基于两阶段博弈模型的高铁民航竞合关系研究
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摘要
本文基于两阶段博弈理论构建高铁与民航的竞合关系模型,通过旅客视角构建一维演化博弈模型,测算高铁与民航的最佳竞争区间;通过古诺博弈理论构建基于价格视角的高铁民航竞合关系模型;通过伯特兰博弈理论构建基于距离视角的高铁民航竞合关系模型,探讨高铁与民航的竞合关系,以期找到两者之间实现共赢的科学策略.研究结果表明:650 km～850 km距离区间是民航和高铁最为激烈的竞争区间,随着运输距离的增加,民航的博弈策略由合作转变为竞争,而高铁恰恰相反,高铁的策略由竞争转变为合作.
This paper proposes a competition and cooperation relationship model between high-speed rail and air transport based on the two-stage game theory. Firstly, it builds a one dimensional evolutionary game model from the perspective of passengers to calculate the best competition range. Then, it builds a competition and cooperation relationship model between high-speed rail and air transport from the perspective of price based on Cournot game theory. Finally, it uses the Bertrand game theory to apply the model through a distance perspective, and discusses the competition and cooperation between high-speed rail and air transport in order to find a scientific strategy to achieve a win-win situation. The results show that a distance range of 650 km ～ 850 km is the most intense competition area between air transport and high-speed rail. With the increase of transportation distance, the game strategy of air transport changes from cooperation to competition. On the contrary, the strategy of high-speed rail changes from competition to cooperation.
This paper proposes a competition and cooperation relationship model between high-speed rail and air transport based on the two-stage game theory. Firstly, it builds a one dimensional evolutionary game model from the perspective of passengers to calculate the best competition range. Then, it builds a competition and cooperation relationship model between high-speed rail and air transport from the perspective of price based on Cournot game theory. Finally, it uses the Bertrand game theory to apply the model through a distance perspective, and discusses the competition and cooperation between high-speed rail and air transport in order to find a scientific strategy to achieve a win-win situation. The results show that a distance range of 650 km ～ 850 km is the most intense competition area between air transport and high-speed rail. With the increase of transportation distance, the game strategy of air transport changes from cooperation to competition. On the contrary, the strategy of high-speed rail changes from competition to cooperation.
引文
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[2]寇勇刚,吴桐水,柳青.基于元胞自动机的民航运输产业竞争演化模拟[J].系统工程理论与实践,2011,31(9):1680-1686.Kou Y G, Wu T S, Liu Q. Simulating the competition evolution of the civil aviation industry based on cellular automata[J]. Systems Engineering—Theory&Practice, 2011, 31(9):1680-1686.
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[4]王强,张琼,杨杭军.中国民航业竞争行为的测度及其影响因素——基于公司和航线面板数据的实证研究[J].中国工业经济,2014(5):148-160.Wang Q, Zhang Q, Yang H J. Market competition and its determinants in Chinese airline industry—An empirical study based on company-level and route-level panel data[J]. China Industrial Economics, 2014(5):148-160.
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[9] Yang H, Zhang A. Effects of high-speed rail and air transport competition on prices, profits and welfare[J].Transportation Research Part B:Methodological, 2012, 46(10):1322-1333.
[10]韦锋,张岚,杜在超,等.需求冲击下的非单调价格调整:来自京沪高铁沿线民航市场的证据[J].南开经济研究,2012(6):133-150.
[11]王姣娥,胡浩.中国高铁与民航的空间服务市场竞合分析与模拟[J].地理学报,2013, 68(2):175-185.
[12]丁金学,金凤君,王姣娥,等.高铁与民航的竞争博弈及其空间效应——以京沪高铁为例[J].经济地理,2013, 33(5):104-110.
[13] Xia W, Zhang A. High-speed rail and air transport competition and cooperation:A vertical differentiation approach[J]. Transportation Research Part B:Methodological, 2016, 94(26):456-481.
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[15]郑士源,王浣尘.基于动态合作博弈理论的航空联盟稳定性[J].系统工程理论与实践,2009, 29(4):184-192.Zheng S Y, Wang H C. Airline alliance stability based on dynamic cooperative game theory[J]. Systems Engineering—Theory&Practice, 2009, 29(4):184-192.
[16] Li H, Kuang X. How can high speed railway survive the competition from civil aviation?[M]. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2013:453-461.
[17]胡荣,夏洪山.航空公司动态价格竞争复杂性及混沌控制——基于不同竞争战略与不同理性的分析[J].系统工程理论与实践,2013, 33(1):151-158.Hu R, Xia H S. Complexity analysis and chaos control of airlines'dynamic price competition:An application of different competition strategies and heterogeneous players[J]. Systems Engineering—Theory&Practice, 2013,33(1):151-158.
[18] D'Alfonso T, Jiang C, Bracaglia V. Would competition between air transport and high-speed rail benefit environment and social welfare?[J]. Transportation Research Part B:Methodological, 2015, 74:118-137.
[19] Qin F, Zhang X, Plant E. The welfare effects of nationalization in a mixed duopoly public transport market[J].Operational Research, 2016:1-26.
[20] Lien J W, Mazalov V V, Melnik A V, et al. Wardrop equilibrium for networks with the BPR latency function[J],Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 2016, 9869:37-49.
[21]吕璞,胡祥培,鲁渤.基于参与人关系网络的高铁快递合作博弈模型研究[J].系统工程理论与实践,2017, 37(6):1536-1547.Lii P, Hu X P, Lu B. Cooperative game model for HSR express based on relationship networks between participants[J]. Systems Engineering—Theory&Practice, 2017, 37(6):1536-1547.
[22]姜力文,戢守峰,孙琦,等.基于竞合博弈的020品牌制造商定价与订货联合策略[J].系统工程理论与实践,2016, 36(8):1951-1961.Jiang L W, Ji S F, Sun Q, et al. Pricing and ordering strategies of online to offline brand manufacturer based on competitive and cooperative games[J]. Systems Engineering—Theory&Practice, 2016, 36(8):1951-1961.
[23]郭军华,李帮义,倪明.双寡头再制造进入决策的演化博弈分析[J].系统工程理论与实践,2013, 33(2):370-377.Guo J H, Li B Y, Ni M. Evolutionary game analysis of duopoly's remanufacturing entry decision[J]. Systems Engineering—Theory&Practice, 2013, 33(2):370-377.
[24]彭峥,胡华清.高速铁路对航空运输市场的影响分析[J].综合运输,2009(7):70-75.
[25]张旭,栾维新,赵冰茹.基于非集计模型的武广线高铁与民航竞争研究[J].交通运输系统工程与信息,2012, 12(6):17-21.
[26]吴泽兵.高铁与民航运输经营博弈研究[D].兰州:兰州交通大学,2014.
[2]寇勇刚,吴桐水,柳青.基于元胞自动机的民航运输产业竞争演化模拟[J].系统工程理论与实践,2011,31(9):1680-1686.Kou Y G, Wu T S, Liu Q. Simulating the competition evolution of the civil aviation industry based on cellular automata[J]. Systems Engineering—Theory&Practice, 2011, 31(9):1680-1686.
[3] Jiang C, Zhang A. Effects of high-speed rail and airline cooperation under hub airport capacity constraint[J].Transportation Research Part B:Methodological, 2014, 60(2):33-49.
[4]王强,张琼,杨杭军.中国民航业竞争行为的测度及其影响因素——基于公司和航线面板数据的实证研究[J].中国工业经济,2014(5):148-160.Wang Q, Zhang Q, Yang H J. Market competition and its determinants in Chinese airline industry—An empirical study based on company-level and route-level panel data[J]. China Industrial Economics, 2014(5):148-160.
[5]张睿,马瑜,赵冰茹,等.京沪线高铁与民航旅客出行选择行为研究[J].交通运输系统工程与信息,2016, 16(1):223-228.Zhang R, Ma Y, Zhao B R, et al. Passenger choice behavior of high-speed rail and airline between Beijing and Shanghai[J]. Journal of Transportation Systems Engineering and Information Technology, 2016, 16(1):223-228.
[6] Li X, Wang W, Yang M, et al. Competitive factors between civil aviation and high-speed rail based on radial basis function and logistic regression[J]. Journal of Shenzhen University, 2016, 33(6):653-660.
[7]范春梅,李华强,贾建民.基于体验管理视角的高速列车乘客体验与再乘意愿研究[J].管理评论,2016, 28(10):133-140.Fan C M, Li H Q, Jia J M. Research on passengers'experience and willingness to take high-speed train:The experience management perspective[J]. Management Review, 2016, 28(10):133-140.
[8] Adler N, Pels E, Nash C. High-speed rail and air transport competition:Game engineering as tool for cost-benefit analysis[J]. Transportation Research Part B:Methodological, 2010, 44(7):812-833.
[9] Yang H, Zhang A. Effects of high-speed rail and air transport competition on prices, profits and welfare[J].Transportation Research Part B:Methodological, 2012, 46(10):1322-1333.
[10]韦锋,张岚,杜在超,等.需求冲击下的非单调价格调整:来自京沪高铁沿线民航市场的证据[J].南开经济研究,2012(6):133-150.
[11]王姣娥,胡浩.中国高铁与民航的空间服务市场竞合分析与模拟[J].地理学报,2013, 68(2):175-185.
[12]丁金学,金凤君,王姣娥,等.高铁与民航的竞争博弈及其空间效应——以京沪高铁为例[J].经济地理,2013, 33(5):104-110.
[13] Xia W, Zhang A. High-speed rail and air transport competition and cooperation:A vertical differentiation approach[J]. Transportation Research Part B:Methodological, 2016, 94(26):456-481.
[14] Brons M, Pels E, Nijkamp P, et al. Price elasticities of demand for passenger air travel:A meta-analysis[J].Journal of Air Transport Management, 2002, 8(3):165-175.
[15]郑士源,王浣尘.基于动态合作博弈理论的航空联盟稳定性[J].系统工程理论与实践,2009, 29(4):184-192.Zheng S Y, Wang H C. Airline alliance stability based on dynamic cooperative game theory[J]. Systems Engineering—Theory&Practice, 2009, 29(4):184-192.
[16] Li H, Kuang X. How can high speed railway survive the competition from civil aviation?[M]. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2013:453-461.
[17]胡荣,夏洪山.航空公司动态价格竞争复杂性及混沌控制——基于不同竞争战略与不同理性的分析[J].系统工程理论与实践,2013, 33(1):151-158.Hu R, Xia H S. Complexity analysis and chaos control of airlines'dynamic price competition:An application of different competition strategies and heterogeneous players[J]. Systems Engineering—Theory&Practice, 2013,33(1):151-158.
[18] D'Alfonso T, Jiang C, Bracaglia V. Would competition between air transport and high-speed rail benefit environment and social welfare?[J]. Transportation Research Part B:Methodological, 2015, 74:118-137.
[19] Qin F, Zhang X, Plant E. The welfare effects of nationalization in a mixed duopoly public transport market[J].Operational Research, 2016:1-26.
[20] Lien J W, Mazalov V V, Melnik A V, et al. Wardrop equilibrium for networks with the BPR latency function[J],Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 2016, 9869:37-49.
[21]吕璞,胡祥培,鲁渤.基于参与人关系网络的高铁快递合作博弈模型研究[J].系统工程理论与实践,2017, 37(6):1536-1547.Lii P, Hu X P, Lu B. Cooperative game model for HSR express based on relationship networks between participants[J]. Systems Engineering—Theory&Practice, 2017, 37(6):1536-1547.
[22]姜力文,戢守峰,孙琦,等.基于竞合博弈的020品牌制造商定价与订货联合策略[J].系统工程理论与实践,2016, 36(8):1951-1961.Jiang L W, Ji S F, Sun Q, et al. Pricing and ordering strategies of online to offline brand manufacturer based on competitive and cooperative games[J]. Systems Engineering—Theory&Practice, 2016, 36(8):1951-1961.
[23]郭军华,李帮义,倪明.双寡头再制造进入决策的演化博弈分析[J].系统工程理论与实践,2013, 33(2):370-377.Guo J H, Li B Y, Ni M. Evolutionary game analysis of duopoly's remanufacturing entry decision[J]. Systems Engineering—Theory&Practice, 2013, 33(2):370-377.
[24]彭峥,胡华清.高速铁路对航空运输市场的影响分析[J].综合运输,2009(7):70-75.
[25]张旭,栾维新,赵冰茹.基于非集计模型的武广线高铁与民航竞争研究[J].交通运输系统工程与信息,2012, 12(6):17-21.
[26]吴泽兵.高铁与民航运输经营博弈研究[D].兰州:兰州交通大学,2014.
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