高管股权激励促进企业升级了吗——来自中国上市公司的经验证据
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摘要
企业升级是中国转变经济发展方式、产业升级的微观基础,而目前高管股权激励与企业升级关系的内在规律仍处于"黑箱"状态。本文首先从四个维度(资产结构高级化、技术结构高级化、员工结构高级化及绩效高级化)构建了不同类型企业(企业整体、劳动密集型企业和非劳动密集型企业)升级的衡量指标体系,并从理论层面分析了高管股权激励对企业升级的影响关系。研究认为,高管股权激励对企业升级理论上有长效促进作用,其学理逻辑来源于两条:一是高管股权激励有助于解决企业所有权与经营权分离所产生的委托—代理问题,这是高管股权激励促进企业升级的利益捆绑(相容)逻辑;二是高管与企业及企业股东利益捆绑(相容)基础的建立将内在驱动高管切实提高企业核心竞争力与动态能力,推动企业积极参与全球价值链分工,并最终实现企业升级,这是高管股权激励促进企业升级的利益驱动逻辑。其次以2011-2016年沪深两市有过股权激励实施记录的所有A股上市公司为基础样本,运用面板向量自回归(PVA R)方法实证研究了高管股权激励对不同类型企业(企业整体、劳动密集型企业和非劳动密集型企业)升级的动态影响。实证研究表明,高管股权激励对技术结构高级化、员工结构高级化以及绩效高级化长短期内都有提升作用,而对资产结构高级化短期内有负向冲击,长期将产生正向效应。
Enterprise upgrade is the micro-foundation for China's transformation of economic development mode and industrial upgrading, however, at present, the inherent laws of the relationship between executive stock incentive and corporate escalation are still in a "black box". This paper first builds the measurement index system of different types of firms(the entire business, labor-intensive and non-labor-intensive industries) to upgrade from four dimensions: advanced asset structure, advanced technology structure, advanced employee structure, and high performance. And from the theoretical level, this paper analyzes the impact of executive stock incentive on the upgrading of enterprises. The paper then points out that executive equity incentive has theoretically a long-term effect on the enterprise upgrading. Its scientific principle or law comes from two logics: The first one is that executive equity incentive is helpful to solve the principal-agent problems arising from the separation of enterprise ownership and management right. This is the benefit bundling(compatibility) logic of executive equity incentive to promote enterprise upgrading. The second one is that the establishment of the interests binding(compatibility) foundation of the executives, the enterprises and the shareholders will drive the executives to improve the core competitiveness and dynamic ability of the enterprises, promote the enterprise to participate actively in the global value chain division of labor, and finally realize the enterprise upgrading, which is the interest driven logic of the executive equity incentive to promote the enterprise upgrading. Next, based on the sample all the A-share listed companies that have record of the implementation of equity incentive in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets between January 1, 2011 and December 31, 2016, and using the panel-based vector autoregressive(PVAR) method to empirically study the dynamic impact of executive incentive on the upgrade of different types of enterprises(the whole enterprise, labor-intensive enterprises and non-labor-intensive ones). Empirical results show that executive stock incentive can enhance the structure of technology, staff structure and performance improvement in the short and long term, while negative impact on the asset structure in the short term and a long-term positive effect.
Enterprise upgrade is the micro-foundation for China's transformation of economic development mode and industrial upgrading, however, at present, the inherent laws of the relationship between executive stock incentive and corporate escalation are still in a "black box". This paper first builds the measurement index system of different types of firms(the entire business, labor-intensive and non-labor-intensive industries) to upgrade from four dimensions: advanced asset structure, advanced technology structure, advanced employee structure, and high performance. And from the theoretical level, this paper analyzes the impact of executive stock incentive on the upgrading of enterprises. The paper then points out that executive equity incentive has theoretically a long-term effect on the enterprise upgrading. Its scientific principle or law comes from two logics: The first one is that executive equity incentive is helpful to solve the principal-agent problems arising from the separation of enterprise ownership and management right. This is the benefit bundling(compatibility) logic of executive equity incentive to promote enterprise upgrading. The second one is that the establishment of the interests binding(compatibility) foundation of the executives, the enterprises and the shareholders will drive the executives to improve the core competitiveness and dynamic ability of the enterprises, promote the enterprise to participate actively in the global value chain division of labor, and finally realize the enterprise upgrading, which is the interest driven logic of the executive equity incentive to promote the enterprise upgrading. Next, based on the sample all the A-share listed companies that have record of the implementation of equity incentive in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets between January 1, 2011 and December 31, 2016, and using the panel-based vector autoregressive(PVAR) method to empirically study the dynamic impact of executive incentive on the upgrade of different types of enterprises(the whole enterprise, labor-intensive enterprises and non-labor-intensive ones). Empirical results show that executive stock incentive can enhance the structure of technology, staff structure and performance improvement in the short and long term, while negative impact on the asset structure in the short term and a long-term positive effect.
引文
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[9]肖曙光,柳兰.企业智力资本入股的治理风险及其防范.江西社会科学,2015,(6):56-60.
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[14]Kaplinsky,R.,Morris,M..A Handbook for Value Chain Research.Prepared for the IDRC,2001:38-39.
[15]Poon,S.C..Beyond the Global Production Networks:A Case of Further Upgrading of Taiwan`s Information Technology Industry.International Journal of Technology and GLobalization,2004,1(1):130-144.
[16]Avdasheva,S.,Budanov,I.,Golikova,V.,Yakovlev,A..Upgrading Russian Enterprises from the Value Chain Perspective:The Case Study of Tube Pipe and Furniture Sectors.School of Slavonic&East European Studies Working Paper,2005.
[17]吴家曦,李华燊.浙江省中小企业转型升级调查报告.管理世界,2009,(8):56-58.
[18]肖曙光.战略性新兴产业组织的劳资分配.中国工业经济,2011,(2):100-109.
[19]Bergstresser,D.,Philippon,T..CEO Incentives and Earnings Management.Journal of Financial Economics,2006,80(3):511-530.
[20]Love,I.,Zicchino,L..Financial Development and Dynamic Investment Behavior:Evidence from Panel VAR.The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance,2006,46(2):190-210.
[2]Tzioumis,K..Why Do Firms Adopt CEO Stock Options?Evidence from the United State.Journal of Economic Behavior&Organization,2008,68(11):100-111.
[3]Kuang,Y.F.,Qin,B..Performance-vested Stock Options and Interest Alignment.The British Accounting Review,2009,41(1):46-61.
[4]王华,黄之骏.经营者股权激励、董事会组成与企业价值.管理世界,2006,(9):101-115.
[5]苏冬蔚,林大庞.股权激励、盈余管理与公司治理.经济研究,2010,(11):88-100.
[6]Krivogorsky,V..Ownership,Board Structure and Performance in Continental Europe.The International Journal of Accounting,2006,41(2):176-197.
[7]Humphrey,J.,Schmitz,H..How Does Insertion in Global Value Chains Affect Upgrading in Industrial Clusters?Regional Studies,2002,36(9):27-101.
[8]毛蕴诗,吴瑶.企业升级路径与分析模式研究.中山大学学报(社会科学版),2009,49(1):178-186.
[9]肖曙光,柳兰.企业智力资本入股的治理风险及其防范.江西社会科学,2015,(6):56-60.
[10]肖曙光.人力资本主导范式下的两权融合与分离.中国工业经济,2009,(3):111-119.
[11]张辉.全球价值链理论与我国产业发展研究.中国工业经济,2004,(5):38-46.
[12]Gereffi,G..International Trade and Industrial Upgrading in the Apparel Commodity Chains.Journal of International Economics,1999,4(1):37-70.
[13]Humphrey,J.,Schmitz,H..Governance and Upgrading:Linking Industrial Cluster and Global Value Chain Research.IDS Working Paper120,Brighton:Institute of Development Studies,2000.
[14]Kaplinsky,R.,Morris,M..A Handbook for Value Chain Research.Prepared for the IDRC,2001:38-39.
[15]Poon,S.C..Beyond the Global Production Networks:A Case of Further Upgrading of Taiwan`s Information Technology Industry.International Journal of Technology and GLobalization,2004,1(1):130-144.
[16]Avdasheva,S.,Budanov,I.,Golikova,V.,Yakovlev,A..Upgrading Russian Enterprises from the Value Chain Perspective:The Case Study of Tube Pipe and Furniture Sectors.School of Slavonic&East European Studies Working Paper,2005.
[17]吴家曦,李华燊.浙江省中小企业转型升级调查报告.管理世界,2009,(8):56-58.
[18]肖曙光.战略性新兴产业组织的劳资分配.中国工业经济,2011,(2):100-109.
[19]Bergstresser,D.,Philippon,T..CEO Incentives and Earnings Management.Journal of Financial Economics,2006,80(3):511-530.
[20]Love,I.,Zicchino,L..Financial Development and Dynamic Investment Behavior:Evidence from Panel VAR.The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance,2006,46(2):190-210.
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