,本文将评价主体定位为商业银行的内部审计,其评价的内容与过往类似的研究亦存在较多的差异。过往的研究因其评价主体不同,评价内容不外乎两种,一种是从股东大会、董事会、监事会、高管层和利益相关者等治理层面来评价,另一种是从治理环境、激励约束机制、监督评价机制来评价。本文利用内部审计本身所具有的地位优势,充分考虑商业银行治理活动与内部审计契约的特殊性,立足内部治理,关注商业银行的运行效率和IT治理的情况；兼顾外部治理,关注商业银行的信息披露的有效性和其履行社会责任的情况。上述四个方面基本涵盖了内部审计对商业银行公司治理的全部关注,有助于提高评价结论的全面性和准确性。本文拓展了传统的研究思路,打破了关于公司治理评价的研究瓶颈,为推动上述研究注入了新的思想。
在丰富商业银行内部审计活动内涵方面,本文力求为商业银行内部审计实践提供有效指导,故在评价方法和评价模型的选择上投入了较多的研究精力。本研究认为,遵循这样的研究思路开展的评价活动无论从报告内容还是从报告形成的过程都将有别于其他审计活动。公司治理评价是对商业银行公司治理的有效性作出的系列排序,其报告本身更偏重于研究性质,在内容上寻求的是公司经营管理表象后面的实质,报告形成过程较多地使用了数理统计和高级计量的方法,传统的现场审计确认的工作方式相对淡化。
本文在数据采集、变量与比较标准的选择方面亦存在一些局限,并由此可能影响到局部或过程结论的准确性,但对本研究不构成实质性影响。
A sound corporate governance framework and strong core competence have been an unswerving pursuit of bankers. As is stated by The Institute of Internal Auditors(IIA), internal audit of commercial banks should contribute more to the sustained development of corporation governance, risk management and internal control, to value creation, and to the realization of development strategies and operation targets. During the past 30 years since the adoption of the reform and opening-up policy, the government-leading financial system reform has gained great achievements with improving corporate governance and upgrading operation performance in banks. With the support of the board of directors and advocacy of the supervision departments, the functioning and status of internal audit enjoys sustaining expansion and promotion, especially in the value creation of commercial banks.
The core role of corporation governance in the stability and development of global economy has been fully reflected in a number of economic and financial issues happening in the global financial market since the start of the new century. Benign corporation governance is considered crucial criteria by the international capital market and global investors in their assessment of operation performance and investment value of commercial banks. Corporate governance evaluation (hereafter referred to as CGE) is:1)a leap-step development internal audit realizes to improve corporation strategies and promote competitiveness and development of commercial banks; 2) an important means internal audit takes to improve risk management and promote high efficiency operation of the internal control system; 3) an inevitable choice to reflect the governance level of commercial banks in an all-round way, and to realize effective communication among stakeholders; 4) a significant measure internal audit adopts to upgrade managerial and service innovation, and to feasibly enhance fulfillment capability.
Beginning with comparison and contrast of different governance scenarios of commercial banks both home and abroad, this paper reveals the significance of CGE in internal audit in the promotion of organizational development strategies and in the realization of operation targets of commercial banks based on the elaboration of the relationship between core competitiveness and corporate governance, corporate governance and fulfillment capability of internal audit in commercial banks. Through thorough paper research, this paper reveals the connotation of the accountability theory, contractual theory, and transaction cost theory, analyzes the particularity of corporate governance and effectiveness of governance structure, and studies such corporate governance properties as vulnerability, externality, and information asymmetry in commercial banks, thus establishing an effective evaluation system of corporate governance, including four aspects of evaluation:operation efficiency evaluation, IT governance capability evaluation, public disclosure evaluation, and social responsibility fulfillment evaluation. The final part of this paper brings forward matters to be focused on in the whole process of CGE in internal audit of commercial banks. This paper values the combination of theory and practice, and uses certain evaluation methodologies to guide practices.
This paper is divided into seven parts:
Part one:introduction. This paper takes the example of the corporate governance scenario of eleven advanced banks most representative in the international arena, and elaborate the intrinsic superiority and positive significance of CGE in internal audit. A literature survey is conducted in the following four aspects:corporate governance of commercial banks, practices of governance by the external stakeholders, and CGE, helping to form the research perspective and approach, and identify research content and methodology. In conclusion, the core of CGE in the perspective of internal audit is to implement and expand the functions of internal audit. Its major task is to improve core competency of commercial banks using the four aspects of evaluation:operation efficacy evaluation, IT governance capability evaluation, public disclosure evaluation, and social responsibility fulfillment evaluation, and therefore, realizes its purpose to effectively and continuously upgrade the governance capability of commercially banks.
Part two:economic analysis of CGE in commercial banks. It includes:1) theoretical basis of CGE; 2) particularity of governance; 3) effectiveness of governance structure in commercial banks. This paper brings forward the root of internal audit by applying the transaction cost theory, defines the functional boundary of internal audit by applying the contractual theory, and analyzes the theoretical basis of CGE by apply the accountability theory. CGE can effectively balance the asymmetry information of stakeholders in commercial banks, maintain the principal-agent balance and promote principal-agent communication, thus avoiding problems of "moral hazard" and "adverse selection". In terms of governance particularity, this paper discusses the vulnerability, externality, and information asymmetry of the banking industry taking the example of the global financial crisis caused by the US subprime mortgage crisis and the present situation in China. In terms of governance structure effectiveness, this paper, adopting the method of normative research, brings forth the idea of effective governance in the following four aspects:shareholder governance, board of directors'governance, top managers'governance, and supervisory committee governance. The above two parts are the foundation of the establishment of the evaluation system, and the research in evaluation content and methodology from part three to six.
Part three:operation efficiency evaluation of commercial banks. Efficiency is the essence and representation of commercial bank's competitiveness. Operation efficiency evaluation is of significant importance to assist the commercial banks to meet challenges, strive for competitive superiority, dissolve the external risks, raise operation performance, and realize profit maximization. Given the special role internal audit plays in various principal-agent and contractual relationships, this paper, taking Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) as the research object, and analyzes its responsibility boundary, decision-making rules, incentive constraints mechanism, and the contribution of resource allocation to corporate interest. This analysis is conducted in terms of technical efficiency, allocation efficiency, and pure technical efficiency, etc. and enhanced by empirical analysis on operation efficiency in ICBC's domestic primary (directly subordinate) branches, thus bringing forward directions of sustained evaluation of ICBC.
Part four:public disclosure evaluation of commercial banks. Corporate governance, as an internal institutional arrangement, guarantees the quality of the information to be disclosed. Qualified public disclosure promotes market credibility of commercial banks, thus playing an important role to alleviate credit crisis and enhance trust of the investors. Given the fact that public disclosure of internal audit composes an important part in the internal adjustment mechanism of commercial banks, it provides reference for the board of directors in its governance policy-making, and reduces transaction cost, helps to establish the settlement mechanism afterwards on the contracts, shortens the expectation gap between voluntary disclosure of the commercial banks and information demand of the investors, and thus improves the quality of information disclosed by the commercial banks. This paper also conducts a depth analysis of the connotation of authenticity, betimes and integrity concerning public disclosure, based on which sensitive matters are discussed including:the cause of public disclosure distortion; time characteristics and pattern of public disclosure; public disclosure and risk management; information disclosure and secrecy, etc. Public disclosure situation in domestic commercial banks is analyzed in the perspectives of compliance disclosure, voluntary disclosure and risk disclosure. The gap between current laws and regulation in China and the standards issued by Basel Committee on Banking Supervision is revealed through analysis of the following aspects:capital structure and adequacy, disclosure of credit, market, operation and liquidity risks, and information disclosure for derivative financial tools, etc.; and the gap between actual public disclosure in China's commercial banks and international practices through analysis of the following aspects:capital structure and adequacy, disclosure of credit, market, operation and liquidity risks, and information disclosure for derivative financial tools etc.
Part five:social responsibility fulfillment evaluation in commercial banks. China's commercial banks should enhance their sense of social responsibility to cope with international competition to merge into international community, as is the same for all industries to update competitiveness and development quality. Corporate social responsibilities are in the center of attention in the globalization era. Social responsibility fulfillment, after price and quality competition, has become an important signal of the new-round international competition. This paper holds the opinion that social responsibility fulfillment evaluation of internal audit sets its foot on promoting stakeholders'recognition on fulfilling social responsibility, and improving governance environment of commercial banks. This paper points out aspects of social responsibilities commercial banks should shoulder in terms of stakeholders, staff, clients, counterpart organization and the general public. By apply social impact, social response and corporate effect as first degree indexes, this paper establishes an evaluation system of social responsibilities in commercials banks, taking the example of Bank A in its fulfillment of social responsibilities using the method of Fuzzy Comprehensive Evaluation, and then conducts precedence ordering and comparison of commercial banks in social responsibility fulfillment.
Part six:IT governance capability evaluation of commercial banks. Information and information technology are important assets of commercial banks, making IT governance a crucial component in corporate governance given the risks, profits and opportunities they face. As the commercial banks are growing more dependent on information system, IT governance becomes more important in the realization of strategic objectives. IT governance capability evaluation plays a great role in the perfection of IT governance mechanism. The evaluation of IT governance's scientific nature and effectiveness is the guidance and services internal audit provides for IT governance in commercial banks. Based on the analysis of the present IT governance situation and the challenges, this paper conducts a depth analysis on the inner links of six governance arrangement modes and five key decision-making processes of IT governance, and the optimum combination. The methods of IT governance are discussed in terms of three different performance objectives:assets income, net assets earning, and income growth, thus presenting the focusing points of internal audit.
Part seven:dynamic optimization of corporate evaluation and effectiveness evaluation of commercial banks. This paper reflects effective corporate governance in its nature and concludes that the nature of corporate governance is for the "effectiveness", and not for "constraint balance", which loses its existence significance without the former. Therefore, the improvement and perfection of corporate governance not only establishes a balancing power structure, but also the company control and distribution package of legal, cultural and institutional arrangements, with their functioning guaranteed. Along with the change of operation mode and growth pattern in China's commercial banks, internal audit needs corresponding adjustments in terms of its evaluation content and methods.
The innovations of this paper are:research object, research perspective, research content, research methods and the combination of theory with practice.
In terms of research object, this paper chooses CGE of commercial banks, the researches of which are rather limited in number both home and abroad. It is different from the current researches which take CGE in the general sense as the research object. Researches concerning Commercial banks, as an important component of national economy, shoulder crucial strategic missions. The improvement of corporate governance raises the operation efficiency and risk prevention capability, thus increasing corporate value. CGE of internal audit enriches the connotation of administration, and advances governance level of commercial banks.
In term of research perspective, external supervisory institutions or social intermediary services are taken by most researchers as valuators. The conclusion is, therefore, in accordance the purpose of evaluation. Such valuators are outside the banking system, without a thorough understanding the operation inside the banking system. Their conclusions are of limited referential value. In this paper, CGE, as a special contract inside the banking system, shoulders the responsibility of raising the operation efficiency and organization value by means of evaluation. Internal audit, as a valuator, is acquainted with organization governance. Therefore, its evaluation shades more positive and effective impact on promoting and perfecting corporate governance of commercial banks.
In terms of research content, this paper, using internal audit as its subject of evaluation, varies greatly from previous similar researches, the content of which is divided into two categories duo to different subjects of evaluation:1) evaluation in aspects of general meetings of stakeholders, board of directors, board of supervisors, top managers, and stakeholders, etc; 2) evaluation in aspects of governance environment, incentive and restrictive mechanism, and monitoring and assessment mechanism. This paper focuses on the operation efficiency and IT governance in commercial banks based on internal governance, taking full advantage of internal audit's status and taking into account of the particularity of commercial bank's governance. In combination of external governance, this paper also highlights the effectiveness of public disclosure and the fulfillment of social responsibilities. The above four aspects are what internal audit covers in corporate governance in commercial banks, which are beneficial for the integrity and accuracy of the evaluation conclusion. This paper expands the traditional research mentality, and overcomes obstacles in CGE, inputting new thoughts into this research.
In terms of the combination of theory and practice, this paper intends to provide guidance for the practice of internal audit in commercial banks, thus focusing more on the choice of evaluation methods and models. Evaluation based on this research mentality varies from other auditing activities both in terms of research content and formation. Reports of CGE carry out series sorting of corporate governance effectiveness. The research-oriented reports seek the nature of corporate operation and administration, and apply methods of mathematical statistics and advanced measurement with less focus on the traditional approach of site audit confirmation.
引文
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②技术效率：表明商业银行作为生产单位,在某种技术条件下,使用相同数量的投入可以扩张产出的能力；或者生产相同的产出可以减少投入的能力。一般认为,如果被评价对象已经运行于生产前沿面上(产出最大或投入最小),则可以认为其技术上是完全有效的。
③配置效率：表明在给定投入的情况下,改变不同投入的数量比例,以获得更大产出的能力。如果被评价对象运行于生产前沿面与等成本线的切点上,则配置效率最大。
④规模效率：表明被评价对象随着投入数量的增加,规模收益是否会同比例增加。如果被评价对象未能达到规模收益不变的情况,则其规模效率未达到最高。
⑤纯技术效率：表明完全是由于内部经营管理方面的纯技术因素导致的效率水平,与规模因素无关。纯技术效率是将规模效率从技术效率中分离出来得到。
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①这里所说的会计信息失真责任合约安排的变迁仅仅涉及“会计信息失真的责任应该由谁来承担”而不涉及“应该承担多大责任”的问题。对于一个合理有效的合约安排,前者是后者的前提。
②这可从中国证监会在1994年、1999年和2001年发布的关于上市公司配股、增发资格文件中看出。
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