摘要
社会民众对食品安全的关注既包括数量的安全,又包括质量的安全。在食品数量匮乏的年代,人们通常更多地关注食品的数量安全,而不会更多地关注食品的质量安全。伴随着中国的改革开放和经济社会的发展,食品的数量日渐丰富,消费者的消费需求大都能够得到满足,人们也越来越多地关注食品的质量安全,食品的质量安全问题随之逐渐突显出来。食品的安全关系民生,关乎经济发展和社会稳定,尤其是近十几年来,以“三鹿奶粉事件”为导火索,食品安全问题再次成为社会各界关注的焦点,建立健全食品安全的质量标准也再次成为学术界的热门话题。基于对以上问题的认识,本论文在前人研究成果的基础上,选取了食品安全质量标准规制这一课题,以质量标准为切入点对食品安全的规制问题展开论述,并将进行理论分析和实证分析。
本论文对食品安全的质量标准规制这一问题的分析,开始于对食品安全质量标准规制的选择,证实了通过运用经济学的效率指标分析食品安全质量标准规制的实施,能够提高规制效率,提升食品的安全水平。在此基础上,论文对食品安全质量标准规制实施的效应进行分析,通过对食品生产企业在与政府和与消费者的博弈分析,以及食品生产企业在面临质量标准壁垒时的国际贸易效应分析,证实了对食品安全的质量标准进行规制能够提高规制效率,提升食品的安全水平。本论文还借鉴了发达国家成功的质量标准规制的经验,寻求中国食品安全质量标准规制的未来政策导向。全文共分为四个部分,包括六章内容,具体为：
第一部分包括论文的第一章和第二章,主要是提出问题。第一章分析了当前食品安全问题的严峻性及其所引发的消极影响,在此基础上提出论文研究的切入点,并对论文中所涉及的诸如食品、食品安全、食品与药品、食品安全与食品卫生以及食品安全和食品质量等概念进行了界定,然后简单介绍了论文的研究意义、研究方法、结构设计和创新之处。第二章对前人关于社会性规制、食品安全规制和食品安全质量标准规制的相关研究进行了梳理。
第二部分包括论文的第三章和第四章,介绍了中国食品质量标准规制的现状以及发达国家的成功经验。首先对中国食品质量标准规制的现状及存在的问题进行分析后认为,在中国的《食品安全法》实施之后,中国食品安全质量标准规制依旧存在,食品的安全标准数量不足,覆盖面不广,对国际标准的采标率较低,而且标准的宣传培训和贯彻执行有待于继续加强；食品安全质量标准体系需要进一步完善,标准的科学性和合理性也有待于进一步提高。论文还介绍了英国、法国、德国、美国和俄罗斯等发达国家在食品安全质量标准规制方面的成功经验。
第三部分包括论文的第五章,主要是食品安全质量标准规制的影响和效应分析。从对生产者收入的影响、对食品安全水平的影响以及对生产者和消费者决策行为的影响三个方面分析了食品安全质量标准规制的影响,然后分析了食品安全质量标准规制的效应。首先对在“政府—企业”博弈中和在“企业—消费者”博弈中的食品生产企业的策略性反应进行了分析；然后分析了食品安全质量标准规制对国际贸易的影响,涉及食品安全的质量标准规制对国际贸易作用的博弈分析和食品安全的质量标准规制对贸易利益的影响分析；最后针对质量标准规制对规制方式的影响进行了分析,主要包括食品安全的企业自我规制和基于第三方认证的食品安全规制。
第四部分是政策分析,涉及论文第六章的内容。首先分析了选择食品安全质量标准规制的原因及其“阈值”的设定,主要包括设定“阈值”需要考虑的因素,以及在信息不对称的条件下如何设定食品安全质量标准规制的“阈值”。在此基础上着重论述了中国食品安全监管模式的重塑问题,包括监管主体的重构：从一元主体到多元参与；监管方式的创新：基于食品供应链的视角；监管体系的完善：从分段监管到行政权衡平监管。然后针对中国实施食品安全质量标准规制提出了相应的政策建议：加强食品安全质量标准的法律法规体系建设,多主体参与以保障食品安全质量标准技术的专业化水平,加强食品安全质量标准的信息化建设,强化食品安全质量标准的法律法规的惩罚力度。
在理论方面,本论文以食品的质量标准为切入点对食品安全的规制问题进行分析,能够做到直奔主题,捕捉到食品安全问题中的核心,并能够以此来拓展食品安全规制问题研究的视野；论文对食品安全质量标准的规制经济学角度的分析,能够为当前食品安全规制工具的选择提供坚实的理论支持,在一定程度上丰富了社会性规制理论的内容。在实践方面,本论文试图建立较为科学的食品安全质量标准体系,这是减少食品安全事故、建设当今以人为本的和谐社会的基本要求,也是维护消费者健康和安全的最根本保证；建立健全较为科学的食品安全质量标准体系,可以为食品生产企业生产安全的食品提供内在激励,同时也有助于对食品的市场秩序进行规范,并能够在一定程度上杜绝行业的“潜规则”,提高中国食品生产企业的国际竞争能力；研究食品安全质量标准体系能够为政府相关部门制定食品安全质量标准和实施食品质量监管体制改革提供经济学上的理论支持。
本论文的研究计划实现以下两个方面的创新：一是问题创新。论文以质量标准为切入点分析食品安全问题,寻求到一种比较新的视角来对食品安全的政府规制问题进行研究；二是研究方法创新。论文运用经济学中的激励理论、博弈理论以及制度经济学等经典理论对食品安全质量标准规制这一较为崭新的问题开展分析,是论文在研究方法上实现的一个创新。
The attention to food safety includes not only the quantity safety,but also includes the quality safety.In the era of shortage in food quantity,people usually pay more attention to the safety of food quantity,instesd of paying more attention to the safety of food quality. With the development of social economy,the food quantity is abundant,consumers' demand all can be met,more and more people are concerns with food quality and food safety,the safety issues in food quality are increasingly prominent Food safety issues is relating to people's livelihood、 economic development and social stability,especially in recent years,for the fuse of "Sanlu milk powder incident",food safety issues once again become the focus of the society, improving the food safety and the quality standards,become a hot topic in academic circles.Based on the understandings of above issues,on the basis of previous research results,this paper chooses the subject of regulation of quality standards for food safety,take the quality standards as breakthrough point,discusses with issues of food safety regulation,and the theoretical analysis and positive analysis.
The paper's analysis of the issues in regulation of quality standards for food safety,begins with the choice of quality standards of food safety regulation,uses Economics's efficiency indicators to analyse regulation's implementation of quality standards for food safety,can enhance regulation's efficiency and improve food safety level.On this basis,the paper analyses implementation's effects of regulation of quality standards for food safety,according to the game analysis between food production enterprises and governments and consumers,and analysis of internatinal trade effect in face of quality standards'barriers,confirms that the regulation of quality standards for food safety can enhance regulation's efficiency and can improve food safety level.The paper also using the successful experiences of developed countries in quality standard's regulation,searches for China's future policy orientations of regulation of quality standards for food safety. The paper is consists of four parts,includes six chapters:
The first part includes Chapterl and Chapter2,mainly introduces a issue.The Chapter1analyzes the seriousness and the negative influences brought by current issues of food safety,put forward the starting point,and definites the conceptions concerning such as food、 food safety、food and drug、food safety and food hygiene、food safety and food quality,then simply explaines the research meanings、research methods、structural designs and innovation points.The chapter2reviews the previous studies concerning about social regulation、 food safety regulation and regulation of quality standards for food safety.
The second part includes Chapter3and Chapter4,introduces the present situations and the successful experiences of developed countries about China's regulation of quality standards for food safety.Firstly,analyzes the present situations and existing issues in China's regulation of quality standards for food safety,concludes that:after implementation of "food safety law",China's regulation of quality standards for food safety still exists,standards'system needs to be improved,standards'scientificalness and rationality needs to be enhanced,insufficient in quantity of food safety standards, the coverage is not broad,the international standards'adoption rate is low,standards'publicity and training、 implementation and carrying out is to be for future reinforced.The paper is also introduces the successful experiences in developed countries,such as Britain、France、 Germany、 the United States、 Russia and so on.
The third part includes Chapter5,mainly about the analysis of influences and effects in regulation of quality standards for food safety.From the three aspects of effects on producers'income、 effects on the levels of food safety、 effect on decision behavior of producers and consumers,analyses the influences of regulation of quality standards for food safety.Firstly,analyses the strategic responses of food enterprises in the game of "government-enterprise" and "enterprise-consumer";secondly,analyses the effects on international trade of regulation of quality standards for food safety, involving the game analysis on the roles of international trades and impacts analysis on trade benefits;finally,analyses the effects in regulation patterns of quality standards' regulation,mainly includes the enterprise's self-regulation of food safety and regulation of food safety based on third-party certification.
The fourth part is policy analysis,involving Chapter6.Firstly,analyses the reason of choosing regulation of quality standards for food safety and its "threshold" setting,and how to set the"threshold" of regulation of quality standards for food safety,underring the condition of information asymmetry.On the basis of these,focus on discussing the supervision mode reshaping of China's food safety,reconstruction of the regulatory body:from the unitary body to pluralism participations;innovations of supervision ways:based on food supply chain's perspectives;the perfection of regulatory systems:from segmented supervisions to administrative measure-flat supervisions.After that,in view of the implementation of China's regulation of quality standards for food safety,put forward corresponding policy recommendations:strengthen the constructions of legal systems in quality standards for food safety, multiagent participations to ensure the professional levels of technology in quality standards for food safety,strengthen information constructions,reinforce punishment powers in corresponding laws and regulations.
In the aspect of theory,the paper takes food's quality standards as breakthrough point,analyses regulation issues of food safety,goes straight to the theme,captures the core of issues,and expands reserach visions.The paper's analysis,from the perspective of regulation economics,can provides a solid theoretical support for choosing the tools of current food safety regulation,and the content of social regulation's theory can be riched.In the aspect of practice,the paper is trying to establish a more scientific system of quality standards for food safety,this is the fundamental guarantee in maintaining the health and safety of consumers,is also the basic requirements in reducing the food safety accidents and constructing the harmonious society;the construction of quality standards' system,can provides intrinsic motivation for food production enterprises to produce safe food,also can help to regulate the food markets' orders,and can put an end to the industry's "unspoken rules",to improve the abilities of international competition of chinese food production enterprises;the research on quality standards' systems for food safety,can provide Economics' theoretical support for government's relevant departments in formulating quality standards for food safety,and in implementing the reform of quality supervision systems.
The paper wants to realize two innovations through the research,one is the issues' innovation,the paper takes the quality standards as breakthrough point to analyse the food safety issues,seeking a new point of view to study the government regulation's issues;the other is the innovation in research methods,the paper applying classical theories,such as the theory of encouragement、game theory and institutional economics,to analyse the new issues of quality standards for food safety,so it's a kind of innovation in research methods.
引文
① “质量标准(quality standard)"在工具书中的解释为：对产品质量要求及其检验方法等所作的统一的技术规定。论文所讨论的质量标准就是遵从这一定义。
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① 尽管这种质量标准信息可以通过中介组织发送,但是其可信度显然不如政府强制性标准。
② 阈值,Threshold,指的是在自动控制系统中能产生一个校正动作的最小输入值,刺激引起应激组织反应的最低值,是指临界值的意思。
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