数据生产和数据造假:基于社会学视角的分析
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摘要
本文从数据生产的过程入手,追溯统计数据造假现象的缘由。首先,误差扰动、接近值模拟和数据质量的资源投入水平,解释了数据生产过程中的数据失真。其次,从统计作为一项国家事业发展演进的角度来说,国家能力和国家意图有时会影响统计数据的真实性和全面性,并引发出制度诱导的造假行为。第三,从个体层面的理性选择过程来看,当违法收益显著高于违法成本时,数据造假现象就成了经济领域中最常见的越轨行为之一。治理数据造假的潜力也和个体的动机和理性计算直接相关:当我们把纯粹物质性的理性计算模型扩展到纳入社会成本和群体动力机制之后将会发现,社会交往网络和同伴群体内部伦理声誉的受损,将会比物质违法成本的提高更能约束数据造假行为。最后,本文还讨论了数据造假问题的直接伦理损失和技术在治理数据造假过程中所扮演角色的两面性。
This paper starts with the process of data production and traces the causes of statistical data fraud. First, the level of resource in error perturbations, proximity simulations, and data quality explains the distortion of data during data production. Second, from the perspective of statistics as a country's cause development, national capabilities and state intentions sometimes may affect the authenticity and comprehensiveness of statistical data, and lead to institutional-induced fraud. Third, from the perspective of the rational selection process at the individual level, when the illegal income is significantly higher than the illegal cost, the data fraud phenomenon becomes one of the most common deviant behaviors in the economic field. The potential of falsifying data is also directly related to individual motivation and rational calculation: when we extend the purely material rational computing model to include social costs and group dynamics, we will find that social networks and peer ethics cancause damage to internal ethical reputations, and this damage canbe a greater constraining force to prevent data fraud than the increase in material illegal costs. Finally, the paper also discusses the direct ethical loss of data fraud as well as the duality of the role of technology in the governance of data fraud.
This paper starts with the process of data production and traces the causes of statistical data fraud. First, the level of resource in error perturbations, proximity simulations, and data quality explains the distortion of data during data production. Second, from the perspective of statistics as a country's cause development, national capabilities and state intentions sometimes may affect the authenticity and comprehensiveness of statistical data, and lead to institutional-induced fraud. Third, from the perspective of the rational selection process at the individual level, when the illegal income is significantly higher than the illegal cost, the data fraud phenomenon becomes one of the most common deviant behaviors in the economic field. The potential of falsifying data is also directly related to individual motivation and rational calculation: when we extend the purely material rational computing model to include social costs and group dynamics, we will find that social networks and peer ethics cancause damage to internal ethical reputations, and this damage canbe a greater constraining force to prevent data fraud than the increase in material illegal costs. Finally, the paper also discusses the direct ethical loss of data fraud as well as the duality of the role of technology in the governance of data fraud.
引文
[1]韩志明.统计数字的多维解读及其理论诠释[J].统计与决策,2007,(20).
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[5]李金昌.浅论政府统计的本质[J].中国统计,2005,(12).
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[28]朱秀君.政府统计中造假与治假的博弈分析[J].数量经济技术经济研究,2000,(7).
[29]李金昌.完善统计体制——从统计职能与政府统计本质说起[J].中国统计,2018,(1).
[30]张子雨.网络直播平台陷入烧钱战数据造假存隐忧[J].广西质量监督导报,2016,(8).
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[32]陈全森.网络播放平台数据造假行为的法律规制[D].南昌:南昌大学法学硕士论文,2018.
[33]Brobeck,Stephen,Robert N.Mayer.Watchdogs and Whistleblowers:A Reference Guide to Consumer Activism[M].Greenwood,2015.
[34]Scott,James.The Moral Economy of the Peasant:Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia[M].Yale University,1977.
[35]郑也夫.信任论[M].北京:中国广播电视出版社,2006.
[36]叶宸辰,唐斌斌,刘林平.中国贫困县划分精度商榷——基于夜间灯光数据的检验[J].中国农业大学学报(社会科学版),2018,(5).
[37]曾冰,邱志萍.省际交界区经济网络空间结构研究——以湘鄂赣的灯光数据为实证[J].财经科学,2018,(11).
[38]赵晓伟,孟治国,郑兴明,范俊甫,王庆帅.夜间灯光数据的东三省城市群发展特征研究[J].测绘科学,2018.
[39]钟洋,林爱文.长江中游城市群空间格局演变及优化研究——基于DMSP/OLS夜间灯光数据的方法[J].水土保持研究,2018,(6).
[40]周翼,谢保鹏,陈英,赵鸿雁,裴婷婷.基于灯光数据的中国县域城镇建设用地产出效率时空演变特征[J].地球信息科学学报,2018,(12).
[41]张滔,唐宏.基于Google Earth Engine的京津冀2001—2015年植被覆盖变化与城镇扩张研究[J].遥感技术与应用,2018,(4) .
[42]徐康宁,陈丰龙,刘修岩.中国经济增长的真实性:基于全球夜间灯光数据的检验[J].经济研究,2015,(9).
[2]Groves,Robert M.,Floyd J.Fowler.Survey methodology[M].Wiley,2009.
[3]刘奇.从统计史的角度看现代统计学[J].财经理论与实践,1999,(6).
[4]邱东.别样的政治工具[J].中国统计,2004,(10).
[5]李金昌.浅论政府统计的本质[J].中国统计,2005,(12).
[6][法]米歇尔·福柯.安全、领土与人口:法兰西学院演讲系列:1977—1978[M].钱翰,杨薇薇译.上海:上海人民出版社,2010.
[7][英]安东尼·吉登斯.民族—国家与暴力[M].胡宗泽,赵力涛,王铭铭译.北京:生活·读书·新知三联书店,1998.
[8]蔡光柏,刘英杰.历史人口的统计范围和资料处理[J].西北人口,1983,(3).
[9][日]池田温.中国古代籍账研究[M].龚泽铣译.北京:中华书局,1984.
[10]黄仁宇.万历十五年[M].上海:三联书店,1997.
[11]张丽萍.GDP:中国实践中的双重建构[D].北京:北京大学社会学系博士论文,2018.
[12]赵胜忠.数字与权力[D].南京:南京大学政治学博士论文,2012.
[13]周黎安.中国地方官员的晋升锦标赛模式研究[J].经济研究,2007,(7).
[14]周飞舟.锦标赛体制[J].社会学研究,2009,(3).
[15]周雪光.基层政府间的“共谋现象”——一个政府行为的制度逻辑[J].开放时代,2009,(12).
[16]李军林,张威,刘思璇.统计造假治理与改革路径研究——基于监督博弈模型的分析[J].区域经济评论,2015,(6).
[17]Malinowski,Bronislaw.Argonauts of the Western Pacific[M].Waveland,1988.
[18]Mauss,Marcel.The Gift:The Form and Reason for Exchange in Archaic Societies[M].W.W.Norton,2000.
[19]Becker,Gary S.The Economic Approach to Human Behavior[M].Chicago:The Chicago University Press,1978.
[20]Popkin,Samuel L.The Rational Peasant:The Political Economy of Rural Society in Vietnam[M].Berkeley:University of California Press,1979.
[21]Beccaria,Cesare.An Essay on Crime and Punishment[M].Forgotten Books,2017.
[22]Olson,Mancur.The Logic of Collective Action:Public Goods and the Theory of Groups[M].Harvard University,1971.
[23]雷宏.对统计数据造假行为的博弈理论分析[J].集美大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2005,(2).
[24]雷宏,雷春.我国统计数据造假的成因及治理对策探讨[J].求实,2005,(2).
[25]叶青,李丽媛.政府统计的博弈研究[J].统计与决策,2014,(8).
[26]朱新玲,黎鹏.非对称信息下统计造假行为的博弈分析[J].统计与决策,2007,(15).
[27]李卫东,刘似臣.统计数据质量的博弈分析[J].中国统计,2005,(4).
[28]朱秀君.政府统计中造假与治假的博弈分析[J].数量经济技术经济研究,2000,(7).
[29]李金昌.完善统计体制——从统计职能与政府统计本质说起[J].中国统计,2018,(1).
[30]张子雨.网络直播平台陷入烧钱战数据造假存隐忧[J].广西质量监督导报,2016,(8).
[31]艾小雅.我国网络直播平台的发展现状与前瞻研究[J].新媒体研究,2018,(4).
[32]陈全森.网络播放平台数据造假行为的法律规制[D].南昌:南昌大学法学硕士论文,2018.
[33]Brobeck,Stephen,Robert N.Mayer.Watchdogs and Whistleblowers:A Reference Guide to Consumer Activism[M].Greenwood,2015.
[34]Scott,James.The Moral Economy of the Peasant:Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia[M].Yale University,1977.
[35]郑也夫.信任论[M].北京:中国广播电视出版社,2006.
[36]叶宸辰,唐斌斌,刘林平.中国贫困县划分精度商榷——基于夜间灯光数据的检验[J].中国农业大学学报(社会科学版),2018,(5).
[37]曾冰,邱志萍.省际交界区经济网络空间结构研究——以湘鄂赣的灯光数据为实证[J].财经科学,2018,(11).
[38]赵晓伟,孟治国,郑兴明,范俊甫,王庆帅.夜间灯光数据的东三省城市群发展特征研究[J].测绘科学,2018.
[39]钟洋,林爱文.长江中游城市群空间格局演变及优化研究——基于DMSP/OLS夜间灯光数据的方法[J].水土保持研究,2018,(6).
[40]周翼,谢保鹏,陈英,赵鸿雁,裴婷婷.基于灯光数据的中国县域城镇建设用地产出效率时空演变特征[J].地球信息科学学报,2018,(12).
[41]张滔,唐宏.基于Google Earth Engine的京津冀2001—2015年植被覆盖变化与城镇扩张研究[J].遥感技术与应用,2018,(4) .
[42]徐康宁,陈丰龙,刘修岩.中国经济增长的真实性:基于全球夜间灯光数据的检验[J].经济研究,2015,(9).