会计专业独立董事选聘与盈余管理——基于人才资源的视角
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摘要
地方人才资源状况作为企业面临的重要外部宏观环境,其对企业独立董事治理的影响不容忽视。基于我国A股上市公司2007—2016年的数据,实证分析了选聘不同类型会计专业独董所产生的治理效果差异以及人才资源对会计专业独董选聘的影响。研究发现,本地会计专业独董比异地会计专业独董更能抑制公司的盈余管理;上市公司所在地人才资源丰富程度与选聘本地会计专业独董显著正相关。这表明,相对于聘用异地会计专业独董的公司,聘用本地会计专业独董的公司有更高的盈余质量,然而,受制于人才资源的约束,人才资源越匮乏地区的上市公司越可能聘请异地会计专业独董。进一步研究发现,在人才资源匮乏地区,交通便利性能提升异地会计专业独董所在公司的盈余质量;本省异地会计专业独董比外省异地会计专业独董更能抑制公司的盈余管理。
As an important external macro circumstance faced by companies,local talent resources have a great impact on the governance of independent directors. Based on the data of China's A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2016,this paper studies the differences in governance effects caused by the employment of independent directors with different types of accounting background and the impact of talent resources on the selection of independent directors with accounting background. It is found that local independent directors with accounting background can restrain earnings management more than non-local independent directors with accounting background. There is a significant positive correlation between the abundance of local talent resources of the listed company and the employment of local independent directors with accounting background. This shows that,compared with the companies employing non-local independent directors with accounting background,the companies employing local independent directors with accounting background have higher earnings quality. However,subject to the constraints of talent resources,listed companies in regions with more scarce talent resources are more likely to employ non-local independent directors with accounting background. Further research also reveals that in regions where talent resources are scarce,travel convenience can improve the earnings quality of the company which hires non-local independent directors. Non-local independent directors with accounting background from the same province as companies' location perform better in suppressing earnings management than the ones from different provinces.
As an important external macro circumstance faced by companies,local talent resources have a great impact on the governance of independent directors. Based on the data of China's A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2016,this paper studies the differences in governance effects caused by the employment of independent directors with different types of accounting background and the impact of talent resources on the selection of independent directors with accounting background. It is found that local independent directors with accounting background can restrain earnings management more than non-local independent directors with accounting background. There is a significant positive correlation between the abundance of local talent resources of the listed company and the employment of local independent directors with accounting background. This shows that,compared with the companies employing non-local independent directors with accounting background,the companies employing local independent directors with accounting background have higher earnings quality. However,subject to the constraints of talent resources,listed companies in regions with more scarce talent resources are more likely to employ non-local independent directors with accounting background. Further research also reveals that in regions where talent resources are scarce,travel convenience can improve the earnings quality of the company which hires non-local independent directors. Non-local independent directors with accounting background from the same province as companies' location perform better in suppressing earnings management than the ones from different provinces.
引文
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[16]董红晔.财务背景独立董事的地理邻近性与股价崩盘风险[J].山西财经大学学报,2016(3):113-124.
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[21]KHANNA V,KIM E H,LU Y. CEO Connectedness and corporate fraud[J]. The Journal of Finance,2015,70(3):1203-1252.
[22]黄海杰,吕长江,丁慧.独立董事声誉与盈余质量——会计专业独董的视角[J].管理世界,2016(3):128-143.
[23]费孝通.乡土中国[M].北京:北京大学出版社,2016.
[24]彭正银,廖天野.连锁董事治理效应的实证分析——基于内在机理视角的探讨[J].南开管理评论,2008(1):99-105.
[25]COVAL J D,MOSKOWITZ T J. Home bias at home:local equity preference in domestic portfolios[J]. The Journal of Finance,1999,54(6):2045-2073.
[26]姜怀宇,徐效坡,李铁立. 1990年代以来中国人才分布的空间变动分析[J].经济地理,2005(5):702-706.
[27]周美华,林斌,罗劲博,等. CEO组织认同能抑制盈余管理吗?——来自中国上市公司调查问卷的证据[J].南开管理评论,2018(4):93-108.
[28]黄张凯,刘津宇,马光荣.地理位置、高铁与信息:来自中国IPO市场的证据[J].世界经济,2016(10):127-149.
[2]ROSENSTEIN S,WYATT J G. Outside directors,board independence,and shareholder wealth[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1990,26(2):175-191.
[3]AGRAWAL A,KNOEBER C R. Firm performance and mechanisms to control agency problems between managers and shareholders[J]. Journal of Financial&Quantitative Analysis,1996,31(3):377-397.
[4]胡勤勤,沈艺峰.独立外部董事能否提高上市公司的经营业绩[J].世界经济,2002(7):55-62.
[5]WANG C,XIE F,ZHU M. Industry expertise of independent directors and board monitoring[J]. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,2015,50(5):929-962.
[6]JOHNSON J L. Boards of directors:a review and research agenda[J]. Journal of Management,1996,22(3):409-438.
[7]申富平,韩巧艳,赵红梅.我国上市公司独立董事制度实施现状分析——以河北、浙江、云南和甘肃省为例[J].审计研究,2007(3):53-57.
[8]崔凯,孙慧琳.对我国独立董事选任机制的思考[J].中国行政管理,2005(7):57-59.
[9]孙亮,刘春.公司为什么聘请异地独立董事?[J].管理世界,2014(9):131-142.
[10]PORTA R L,LOPEZ-DE-SILANES F,SHLEIFER A,et al. Law and finance[J]. Journal of Political Economy,1998,106(6):1113-1155.
[11]PORTA R L,LOPEZ-DE-SILANES F,SHLEIFER A. Corporate ownership around the world[J]. The Journal of Finance,1999,54(2):471-517.
[12]樊纲,王小鲁,张立文,等.中国各地区市场化相对进程报告[J].经济研究,2003(3):9-18.
[13]MALLOY C J. The geography of equity analysis[J]. The Journal of Finance,2005,60(2):719-755.
[14]BAE K H,STULZ R M,TAN H. Do local analysts know more? A cross-country study of the performance of local analysts and foreign analysts[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2008,88(3):581-606.
[15]黄芳,李高奎,郭耕愚.独立董事本地化能提高公司盈余质量吗?——来自2010—2013年A股上市公司经验证据[J].经济与管理,2016(5):85-91.
[16]董红晔.财务背景独立董事的地理邻近性与股价崩盘风险[J].山西财经大学学报,2016(3):113-124.
[17]曹春方,林雁.异地独董、履职职能与公司过度投资[J].南开管理评论,2017(1):16-29.
[18]谭劲松.独立董事“独立性”研究[J].中国工业经济,2003(10):64-73.
[19]HWANG B H,KIM S. It pays to have friends[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2009,93(1):138-158.
[20]罗进辉,黄泽悦,朱军.独立董事地理距离对公司代理成本的影响[J].中国工业经济,2017(8):101-120.
[21]KHANNA V,KIM E H,LU Y. CEO Connectedness and corporate fraud[J]. The Journal of Finance,2015,70(3):1203-1252.
[22]黄海杰,吕长江,丁慧.独立董事声誉与盈余质量——会计专业独董的视角[J].管理世界,2016(3):128-143.
[23]费孝通.乡土中国[M].北京:北京大学出版社,2016.
[24]彭正银,廖天野.连锁董事治理效应的实证分析——基于内在机理视角的探讨[J].南开管理评论,2008(1):99-105.
[25]COVAL J D,MOSKOWITZ T J. Home bias at home:local equity preference in domestic portfolios[J]. The Journal of Finance,1999,54(6):2045-2073.
[26]姜怀宇,徐效坡,李铁立. 1990年代以来中国人才分布的空间变动分析[J].经济地理,2005(5):702-706.
[27]周美华,林斌,罗劲博,等. CEO组织认同能抑制盈余管理吗?——来自中国上市公司调查问卷的证据[J].南开管理评论,2018(4):93-108.
[28]黄张凯,刘津宇,马光荣.地理位置、高铁与信息:来自中国IPO市场的证据[J].世界经济,2016(10):127-149.