地方政府与农资经销商在农业非点源污染控制中的博弈分析
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摘要
运用完全信息静态博弈的理论方法,构建地方政府与农资经销商在农业非点源污染治理中的行为策略博弈模型,分析其策略均衡情况,为制定相关政策规范农资市场,达到源头上控制农业非点源污染物的目的。结果表明地方政府与农资经销商的博弈不存在纯策略纳什均衡,只存在混合策略纳什均衡,二者混合策略分别为[(H1-H2)/E2,(E2+H2-H1)/E2)]和[(E2-K)/E2,K/E2];故笔者建议地方政府应加大对农资经销商违法销售的处罚力度和监督力度,以降低农资经销商违法销售的行为,亦应加强对农户识别假冒伪劣农资物品的指导和培训,同时还需要国家加大对地方政府及易于普及和推广的环境友好型农资物品研究的资金支持,并完善法律制度建设,从源头控制农业非点源污染。
Using the theory and method of complete information static game,the paper constructed the game model of behavior strategy between local government and agricultural dealers in the treatment of agricultural non-point source pollution,and analyzed the equilibrium of their strategies,aiming to standardize the agricultural supplies market through relevant policies and realize the control of agricultural nonpoint source pollution.The results showed that there was no pure strategy Nash equilibrium between the local governments and agricultural commodities dealers,only existed a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium,which the strategy of the two aspects were [(H1-H2)/E2,(E2+H2-H1)/E2)] and [(E2-K)/E2,K/E2],respectively.According to the above results,the author suggested that the local government should increase the intensity of punishment and supervision for illegal sales of agricultural materials dealers to reduce the illegal sales of agricultural materials dealers,also should strengthen the guidance and training of farmers' identify for counterfeit agricultural capital goods,at the same time also need the nation government to improve the financial support for local governments and the study of environmentally friendly agricultural capital goods,and perfect the legal system construction,controlling the agricultural non-point source pollution from the source.
Using the theory and method of complete information static game,the paper constructed the game model of behavior strategy between local government and agricultural dealers in the treatment of agricultural non-point source pollution,and analyzed the equilibrium of their strategies,aiming to standardize the agricultural supplies market through relevant policies and realize the control of agricultural nonpoint source pollution.The results showed that there was no pure strategy Nash equilibrium between the local governments and agricultural commodities dealers,only existed a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium,which the strategy of the two aspects were [(H1-H2)/E2,(E2+H2-H1)/E2)] and [(E2-K)/E2,K/E2],respectively.According to the above results,the author suggested that the local government should increase the intensity of punishment and supervision for illegal sales of agricultural materials dealers to reduce the illegal sales of agricultural materials dealers,also should strengthen the guidance and training of farmers' identify for counterfeit agricultural capital goods,at the same time also need the nation government to improve the financial support for local governments and the study of environmentally friendly agricultural capital goods,and perfect the legal system construction,controlling the agricultural non-point source pollution from the source.
引文
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[12]代伟.北戴河及相邻地区近岸海域农业面源污染测算及特征分析[J].河南农业科学,2013(2):58-61.
[13]赵晓强,王闰平,张元庆.山西省农村面源污染问题研究[J].山西农业科学,2018(4):638-641.
[14]赵会薇,刘伊明,李菊梅,等.促进精准高效清洁农业发展,防治河北面源污染[J].山西农业科学,2015,43(9):1156-1159.
[2]刘伟,周娟.农业面源污染控制中的博弈分析[J].菏泽学院学报,2013(5):23-29.
[3]陈红.治理农村面源污染地方政府联动的行为博弈[J].学术交流,2010(2):78-84.
[4]周早弘,张敏新.农业面源污染博弈分析及其控制对策研究[J].科技与经济,2009(1):53-55.
[5]孙勇.基于利益相关者分析的农业面源污染治理研究[D].南京:南京农业大学,2011.
[6]焦玮.中国农村环境可持续发展的博弈分析[J].经济视角,2011,12(35):169-171.
[7]卢亚丽,薛惠锋.我国农业面源污染治理的博弈分析[J].农业系统科学与综合研究,2007(3):268-271.
[8]陈红,马国勇.农村面源污染治理的政府选择[J].求是学刊,2007(2):56-62.
[9]陈红.地方政府联动治理农业面源污染的行为分析[J].东北农业大学学报(社会科学版),2010(4):22-26.
[10]于峰,史正涛,彭海英.农业非点源污染研究综述[J].环境科学与管理,2008(8):54-58, 65.
[11]李华,马丽.绵阳市农业面源污染特征与区域差异分析[J].河南农业科学,2014(11):59-64.
[12]代伟.北戴河及相邻地区近岸海域农业面源污染测算及特征分析[J].河南农业科学,2013(2):58-61.
[13]赵晓强,王闰平,张元庆.山西省农村面源污染问题研究[J].山西农业科学,2018(4):638-641.
[14]赵会薇,刘伊明,李菊梅,等.促进精准高效清洁农业发展,防治河北面源污染[J].山西农业科学,2015,43(9):1156-1159.