银行竞争背景下定向降准政策的“普惠”效应——基于A股和新三板三农、小微企业数据的分析
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摘要
本文基于A股和新三板企业的微观数据,采用倍差法(DID)检验定向降准货币政策的实施是否对农业和小微企业等所谓"弱势部门"的信贷资源产生了作用,从而实现政策的"普惠"效应。同时基于定向降准政策的影响机制,本文将基于时间维度和区域维度的银行竞争引入实证模型,进一步探讨了银行竞争对定向降准政策"普惠"效应的影响。结果表明:首先,我国定向降准政策可以促进农业企业和小微企业获取信贷资源,发挥了普惠效应;其次,银行竞争可以在一定程度上对定向降准政策的"普惠"效应表现出正向调节作用,具体来说,时间维度的银行竞争对定向降准政策的"普惠"效应的影响较为明显,区域维度的银行竞争没有调节作用。
After several decades of a"scale-type extensive growth"development pattern,China's economic development has reached a new normal in which the main policy objectives are to guide the transformation and upgrading of enterprises and the rational allocation of financial resources,and to resolve the contradictions in the economic structure. In this context,China's central bank has created innovative operating tools for its monetary policy,such as the targeted RRR cuts. This paper empirically tests the "inclusive"effect of the targeted RRR cuts and further explores their relationship with bank competition.We divide the orientation sector into agriculture-related enterprises and small and micro enterprises.Based on the macro data and enterprise credit data in Wind,the enterprise microdata in CSMAR,and the monetary policy data in the People's Bank of China for the 2011 to 2017 period,we use the propensity score matching( PSM) method to select the control group and the DID method to check whether implementation of the RRR cuts influenced the credit resources of the so-called "vulnerable sectors"such as agriculture and small and micro enterprises,thus achieving the intended "inclusive " effect. Furthermore, on account of the mechanism of the target RRR cuts,this paper introduces time and regional dimensions for bank competition into the empirical model,and then analyzes the impact of bank competition on the"inclusive"effect of the targeted RRR cuts. To exclude the interference of other policies,we choose the second half of 2011 as the policy implementation time point,and conduct a counterfactual test. The result is not significant,which indirectly indicates the robustness of the previous empirical results. In addition,we conduct a rigorous robustness test by changing the sample. For the sample of agriculture-related enterprises,we select agricultural enterprises from the A-shares,and find matching non-agricultural enterprises among the New OTC Market listed enterprises to obtain 27 agricultural-related samples. For small and micro-enterprise samples,we randomly select 78 large enterprises from China's A-shares and the New OTC Market as the control group. The results of the robustness test are not significant,thus confirming the conclusions of our main research.Our results show that China's targeted RRR cuts have an "inclusive "effect by promoting agricultural enterprises and small and micro enterprises to obtain credit resources. Moreover, bank competition can positively enhance the"inclusive"effect of targeted RRR cuts to some extent. The impact of bank competition is more obvious in the time dimension,but has no regulatory effect in the regional dimension. Therefore,it is beneficial to appropriately increase the use of targeted RRR cuts and promote the development of the banking industry to adjust the economic structure and develop"inclusive finance. "Our analysis contributes to the literature by empirically testing the"inclusive"effect of the targeted RRR cuts using firm micro data by means of the propensity score matching and difference-in-differences methods.This firm-level study with the latest data on China's A-shares and the New OTC Market also makes up for the lack of micro-data support in the existing research. Finally,we introduce bank competition according to the mechanism of targeted RRR cuts,not only as a test of the relationship between bank competition and policy control,but also to further explore the factors influencing the "inclusive"effect of the targeted RRR cuts.Subsequent research could be extended in the following ways. First,research on the bank-level data would be useful,especially the relationship between the targeted RRR cuts and bank risk-taking based on credit channels and risk-taking channels. Second,starting with the signal transmission channel,researchers could analyze whether,when approaching the implementation standards of the targeted RRR cuts,the bank will significantly adjust its credit structure in accordance with the policy. Third,from the perspective of competition and concentration of the banking industry,banking market structures could be examined to find the best match for the monetary policy operation. Fourth,further study of the relationship between targeted RRR cuts and industrial restructuring is needed,and analysis of the dynamic adjustment between the targeted RRR cuts,"inclusive finance,"corporate credit,and investment.
After several decades of a"scale-type extensive growth"development pattern,China's economic development has reached a new normal in which the main policy objectives are to guide the transformation and upgrading of enterprises and the rational allocation of financial resources,and to resolve the contradictions in the economic structure. In this context,China's central bank has created innovative operating tools for its monetary policy,such as the targeted RRR cuts. This paper empirically tests the "inclusive"effect of the targeted RRR cuts and further explores their relationship with bank competition.We divide the orientation sector into agriculture-related enterprises and small and micro enterprises.Based on the macro data and enterprise credit data in Wind,the enterprise microdata in CSMAR,and the monetary policy data in the People's Bank of China for the 2011 to 2017 period,we use the propensity score matching( PSM) method to select the control group and the DID method to check whether implementation of the RRR cuts influenced the credit resources of the so-called "vulnerable sectors"such as agriculture and small and micro enterprises,thus achieving the intended "inclusive " effect. Furthermore, on account of the mechanism of the target RRR cuts,this paper introduces time and regional dimensions for bank competition into the empirical model,and then analyzes the impact of bank competition on the"inclusive"effect of the targeted RRR cuts. To exclude the interference of other policies,we choose the second half of 2011 as the policy implementation time point,and conduct a counterfactual test. The result is not significant,which indirectly indicates the robustness of the previous empirical results. In addition,we conduct a rigorous robustness test by changing the sample. For the sample of agriculture-related enterprises,we select agricultural enterprises from the A-shares,and find matching non-agricultural enterprises among the New OTC Market listed enterprises to obtain 27 agricultural-related samples. For small and micro-enterprise samples,we randomly select 78 large enterprises from China's A-shares and the New OTC Market as the control group. The results of the robustness test are not significant,thus confirming the conclusions of our main research.Our results show that China's targeted RRR cuts have an "inclusive "effect by promoting agricultural enterprises and small and micro enterprises to obtain credit resources. Moreover, bank competition can positively enhance the"inclusive"effect of targeted RRR cuts to some extent. The impact of bank competition is more obvious in the time dimension,but has no regulatory effect in the regional dimension. Therefore,it is beneficial to appropriately increase the use of targeted RRR cuts and promote the development of the banking industry to adjust the economic structure and develop"inclusive finance. "Our analysis contributes to the literature by empirically testing the"inclusive"effect of the targeted RRR cuts using firm micro data by means of the propensity score matching and difference-in-differences methods.This firm-level study with the latest data on China's A-shares and the New OTC Market also makes up for the lack of micro-data support in the existing research. Finally,we introduce bank competition according to the mechanism of targeted RRR cuts,not only as a test of the relationship between bank competition and policy control,but also to further explore the factors influencing the "inclusive"effect of the targeted RRR cuts.Subsequent research could be extended in the following ways. First,research on the bank-level data would be useful,especially the relationship between the targeted RRR cuts and bank risk-taking based on credit channels and risk-taking channels. Second,starting with the signal transmission channel,researchers could analyze whether,when approaching the implementation standards of the targeted RRR cuts,the bank will significantly adjust its credit structure in accordance with the policy. Third,from the perspective of competition and concentration of the banking industry,banking market structures could be examined to find the best match for the monetary policy operation. Fourth,further study of the relationship between targeted RRR cuts and industrial restructuring is needed,and analysis of the dynamic adjustment between the targeted RRR cuts,"inclusive finance,"corporate credit,and investment.
引文
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1为节省篇幅,倾向分值匹配结果未作报告,如有需要,可向作者索要。
2工业和信息化部、国家统计局、国家发展改革委、财政部《关于印发中小企业划型标准规定的通知》(工信部联企业[2011]300号)明确了不同行业的小微企业划分标准。由于从业人员难以获取有效数据,本文主要依靠营业收入进行划分,划分的基期安排在2013年下半年(即定向降准政策实施之前)。
1基于区域维度的银行竞争变量M,该指标采用樊纲等编制的中国各地区市场化指数中的金融业市场竞争指数(2009)来定义,包括两个子变量mc1和mc2:其中mc1为连续变量,mc2为类别变量。
1PR模型中,PL表示人力成本:应付职工薪酬/总资产,PF表示资本成本:固定资产折旧/固定资产净额,PK表示资金成本:利息支出/总存款。X为控制变量,包括总资产的对数X1和所有者权益/总资产X2。
2为节省篇幅,银行竞争H值未作报告,如有需求,可向作者索要。
1本文在实证分析时,首先对模型分别进行了F检验和Hausman检验,检验结果表明应该采用固定效应回归模型。为了解决可能存在的异方差问题,采用稳健标准误。同时,本文在回归时加入了年度虚拟变量。
1由于篇幅限制,虚拟实施检验结果未作报告,如有需求,可向作者索要。
2本文在回归时,先对连续变量进行了中心化处理得到H_c和mc1_c,以处理后的银行竞争变量构建交互项。
1表6第(1)列和第(3)列报告了使用金融业竞争指数连续变量mc1的回归结果,其中第(1)列针对涉农贷款,第(3)列针对涉小贷款。表6第(2)列和第(4)列报告了使用金融业竞争指数虚拟变量mc2的回归结果,其中第(2)列针对涉农贷款,第(4)列针对涉小贷款。
1为节省篇幅,本文未报告稳健性检验的实证结果,如有需要,可向作者索要。
[2]楚尔鸣、曹策和许先普,2016,《定向降准对农业经济调控是否达到政策预期》,《现代财经》第11期,第3~10页。
[3]邓柏峻、李仲飞和张浩,2014,《限购政策对房价的调控有效吗》,《统计研究》第11期,第50~57页。
[4]郭晔和赖章福,2010,《货币政策与财政政策的区域产业结构调整效应比较》,《经济学家》第5期,第67~74页。
[5]胡莹和仲伟周,2010,《资本充足率、存款准备金率与货币政策银行信贷传导——基于银行业市场结构的分析》,《南开经济研究》第1期,第128~139页。
[6]黄隽,2007,《银行竞争与银行数量关系研究——基于韩国、中国和中国台湾的数据》,《金融研究》第7期,第78~93页。
[7]冀志斌、周先平和董迪,2013,《银行集中度与银行业稳定性——基于中国省际面板数据的分析》,《宏观经济研究》第11期,第37~45页。
[8]黎齐,2017,《中国央行定向降准政策的有效性——基于双重差分模型的实证研究》,《财经论丛》第4期,第37~46页。
[9]李连发和辛晓岱,2009,《外部融资依赖、金融发展与经济增长:来自非上市企业的证据》,《金融研究》第2期,第73~86页。
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[11]李连发,2016,《提高金融服务实体经济效率:基于流动性理论的分析》,《郑州大学学报(哲学社会科学版)》第4期,第39~42页。
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[13]刘洋,2011,《不同银行业结构下的货币政策传导效果研究》,《统计与决策》第6期,第141~145页。
[14]刘伟和苏剑,2014,《“新常态”下的中国宏观调控》,《经济科学》第4期,第5~13页。
[15]刘洋和张浩禛,2013,《银行业市场结构对货币政策效果的影响》,《当代经济研究》第6期,第68~74页。
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[44]Swanson,E. T,L. Reichlin and J. H. Wright. 2011.“Let's Twist Again:A High-Frequency Event-Study Analysis of Operation Twist and Its Implications for QE2”,Brookings Papers on Economic Activity,(1):151~207.indicates the robustness of the previous empirical results. In addition,we conduct a rigorous robustness test by changing the sample. For the sample of agriculture-related enterprises,we select agricultural enterprises from the A-shares,and find matching non-agricultural enterprises among the New OTC Market listed enterprises to obtain 27 agricultural-related samples. For small and micro-enterprise samples,we randomly select 78large enterprises from China's A-shares and the New OTC Market as the control group. The results of the robustness test are not significant,thus confirming the conclusions of our main research.Our results show that China's targeted RRR cuts have an “inclusive”effect by promoting agricultural enterprises and small and micro enterprises to obtain credit resources. Moreover, bank competition can positively enhance the“inclusive”effect of targeted RRR cuts to some extent. The impact of bank competition is more obvious in the time dimension,but has no regulatory effect in the regional dimension. Therefore,it is beneficial to appropriately increase the use of targeted RRR cuts and promote the development of the banking industry to adjust the economic structure and develop“inclusive finance.”Our analysis contributes to the literature by empirically testing the“inclusive”effect of the targeted RRR cuts using firm micro data by means of the propensity score matching and difference-in-differences methods.This firm-level study with the latest data on China's A-shares and the New OTC Market also makes up for the lack of micro-data support in the existing research. Finally,we introduce bank competition according to the mechanism of targeted RRR cuts,not only as a test of the relationship between bank competition and policy control,but also to further explore the factors influencing the “inclusive”effect of the targeted RRR cuts.Subsequent research could be extended in the following ways. First,research on the bank-level data would be useful,especially the relationship between the targeted RRR cuts and bank risk-taking based on credit channels and risk-taking channels. Second,starting with the signal transmission channel,researchers could analyze whether,when approaching the implementation standards of the targeted RRR cuts,the bank will significantly adjust its credit structure in accordance with the policy. Third,from the perspective of competition and concentration of the banking industry,banking market structures could be examined to find the best match for the monetary policy operation. Fourth,further study of the relationship between targeted RRR cuts and industrial restructuring is needed,and analysis of the dynamic adjustment between the targeted RRR cuts,“inclusive finance,”corporate credit,and investment.
1为节省篇幅,倾向分值匹配结果未作报告,如有需要,可向作者索要。
2工业和信息化部、国家统计局、国家发展改革委、财政部《关于印发中小企业划型标准规定的通知》(工信部联企业[2011]300号)明确了不同行业的小微企业划分标准。由于从业人员难以获取有效数据,本文主要依靠营业收入进行划分,划分的基期安排在2013年下半年(即定向降准政策实施之前)。
1基于区域维度的银行竞争变量M,该指标采用樊纲等编制的中国各地区市场化指数中的金融业市场竞争指数(2009)来定义,包括两个子变量mc1和mc2:其中mc1为连续变量,mc2为类别变量。
1PR模型中,PL表示人力成本:应付职工薪酬/总资产,PF表示资本成本:固定资产折旧/固定资产净额,PK表示资金成本:利息支出/总存款。X为控制变量,包括总资产的对数X1和所有者权益/总资产X2。
2为节省篇幅,银行竞争H值未作报告,如有需求,可向作者索要。
1本文在实证分析时,首先对模型分别进行了F检验和Hausman检验,检验结果表明应该采用固定效应回归模型。为了解决可能存在的异方差问题,采用稳健标准误。同时,本文在回归时加入了年度虚拟变量。
1由于篇幅限制,虚拟实施检验结果未作报告,如有需求,可向作者索要。
2本文在回归时,先对连续变量进行了中心化处理得到H_c和mc1_c,以处理后的银行竞争变量构建交互项。
1表6第(1)列和第(3)列报告了使用金融业竞争指数连续变量mc1的回归结果,其中第(1)列针对涉农贷款,第(3)列针对涉小贷款。表6第(2)列和第(4)列报告了使用金融业竞争指数虚拟变量mc2的回归结果,其中第(2)列针对涉农贷款,第(4)列针对涉小贷款。
1为节省篇幅,本文未报告稳健性检验的实证结果,如有需要,可向作者索要。