On noncooperative oligopoly equilibrium in the multiple leader-follower game
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- 作者：Ludovic A. Julien ; ludovic.julien@u-paris10.fr" class="auth_mail" title="E-mail the corresponding author
- 关键词：Multi-agents systems ; Best response ; Existence ; Uniqueness
- 刊名：European Journal of Operational Research
- 出版年：2017
- 出版时间：16 January 2017
- 年：2017
- 卷：256
- 期：2
- 页码：650-662
- 全文大小：699 K
文摘
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A multiple leader–follower two-stage game with heterogeneous firms is built.
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New proofs of existence and uniqueness of Stackelberg market equilibrium are provided.
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A consistency criterion is provided for determining the individual best response functions.
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This consistency criterion is used to show existence and uniqueness.