矿山废弃地治理PPP模式演化博弈分析
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摘要
为探讨矿山废弃地治理PPP模式地方政府与社会资本的合作机制,本文构建了演化博弈稳定均衡模型。结果表明:当社会资本机会成本小于机会主义收益时,若地方政府在矿山废弃地治理PPP项目中获得额外收益增加,或社会资本在声誉、物资和其他方面的奖励增加,双赢合作成为稳定均衡策略;当政府加大对社会资本机会行为惩罚,并使得社会资本机会成本大于机会主义收益时,系统演化博弈由地方政府来主导。政府在演化过程中给予外部影响,如降低监管成本、提升社会资本积极合作的口碑效应和声誉收益,可改变演化结果,实现稳定策略均衡。最后提出降低地方政府监管成本、构建社会资本激励机制以及建立反向约束和公众监督机制三个措施。
In order to explore the PPP cooperation mechanism between local government capital and social capital in mining wasteland,this paper constructs a stable equilibrium model of evolutionary game.The results show that when the opportunity cost is less than the opportunistic income,if the local government gains additional income in abandoned mine governance PPP projects,or social capital rewards in reputation,material and other aspects increase,win-win cooperation becomes stable equilibrium strategy;when the government increases the penalties for social capital opportunity behavior and makes the social capital opportunity cost greater than the opportunistic income,the system evolutionary game is dominated by local governments.The government gives external influence in the process of evolution,such as reducing the supervision cost,enhancing the word-of-mouth effect of active cooperation of social capital,reputation gain,and changing the evolutionary result to achieve stable strategic balance.Finally,according to the actual situation of the management of abandoned mines in PPP mode,the article puts forward three measures to reduce the supervision cost of local government,construct the incentive mechanism of social capital and establish the mechanism of reverse restraint and public supervision.
In order to explore the PPP cooperation mechanism between local government capital and social capital in mining wasteland,this paper constructs a stable equilibrium model of evolutionary game.The results show that when the opportunity cost is less than the opportunistic income,if the local government gains additional income in abandoned mine governance PPP projects,or social capital rewards in reputation,material and other aspects increase,win-win cooperation becomes stable equilibrium strategy;when the government increases the penalties for social capital opportunity behavior and makes the social capital opportunity cost greater than the opportunistic income,the system evolutionary game is dominated by local governments.The government gives external influence in the process of evolution,such as reducing the supervision cost,enhancing the word-of-mouth effect of active cooperation of social capital,reputation gain,and changing the evolutionary result to achieve stable strategic balance.Finally,according to the actual situation of the management of abandoned mines in PPP mode,the article puts forward three measures to reduce the supervision cost of local government,construct the incentive mechanism of social capital and establish the mechanism of reverse restraint and public supervision.
引文
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[3] VIAN T,MCLNTOSH N,GRABOWSKI A,et al.Hospital Public-Private-Partnershipsinlowresourcesettings:perceptions of how the Lesotho PPP transformed management systems and performance[J].Health Systems&Reform,2015,1(2):155-166.
[4] VALIPOUR A,YAHAYA N,MD NOOR N,et al.A fuzzy analytic network method for risk prioritization in freeway PPP projects:an iranian case study[J].Journal of Civil Engineering and Management,2015,21(7):933-947.
[5]杨彤.矿山废弃地生态修复中PPP模式博弈框架[J].山西农业大学学报:社会科学版,2016,15(6):437-441.YANG Tong.Game framework of PPP model in ecological restoration of mine waste land[J].Journal of Shanxi Agricultural University:Social Sciences Edition,2016,15(6):437-441.
[6]刘亦晴.基于SWOT分析的矿山废弃地环境治理PPP应用分析[J].中国矿业,2016,25(12):48-53.LIU Yiqing.Application of PPP in environmental treatment of mine wasteland based on SWOT analysis[J].China Mining Magazine,2016,25(12):48-53.
[7]刘亦晴,许春冬.矿山废弃地环境治理PPP模式:背景、问题及应用[J].科技管理研究,2017(12):240-246.LIU Yiqing,XU Chundong.PPP model for environmental treatment of mine wasteland:background,problems and applications[J].Science and Technology Management Research,2017(12):240-246.
[8] FRIEDMAN D.Evolutionary games in economics[J].Economics,1991,59(3):637-666.
[9] CRESSMAN P.The stability concept of evolutionary game approach[R].1992.
[10]李静菲.PPP项目核心利益相关者合作机制演化博弈研究[D].成都:西华大学,2017.
[11]陈慧,安春晓,付光辉,等.土地整治PPP模式中政府与社会投资者演化博弈研究[J].中国农业大学学报,2017,22(7):163-172.CHEN Hui,AN Chunxiao,FU Guanghui,et al.Evolutionary game between government and social investors in land remediation PPP model[J].Journal of China Agricultural University,2017,22(7):163-172.