The costs of avoiding accidents: Selective compliance and the 鈥楶eltzman effect鈥?in Italy

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• 作者：Simona Benedettini^a ; ^{benedettini@unibocconi.it} ; ^{sbenedettini@gmail.co} ; Antonio Nicita^b ; ^{nicita@unisi.it}
• 关键词：D02 ; K32 ; K42 ; L51
• 刊名：International Review of Law and Economics
• 出版年：2012
• 期刊代码：50_01448188
• 类别：soc
• 出版时间：June, 2012
• 卷：32
• 期：2
• 页码：256-270
• 文件大小：797 K

摘要

We empirically investigate the deterrent and offsetting effects of the introduction of a point-record driving license (PDRL) in Italy. We find that the PDRL resulted in a sharp reduction of seat belt offenses, and in a noticeable decrease of road accidents. However, the reduction in occupant fatalities and injuries was associated with an increase in non-occupant ones, suggesting a remarkable 鈥淧eltzman effect鈥? We then discuss whether a given enforcement design, by inducing drivers to make the best use of safety resources already available to them, may generate more external costs than would otherwise occur.