公司治理结构与公司绩效关系研究——基于企业全要素生产率的视角
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摘要
在我国经济增长模式从高速向高质转变的背景下,探索提升企业全要素生产率的新路径具有一定的现实意义。文章从公司的内部治理结构出发,将企业全要素生产率作为公司绩效指标,基于我国2010—2016年1974家A股上市公司的非平衡面板数据,采用随机效应模型,从股权结构、董事会结构和激励机制三方面研究公司治理结构与全要素生产率之间的关系。结果表明:(1)我国上市公司第一大股东持股与企业TFP存在倒U型关系;第一大股东为国有背景公司的企业TFP显著地低于非国有背景公司;(2)董事会规模与企业TFP负相关,而独立董事在董事会的比重对企业效率提升具有积极作用,此外,董事长兼任CEO对公司TFP也有显著提升作用;(3)高管薪酬对企业TFP提升有显著的正向激励效应。最后,依据实证结果提出以下政策建议:(1)要注重防范大股东"一股独大"导致的第二类委托代理问题,探索多层股权结构机制,提升股权制度灵活性与多样性;(2)公司在董事会构建时,不仅要规模适度,还应重视外部独立董事在公司治理中的积极作用,提升独立董事在董事会中的比重;(3)运用丰富多样的激励手段增强高层管理人员与股东间的利益协同性,以缓解与股东目标的不一致性所带来的利益冲突。
It is of enormous practical significance to investigate the determinants of TFP and explore the path of how to promote corporate TFP under the circumstance that economic structure transforms from high speed to high equality.Based on the unbalanced panel data of1973 A shares listed companies in China,weapplied the random effect model toestimate the relationship between corporate governance structure and TFP.Results illustrated the following things:firstly,there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between Chinese largest shareholder of the listed company and corporate TFP,and we also find listed companies whose first largest shareholder had a state-owned background couldgain a lower TFP.Secondly,there is a positive relationship between the size of the board and the enterprise TFP,and the independent director proportion has a significant relationship with enterprise TFP.Besides,the CEO duality have a significant promotion effect on the total productivity of the company.Thirdly,executive compensation could positively stimulate the TFP growth of enterprises.Finally,based on the empirical results,three suggestions are proposed:(1)Under the existing stock company's shareholding system,attention should be paid to preventing the second-class principal-agent problem caused by the "big-share" major shareholder,and exploring multi-layer equity structural mechanisms to improve the flexibility and diversity of the equity system.(2)The company should choose a modest board size when the board of directors is established,and paying equal attention to the positive role of external independent directors in corporate governance,and increase the proportion of independent directors in the board of directors.(3)Enrich and use a variety of incentives to management to mitigate conflicts of interest between shareholders,enhance work enthusiasm.
It is of enormous practical significance to investigate the determinants of TFP and explore the path of how to promote corporate TFP under the circumstance that economic structure transforms from high speed to high equality.Based on the unbalanced panel data of1973 A shares listed companies in China,weapplied the random effect model toestimate the relationship between corporate governance structure and TFP.Results illustrated the following things:firstly,there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between Chinese largest shareholder of the listed company and corporate TFP,and we also find listed companies whose first largest shareholder had a state-owned background couldgain a lower TFP.Secondly,there is a positive relationship between the size of the board and the enterprise TFP,and the independent director proportion has a significant relationship with enterprise TFP.Besides,the CEO duality have a significant promotion effect on the total productivity of the company.Thirdly,executive compensation could positively stimulate the TFP growth of enterprises.Finally,based on the empirical results,three suggestions are proposed:(1)Under the existing stock company's shareholding system,attention should be paid to preventing the second-class principal-agent problem caused by the "big-share" major shareholder,and exploring multi-layer equity structural mechanisms to improve the flexibility and diversity of the equity system.(2)The company should choose a modest board size when the board of directors is established,and paying equal attention to the positive role of external independent directors in corporate governance,and increase the proportion of independent directors in the board of directors.(3)Enrich and use a variety of incentives to management to mitigate conflicts of interest between shareholders,enhance work enthusiasm.
引文
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19.Bai C E,Liu Q,Lu J,et al.Corporate governance and market valuation in China[J].Journal of Comparative Economics,2004,32(4):599-616.
2.冯根福,赵钰航.管理者薪酬、在职消费与公司绩效---基于合作博一的分析视角[J].中国工业经济,2012(6):147-157.
3.郭家堂,骆品亮.互联网对中国全要素生产率有促进作用吗?[J].管理世界,2016(10):34-49.
4.贺炎林,张瀛文,莫建明.不同区域治理环境下股权集中度对公司业绩的影响[J].金融研究,2014(12):148-163.
5.胡一帆,宋敏,张俊喜.竞争、产权、公司治理三大理论的相对重要性及交互关系[J].经济研究,2005(9):44-57.
6.贾俊雪.公共基础设施投资与全要素生产率:基于异质企业家模型的理论分析[J].经济研究,2017(2):4-19.
7.孔东民,刘莎莎等.冷漠是理性的吗?中小股东参与、公司治理与投资者保护[J].经济学(季刊),2013(1):1-28.
8.徐培源.我国对外开放与TFP增长的关系:经验研究[M].北京:清华大学出版社,2012:199.
9.杨典.公司治理与企业绩效---基于中国经验的社会学分析[J].中国社会科学,2013(1):72-94.
10.杨汝岱.中国制造业企业全要素生产率研究[J].《经济研究》2015(2):61-74.
11.于东智.公司治理与绩效---对中国上市公司的经验分析[J].中国社会科学,2003(3):29-40.
12.袁奋强,季婷,李惠蓉,陈刚.股权结构、信息透明度与公司绩效---基于深圳A股上市公司的实证分析[J].经济与管理评论,2017(4):64-77.
13.周林洁.公司治理、机构持股与股价同步性[J].金融研究,2014(8):146-161.
14.张杰,郑文平,陈志远.进口与企业生产率---中国的经验证据[J].经济学(季刊),2015(2):1029-1052.
15.张军,金煜.中国的金融深化和生产率关系的再检测:1987-2001[J].经济研究,2005(3):34-45.
16.张劲帆,李汉涯,何晖.企业上市与企业创新---基于中国企业专利申请的研究[J].金融研究,2017(5):160-175.
17.洪功翔,顾青青,董梅生.国有经济与民营经济共生发展的理论与实证研究[J].政治经济学评论,2018(5):68-100.
18.Baker M.,Gompers P.An Analysis of Executive Compensation,Ownership,and Control in Entrepreneurial Firms[J].Harvard University Working Paper.
19.Bai C E,Liu Q,Lu J,et al.Corporate governance and market valuation in China[J].Journal of Comparative Economics,2004,32(4):599-616.